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The financial crash of 2007-2008 brought words like ‘capitalism’, ‘capital’, and ‘socialism’ 
back in vogue. However, the discipline of international law remains to reflect systematically 
on its relationship with the ways in which wealth and power are produced and distributed.  
This thesis examines the relationship between international law, imperialism and capitalism 
through historical lenses, arguing that the diffusion of capitalist relations is a core function of 
international law. Analysing the nineteenth-century ‘standard of civilisation’, I contend that 
transforming (semi)colonised polities into centralised, territorialised states operating as 
guarantors of capitalist relations of production was at the core of the concept. 
Extraterritoriality in Japan and the Ottoman Empire serves as a case study to verify this 
statement and to highlight the transformative functions of the ‘civilising mission’. The 
Mandates System of the League of Nations established a system of partial internationalisation 
of this transformative process, while attempting to safeguard the long-term interests of capital 
through the introduction of limited forms of welfarism.  
My thesis then argues that decolonisation assumed the form of national statehood due to the 
transformative functions of nineteenth-century international law. Therefore, the attempt to 
push for a New International Economic Order was both a challenge to contemporary 
international law and a reaffirmation of its role in promoting capitalist relations on a global 
level. These reformist attempts did not succeed, however, and a new model of capitalist 
accumulation, neoliberalism, became hegemonic after 1990. The quantitative expansion and 
qualitative refinement of international law during that period was intrinsically linked to the 
neoliberal aversion to democratic and mass politics. The neoliberal reconstruction of Iraq in 
the aftermath of the 2003 invasion is interpreted in the light of this reality. In so doing, my 
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Although I studied jurisprudence, I pursued it as a subject subordinated to philosophy and history. 
K. Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy  
It is hard to believe that it was only twenty years ago when Anthony Carty was pointing out that, in 
international law, ‘no systematic undertaking is usually offered of the influence of colonialism in the 
development of the basic conceptual framework of the subject’.1 In the course of the two intervening 
decades, significant historiographical work has been undertaken, and colonialism is no longer the 
absolute ‘blind spot’ of the discipline.2 Crucially, much of this historiographical research has been 
part of a broader critical challenge to international law scholarship. The thesis at hand is situated 
within this broader context, offering a historical account of international law spanning from the 
second half of the nineteenth century to the end of the official occupation of Iraq in 2004. 
Incidentally, it was also in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq that Martti Koskenniemi was 
asking ‘What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx?’3 Even though in the intervening 
years the relevant literature has grown exponentially,4 the question remains partly unanswered. The 
                                                          
1 A. Carty, Was Ireland Conquered? International Law and the Irish Question (Pluto Press, 1996), 5.  
2 Amongst many: G.N. Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in 
International Law (University of Minnesota Press, 1996); D. Kennedy, ‘International Law and the Nineteenth 
Century: History of an Illusion’ (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law 445; D.P. Fidler, ‘The Return of 
the Standard of Civilization’ (2001) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 137; M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (CUP, 2001); A. Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP, 2005); M. Craven, ‘What Happened to Unequal 
Treaties? The Continuities of Informal Empire’ (2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law, 335; C. 
Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Pluto Press, 2006); J. T. Gathii , 
‘Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law’ (2007) 54 Buffalo Law Review 1013; N. Berman, Passion 
and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism and International Law (Brill, 2011); S. Pahuja, Decolonising 
International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (CUP, 2011); M. Craven, 
‘Colonialism and Domination’ in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law (OUP, 2012); M. Craven, ‘Between Law and History: The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 
and the Logic of Free Trade’ (2015) 3 London Review of International Law 31.  
3 M. Koskenniemi, ‘What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx?’ (2004)17 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 229.  
4 See, for example: A. Carty, ‘Marxism and International Law: Perspectives for the American (Twenty-First) 
Century?’ (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 247; Miéville, (supra note 2); S. Marks, ‘International 




present thesis intervenes in the evolving historiographical debate about international law, applying 
precisely such a Marxian lens. In a nutshell, in the following chapters, I will attempt a history of 
international law as an integral part of the history of the capitalist mode of production. Before doing 
so, a number of theoretical and methodological clarifications are warranted. I will proceed in three 
steps. First, it is essential to present the core features of Marxian thought, especially regarding the 
capitalist mode of production. Secondly, I will attempt to detect these aspects of Marxism most 
relevant to international law and, thirdly, I will briefly visit recent influential historiographical works 
and show how my approach adds to our understanding of international law.  
The capitalist mode of production: a very brief introduction 
In a recent contribution, Martti Koskenniemi problematises international lawyers’ (understandable) 
state-centrism, while both mapping and urging for a re-appreciation of private law and private actors, 
such as property regimes and colonial companies.5 Indeed, both private law and, importantly, private 
power remain largely untheorised and unproblematised by the discipline at a time when wealth 
inequality and corporate power have reached possibly 
historically unprecedented levels.6 At the same time, crisis looms both in the Global North and the 
Global South, in the form of financial crashes, state collapse, mass displacement and rapid 
environmental degradation. This thesis asserts that re-reading the history of international law through 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Judicial Activism and the Commodity-Form Theory of International Law’ (2007) 18 European Journal of 
International Law 199; S. Marks (ed.), International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies (CUP, 
2008); A. Rasulov, ‘“The Nameless Rapture of the Struggle”: Towards a Marxist Class-Theoretic Approach to 
International Law’ (2008) 19 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 243; R. Knox, ‘Marxism, International 
Law, and Political Strategy’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 413; G. Baars, ‘“Reform or 
Revolution”? Polanyian versus Marxian Perspectives on the Regulation of the Economic’ (2011) 62 Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 415; R. Knox, ‘Strategy and Tactics’ (2012) 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 
193; M. Neocleous, ‘International Law as Primitive Accumulation: Or, the Secret of Systematic Colonization’ 
(2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 941; G. Baars, ‘Capitalism's Victor's Justice? The Hidden 
Stories behind the Prosecution of Industrialists Post-WWII’ in K.J. Heller, G. Simpson (eds), The Hidden 
Histories of War Crimes Trials (OUP, 2013); R. Knox, ‘Valuing Race? Stretched and the Logic of Imperialism’ 
(2016) 4 London Review of International Law 81; G. Baars, ‘“It’s Not Me, It’s the Corporation”: The Value of 
Corporate Accountability in the Global Political Economy’ (2016) 4 London Review of International Law 127.  
5 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Expanding Histories of International Law’ (2016) 56 American Journal of Legal History 
104.  
6 See: Oxfam, ‘An Economy for the 1%: How Privilege and Power in the Economy Drive Extreme Inequality 
and How This Can Be Stopped’ 210 Oxfam Briefing Paper (Oxfam, 18 January 2016), available at: 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp210-economy-one-percent-tax-havens-
180116-en_0.pdf [last accessed 23 June 2016]. 




Marxian lenses could be useful in at least two ways. First, Marxian theory could help us to bridge the 
gap between emphasis on the state and appreciation of private power, private law and private actors. It 
does so by conceptualising the state, not as a Schmittian sovereign with its own will, but as a 
crystallisation of class relations of power. At the same time, my specific approach to Marxian theory 
emphasises the importance of public power in the constitution, reproduction and legitimisation of a 
specific form of private power, class relations. Secondly, the deployment of Marxian lenses enables us 
to move beyond ‘false contingencies’7 and to analyse the role of international law both in the 
construction of power and in the spread of dispossession, displacement and poverty while 
acknowledging that these are two sides of the same coin.8 Within the Marxian trajectory, wealth 
accumulation can only occur because of the exploitation and dispossession inflicted upon specific 
parts of the world, be it domestic working classes or colonial territories. Therefore, analysing 
international law through the prism of Marxism enables us to appreciate and explain the centrality of 
the state for the discipline, without surrendering unconditionally to the fetishism of the international 
legal form that generally obscures private relations of power and domination. At the same time, 
acknowledging the fundamentally competitive structure of society elucidates the inherent biases of the 
discipline and warrants a responsible, positional thinking about its future and its functions.  
Before moving to the specific question of the relationship between colonialism, capitalism and 
international law, we need to take a step back and discuss a concept central to Marx’s thought: the 
mode(s) of production (Produktionsweise). Marx begins with a fairly simple observation: ‘In the 
social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations that are indispensable 
and independent of their will, relations of production that correspond to a definite stage of 
development of their material productive forces.’9 Simply put, for human societies to maintain their 
                                                          
7 ‘[W]e need also to be on guard against what might correspondingly be termed false contingency. For just as 
things do not have to be as they are, so too history is not simply a matter of chance and will. The concept of 
false contingency refers to this idea, and to the limits and pressures, tendencies and orientations, over-
determination and determination in the last instance, that shape both realities and possibilities.’ S. Marks, ‘False 
Contingency’ (2009) 62 Current Legal Problems 1, 10.  
8 ‘Considered from the standpoint of a concern with that problem, Collier's analysis is notably lacking in 
attention to the relational dimensions of global poverty. This is epitomised in the notion of the “bottom billion” 
itself—a number that is relative (to the top or next billion), and yet, as a concept, curiously autonomous and 
non-relational: these poorest of the poor are simply there, a feature on our analytical landscape. And just as in 
his work all eyes are on the bottom billion and what we might do to help them, so too in human rights circles the 
focus is on the victims and on the rights and correlative obligations they may assert. Those who benefit from 
current arrangements remain comfortably out of view.’ S. Marks, ‘Human Rights and the Bottom Billion’ 
(2009) 9 European Human Rights Law Review 37, 48-49.  
9 K. Marx, ‘Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’ in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected 
Works (Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), Volume 1, 182.  




existence, they need to produce the goods and services necessary to this end. However, this 
production does not happen in a social void; neither is it a neutral, technical process. Rather, it 
happens within a web of relations of power that exist independently of the will and consciousness of 
individuals. The specific form of these power relations is not eternal or unchanged. In fact, Marx 
identified in the same text four different modes of production: ‘the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and 
modern bourgeois modes of production’.10 In the second volume of Capital, Marx further elaborated 
on the concept: ‘[w]hatever the social form of production, workers and means of production always 
remain its factors. But if they are in a state of mutual separation, they are only potentially factors of 
production. For any production to take place, they must be connected.’11 Marx went on to mention 
that, specifically in the capitalist mode of production (CMP), ‘the separation of the free worker from 
his means of production is the given starting point, and we have seen how and under what conditions 
the two come to be united in the hands of the capitalist’.12 This immediately adds a third factor to the 
basic structure of a mode of production: that of the non-worker who exploits the labour-power of 
labourers.  
These factors of production (labourers/direct producers, means of production and appropriators of 
surplus labour) only meaningfully exist in their mutual entanglement. Balibar argues that despite 
certain conceptual and linguistic confusions, we can detect two different ways in which the factors of 
production relate to each other simultaneously in each and every mode of production.13 First, there is 
the formal property connection, as traditionally understood by lawyers. This relationship implies the 
intervention of an individual or a collectivity, who, by the exercise of economic ownership, controls 
access to the means of production and the reproduction of productive forces. Secondly, there is the 
connection or real or material appropriation, which designates the relation of the labourer to the 
means of production. The distinction between the two modes of articulation becomes clearer if we 
look at historic modes of production, such as feudalism. In feudalism, serfs were tied to the land, 
which was the most important means of production of the time. This bond inflicted severe restrictions 
upon the freedom of the serfs, but also meant that the product of their labour could not be 
automatically deprived from them, precisely because of this formal property relation that tied them to 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 183.  
11 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Penguin, 1992) Volume 2, 120.  
12 Ibid.  
13 ‘Now we find that production itself is a complex reality, i.e., that nowhere is there a simple totality, and we 
can give a precise meaning to this complexity: it consists of the fact that the elements of the totality are not 
linked together once, but twice, by two distinct connexions. What Marx called a combination is not therefore a 
simple relationship between the “factors” of any production, but the relationship between these two connexions 
and their interdependence.’ E. Balibar, ‘On the Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism’ in L. Althusser and E. 
Balibar, Reading Capital (B. Brewster tr) (NLB, 1970), 215 (emphasis in original).  




the land as much as it tied the land to them. Therefore, feudal lords could not automatically 
appropriate the product of the serfs’ labour. Instead, a complex mechanism of juridical, ideological 
and military compulsion was in place that safeguarded the extraction of the serfs’ surplus-labour and 
its appropriation by the feudal lords. In short, a clear distinction was in place between property 
relations and relation of real appropriation.  
In accordance with Ellen Meiksins Wood, this thesis will define the CMP as ‘the system in which 
goods and services, down to the most basic necessities of life, are produced for profitable exchange, 
where even human labour-power is a commodity for sale in the market, and where all economic actors 
are dependent on the market’.14 In other words, the CMP is this mode of production where production 
is organised around exchange and profit. In her definition, Wood also hints at the elementary 
relationship at the heart of the CMP: the capitalist exploitation of immediate producers. The 
distinctive characteristic of the CMP is that, unlike other, historical modes of production, labourers 
are entirely separated from the means of production. Unlike serfs or slaves, labourers under the CMP 
are not legally, formally linked to the means of production or to the owners of those means in any 
way. Hence, they are not only legally free, since they are not tied to a feudal lord, slave-owner, or to a 
plot of land, but they are also free of substantive property. When this is the case, for labourers to 
survive they need to sell the only commodity in their disposal: their labour-power, their ability to 
perform labour.15 This is a freedom that alleviates immediate producers from the violence of slavery 
or serfdom only to submit them to the inner logic of the market. This remark is crucial in order to 
comprehend Marx’s anti-capitalism. For Marx, the CMP appears to equip individuals with choice and 
freedom, while in reality subjects them to the inflexible imperatives of the market. The labourer is 
obliged to sell her labour-power in order to survive, while the capitalist is geared in the constant 
pursuit of surplus-value if they want to survive as capitalists. In this sense, Marx’s critique of the 
CMP was, at least partly, anchored to a quest for human freedom.16  
                                                          
14 E. Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (Verso, 2002), 2.  
15 ‘For the conversion of his money into capital, therefore, the owner of money must meet in the market with the 
free labourer, free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labour-power as his own 
commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for 
the realisation of his labour-power.’ Marx concluded Volume One of the Capital with the brief articulation of an 
explicit ‘modern theory of colonisation’: K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1954, 1977), Volume 1, 166.  
16 The tragic events of the twentieth century surrounding the authoritarian turn of communism make it easy to 
forget that Marx described communism as ‘the realm of freedom’: ‘[T]he realm of freedom actually begins only 
where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of 
things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production.’ K. Marx, Capital: A Critique to Political 
Economy (International Publishers, 1977) Volume 3, 820.  




Within the CMP, labourers are separated from the means of production in a way that is historically 
unprecedented. Therefore, their only means of survival is to sell their labour-power. In the absence of 
personal ties of allegiance or subordination to capitalists, the way to do so is through entering into 
contractual relationships in the market. For contracts to be conceivable in the first place, the 
participants in the labour process need to recognise themselves as free and equal and therefore able to 
exchange commodities in this market-place. In this context, labour-power is fully commodified and, 
more generally, wealth presents itself as ‘an immense accumulation of commodities’.17 Crucially, the 
separation of labourers from the means of production (the property connection we saw above) has 
direct implications for the real appropriation connection. Since the capitalist owns, by definition, the 
means of production and since (s)he also purchases the labour-power of immediate producers, ‘the 
labour-process is a process between things that the capitalist has purchased, things that have become 
his property. The product of this process belongs, therefore, to him.’18 In other words, in the context 
of the CMP both legal property and real appropriation are concentrated at the hands of the capitalist. 
In turn, this has at least two significant implications. First, the capitalist assumes unprecedented 
control over the labour-process and the labourers are fully submitted to the organisation of the labour-
process chosen by the capitalist. Hence, labourers lose control both over the product of their labour 
and of the labour-process itself. Secondly, this economic structure means that direct compulsion is no 
longer necessary for the extraction of surplus-labour. No personal relationship of force and hierarchy 
exists between capitalists and labourers.  
A small clarification is necessary before we move on: even though in international law, as well as in 
everyday parlance, ‘exploitation’ has connotations of immorality when used in reference to inter-
personal relations,19 for Marx it meant essentially that the dominated class, which in the case of the 
CMP is the working class, produces not only the means for its own subsistence, but also for the ruling 
class. As it has been established above, what is purchased by the capitalist, is the human capacity for 
labour (labour-power) for a specific period of time (for example, for one day). If labour-power is sold 
for a day, the next question that arises is to determine the length of the working day. Marx argued 
that, in fact, under the CMP the labourer does not just work the number of hours necessary to produce 
goods of value equivalent of the value of her sold labour-power. Rather, the ordinary length of the 
working day includes a number of hours during which the labourer works to produce value not for 
herself, but for the capitalist who has bought her labour. In the course of this time, the labourer is not 
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producing to sustain herself, but rather she is producing value for the capitalist. However, since the 
labourer receives a wage for the sum-total of the one day she has worked, it is not readily evident that 
the working-day is divided into two parts: one in which she works to create commodities the value of 
which are necessary for her survival, and a number of hours in which she creates value without being 
paid for it: ‘The wage-form thus extinguishes every trace of the division of the working-day into 
necessary labour and surplus-labour, into paid and unpaid labour. All labour appears as paid labour.’20 
In this context, the difference between the newly added value and the value of labour-power is the 
surplus value. By moving from the ‘value of labour’ to the ‘value of labour-power’ Marx managed to 
escape the fact that ‘[t]he exchange between capital and labour at first presents itself to the mind in 
the same guise as the buying and selling of all other commodities’.21 However, labour-power and 
capital are two fundamentally incommensurable commodities, and they need to be treated as such, 
even if the ‘emptiness’ of the legal form of commodity exchange conceals this reality. On the one 
hand, labour-power is a very special commodity to the extent that its application, labour, creates 
value:  
our friend, Moneybags, must be so lucky as to find, within the sphere of circulation, in the market, a 
commodity, whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual 
consumption, therefore, is itself an embodiment of labour, and, consequently, a consumption of value. 
The possessor of money does find on the market such a special commodity in capacity for labour or 
labour-power.22  
Conversely, capital ‘is essentially the command over unpaid labour. […] The secret of the self-
expansion of capital resolves itself into having the disposal of a definite quantity of other people’s 
unpaid labour.’23 Therefore, it is a fundamental interest of capital to expand the working day and to 
intensify the pace of the labour-process, since this the only method to maintain its existence as a self-
valorising value. However, as labour history of the nineteenth century or of modern China vividly 
shows, this is a process fundamentally destructive for labourers, whose physical and mental condition 
deteriorates rapidly. Crucially, this process is not due to individual capitalists’ ‘greediness’ or other 
objectionable moral qualities. Competition between individual capitals compels capitalists to follow 
this logic without even realising it. If they do not, they will sooner or later go bankrupt and, therefore, 
stop being capitalists in the first place. Marx’s critique of the CMP was not directed against the 
character of specific individuals, but it was fundamentally a critique of the very structure of the 
capitalist society.  
The ‘secret’ of primitive accumulation, imperialism and international law 
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So far we have described the elementary structure and functions of the CMP. However, the link 
between these stipulations and international law, or even imperialism and colonialism, is yet to be 
established. To do so, we will turn our attention to Part VIII of Capital, which is devoted to ‘the so-
called primitive accumulation’.24 Since the early stages of his analysis, Marx clearly pointed out the 
existence of social classes; in this specific instance, the existence of masses in possession of nothing 
else but their ability to work was not a natural phenomenon:  
One thing, however, is clear – Nature does not produce on the one side owners of money or commodities, 
and on the other men possessing nothing but their own labour-power. This relation has no natural basis, 
neither is its social basis one that is common to all historical periods. It is clearly the result of a past 
historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a whole series of 
older forms of social production.25 
Marx rejected any conceptualisation of the CMP as an ahistorical or natural phenomenon. The CMP 
did not always exist; neither did it peacefully, automatically, emerge from the gradual expansion of 
the market. As he pointed out, it was through a process of violence, brute force and systematic 
dispossession in the context of which the state and (international) law played a pivotal role that the 
CMP came into existence. In Marx’s own, graphic language: ‘[i]f money, according to Augier, 
“comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek”, capital comes dripping from head 
to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt’.26 The creation of free labourers presupposes the radical 
separation of large masses from the means of production. As always, Marx utilised the specific case 
of Britain as the model capitalist state of his time, but always with the purpose of drawing general 
conclusions.27 In a series of vivid descriptions, Marx sketched the violent process of enclosures when 
peasants were violently driven out of their land and they were banned access to the ‘commons’: the 
forests, rivers and hunting sides that provided them with timber, fish or meat and other essential 
means of subsistence, partly decoupling their survival from their subjection to wage-labour. Around 
the same time, draconian laws were put in place punishing harshly those who refused to submit 
themselves to the discipline of wage-labour by becoming beggars, vagabonds or thieves. Pursuant to 
the 1572 and 1597 Vagabonds Acts, being an unlicensed beggar was punishable by death, while the 
1597 Act introduced the measure of penal transportation overseas. Simultaneously, legislation was 
introduced that prescribed maximum (but not minimum) wages that enabled and accelerated capitalist 
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accumulation, while attempts to form labour unions were treated as a ‘heinous crime’.28 It was 
through these draconian methods that ‘men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of 
subsistence, and hurled as free and “unattached” proletarians on the labour-market’.29 
What becomes evident from Marx’s account of primitive accumulation is that the emergence of the 
CMP was far from a smooth, natural or spontaneous process, with people ‘realising’ the supposed 
advantages of the free-market. In fact, state-sanctioned violence and law were central to the process. 
Far from the self-sustaining commodity-form that constitutes the basis of Pashukanian accounts of 
international law, including Miéville,30 capital as a social relationship needs the mediation of law both 
to come into existence and to be reproduced. Unlike the all-against-all violence implicit in the 
commodity-form that Miéville argues to be the basis of the legal order,31 the violence of primitive 
accumulation was centralised and all but chaotic. In fact, it was this very violence that created a social 
structure where individuals possess fundamentally incommensurable commodities: ‘Political 
economy confuses on principle two very different kinds of private property, of which one rests on the 
producers’ own labour, the other on the employment of the labour of others.’32  
As has been argued above, the role of the state and law is integral in the emergence and reproduction 
of the capitalist relations of production. This, indeed, is less clear if we take as the focal point of our 
analysis the ‘commodity-form’ and ignore Marx’s actual contributions to political economy and the 
philosophy of history, including his labour theory of value, his explanation of capitalist exploitation 
and the unpacking of the internal logic of capital. Undeniably, the generalisation of the commodity-
form is a significant and integral part of this process. However, the attempt to derive the ‘nature’ of 
(international) law exclusively from the commodity-form attaches Marxian theories of law to the 
seemingly obvious realities of the circulation sphere, ignoring the conceptually unbreakable ties 
between the sphere of circulation and the sphere of production in Marx. Interestingly, Marx expressly 
warned against such an approach: ‘[i]t is typical of the bourgeois horizon, moreover, where business 
deals fill the whole of people’s mind, to see the foundation of the mode of production in the mode of 
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commerce corresponding to it, rather than the other way round’.33 In fact, such an approach aligns 
Marxist theories of law to traditional liberal theories which attempt to derive public law from private 
law,34 and specifically in the sphere of international law, argue that there is essentially a homology 
between domestic and international law.35 Therefore, Pashukanian interpretations of law assume that 
the commodity-owner is somehow a natural figure and not one that emerges through bureaucratic and 
legal techniques of individualisation and, crucially, the separation of individuals from the means of 
production and their traditional (legal) links to family, and community. This is a point to which I will 
return in Chapters 1 and 2 of the present thesis. 
Before moving on though, it is essential to stress that Marx did not exclusively focus on Britain when 
discussing primitive accumulation. In fact, colonialism features centrally in his  engagement with the 
primitive accumulation, also echoing his (and Engels’) growing interest in revolutionary politics 
outside Western Europe.36 As Mark Neocleous has pointed out, spatial expansionism under the CMP 
was an issue of great concern to Marx for a number of years.37 However, post-colonial theorists such 
as Edward Saïd, who argues that Marx’s thought was profoundly Euro-centric, exclusively focus on 
his 1853 article on the British rule in India,38 ignoring both his subsequent articles and, crucially, his 
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analysis of colonialism in Capital. Here, Marx did not attempt to explain the specificities of the 
historical development of colonialism. In other words, writing on the eve of the ‘scramble for Africa’ 
and the revival of European expansionism, Marx did not try to explain why, at that specific moment, 
this historical development occurred. Rather, his analysis focused on the social implications of 
colonialism once it is in full swing. What becomes clear is that, for him, colonialism was another 
manifestation of primitive accumulation. Unlike primitive accumulation in Europe, which was largely 
complete at the time, primitive accumulation in the colonies was in fact happening in front of his 
readers’ eyes: ‘[t]here [in the colonies] the capitalist regime everywhere comes into collision with the 
resistance of the producer, who, as owner of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour to 
enrich himself, instead of the capitalist’.39 Once again, Marx stressed that money, machines or 
otherwise accumulated wealth are not capital, for ‘capital is not a thing, but a social relation between 
persons, established by the instrumentality of things’.40 For this social relationship to be established, 
the existing modes of production in the colonies had to be dismantled, in order for free labourers to 
arise and submit themselves to the process of capitalist accumulation. In Marx’s late thought, 
colonialism clearly arises not simply as a process of alien domination and extraction of natural 
resources for the enrichment of the colonial metropolis. Rather, what clearly distinguishes ‘modern’ 
colonialism from ancient practices of conquest and pillage were its profoundly transformative 
functions. In Capital colonialism is clearly conceptualised as another distinct step in the process of 
primitive accumulation, as a method for the further diffusion of the CMP outside the space in which it 
first triumphed.41 It is worth recalling that the closing sentence of the first volume of Capital reads as 
follows:  
The only thing that interests us is the secret discovered in the new world by the Political Economy of the 
old world, and proclaimed on the house-tops: that the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, 
and therefore capitalist private property, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of self-
earned private property; in other words, the expropriation of the labourer.42 
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The presumption underpinning this thesis is that, in order to understand fully the functions of 
international law, we need to accept that the world was not colonised by the amorphous entity known 
as ‘the West’, but by capital. As was the case with the overall process of primitive accumulation, this 
was a process characterised by incredible levels of brutality and violence, a story truly ‘written in the 
annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire’.43 My thesis invites us to re-conceive international law 
as precisely written in such ‘letters of blood and fire’. In this effort, I am consciously not focusing on 
specific atrocities of the colonial encounter and the role of international law in legitimising them. It is 
rather the systemic, structural violence of primitive accumulation and capitalist expansion and the 
central role of international law in these processes that is the centre of my attention.  
Structure, contribution and originality 
A number of methodological clarifications is necessary before we proceed. This thesis does not claim 
to have detected the essence of international law; nor does it contend that the only significant function 
of international law is its profound contribution in the diffusion and consolidation of the capitalist 
relations of production. To begin with, both within individual social formations and on an 
international level, class relations are by no means the only aspect of social conflicts, and despite 
vulgar interpretations of Marxism, the mode of production is only determinative of the social life in 
the final instance. Racial hierarchies, gendered and heteronormative oppression, and clashes between 
more and less powerful states are just some aspects of social conflict and oppression in which 
international law is deeply implicated. Recently, Knox has argued that Marxist accounts of 
international law need to conceptualise race and value as co-constitutive.44 This is a fruitful line of 
inquiry and needs to be further pursued. Indeed, the racist and sexist assumptions of international law 
are too well-documented to be ignored.45 Even though my thesis will not always expressly invoke 
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these contributions, this should not be read as a rejection. Rather, it should be seen as a mere 
consequence of the fact that I posed a different question to myself: the contours of the relationship 
between international law and the CMP. If a holistic history and theory of international law is even 
possible, this contribution does not claim to be one.  
Secondly, even though my argument aspires to take seriously the Marxian argument about the 
primacy of the class struggle for historical development,46 reasons of brevity have limited direct 
references to the class struggle and resistance to international law as a means of diffusion of capitalist 
relations of production. This is not to imply that international law, colonialism or the CMP somehow 
remained unopposed; quite the contrary. In fact, as the case of extraterritoriality, which is examined in 
Chapter 2,47 shows, class confrontations domestically were of paramount importance for the ultimate 
success of extraterritoriality and unequal treaties. However, a careful reader will notice that there is a 
striking omission to this Marxian history of international law: the October Revolution, and the 
profound challenges it posed to the bourgeois world, including the challenges it posed to international 
law. This omission is linked to the methodological choice of discussing a ‘success story’: the story 
which made the CMP the dominant mode of production on a global level, and how international law 
is determined by its profound involvement in this process. Discussing the role of the October 
Revolution and the USSR within international legal history would therefore require a shift of focus. 
The USSR essentially appears in this thesis at the moment of its collapse, to the extent that it opened 
the way for the global emergence of a specific variant of the CMP: neoliberal capitalism. More 
broadly, since my analysis covers a period extending from the second half of the nineteenth century to 
August 2004, this will necessarily be a partial, fundamentally incomplete, historical account. In the 
next section of this introduction, I will, however, show that neither was the selection of my case-
studies arbitrary, nor did it involve a highly selective approach to my materials that would simply 
ratify my conclusions.  
Thirdly, a clarification needs to be made about the role of individuals and their conscious actions, 
decisions and initiatives in my historical account. Following the Marxian methodology, ‘individuals 
are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of 
particular class-relations and class-interests’.48 Otherwise put, this is not a history of particular 
international lawyers, diplomats or bureaucrats and their conscious designs about international law 
and international institutions. Even though the history of ideas, and of professional practices and 
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ethics, is on the rise within international legal scholarship,49 this thesis does not address this question. 
In fact, my arguments rest on the materialist presumption that, in the final analysis, international legal 
arguments prevail not because of their internal coherence or elegance, but because of the material 
interests that support them. This is not to say that the history of ideas or sociology of professions are 
unimportant pursuits for international lawyers, but only to state that ideas cannot be decoupled from 
the material world within which they develop. It flows naturally from this position that the perception 
of the individuals involved in my legal histories of the meaning and significance of their actions is not 
the defining criterion when determining this very meaning. To put it bluntly, there might well be a 
large gap between what historical actors think they are doing and what they are actually doing. 
Relatedly, this approach does not require the attachment of blame or the accusation of dishonesty 
against the actors involved in the historical processes examined. International legal history is 
emphatically not a history of malicious ‘cover ups’ in which the actors involved somehow knew that 
they were promoting the interests of global capitalism and consciously manufactured a story to 
legitimise their mission and obscure their ‘real’ motives. From James Lorimer to Samantha Power, 
even the most important actors of international law are individuals who are always already embedded 
in legal ideology, and to hegemonic ideology more broadly.50 Due to inherent linguistic constraints, 
occasionally my argument will appear to assign primary functions to specific individuals within my 
story, and it might read as if they, with their conscious choices and designs, who determined the 
history of international law. The reader is kindly requested to read these passages in the light of the 
present comments.  
Written in a time of multiple, inter-locking crises, the thesis at hand is also structured around crises, 
both within the discipline, and also political and economic crises. It is these crises that define the outer 
temporal limits of my inquiry. In the world of global politics and economics, three major crises define 
my narrative. First, my narrative is delimited by the largely forgotten crisis of European capitalism 
after 1873 and its links to the ‘revival’ of the colonial project during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. Even though today this is remembered as a period of expansion and growth for capitalism, 
contemporaries had an acute sense of crisis. Agriculture witnessed a decline in profits, which in turn 
led to numerous peasant revolts between 1879 and 1894 across Europe, while falling prices depressed 
the profit rate of business too.51 Protectionism, economic concentration and economic modernisation 
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were on the rise, and so was imperialism. Even though it would be reductionist to establish a simple 
‘cause and effect’ relationship between the 1870s Great Depression and the intensification of 
imperialism and colonialism, ‘it is quite undeniable that the pressure of capital in search of more 
profitable investment, as of production in search of markets, contributed to policies of expansion-
including colonial conquest’.52 The second crisis that marks my narrative is the 1973 ‘oil crisis’ and 
the intensification of competition between different paradigms as for what would succeed the 
collapsing post-war arrangement. Finally, my narrative is delimited by the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
with its profound implications for American hegemony, security and stability in the Middle East, and 
crucially, for the legitimacy of the capitalist model that emerged triumphant from the 1973 crisis: 
neoliberalism.  
Conversely, it will be argued that these were also moments of crisis, or at the very least, of profound 
transformation for international law. First, both the gradual collapse of sixteenth-century Christian 
universalism as a normative basis for international law, and the rapid colonisation of the globe, led to 
a profound transformation of the discipline. This transformation was marked by the emergence of the 
‘standard of civilisation’, which in varying forms dominated the discipline at least until 1945. Even 
though the seeds for the second disciplinary crisis were already laid in this period, they grew rapidly 
during the process of decolonisation, and came to full maturity with the official launch of the ‘New 
International Economic Order’ in 1973. Even though, at the time, the loss of control over the UN by 
the US and other Western, capitalist states appeared to be the main crisis evolving, another, much 
more fundamental crisis was looming. By the end of the 1960s, the Keynesian model of managing 
capitalism in the West through class compromise and state interventionism had entered a prolonged—
and as we know, in retrospect, fatal—crisis. David Harvey summarised this trend as follows:  
Signs of a serious crisis of capital accumulation were everywhere apparent. Unemployment and inﬂation 
were both surging everywhere, ushering in a global phase of “stagﬂation” that lasted throughout much of 
the 1970s. Fiscal crises of various states (Britain, for example, had to be bailed out by the IMF in 1975–
6) resulted as tax revenues plunged and social expenditures soared.53  
The situation was aggravated by the 1973 oil crisis that endangered the supply of low-cost energy and 
revealed the shaky foundations of the then prevailing model. Social struggles intensified, and 
eventually capital emerged triumphant from the process through the construction of neoliberalism as 
the new hegemonic paradigm of capitalist accumulation. As will be argued in Chapter 6 of this 
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thesis,54 the global emergence of neoliberalism triggered a profound, if incomplete, transformation of 
international law, the antinomies of which brought it to a breaking point in the aftermath of the Iraq 
invasion, when a thorough and intense programme of neoliberalisation of the Iraqi economy was 
implemented under the auspices of international law and institutions. 
The structure of the present thesis is as follows. In Chapters 1 and 2, I revisit ‘misremembered’55 
nineteenth-century international law and the ‘standard of civilisation’ as its central concept. In 
Chapter 1, I focus on the emergence of the concept during the nineteenth century, as well as the 
material and disciplinarian reasons that led to this emergence. Attempting to locate the meaning and 
social function of the standard, I examine the interpretations offered by four major scholars in the 
field: Gerrit Gong, Martti Koskenniemi, Anthony Anghie and China Miéville. Acknowledging the 
merits of each approach, I argue that all four scholars fail to account for the profoundly 
transformational character of the ‘standard of civilisation’. Even though it is undeniably true that 
civilisation established a hierarchy between political communities, it also carried the promise of its 
own undoing. However, for this to happen, peripheral societies needed to be transformed, in order to 
comply with the different parameters of the standard. In the final section of Chapter 1, entitled A way 
forward: capitalism as civilisation, I offer one of my main contributions to our understanding of 
international law by arguing that compliance with the ‘standard of civilisation’ essentially meant 
transformation into a capitalist state. Examining the different requirements for a polity to be 
considered ‘civilised’, such as the abolition of slavery, the protection of individual rights, or the 
construction of a centralised, bureaucratic state, I suggest that these were distinct steps in the 
completion of primitive accumulation in the (semi)colonies and the establishment and reproduction of 
capitalist relations of production.  
In Chapter 2, I verify this claim by turning to nineteenth-century extraterritoriality and comparing its 
function and social implications in two social settings where it was applied: Japan and the Ottoman 
Empire. First, I show that extraterritoriality, that is the exception of imperial powers’ subjects from 
the jurisdiction of semi-colonial states where they resided, was understood at the time as a clear 
example of the ‘civilising mission’ of international law, therefore establishing the suitability of my 
case study. Further to this, I examine separately the process of introduction and, more importantly, the 
abolition of extraterritoriality in Japan and the Ottoman Empire. My general conclusion is that, for 
extraterritoriality to be abolished, semi-peripheral societies needed to be transformed into territorially-
bound, centrally-organised states that guaranteed capitalist relations of production through different 
legal devices, such as the protection of individual rights, or the development of commercial law, and 
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through the monopolisation of legitimate violence. Crucially, the process of abolition of 
extraterritoriality reveals a dialectical move at the heart of nineteenth-century international law: the 
more international law succeeded in its ‘civilising mission’ by transforming archaic societies into 
centralised, capitalist nation-states, the more decisively it paved the way for its own demise by 
creating polities to which direct colonial or imperial domination were unacceptable.  
This process of the gradual demise of nineteenth-century international law also sets the background 
for Chapter 3 of the thesis, which focuses on the Mandate System of the League of Nations. 
Conceptualised here as a re-invention of the relationship between international law, colonialism and 
the CMP, the Mandate System was the solution opted for in the management of the colonies of the 
powers defeated in World War I. It is argued that the Mandate System needs to be situated within the 
‘civilisation’ lineage of international law not simply because the relevant article of the League 
Covenant (Article 22) expressly mentioned the ‘sacred mission of civilisation’, but because the 
System assumed similar functions of social engineering supportive of the CMP as extraterritoriality 
during the previous century. Further, this chapter focuses on the independence of Iraq under the 
League and the criteria specified by the Permanent Mandates Committee as necessary for the 
emancipation of a mandated territory. The argument put forward is that, as the moralistic language of 
nineteenth-century international law was fading, it became evident that the criteria for statehood under 
the Mandate System were institutional and economic, rather than ‘cultural’ or religious. Finally, it is 
argued that the System was not immune from the welfarist trend of its time. However, this should not 
be seen as a negation of the implication of international law in the spread of the CMP, but rather as its 
reaffirmation, since welfarism was an attempt to guarantee the long-term viability of capitalist 
development in the face of unsustainable capitalist exploitation.  
As was mentioned already, a tension between social transformation on the one hand, and the 
continuity of the Empire on the other, was at the heart of nineteenth-century international law. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis is centred on this tension. Revising the process of decolonisation, I am arguing 
that international law and decolonisation existed in a dialectical relationship. As has been argued 
already, the social transformation brought about through the ‘civilising mission’ gave rise to the very 
same material realities that sustained anti-colonial movements and eventually rendered nineteenth-
century international law unintelligible. At the same time, however, by shaping material realities on 
the ground, international law had set the boundaries within which decolonisation was to take place. In 
other words, the fact that self-determination came to be synonymous with statehood was at least partly 
attributable to the very functions of international law. To verify this argument, my chapter examines 
the initiative to establish a New International Economic Order, its profound and honest engagement 
with international law and its failure, which is attributed to different legal and extra-legal reasons. 
NIEO’s commitment to international law also meant its entrapment was within the well-known 
oscillation of international law between ‘apology’ and ‘utopia’, while its emphasis on development 




incorporated numerous assumptions of hierarchy and social engineering of nineteenth-century 
international law.  
The collapse of NIEO, as well as the collapse of the USSR ten years later, paved the way for the 
global hegemony of neoliberalism, which is the focus of Chapter 5 of the thesis. In the first part of this 
chapter, I map the core characteristics of neoliberalism as the prevalent model of capitalist 
accumulation in the twenty-first century. Particular emphasis is paid on neoliberals’ thought about the 
international sphere and international law, arguing that, for a number of neoliberal thinkers, such as 
Hayek or Roepke, internationalisation of economic governance was a necessary step for dismantling 
the Keynesian state and establishing a neoliberal state. Drawing from this conclusion, I analyse the 
qualitative and quantitative expansion of international territorial administration (ITA) after 1990 as a 
manifestation of neoliberal thinking in the fabric of international law and international institutions. 
Using the examples of East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, I argue that international 
legal techniques were once more of paramount importance in the process of social engineering, in 
order to manufacture a specific form of capitalist state, the neoliberal state.  
This conclusion leads me to my final chapter, which discusses the occupation and reform of Iraq in 
the aftermath of the infamous 2003 invasion. Challenging the conviction that the problem at the time 
was the USA’s unilateralism and their lack of respect for international law, I show how international 
law and institutions were profoundly implicated in the neoliberal reform of Iraq. Analysing UN 
Security Council Resolution 1483, which acknowledged the fact of the occupation and set the 
parameters for its conduct, I argue that it is far from obvious that these reforms were illegal under the 
international law of the time. To do so, I focus both on the deeply contradictory wording of the 
Resolution and on the developments international law underwent after 1990, arguing that even though 
the nominal structure of international law remained the same, a distinctive form of neoliberal legality 
was in the making, and the reform undertaken by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) need to 
be situated within this process. Mapping the profound economic and political reforms applied in Iraq, 
I document not only how the occupiers attempted to create a ‘model’ neoliberal state, but also how 
ITA and other international legal developments since 1990 formed the blueprint for these reforms. 
Concluding my analysis, I contend that the occupation of Iraq confirms the continuing relevance of 
my conceptualisation of international law as an enabling method of capitalist accumulation (primitive 
or not) and capitalist state-building.  
To summarise, this thesis offers a new interpretation of the history of international law from the 
middle of nineteenth century to 2004. Adopting a Marxian methodology, my research examines the 
profound implication of international law in the global spread of the CMP. Acknowledging the 
importance of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) theorists, such as Anghie, for 
our understanding of international law, I show how the ‘standard of civilisation’ was essentially 




linked with capitalist transformation rather than with some elusive conception of ‘Western culture’. 
Further, my conception departs from Pashukanian accounts of international law to the extent that, 
unlike Miéville, I consider the state to be essential to the establishment and reproduction of the 
capitalist mode of production. Correspondingly, this thesis does not conceptualise the relationship 
between the (capitalist) nation-state and international law as a zero-sum game. By showing that 
international law and institutions have operated consistently at least since the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century as a method of capitalist state-building, my work puts into question cosmopolitan 
understandings of international law as a limitation to the ‘excesses’ of the nation-state by exposing 
how the two have been co-constitutive and linked to the process of capitalist expansion. In this sense, 
my thesis provides an original contribution not only to the history of international law, but also to 
legal theory and to our doctrinal understanding about the relationship between state sovereignty and 
international law.  




Chapter 1: Decoding ‘civilisation’: nineteenth-century international law and capitalist 
expansion  
Communism and nihilism are prohibited by the law of nations. 
James Lorimer, La doctrine de reconnaissance. Le fondement du droit international 
Coincidence and historical irony are mostly in the eye of the beholder. Still, there is a pleasant 
symmetry to the fact that 1873 was a year of paramount importance, both for the discipline of 
international law and for (European) capitalism.1 In that year, while European capitalism was entering 
a period of crisis and stagnation, the Institut de droit international was founded in Ghent, aspiring to 
become an organ of the ‘legal conscience/consciousness of the civilised world.’2 This chapter 
scrutinises international legal theory and practice of the nineteenth century with a view to link them to 
the rapid consolidation and expansion of capitalist relations that took place during that period. 
Therefore, 1873 functions not as an actual point of rupture, but rather as a symbol of the increasingly 
symbiotic nature of the two. My inquiry spans from the mid-nineteenth century, which was marked by 
the rise of the ‘unequal treaties’, the gradual revival of imperial projects and the establishment of the 
first university chairs in international law,3 until the outbreak of World War I that gave the nineteenth-
century international legal order a serious - yet not fatal - blow. In doing so, I argue that, since its (re-
)birth, international law has been integral in the process of spreading, consolidating and legitimising 
the capitalist relation of production across the globe. Ι do so by offering a re-interpretation of the 
‘standard of civilisation’, arguing that conscious intentions, notwithstanding the function of the 
standard, were linked to the transformation of ‘semi-civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ peripheral societies 
into centralised, modern, capitalist states.  
Despite common narratives, the nineteenth century was not solidly statist and voluntarist. The 
community of civilised states, rather than unfettered state sovereignty, constituted the basis of 
international legal obligation. In this context, the concept that provided coherence to the discipline 
throughout the nineteenth century was that of ‘the standard of civilisation’. Four major approaches to 
                                                          
1 The irony did not escape Koskenniemi: ‘The great economic slump had started in Europe in the very year the 
Institut was established. [...] As Bluntschli noted, in parts of civilised Europe the condition of workers and 
peasants was worse than that of the slaves of antiquity.’ M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The 
Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (CUP, 2004), 58.  
2 ‘Il a pour but de favoriser le progrès du droit international : a) En travaillant à formuler les principes généraux 
de la science de manière à répondre à la conscience juridique du monde civilisé’, Article 1 Statute of the 
Institute of International Law (Ghent, 1873), available at: http://justitiaetpace.org/status.php?lang=fr (original in 
French).  
3 A chair in international law was only established in Oxford in 1859 and in Cambridge in 1866. See: 
Koskenniemi (supra note 1), 33. 




the concept will serve as landmarks: first, I will focus on Gerrit Gong, whose work in the 1980s was 
decisive in reviving scholarly interest in the area.4 Secondly, Martti Koskenniemi’s approach to the 
concept will be presented and critiqued to the extent that it is directly linked to his wider, influential 
historical project on the nineteenth century, but also an integral part of his defence of a ‘culture of 
formalism’.5 Thirdly, I will engage with Anthony Anghie’s argument, since it represents a canonical 
work of the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) tradition.6 Fourthly, the view of 
China Miéville will be analysed to the extent that his work provides the most comprehensive Marxist 
history of international law so far.7 Finally, having discussed the merits, but also the limits of these 
approaches, I will offer my own interpretation of the standard. Despite indeterminacies and 
inconsistencies, the pre-conditions for a political community to be considered ‘civilised’ significantly 
overlapped with the institutions necessary for the functioning of a capitalist economy. Hence, the 
standard performed a number of functions: at a primary level, it excluded certain political 
communities from being subjects of international law. Nonetheless, this exclusion was not definite. 
Rather, through comprehensive reform, these political communities could acquire ‘civilised’ status. 
My argument is that to do so, non-Western political communities should dissolve feudal or ‘Asian’ 
structures of production and push through the marketisation of social life, along with all the 
institutions essential for the sustainment and reproduction of capitalist relations. In other words, the 
argument put forward here is that, besides being a concept organising hierarchy between political 
communities, the ‘standard of civilisation’ was a means for social transformation towards capitalism 
on a global scale.  
1:1 Beyond popular ‘illusions’: community, subjectivity and civilisation in nineteenth-
century international law 
The nineteenth century was one of major historical transformations. After a century of relative 
economic and political stagnation, Europe and large parts of the rest of the world, including China and 
India, started moving again towards greater state centralisation, the demise of multicultural empires 
and the advancement of market relations.8 This trend towards market expansion was particularly felt 
                                                          
4 G. W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (OUP, 1984).  
5 Koskenniemi (supra note 1).  
6 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP, 2004). 
7 C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Pluto Press, 2006). 
8 ‘Assuming that the ideas and practices of the early modern state - call it, after Thomas Hobbes’s thought-
minded treatise of 1651 “Leviathan 1.0” - arose in the seventeenth century, then fell into difficulty in the later 
eighteenth century, they were reconstituted after 1850 as “Leviathan 2.0”.’ C.S. Maier, Leviathan 2.0: Inventing 
Modern Statehood (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 15.  




in agricultural settings, where revolts were commonplace.9 The American and the French revolutions 
symbolised this trend, but should not be treated as isolated phenomena. Under the influence of the 
French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution erupted. After years of struggle, the island declared its 
independence (1804) and was recognised by France in 1825, albeit under harsh conditions.10 The 
emergence of an independent state governed by people of African descent was a sui generis, yet 
important, moment for international law. This trend was followed by the gradual decolonisation of 
South America11 and, finally, by the independence of Liberia in 1847 and the recognition of its 
independence by the US fifteen years later (1862). These events are important since they indicate that, 
by the mid-nineteenth century, there was an established trend towards national statehood which was 
not confined within Europe.  
Moreover, the defeat of Napoleon and the establishment of the Holy Alliance in 1815 brought relative 
stability in Europe.12 Within this context the British economy flourished,13 reaching unmatched levels 
of industrial predominance.14 Crucially, in 1858 Britain terminated the rule of the British East India 
                                                          
9 ‘All the traditional restraints on the pervasive market mentality, whether religious teachings, feudal privileges, 
the inscribed status of nobles or churches, or the statutory village control of common lands, were under pressure. 
Population growth, the cost of military and colonial competition, and the burdens of alleviating poverty 
ratcheted up the demands for extracting resources and money from the countryside. […] But the result was 
agrarian unrest, and there was a cluster of major rural revolts in the 1770s and 1780s.’ Ibid., 43-44.  
10 ‘However, recognition came with a catch. Under the ﬁrst Article of the Ordinance, Haiti was to open itself up 
to trade from all nations, with an equal tariff for all, apart from France, which would only pay half the standard 
rate. The second, most controversial, Article demanded that Haiti pay 150 million francs to compensate for the 
loss of slave property occasioned by the revolution.’ R. Knox, ‘Valuing Race? Stretched Marxism and the Logic 
of Imperialism’ (2016) 4 London Review of International Law 81, 119.  
11 For the legal implications of the events, see: W. G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Walter de 
Gruyter, 2000), 497-502.  
12 The narrative that the Holy Alliance managed to maintain a century of peace in Europe is more of a 
conservative post factum myth than an accurate historical account of the facts. After all, the order the Alliance 
aspired to establish was already challenged in 1821 with the outbreak of the Greek Revolution, while the 
conservative domestic alliances that preserved the status quo in Europe were unstable too: ‘The domestic 
restoration was breaking down by the 1830s and 1840s. International arrangements collapsed in the 1850s and 
1860s.’ Maier (supra note 8), 49.  
13 Nonetheless, this did not result in prosperity for the working masses, the destitution of which also reached 
unprecedented levels. See: F. Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Penguin, 2009).  
14 ‘Even the USA, at the peak of her global supremacy in the early 1950s - and representing a share of the world 
population three times as large as Britain in 1860 - never reached 53 per cent of iron and steel production and 49 
per cent of its textile production.’ E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1987), 47.  




Company over India by transferring it to Queen Victoria.15 This was a turning point for international 
law, since it signalled the renewal of imperialism, which would reach unprecedented levels between 
1875 and 1914. The unification of Germany meant that a new power also demanded its position in 
colonial expansion and, also, that Britain’s economic supremacy was to be challenged. In this context, 
the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) attempted to rationalise the ‘scramble for Africa’ by imposing 
certain rules, so as to prevent a direct clash between imperial powers in the course of their 
expansion.16 Colonial expansion and imperialism coincided with, and were partly caused by, the 
prolonged, yet forgotten, crisis of European capitalism that became evident around 1873. Prices fell 
rapidly as European economies were shrinking due to deflation, and domestic market expansion was 
not fast enough to rectify the falling profit rates.17 Even though today the link between colonial 
expansion and capitalist crisis is rarely raised in international legal historiography, especially outside 
Marxian accounts,18 as late as 1951, Hannah Arendt considered the connection fairly straightforward:  
Imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against national limitations 
to its economic expansion. The bourgeoisie turned to politics out of economic necessity; for if it did not 
want to give up the capitalist system whose inherent law is constant economic growth, it had to impose 
this law upon its home governments and to proclaim expansion to be an ultimate political goal of foreign 
policy.19 
When it comes to the nineteenth century, it is not only the historical facts that are misremembered. 
The standard narration of international law of the time is centred around the concept of positivism, 
which in this context is taken to mean that state sovereignty was considered to be the exclusive basis 
of international legal obligation, while legal theorists were struggling to resolve the riddle of legal 
order between sovereigns.20 In fact, this historical narrative is inaccurate to such a degree that David 
                                                          
15 ‘The Government of the Territories now in the possession or under the Government of the East India 
Company, and all powers in relation to the Government vested in or exercised by the said Company in trust for 
Her Majesty, shall cease to be vested in or exercised by the said Company; and all territories in the possession or 
under the government of the said Company, and all rights vested in or which if this Act had not been passed 
might have been exercised by the said Company in relation to any Territories, shall become vested in Her 
Majesty, and be exercised in her name.’ Section 1, Government of India Act 1858. 
16 For the Berlin Conference and its contested significance for international law of the time, see: M. Craven, 
‘Between Law and History: The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the Logic of Free Trade’ (2015) 3 London 
Review of International Law 31; Miéville (supra note 7), 250-56; Koskenniemi (supra note 1), 121-27. 
17 ‘Conversely, deflation cut into the rate of profit. A large expansion of the market could more than offset this - 
but in fact the market did not grow fast enough.’ Hobsbawm (supra note 14), 37.  
18 A notable exception is Koskenniemi, though he raises the point briefly and does not follow it through. See 
Koskenniemi (supra note 1), 58.  
19 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (George Allen and Unwin, 1967) 126. 
20 Amongst many: ‘Closely allied to the consent-based view of international law was the firm insistence of most 
positivists on the centrality of the State as the principal (or even the sole) subject of international law, ie as the 




Kennedy has called it ‘an illusion’,21 since the foundational questions and statist assumptions 
commonly attributed to nineteenth-century international lawyers in fact did not arise until around the 
time of the Lotus case:  
It was only in the 1927 Lotus case, we should remember, that international law first asked itself whether 
the international legal order was fundamentally one of sovereign freedom or constraint, the Permanent 
Court concluding that: “restrictions upon the independence of States cannot… be presumed,” 
inaugurating the period of what now seems extreme positivist doctrine. It is interesting, however, that the 
Court came to this foundational conclusion (in a sharply divided opinion) not because the international 
legal order inherited from the nineteenth century was well known as one of sovereign freedom, but 
because whichever way you looked at it, as freedom or as constraint, it would still be necessary to ground 
either the particular rule or the overall system of constraint in sovereign consent, from which permission 
could then be granted.22 
In a nutshell, it was society, rather than unlimited sovereignty, that was seen as the logical 
precondition for international law: ‘It was at this time that jurists and thinkers generally appreciated 
that Europe consisted of a number of states which were independent, and, at the same time, formed a 
community.’23 Westlake further observed that ‘consent is the immediate source of international law 
[…] but only the consent of a society can establish rules’,24 while Lorimer identified ‘the real power 
of the whole community subject to the law, as exhibited in and measured by its rational will’ as the 
primary source of positive law.25  
What is true when it comes to mainstream narratives about the discipline at the time is that the idea of 
a universally applicable set of laws linked to Christian morality, as articulated for example by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
exclusive bearer of rights and duties on the international plane. States were now perceived as possessing what 
came to be called “international personality” - and, crucially, as also possessing a set of fundamental rights that 
must be protected at all times. Foremost of these fundamental rights was the right of survival or self-
preservation.’ S. C. Neff, ‘A Short History of International Law’ in M. D. Evans (ed.), International Law (4th 
edn, OUP, 2014), 14; ‘I have noted above that, until the 19th century, international law constituted a core of legal 
standards that attributed great latitude to States in the conduct of their foreign affairs, and substantially refrained 
from regulating most matters relating to international intercourse.’ A. Cassese ‘States: Rise and Decline of the 
Primary Subjects of the International Community’ in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of the History of International Law (OUP, 2012), 60; ‘According to positivist theory, the obligation to obey 
international law derived from the consent of individual States.’ J. Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP, 2006), 13.  
21 D. Kennedy, ‘International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion’ (1996) 65 Nordic Journal 
of International Law 385.  
22 Ibid., 402. 
23 J. A. Carty, ‘19th Century Textbooks and International Law’ (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, Jesus College 
Cambridge, 1972), xxvi. 
24 J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (Elibron Classics, 2005), 81.  
25 J. Lorimer, The Institutes of Law: A Treatise of the Principles of Jurisprudence as Determined by Nature 
(Elibron Classics, 2005, 1880), 291.  




Vitoria,26 was on the decline. The idea that law was an indispensable part of communal life and 
expressed the particular traits and organisation of each people gradually arose in Europe, especially 
under the influence of the ‘historical school’ of law.27 However, this acceptance of the historicity of 
law did not mean that all legal systems were seen as equally valid. The different ‘stages’ of human 
development were in clear hierarchical relation to each other. Therefore, the laws expressing the 
collective spirit of ‘superior’ races, states or civilisations were by definition of higher validity.  
Therefore, the community of states described above was not inclusive or universal. Rather, as Anghie 
has pointed out, nineteenth-century international society was fundamentally exclusionary: ‘[t]his is an 
important shift: for implicit in the idea of society is membership; only those states accepted into 
society and which agree upon principles regulating their behaviour can be regarded as belonging to 
society’.28 It was the concept of civilisation that provided the criteria for which political communities 
were part of this international society and which were outside its realm. Even though the concept 
gained indisputable prominence within the discipline as a whole,29 Lorimer is commonly considered 
the ‘father’ of the concept. For him, humanity was divided in three distinct spheres: the civilised, the 
barbarian (semi-civilised) and the savage (un-civilised), each sphere representing different degrees of 
development of the ‘human race’.30 Of the three categories, only the first enjoyed full political status 
and therefore the states comprising it were full subjects of international law. Semi-civilised polities 
only enjoyed partial recognition and, therefore, limited international legal personality, while savage 
peoples were ‘purely human’, belonging to the realm of nature and not of politics and therefore 
enjoyed no political recognition under international law.31 This tri-partite division became 
commonplace in the writings of nineteenth-century scholars. In 1895, Lawrence defined international 
                                                          
26 For a summary and critique of Vitoria’s natural law, see: A. Anghie, ‘Francisco De Vitoria and the Colonial 
Origins of International Law’ (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 32.  
27 ‘As it is known, the historical school emerged as a reaction against the abstract rationalism of Enlightenment 
thought and appeared in the critique against the legislating of comprehensive codes - such as Napoleon’s Code 
Civil – that were felt by Savigny to neglect the organic development of law by popular conviction and to freeze 
it into inflexible and abstract maxims.’ Koskenniemi (supra note 1), 43. 
28 Anghie (supra note 6),48.  
29 ‘The existence of a distinction between the civilized and the uncivilized was so vehemently presupposed by 
positivist jurists, that the state of nature - and therefore naturalism - becomes epistemologically incoherent 
because it lacks this central distinction.’ Ibid., 55.  
30 M. J. Lorimer, ‘La doctrine de la reconnaissance, fondement du droit international’ (1884)16 Revue de droit 
international et de législation comparée 333, 335.  
31 ‘Que ces sphères résultant de caractères particuliers de race, ou bien de degrés diffèrent dans le 
développement d’une même race ou bien de degrés différents dans de développement d’une même race, elles 
ont droit, de la part des nations civilisées, a un triple degré de reconnaissance: la reconnaissance politique 
plénière, la reconnaissance politique partielle et la reconnaissance naturel ou purement humaine.’ Ibid.  




law as ‘[t]he rules which determine the conduct of the general body of civilized states in their dealings 
with one another’.32 He went on to distinguish between fully sovereign states at the one end of the 
spectrum, the ‘dwarves of the central African forest’ (sic) at the other, and finally polities like Turkey, 
China or Japan that were somewhere in the middle with respect to the stage of their development and 
their engagement with and rights under international law.33 Such was the prominence of the concept 
that even voices relatively critical of the three-fold distinction, like Hornung, mainly questioned the 
unconditional moral superiority Western theorists and statesmen claimed through the categorisation, 
and were not articulating a comprehensive challenge to the concept itself.34  
Similarly, the concept was central in the actual practice of states. Its first appearance is probably in the 
1815 Vienna Declaration on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, a point to which we will shortly return. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, states would invoke the concept to justify a number of their 
practices, such as unequal treaties and the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction in so-called 
semi-civilised states.35 By 1899 the concept had acquired an autonomous existence and even appeared 
in the preamble of the First Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare:  
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to 
declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents 
remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the 
usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the 
public conscience.36 
Thus, Gong was right when he stated that ‘[a]s the principle which distinguished “civilized” from 
“uncivilized” states, the standard of “civilization” became an integral factor in the changing domain 
and rules of international law’.37 
1:2 Civilisation: what’s in a name?  
Given the distortions of historical memory regarding nineteenth-century international law described 
above, it is unsurprising that, until relatively recently, the concept of civilisation remained relatively 
unexamined and untheorised. However, the recent revival of international legal historiography has 
started rectifying this omission. Mindful of the selectiveness (but not arbitrariness) of the exercise, 
this contribution will focus on the analyses of Gong, Koskenniemi, Anghie and Miéville. My main 
                                                          
32 T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (MacMillan and Co, 1895), 1.  
33 Ibid., 58-59. For further analysis of the position of ‘semi-civilised’ states in international law, see Chapter 2 of 
the present thesis.  
34 See: J.M. Hornung ‘Civilisés et barbares’ (1885) 17 Revue de droit international 447. 
35 See Chapter 2 of the thesis at hand.  
36 Preamble, Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) (adopted 29 July 1899, entry into force 4 September 
1900) TS 403. 
37 Gong (supra note 4), 5.  




argument will be that, despite their important contributions to our understanding, all four approaches 
radically underestimated the material(ist) and transformative dimension of the concept. Furthermore, 
this is a problem to the extent that it leads to a radical underestimation, or in the case of Miéville, to a 
significant misunderstanding of the role of international law in the diffusion of capitalist relations of 
production to colonised or semi-colonised territories.  
To begin with, Gong has provided us with the best systematisation of the criteria that legal theorists 
and practitioners used in order to determine the status of a political community vis-à-vis civilisation 
from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. For him, these criteria were:  
1. Guarantees of basic human rights, such as life, dignity, property, freedom of movement, of 
commerce and of religion.  
2. The existence of a vertically and bureaucratically organised state apparatus, capable of 
armed self-defence.  
3. The legalisation of domestic and foreign affairs. This included the codification and 
publication of laws, along with the establishment of a professionalised, independent judiciary, 
as central parts of this process.  
4. Maintenance of permanent diplomatic relations with the outside world.  
5. Abolition of ‘uncivilised’ practices, such as polygamy, suttee and slavery.38  
Gong understood the first four criteria to be political and institutional, while the fifth was allegedly 
cultural. Even though later in this chapter I will challenge the assertion that the abolition of slavery 
was a cultural demand, the important point here is that, even if we accept Gong’s own 
characterisations, the concept of civilisation manifested a strong institutional aspect. Nonetheless, 
whenever Gong attempted a broader point about the standard, his analysis leant clearly towards the 
cultural aspect. For example, in the introduction of the book, Gong noted that ‘the imposition of 
Europe’s standard of “civilization” on the non-European world precipitated a confrontation of cultural 
systems, as fundamentally irreconcilable standards of “civilization” clashed with each other’.39 
Moreover, he conceptualised European expansion as ‘fundamentally a confrontation of civilizations 
and their respective cultural systems’,40 while he also argued that the concept of civilisation was in 
fact a means to legitimise this very expansion.41 Therefore, Gong’s fragmented conceptual framework 
is at odds with his own historical findings about the predominantly institutional aspects of the 
                                                          
38 Ibid., 14-15.  
39 Ibid., xi.  
40 Ibid., 3.  
41 Ibid., 7.  




concept. Further to this, Gong’s analysis deploys the concept of ‘culture’ without much elaboration or 
critical reflection on its content. Even though this point will be made clearer later in the analysis of 
Anghie’s work, it suffices to be said here that ‘culture’ is used as an all-encompassing term that 
covers aspects of social co-existence as diverse as religion, inter-personal relations, institutional 
structures, economic systems or even alimentary preferences. Despite the fact that the 
historiographical work of Gong is much more nuanced and detailed, the uncritical deployment of the 
concept serves to obscure rather than to elucidate his factual observations.  
In turn, Koskenniemi’s argument oscillates between conceptualising the standard of civilisation as 
largely cultural and emphasising its indeterminate character, which rendered it open to abuse and 
manipulation by Western states and legal elites. In fact, Koskenniemi advances both arguments in a 
rather self-contradictory manner. For example, in various parts of his analysis, Koskenniemi 
maintains that the concept of civilisation was always a rather vague and indeterminate concept.42 This 
way, Europeans could deploy the language to legitimise ‘what was simply a conjectural policy’ and to 
determine, largely arbitrarily, who was to be admitted to the ‘club’ of civilisation.43 At the same time, 
Koskenniemi argues that the concept of civilisation did have a relatively specified content since it was 
‘a shorthand for the qualities that international lawyers valued in their own societies playing upon its 
opposites’44 or a way to manage ‘otherness’ and cultural difference through the dynamics of 
exclusion-inclusion.45 Setting aside objections to the conceptualisation of the standard of civilisation 
as primarily the expression of cultural difference, it is essential to note here that Koskenniemi’s 
approach is internally incoherent. If the concept indeed reflected certain values or institutions that 
international lawyers of the time valued and cultural differences between the West and the periphery, 
then by definition it was not a ‘empty signifier’ that could be manipulated by Western powers, or at 
least this manipulation had some outer limits dictated by the very preferences the concept embodied. 
Schwarzenberger offered a good summary of the breadth and limitations of the concept as ‘an elastic, 
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but, nevertheless, relatively objective standard for the treatment of foreign nationals’.46 Therefore, 
Koskenniemi’s relative emphasis on the ‘emptiness’ of the concept, even though not without basis, is 
directly linked to his final conclusion about the merits of a ‘culture of formalism’ in international 
law.47 However, for the history of the standard of civilisation to support this commitment, a somewhat 
selective reading was warranted that would ‘empty’ the concept from all its meaning and render its 
very indeterminacy, instead of its content, a tool at the hands of imperialism. My objection to this 
approach should not be read to mean that the meaning and content of the standard was perfectly 
determinate or stable across time and space. However, both legal writings and state practice of the 
time, as crystallised for example in the case of extraterritoriality,48 point to a certain point of gravity, a 
‘core’ of the concept that was not directly linked to the opportunistic politics of particular imperial 
powers of the time, but rather with the fundamental association between international law, imperial 
expansion and the capitalist mode of production (CMP).  
Perhaps the most coherent argument about the concept of civilisation as a way of managing cultural 
difference is that of Anghie. Indeed, his approach to the concept of ‘civilisation’ is part of his broader 
argument about the constitution of sovereignty through international law, or in his own words, ‘the 
relationship between ideas of culture and sovereignty and the ways in which sovereignty became 
identified with a specific set of cultural practices to the exclusion of others’.49 For Anghie, the 
distinction between the civilised and the uncivilised was central to nineteenth century positivism,50 
and expressive of an ‘anxiety-driven process of naming the unfamiliar, asserting its alien nature, and 
attempting to reduce and subordinate it’.51 Hence, ‘the primitive’ was at the heart of nineteenth-
century international law, since lawyers devoted energy and time finding ways of managing the 
mysterious ‘other’. Indeed, for Anghie this is a process that never came to an end and regularly re-
emerges, for example, in the war against terror after 9/11.52 
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Unsurprisingly, Miéville is very suspicious of Anghie’s explanation, which he summarily dismisses as 
‘postmodern commonplace’ and ‘modern-day banality’.53 Instead, he offers what he understands to be 
‘a counterintuitive materialist analysis’.54 The line of argument is the following: the standard of 
civilisation arose as the outcome–-and not as the intellectual matrix—of the conclusion of unequal 
treaties between the West and what came to be understood as ‘semi-civilised’ countries, such as China 
or the Ottoman Empire. For Miéville, these polities were ‘territorially bounded and internally 
sovereign’55 and, therefore, their subjection to unequal treaties created an environment of partial 
inclusion into international law, which in turn ‘was generative of the continuum of civilisation’.56 
Hence, Miéville makes a series of claims that derive from the presumption that it was specific 
practices of imperialist states that gave rise to the concept and not the other way round, while he 
insists that the crucial category to be managed were the so-called ‘barbarous’ states and not the 
‘savages’ of Africa. In his own words, ‘[b]ecause “civilisation” is not a discursive strategy of 
“othering”, but a result of the paradoxes of actually-existing sovereignty’.57  
1:3 The limits of received wisdom and an alternative way forward 
The standard of civilisation was neither an ‘empty signifier’, open to manipulation by imperial 
powers, nor a mere proxy for culture, a fairly vague concept in any event. Moreover, the exclusion of 
non-Western societies from the realm of international law and politics was not the only, or even the 
primary, function of the concept. Rather, the standard was structured in such a way so as to allow for, 
and even promote the radical social transformation of non-Western polities and their inclusion in the 
cycle of ‘civilised’ states. If we analyse the pre-conditions for ‘civilisation’ closely, we can come to 
the conclusion that they were all institutional, legal and political pre-conditions for the development 
and stabilisation of the capitalist mode of production. Hence, the engagement of colonial international 
law with the periphery had broader objectives than simply subjecting the periphery to Western rule. 
Regardless of the active consciousness of lawyers and politicians, international law was part of a 
broader trend of social transformation that was taking place at the time and involved the gradual 
dissolution of feudal or other pre-capitalist forms of social co-existence and the generalisation of 
market relations.  
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1:3:1 Civilisation v. Culture: The broader origins of the concept and its emphasis on 
institutions 
In order to comprehend the standard of civilisation, it is imperative to situate it within the broader 
trajectory of progress discourses of the time. In his Course in Positive Philosophy,58 which was 
gradually published between 1830 and 1842, Auguste Comte provided a linear account of human 
history. For Comte, history progressed necessarily in three stages—the similarity between Comte’s 
theory and the threefold categorisation of civilisation is noticeable—the theological, the metaphysical 
and the positive. It is crucial to bear in mind that these stages were not simply in temporal relation, but 
in a hierarchical one as a matter of logic. The first represented the lowest stage of humanity, when 
people were subjected to blind faith and superstition. The priest was the central figure of this time. 
The metaphysical stage was basically that of the Enlightenment, when Reason began to develop and 
universal rights were mobilised. The jurist dominated this stage. Finally, the positivist era is reduced 
to the nineteenth century and is characterised by rigorous scientific inquiry, which in turn is put in 
motion to solve social problems. The scientist is elevated to the absolute authority of the positive 
stage. Comte’s ideas set the stage for a number of social evolutionists, a trend which reached its 
apogee with Spencer and his fierce opposition to any form of social legislation that would supposedly 
distort this evolutionary process.59 Crucially, this progressivist account of human development was 
not simply an academic argument, but became one of the hegemonic ideas of the time. It is an 
extreme but not inexplicable example that Brazil put the slogan ‘Order and Progress’ on its national 
flag. More generally, the nineteenth century developed an obsession with scientific rationality, which 
would supposedly reveal the origins of all social problems, including poverty or crime. With the old 
religious hierarchies collapsing, both at home and abroad, there was an urgent need for new 
hierarchies. Scientific reason and the emerging ‘classificatory mania’60 provided an alternative 
paradigm for governing the world in this transitory period. It is telling that Lorimer considered 
ethnology, ‘the science of races’, to be the most influential force for international law of his time.61 
This synergy between international law and social sciences was also of direct relevance to the 
standard of civilisation as such, since ‘civilisation’ as a concept did not originate in international law, 
but had deeper roots. Brett Bowden’s work provides us with perhaps the most comprehensive 
historical account of the broader origins of ‘civilisation’.62 Bowden traces the origins of the word in 
the three languages that dominated diplomacy at the time: English, French and German. According to 
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Bowden, the first recorded use of the word was in French by Boulanger in 766.63 In this context, the 
word had a dual meaning, since it was used to signify both the process through which someone 
became civilised and the outcome of this process. The word appeared in English close to that period 
too, without it being clear whether that happened under French influence or whether we are 
confronted with two parallel processes. Tellingly, Gong mentions that the first appearance of the word 
was in 1772,64 but Bowden argues that the ‘father’ of the English word was the philosopher of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, Adam Ferguson.65 In both languages, ‘“[c]ivilisation” is not usually used to 
describe the collective life of just any group, as culture sometimes is; it is reserved for collectives that 
demonstrate a degree of urbanization and organization’.66 For example, for Ferguson, security of the 
person and property and of commercial acts and the order necessary to achieve these goals were the 
essential preconditions for a civilised society.67 The history of the word in German is quite different, 
but not necessarily in a way that is significant here. More specifically, Zivilisation was commonly 
juxtaposed to Kultur, with the latter denoting ‘intellectual, artistic, and religious facts or values’.68 
Thus, numerous German thinkers were fairly dismissive of ‘civilisation’, while embracing Kultur as 
expressing the inner unity and intellectual heritage of a people.69 Despite the different lineage of the 
German version, what all three traditions shared was that the word was not generally used to denote 
cultural difference or similarity. Even though the disposition of Germans differed from those of 
English or French thinkers, it is clear that civilisation meant something much more tangible than 
‘culture’, referring instead to political organisation and institutional arrangements. To put it otherwise, 
‘culture’ is arguably a fairly generic concept, but creating a secure environment for commercial 
transactions is generally not considered to fall under its ambit, provided that we do not stretch the 
word to cover literally every aspect of social co-existence.  
Further, it is crucial that the specific legal meaning of the word was fairly close to its original 
intellectual roots described above, since it emphasised institutional arrangements rather than abstract 
cultural standards. Indeed, the criteria to be fulfilled could perhaps be said to be influenced by 
Christianity but did not coincide with it. For example, Lawrence observed that  
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we have not thought fit to follow the same example of some writers, and limit it still further to Christian 
states. It is quite true that modern International Law grew up among nations which professed 
Christianity, and that many of its chapters would have to be very differently written if Christian 
influences had been absent from their formation. But it is also true that more than one non-Christian state 
has adopted the European international code.70 
Rather, the criteria a society had to fulfil were of a much more practical character, which is also 
reflected in the five criteria provided by Gong.71 This is indeed the main trend in the writings of jurists 
of the time. For example, in analysing the concept, Westlake wrote that: ‘We have nothing here to do 
with the mental or moral characters which distinguish the civilised from the uncivilised, nor even with 
the domestic or social habits, taking social in a narrow sense, which a traveller may remark.’72 Far 
from it, the existence of a centralised state that would protect activities such as trade was absolutely 
central in his account.73 Similarly, Lorimer, despite his general contempt towards Islam, was much 
more pragmatic when explaining how Algeria would achieve recognition under international law: 
‘[h]ad Algeria come to respect the rights of life and property, its history would not have permanently 
deprived it of the right to recognition’.74 As will be shown in the next chapter of this thesis, actual 
state practice in the field of extraterritoriality also embodied the same principles. Despite racist or 
religious rhetoric, at the end of the day practice was focused on specific institutional reform, including 
state centralisation, the monopolisation of violence, adherence to international law and the protection 
of certain rights closely linked to the market.75  
 
Finally, attainability was a crucial characteristic of the concept, thus indicating its close links with 
progressivist narratives. International lawyers of the time were generally optimistic, arguing that 
‘uncivilised’ societies could progress towards ‘higher’ stages of development, and indeed civilised 
peoples had a duty to enable this transition. A clarification is essential here: within the racist 
intellectual universe of these scholars, this evolution did not mean that non-Western polities would 
acquire equal status to the Western ones.76 Indeed, Lorimer was comfortable with the idea that even 
sovereign European states did not enjoy equal rights under international law, but were in a 
hierarchical relation depending on their actual power.77 The Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe 
are good examples of the fact that being a member of ‘the society of civilised states’ did not lead to 
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factual or judicial equality, even within Europe.78 It was much later that ‘sovereignty’ became 
associated with equality in the context of international law. Therefore, the argument that non-Western 
polities could not become civilised and therefore gain sovereignty because they were not seen as equal 
is based on an anachronism that links sovereignty with equality. That being said, most legal scholars 
were reassuring that sovereignty was achievable for non-Westerners. Westlake was clear when 
writing that: ‘The civilisation has grown up by degrees, and populations have become included in it 
among whom it did not originate.’79 Rivier was also of the same opinion: ‘[o]ur community of nations 
is not a closed one. Just as it opened itself for Turkey, it will open itself for other states as soon as 
these have reached a level of spirituality comparable to ours.’80 Gradually, the examples of Japan and 
the Ottoman Empire were mobilised to show that non-European, non-Christian powers were able to 
achieve ‘civilised’ status and become full members of international society. Indeed, the Ottoman 
Empire was at least partially admitted in 1856,81 and in 1899 Japan was recognised as fully sovereign, 
when extraterritoriality was abolished. This was an event of immense historical importance that will 
be analysed fully in the next chapter of this thesis.82 What we should bear in mind here is Gong’s 
observation that 
 
[s]aying race and colour did not matter did not make it so. However widespread the general beliefs about 
race and colour, their direct influence on the legal standard of “civilization” was circumscribed by the 
shift toward general principles of progress in civilization, which, at least in theory, denied fixed 
hierarchies based on immutabilities of race and colour.83 
 
To sum up, the standard of ‘civilisation’ emerged as an ‘open’ category that could and should be 
achieved by ‘uncivilised’ peoples, something that in turn would provide their now transformed 
political societies with the ‘gift’ of sovereignty.  
 
If the above observations are correct, the limitations of the four approaches discussed in the previous 
section become evident. To begin with, both the theory and practice of the time indicate that despite 
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contradictions, and of course occasional manipulation by powerful states, the concept had a relatively 
stable and clear content. It is argued here that Gong’s five criteria84 adequately summarise this 
content. Hence, it is difficult to agree with Koskenniemi that ‘civilisation’ never acquired a settled 
content and that was its greatest advantage, since it was stretched to justify opportunistic political 
calculations of the West.85 The concept of civilisation was indeed a creation of Western legal thought 
and diplomatic practice, but it had numerous political and legal implications which were not always 
under the control of the West.  
Secondly, this thesis challenges the common argument that the standard of civilisation was basically 
the expression of cultural differences between Europe and the rest of the world. Anghie is probably 
the scholar who articulated this point most clearly: ‘But positivist jurisprudence had to plausibly 
establish that cultural difference translated into legal difference,’86 but, as was mentioned above, Gong 
and Koskenniemi also flirted with explanations based on cultural difference and perceived cultural 
superiority.87 Here it is essential to admit a difficulty: it is extremely challenging to contest an 
argument if its basic premises are not properly explained. In other words, none of these scholars, and 
especially Anghie, explains what the content of this perceived cultural difference was and, 
consequently, their approach is very difficult to deconstruct. However, contract law in its most general 
form or the existence of a national army and a domestic police force can hardly be said to be part of 
what people instinctively understand as ‘culture’. Further, in the course of the nineteenth century, it 
became obvious that religion was not the ultimate criterion for ‘civilisation’, which in turn excludes a 
major cultural factor from being a determinant of ‘civilised’ status. Fidler reaches a similar conclusion 
when arguing that, ‘[w]hether a country was civilized was more a question of the adoption of 
Westphalian mechanics than the acceptance of Western culture. The expansion of Western power in 
the nineteenth century saw Western civilization expanding in the more limited form of Westphalian 
civilization.’88  
Finally, the fact that the concept was first used in relation to slavery around 1815 challenges 
Mieville’s assertion that the concept only arose towards the end of the century to rationalise the 
practice of unequal treaties. More fundamentally, Mieville’s argument solely takes into account the 
conclusion of the unequal treaties and not their termination. Therefore, his analysis does not 
acknowledge that achievability was integral to the standard and that the matrix of progression 
discourses from which it arose came with the promise (or threat) of social transformation, which in 
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turn would render these societies sovereign. In a nutshell, the argument that the concept arose from 
the need to explain two-tier sovereignty of the time does not account for the fact that eventually it was 
through this concept that more and more political communities achieved sovereign status and 
terminated unequal treaties. Thus, Miéville (along with Koskenniemi on that point) overstates the role 
of the standard of civilisation as a means of political or economic domination and underestimates its 
function as a means of political and economic transformation. 
 
To sum up, scholarly engagement with civilisation has focused on three different conceptualisations 
and critiques. A first strand is the conceptualisation of ‘civilisation’ as a method of managing cultural 
differentiation in a hierarchical manner, which is paramount for the work of Anghie and can also be 
found in a less systematised form in the works of Gong and Koskenniemi. Koskenniemi’s point, 
though, is interlinked with, and partly negated by, his argument about the radical indeterminacy of the 
concept as a primary method for the political subjugation of the colonies. Thirdly, Miéville offers a 
different explanation, arguing that the concept was a post factum rationalisation of the specific 
practice of unequal treaties with the so-called semi-civilised states. However, the historical lineage of 
the concept and the way international lawyers of the time set out the criteria for ‘civilised’ status do 
not support the view that the concept was about ‘culture’, a fairly abstract concept in any event. 
Rather, analysis of both theory and practice of the time reveals that the concept had a specific, if not 
altogether fixed, content, including state centralisation, guarantees for basic rights, adherence to 
international law, and the abolition of slavery. In this sense, Miéville’s attempt to construct an 
alternative to cultural explanations is a welcome point of departure. However, his scheme ignores the 
contradictory and dynamic function of the concept, which both enabled the periphery’s exclusion 
from international law and engineered its conditional inclusion provided that socio-economic 
transformation towards market relations would take place. Given the diagnosed shortcomings of the 
available analyses, the next section will provide an alternative that focuses on the close conceptual 
and practical links between ‘civilisation’ and the diffusion, consolidation and legitimisation of 
capitalist relations of production across the globe.  
1:4 A way forward: capitalism as civilisation  
Thus far, this chapter has shown that the standard of civilisation was more about institutional change 
than about cultural difference and assimilation. This section will elaborate further on this premise. 
Through the standard of civilisation, international law became part of a wider process of social 
transformation that was taking place during that period. In a nutshell, a new reading of nineteenth-
century international law is warranted, which re-evaluates the role of the discipline in healing the 
‘anti-capitalist cancer of the colonies’.89 This thesis emanates from an observation made in passing by 
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Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto. Discussing the inherent tendency of capitalism for 
spatial expansion,90 Marx and Engels argued that ‘civilisation’ was nothing but a proxy for capitalist 
societies of the time: 
 
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated 
means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices 
of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it 
forces “the barbarians” intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on 
pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls 
civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its 
own image.91 
 
My own argument is that an analysis of the specific aspects of the standard of civilisation confirms the 
above aphorism and supports my argument that links the standard of civilisation with the global 
spread of capitalist relations that was taking place at the time.  
 
1:4:1 Protecting individual rights and the rise of capitalism: the construction of the 
individual  
 
Following Gong’s criteria, we can conclude that the protection of certain fundamental rights was 
essential for a political community to be considered civilised. One obvious way to link this criterion 
with the CMP would be that the specific rights guaranteed, such as life, property, travel or freedom of 
commercial activity,92 were directly related to commercial activities in the periphery, especially that 
of Western commercial capitalists. Indeed, the pre-conditions of ‘civilisation’ had little, if anything, to 
do with contemporary conceptions of ‘human rights’. Rather, they provided for certain guarantees 
against arbitrary—but not necessarily against authoritarian—exercises of power, embodying the most 
traditional understanding of civil liberties. Put simply, for Western merchants to be able to operate in 
these regions it was essential that some guarantees would be provided for their personal safety, 
primarily for their property rights and for the operational character of contracts. Viewing this debate 
from a different angle, Craven makes a similar observation regarding the essential guarantees needed 
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for colonial trade to operate smoothly. Trying to find a way out of the (problematic) debate as to 
whether the Berlin Conference exclusively focused on facilitating colonial trade or led to the 
formalisation of colonialism,93 Craven points out that, regardless of the conscious plans of political 
elites of the time, some degree of formalisation was essential in order for colonial trade to flourish. 
Protection of trade-related rights was one important aspect of this formalisation trend.94  
This emphasis on rights was linked to the establishment of the capitalist mode of production in ways 
more complicated than directly facilitating commercial activity. In a nutshell, the existence of a 
specific form of legal, social and psychological subjectivity, individualism, is both a necessary 
precondition and an outcome of the function of capitalism. In this process of indvidualisation of the 
social body, it is principally the form of rights, as entitlements held by individuals, that is deeply 
rooted in the emergence and establishment of capitalist relations of power. As Douzinas has pointed 
out, ‘the relationship between law and the subject is circular’.95 On the one hand, it is almost self-
evident that the legal guarantee of a right pre-supposes the existence of a subject to whom this right is 
guaranteed. On the other hand (and this is perhaps less obvious), ‘a legal subject, whether a human 
being or an artificial entity (a company or association, the state or a municipality), exists if the law 
recognises its ability to bear rights and duties’.96 A bodily monad, a person in the most neutral sense 
of the word, is not automatically an individual, in the sense of being a juridical and political subject. 
Rather, a series of social processes of interpellation and disciplining is required for persons to 
perceive themselves as individuals. One such technique was the legalisation of individual rights as 
part of the process of attaining ‘civilised’ status under international law.  
Let us take a step back and offer some more general remarks about the then-rising capitalism, so as to 
understand the importance of rights protection in the context of the ‘standard of civilisation’. As was 
argued in the Introduction of this thesis, the distinctive characteristic of direct producers in the context 
of the CMP is their radical separation of the means of production.97 It is only in capitalism that direct 
producers are not legally or factually tied to the means of production or to other producers. In 
Poulantzas’ words: ‘[t]hrough being totally dispossessed of the means of labour, the direct producer 
emerges as the “free” and “naked” worker, cut off from the network of personal, statutory, and 
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95 C. Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2000), 233. 
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territorial bonds that actually constituted him in medieval society’.98 To elaborate on this statement, it 
is essential to keep in mind how, within feudalism, serfs were legally bound to their land and their 
master through a nexus of legal and ideological ties. These ties both restricted the movement and 
freedom of the serfs but also gave them claims against feudal lords. For these archaic social structures 
to be dissolved, people needed to stop perceiving themselves primarily as a part of their wider social 
group, religious community, village and so on, and needed to conceive themselves as nominally free 
and equal individuals. In turn, this individualisation of the social body is essential for the smooth 
reproduction of capitalism. To quote Marx: ‘labour-power can appear upon the market as a 
commodity only if, and so far as, its possessor, the individual whose labour-power it is, offers it for 
sale, or sells it as a commodity’.99 In other words, it is through this formal separation of producers 
from each other and from the means of production that individualisation of the social body emerges. 
On a second level, these products of independent labour need to be circulated through contractual 
relations. Τhis is the case since tributary relations that are of significance under feudalism are no 
longer operational under capitalism. Hence, a contract is the form through which this circulation takes 
place. Nonetheless, both for the above-sketched division of labour and for contracts to be operational 
and even conceivable, it is imperative that bodily monads perceive themselves as free and equal 
individuals who operate in conceptual isolation from each other and enjoy the freedom that enables 
them to sell their labour power without being legally bound to a feudal lord or a plot of land.  
The specific way this individualisation takes place is historically contingent and differs across space 
and time.100 That said, the protection of specific individual rights had been crucial in this process of 
individualisation of the social body, at least in Europe. Through the introduction of basic rights 
protections, the individual is elevated to the primary subject of domestic law. This is essential for the 
dissolution of archaic social structures that elevate patriarchal families or the community—that also 
constituted primary productive units—into primary legal subjects. Through individual rights 
guarantees, protection from power is guaranteed on an individual level. It is no longer families or 
serfs working on a plot of land who enjoy certain privileges and claims against power, but individuals. 
As we noted already, this individualisation is derivative of the social division of labour and of 
contractual relations. In turn, for contractual relations to be conceivable, and for this social division of 
labour to appear natural and acceptable, the social body needs to perceive itself as an ensemble of 
nominally autonomous individuals. Thus, rights protection was one of the possible techniques to 
achieve this crucial individualisation and sustain the diffusion—and then reproduction—of capitalist 
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100 ‘Of course, this structure of the relations of production and the labour process does not directly institute the 
precise forms of individualization assumed by the divided social body. It rather induces a material frame of 
reference.’ Poulantzas (supra note 98), 64.  




relations of production. Foucault captured this complicated relationship when he noted that the 
individual is not simply oppressed or protected by and against the state, but is a product of state 
power.101 Protection of individual rights was one of the techniques for ‘producing’ individuals and 
hence its centrality for the concept of civilisation.  
 
1:4:2 Constructing the Leviathan: modern nation-state as civilisation  
In Gong’s classification, at least three of the ‘civilisation’ criteria were directly related to what later 
came to be known as ‘state-building’. First, for a political community to be ‘civilised’, it was essential 
to have a centralised, bureaucratic structure, leaving behind the loose administrative structure of 
mediaeval empires. Secondly, the monopolisation of violence was an essential step in this direction. 
Thirdly, the legalisation of both domestic and international affairs was considered a distinctive 
characteristic of ‘civilisation’. Indeed, what we commonly understand as modern statehood, involving 
a centrally-organised, bureaucratic state apparatus and enjoying a monopoly of legitimate violence 
and control over both territory and population, was at the heart of the standard of civilisation. For 
example, Westlake considered state-building essential for the termination of colonialism: ‘[i]f any 
fanatical admirer of savage life argued that the whites ought to be kept out, he would only be driven to 
the same conclusion by another route, for a government on the spot would be necessary to keep them 
out’.102 Turning to state practice, state centralisation, disarmament and the weakening of local 
warlords was deemed essential for China’s transition to fully ‘civilised’ status and to abolish 
extraterritoriality. Amongst other justifications, this was deemed essential to secure China’s adherence 
to international law: ‘China’s immense interior necessitated the co-operation of the Chinese 
government in applying pressure on the provincial and local authorities to abide by treaty provisions 
such as permitting trade and missionary work.’103 In this respect, the standard of civilisation was 
linked to the broader function of international law in promoting and consolidating state centralisation 
and more specifically the state monopoly over legitimate violence. We are here confronted with what 
Frédéric Mégret understands as the ‘specific statism’ of international law, which ‘well participated in 
a dogma the consequences of which is to delimit the possibilities of imagining judicial forms other 
than the state’.104 In the same way that Afghanistan or Somalia committed the gravest state crimes of 
                                                          
101 ‘The individual is not, in other words, power’s opposite number; the individual is one of power’s first 
effects.’ M. Foucault, Society Must be Defended (Penguin Books, 2003), 30; ‘And the doubt must remain that 
the abstract subject celebrated as the carrier of universal human rights is but a fabrication of the disciplinary 
techniques of Western “governmentality” whose only reality lies in the imposition on social relations of a 
particular structure of domination.’ Koskenniemi (supra note 1), 514-15.  
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104 F. Mégret, ‘L’ étatisme spécifique de droit international’ (2011-2012) Revue québécoise de droit 
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allowing their monopoly over legitimate violence to be eroded and hijacked by terrorists and 
pirates,105 nineteenth-century fading empires and pre-modern political communities were exiled from 
the realm of international law due to their ‘weak’ structure, which did not conform with modern 
statehood.  
Admittedly, the nexus between modern statehood and the CMP is a dense and complicated one.106 
This contribution does not aspire to provide an exhaustive account of this relation. Nonetheless, it is 
argued that the existence of a centralised state apparatus was integral in the process of the dissolution 
of feudal and other archaic modes of production and the emergence and smooth reproduction of the 
CMP. Moving away from what Althusser characterised as the ‘spatial metaphor’107 of the classical 
Marxian scheme of infrastructure (the economic base) and superstructure (law and the State, ideology, 
religion, art, etc),108 this thesis rests upon the premise that law and the state do not simply reflect the 
relations of production or the commodity-owner paradigm,109 but are constitutive of them. In this 
instance, the existence of a centralised, bureaucratic state which is relatively separate from society and 
enjoys a monopoly over the legitimate use of force is intrinsic in the process of reproduction of the 
social relations of production. In turn, the existence of such a state was essential for the uniform 
application of laws necessary for the harmonious reproduction of the capitalist relations of production. 
As Heinrich notes: ‘the state must be a discrete, independent force, since it has to compel all members 
of the society to recognize one another as private owners’.110 This separation should not, however, be 
understood as a radical disassociation between the state and social struggles, but rather as the specific 
modality of the state’s ‘presence in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production’.111 
The origin of this separation is the de-personalisation of economic domination in the context of the 
CMP. Direct producers are not directly subject to the owners of the means of production, unlike the 
                                                          
105 ‘Inversement, il n'est sans doute pas plus grand crime pour l’ État, dans une perspective classique que de se 
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l'Afghanistan des Talibans ou aujourd'hui de la Somalie des pirates, ou encore de tel ou tel État ayant permis à 
certains de ses ressortissants de s'en prendre a des intérêts étrangers.’ Ibid., 109.  
106 Amongst many: Maier (supra note 8); Poulantzas (supra note 96); C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European 
State AD 990-1992 (Blackwell, 1992). 
107 L. Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)’ in L. Althusser, 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (NLB, 1971), 130. 
108 See generally: K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Progress Publishers, 1977).  
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personal bonds between the serfs and the princes or the slaves and their masters. Economic 
domination takes place in the seemingly neutral place of the market, where agents encounter each 
other as free and equal subjects selling commodities. Therefore, political and economic domination 
are analytically distinct in capitalism, even though in practice it is representatives of the upper classes 
who occupy the crucial political positions. For this distinction to emerge, it was necessary that feudal 
or even tribal forms of political organisation that were based on personal status and religious belief 
had to be dissolved and the impersonal, bureaucratic state was one of the possible competitors to 
replace them, and in any case the model of capitalist political organisation available at the time. 
Therefore, the requirement of the centralisation, bureaucratisation and monopolisation of legitimate 
violence of the standard of civilisation was not simply an arbitrary preference for a ‘Western’ model 
of political community. Much more fundamentally, these requirements were aiming towards the 
creation of such state structures capable of sustaining capitalist relations of production.  
 
1:4:3 Abolition of slavery and free labour: vogelfrei labourers as civilisation  
 
The abolition of slavery was another principal condition for achieving ‘civilised’ status. Indeed, it was 
in reference to combating the slave trade that the term was probably used for the first time in the 
context of international law. From the last quarter of the eighteenth century, abolitionist movements 
across the Atlantic, and particularly in Britain, started gaining momentum.112 Pursuant to an initiative 
of Lord Castlereagh, the Congress of Vienna issued a Declaration on the Abolition of the Slave Trade. 
The Declaration was incorporated into the General Act of the Congress, thus acquiring the character 
of an international law rule. Admittedly, the Declaration was of a general, programmatic character and 
did not lay down very specific obligations. Nevertheless, it stated that ‘the public voice, in all civilised 
countries, calls aloud for slavery’s prompt suppression’.113 However, the international legal 
(im)permissibility of slavery remained unsettled under international law. Ten years after Vienna, 
Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the slave trade was not against the ‘law of nations’ and did not 
amount to piracy.114 Gradually, the problem was transformed into one of a conflict of laws and the 
prevailing view was that ‘no state or nation was required, on theories of international law or comity, 
to give force to slave status created in another jurisdiction’.115 Simultaneously, Britain negotiated 
numerous bilateral treaties that allowed for mutual ship searches in order to suppress the slave 
                                                          
112 ‘Launched in 1787, the first campaign against the British slave trade evolved to amass more popular support 
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113 Grewe (supra note 11), 554.  
114 The Antelope 23 US 66, 10 Wheat 66 (1825).  
115 Drescher and Finkelman (supra note 112), 901.  




trade.116 The Berlin Conference (1884-85) also paid attention to the question of the slave trade. The 
American delegate, Kasson, concisely summarised the reasons dictating the abolition of the slave 
trade as follows: ‘it is not sufficient for all our merchants to enjoy equally the right of buying the oil, 
gums and ivory of the natives... Productive labour must be seriously encouraged in the African 
territories, and the means of the inhabitants of acquiring the products of civilized nations be thus 
increased.’117  
Crucially, struggle for the abolition of slavery was one of the first and most prominent humanitarian 
campaigns of the nineteenth century. Its deep social roots still capture the imagination of lawyers and 
humanitarians alike.118 The social and economic origins of this new humanitarian sensitivity were 
intensely debated in twentieth-century historiography, and what came to be known as the ‘Haskell 
debate’ is a good example thereof.119 The question why humanitarian sensibility was specifically 
triggered by slavery and not, for example, by the appalling living conditions of the emerging working 
class of the time is of direct relevance here as well. Drawing from the rich Marxist historiography on 
the topic, the abolition of slavery is understood here as an essential pre-condition for the development 
and smooth reproduction of capitalist relations of production through the promotion of wage labour.120 
Craven puts forward a similar point:  
the concern for the problem of “slavery” or for the well-being of the native populations [was] being 
driven, neither by a purely humanitarian idealism, nor by a cynical desire to justify colonial intervention, 
but by the underlying logic of producing free labour as the generative condition for the market 
economy.121  
Indeed, the existence of labourers who are deprived of access to the means of production and 
therefore can only survive by selling their labour power is at the heart of CMP. Marx described this 
freedom under capitalism as ‘vogelfrei’ (‘free as a bird’), when labourers’ only choice was to sell their 
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labour power or starve to death.122 Hence, the perpetuation of slavery outside Europe was an 
impediment to these regions’ transition to capitalism.  
Τhis observation about the contradictory relationship between imperialism and slavery brings us to an 
interim conclusion about the function of international law, imperialism and free-market economy. As 
has already been hinted, slavery had been an integral part of the colonial enterprise despite Miéville’s 
opposing claim,123 and it is difficult to conclude that, by the nineteenth century, it was altogether 
unprofitable. Moreover, though the argument that the struggle against the slave trade reinforced 
Britain’s naval supremacy124 is undeniably correct, it fails to address the heart of the question. It is 
argued that the essential question here is how and why the anti-slavery movement acquired enough 
moral force to allow the powers that invoked it to reinforce their naval supremacy or to categorise 
political communities in relation to their stance towards slavery. The response that has been offered 
by a significant part of Marxist historiography is that, without questioning the conscious motives of 
those combating the slave trade and slavery,125 the fact that they more or less ignored the very real 
plight of freed slaves or of the working class of the time suggests that the drive was more complicated 
than pure humanitarianism. The answer provided here is that the abolition of slavery was intrinsically 
linked to the rise of capitalism on a global scale, being a necessary precondition of it. If we accept this 
line of argument, we could start drawing more general conclusions about both the specific function of 
the concept of civilization at the time and about international law more broadly. Even if a fraction of 
colonialists and Western powers benefited from slavery, its maintenance undermined the long-term 
sustainability of capitalism. Thus, the centrality of the abolition of slavery in international law of the 
time, including its importance for achieving ‘civilised’ status, indicates the crucial role of 
international law in safeguarding the long-term, generic interests of capitalism, even at the expense of 
individual capitalist states or fractions of capital.  
Conclusion  
It is probably an understatement that the vast majority of nineteenth-century international lawyers 
were no radicals. Their political commitments were associated with reformist liberalism and they even 
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‘waged a defensive war against the socialists and communists of the left’.126 This defence and 
promotion of the capitalist status quo against anti-capitalists and pre-capitalist modes of production 
ran deeper than the individual preferences of specific lawyers. Rather, the political commitments of 
the ‘founding fathers’ of the discipline were symptomatic of its deeper biases. The systematic 
privileging of the capitalist mode of production and of the institutions needed for its reproduction as 
the sole legitimate forms of social and political organisation in the nineteenth century was one of 
these disciplinary biases. The standard of civilisation, which dominated the field for almost a century, 
is but one example of this close link. Having challenged earlier historiographical understandings of 
the concept, I have shown that the concept exhibited a relatively stable meaning, which was much 
more institutional and political than purely cultural. In a nutshell, for a political community to be 
deemed ‘civilised’ and therefore admitted to the society of civilised states, it needed to develop the 
institutions and legal norms essential for the development and reproduction of the capitalist mode of 
production. State centralisation, safeguarding some basic individual rights and the abolition of slavery 
formed the backbone of the standard, and at the same time constitute necessary preconditions for the 
smooth function of a market society. In turn, this observation has a number of implications, both for 
international law and for the way we conceptualise capitalism. For international law, arguments about 
the supposed neutrality of the field vis-à-vis states’ socio-economic systems are fundamentally 
destabilised. Even though the rise of states claiming not to be capitalist in the course of the twentieth 
century challenged the discipline profoundly, the nineteenth century indicates a deep historical 
synergy between international law and capitalism. This synergy also challenges the perceptions of 
certain strands of Marxism that treat (international) law as a mere reflection of the realities of 
capitalism that supposedly exist outside law. The unattainability of both positions will become even 
clearer in the next chapter, which discusses the ‘real life’ of the standard of civilisation in the context 
of extraterritoriality in Japan and the Ottoman Empire. 
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Chapter 2: Extraterritoriality and the civilising mission: international law and social 
transformation in Japan and the Ottoman Empire 
 
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned. 
K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the standard of ‘civilisation’, a concept which largely dominated 
nineteenth-century international law, can be better understood if linked to the advancement of 
capitalist relations of production on a global level, which characterised the period. In essence, the 
criteria a political community had to fulfil in order to be considered ‘civilised’ were preconditions for 
the establishment and smooth reproduction of the capitalist mode of production (CMP). To verify this 
claim, I turn to international legal practice of the time and, more specifically, I focus on the practice of 
extraterritoriality and its specific application in Japan and the Ottoman Empire.  
The official justification for the imposition of extraterritoriality lay with the allegedly insufficiently 
civilised character of these countries’ social, political and institutional life. Hence, the examination of 
the conditions of imposition, function and abolition of extraterritoriality enables us not only to 
understand this specific practice, but also to grasp the socio-legal functions of the ‘standard of 
civilisation’.1 More specifically, this practice was not simply positive discrimination in favour of 
Westerners.2 Rather, extraterritoriality should be understood as a means of exerting pressure towards 
these ‘semi-civilised’ societies to reform their legal, administrative and political systems. These 
countries were expected to develop a centralised bureaucratic mechanism, to claim and secure the 
legitimate monopoly to violence, demarcate their territory, legalise their interaction with the ‘exterior’ 
and, finally, to systematise their legal order by abolishing status-based law and promoting a legal 
system centred around the individual as a free, autonomous and self-reliant element. Furthermore, 
these reforms were neither part of a neutral process of ‘modernisation’ nor a form of cultural 
expansionism on behalf of certain Western states overconfident of the excellence of their legal 
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system.3 Rather, these reforms were essential in order for these countries to dissolve the archaic 
relations of production and move towards a free-market, capitalist paradigm.  
This chapter is structured as follows: to begin with, extraterritoriality will be briefly explained and 
contextualised. Moreover, two sets of methodological comments will be provided. First, it will be 
shown that extraterritoriality was understood as a typical instance of the ‘civilising mission’ at the 
time. This centrality enables us to draw broader conclusions about the social function of the ‘standard 
of civilisation’ through examining extraterritoriality. Secondly, the choice of the specific case studies, 
Japan and the Ottoman Empire, will be explained: these provide two diverse historical settings and 
therefore allow for the drawing of more general conclusions. In the second part, a detailed historical 
account of the evolution of extraterritoriality in Japan and the Ottoman Empire will be provided. 
Finally, I will argue that, regardless of the conscious intentions of its designers, extraterritoriality was 
a mechanism of social engineering that enabled the transformation of feudal empires into centralised 
nation-states with growing capitalist bases. Therefore, both the theory and practice of the standard of 
‘civilisation’ need to be understood in reference to the expansion of capitalist relations outside Europe 
at the time.  
2:1 Extraterritoriality as the ‘crown jewel’ of the civilising mission 
Extraterritoriality during the nineteenth century constituted a legal arrangement between Western and 
non-Western polities that excluded the citizens of the former from the territorial jurisdiction of the 
latter.4 As numerous scholars have pointed out, this was a standard practice during the mediaeval 
period, when it was one’s personal status that determined which set of laws was applicable to them.5 
                                                          
3 Legal imperialism and assimilationism are the underlying argument of Kayaolu’s comprehensive study of the 
phenomenon: T. Kayaolu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman 
Empire, and, China (CUP, 2014).  
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In the course of the nineteenth century, extraterritoriality was in operation in a number of social 
settings, including colonies, protectorates and so-called ‘semi-civilised’ states such as Japan, China, 
the Ottoman Empire and Siam. This chapter will focus on the last category, as these ‘semi-civilised’ 
countries presented the most challenging situation for the diplomats and theorists of the time.6 This 
was because, given that these countries were nominally independent, such extensive exceptions to 
their territorial jurisdiction were generally considered problematic and hence, exceptional and 
temporary.  
Extraterritoriality only arose as a problem for international lawyers to the extent that it was imposed 
upon ‘semi-civilised’ states that were not subject to formal colonialism, but still were not considered 
to have equal standing in the international legal realm. Importantly, the precise nature and 
characteristics of these polities remained unclear in the contemporary literature. For example, Lorimer 
remained quite indecisive regarding the exact status of countries like Japan, China or the Ottoman 
Empire.7 Hence, this categorisation fitted all those political communities that fell ‘somewhere 
between two ideal-typical poles - that of the territorially and jurisdictionally European state […] and 
that of the “stateless” extra-European nation’.8 For the legal orthodoxy of the time, this peculiar 
position bore a series of legal consequences. The point of departure was Lorimer’s argument that their 
jurisdiction could and should be restrained and, therefore, Western states could extend the application 
of their domestic laws ‘on grounds of humanity’.9 Nevertheless, these countries’ partial inclusion in 
the international legal order10 meant that their consent was required for the establishment of such a 
system. Hence, extraterritoriality could be imposed only through treaties, unequal as these might have 
been: ‘[t]hese treaties were unequal in several senses: they were forced at gunpoint; they expressed 
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European legal thought’ Özsu (supra note 8), 127.  




the economic and political interests of Britain and other powers; and key provisions, including 
extraterritoriality, were not reciprocal’.11 Amongst other instances, the ruling of the mixed tribunal of 
Alexandria is telling. When confronted with the argument that, as a matter of principle, ‘foreigners, 
when living in an Ottoman country, are to enjoy the privilege of absolute extraterritoriality and hence 
are freed from all subjection to the local laws and local sovereignty’,12 the tribunal ruled that the claim 
was manifestly exaggerated, since independent states enjoyed territorial sovereignty regardless of 
their participation or exclusion from Christendom.13 The tribunal went on to assert that the bases for 
extraterritoriality were the capitulations. Capitulations could be interpreted narrowly or broadly 
depending on the context, but no blanket exception to local jurisdiction could be presumed 
independently from them: ‘these immunities are veritable restrictions to the principle of sovereignty, 
the law of nations has hence assimilated them to the servitude of public law, servitudes, juris gentium 
whose application must be kept within the limits of the treaties or usages that have established’.14  
Institutional requirements aside, the imposition of extraterritoriality as such was a given and it was 
expressly associated with the supposedly insufficiently ‘civilised’ character of these countries. The 
relationship between civilisation and extraterritoriality was such a close one that numerous scholars 
and diplomats saw a clear causal link between the two. Bowden unambiguously conceptualised 
extraterritoriality as an outcome of the distinction between civilised and un-civilised political 
communities: ‘[t]he clear-cut legal distinction between the civilized and uncivilized worlds and the 
unavoidable interactions between the two led to what became known as the unequal treaty system, or 
the system of capitulations and the right of extraterritoriality’.15 Despite their marked theoretical 
differences, Grewe,16 Anghie17 and Gong18 all agree that extraterritoriality was intrinsically linked to 
                                                          
11 R. S. Horowitz ‘International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during 
the Nineteenth Century’ (2005) 15 Journal of World History 445, 455. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
‘unequal treaties’, see M. Craven ‘What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of Informal Empire’ 
(2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 335. 
12 Sursock Brothers v Egyptian Government, reprinted in EA van Dyck, The Capitulations of the Ottoman 
Empire since the Year 1150 (Government Printing Office, 1881), 178.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. Lawrence also clearly stated that, for subjects of Western states to be exempted for local law, ‘[i]t rests 
on special agreement, and not, like those we have been considering hitherto, on the common law of nations’. 
T.J. Lawrence, Principles of International Law (Cushing and Co, 1895), 229.  
15 B. Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (University of Chicago Press, 
2009), 124.  
16 ‘The principal, practical effect of the linkage of international law to the standards of civilisation was the 
system of “capitulations” or, in other words, the “unequal” treaties by which the civilised nations reserved a 
special jurisdiction (“consular jurisdiction”) over their own nationals, whom they did not wish to have subjected 
to the legal order and justice system of a half-civilised or uncivilised country.’ Grewe (supra note 5), 457.  




the concept of civilisation. This consensus19 is largely reflective of the attitudes of international 
lawyers of the time. For example, Westlake understood extraterritoriality to be a direct outcome of the 
interaction between different civilisations:  
Turkey and Persia, China, Japan, Siam and some other countries have civilisation differing from the 
European, and so far as they are not Mahometan from those of one another. The Europeans or Americans 
in them form classes apart, and would not feel safe under the local administration of justice which, even 
were they assured of its integrity, could not have the machinery necessary for giving adequate protection 
to the unfamiliar interests arising out of a foreign civilisation.20  
Similarly, Lawrence argued that extraterritoriality is essential, ‘owing to the defective character of 
Oriental administration of justice and the dependent position assigned to Christians by the sacred code 
of Islam’.21 Pasquale Fiore was also clear about the link between extraterritoriality and the standard of 
‘civilisation’: ‘[i]n principle, Capitulations are derogatory to the local “common” law; they are based 
on the inferior state of civilisation of certain states in Africa, Asia and other barbarous regions’.22 
On a related note, it was during the nineteenth century that an Orientalist discourse on the barbarity, 
cruelty and lawlessness of the Ottoman Empire emerged, in order to justify the stabilisation and 
expansion of Westerners’ extraterritoriality rights. To provide but one example, Lord Cromer wrote: 
The rigidity of the Sacred Law has been at times slightly tempered by well-meaning and learned 
Moslems who have tortured their brain in devising sophisms to show that the legal principles and social 
system of the seventh century can, by some strained and intricate process of reasoning, be consistently 
and logically made to conform with the civilized practices of the twentieth century.23  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17 ‘Put another way, this test in effect suggested that the project of meeting the standard of civilisation consisted 
of generalising the standards embodied in the capitulation system which was specific to aliens, to the entire 
country.’ A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP, 2005), 86.  
18 ‘[T]he imposition of extra-territorial requirements until a certain “minimum of efficiency in running the State 
machinery, modicum of independence of the judiciary from the executive, and adequate protection of the safety, 
life, liberty, dignity, and property of foreigners” could be guaranteed by the non-European countries themselves, 
seemed a practical solution to the everyday problems which unavoidably arose when different civilizations 
collided in their customs and traditions.’ Gong (supra note 2), 14.  
19 See also: ‘The core of the problem was the difference in civilisation between the foreign merchants and local 
inhabitants, and the close association of the Mohammedan religion with the laws which the local inhabitants 
followed.’ Keeton (supra note 4), 295; D.P Fidler, ‘A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International 
Law, Structural Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization’ (2000) 35 Texas 
International Law Journal 387.  
20 J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (Elibron Classics, 1894), 102.  
21 Lawrence (supra note 14), 230.  
22 P. Fiore, International Law Codified and its Legal Sanction or The Legal Organisation of the Society of States 
(Baker, 1918), 362.  
23 E.B. Cromer, Modern Egypt (Macmillan, 1908) Volume II, 136. 




This disapproval would escalate to moral panic whenever the abolition of the practice was 
discussed.24 Similarly, the rationale for the imposition of extraterritoriality in Japan was that ‘it was 
thought that [the Japanese] were not able to guarantee some basic rights, like life, dignity, property, 
travel, commerce and religion, to foreigners in their countries and were not even familiar with the 
obligations of modern international law, including the law of war’;25 in a nutshell, their legal and 
political system did not live up to the ‘standard of civilisation’. Extraterritoriality was thus not only 
conceived as the inevitable consequence of certain polities’ ‘uncivilised’ status, but it was also viewed 
as the most typical demonstration of the operation of the standard of civilisation.  
As has already been mentioned, this chapter is structured around a comparative study between Japan 
and the Ottoman Empire. Admittedly, these were not the only ‘semi-civilised’ states submitted to the 
practice, as China and Siam were two other prominent examples.26 The reason for this specific choice 
of case studies is that these two cases represent the application of extraterritoriality in widely 
diverging social, cultural, religious and geographical circumstances. To mention but a few 
dimensions, the Ottoman Empire was in close interaction with Europe for centuries, whereas Japan 
experienced centuries-long isolation even from its own neighbours. Moreover, Japan represents the 
single most successful (judged against intra-systemic standards) case of encounter with, and 
management of, extraterritoriality, while the Ottoman Empire was subject to the regime well into the 
twentieth century. Finally, the Ottomans were a multi-ethnic empire with a strong Islamic tradition, 
while Japan adhered to a (neo)Confucian philosophy. Therefore, if common trends can be detected 
despite these diverse historical contexts, it is at least plausible to draw general conclusions regarding 
the overall function of extraterritoriality.  
2:2 Japan and the Ottoman Empire: in search of common trends 
2:2:1 Japan's successful encounter with extraterritoriality: 1858-1899 
 
                                                          
24 See: H. Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Gomidas Institute, 2000), 114-17.  
25 R.P. Anand, ‘Family of “Civilized” States and Japan: A Story of Humiliation, Assimilation, Deﬁance and 
Confrontation’ (2003) 5 Journal of the History of International Law 1, 18.  
26 For the history of extraterritoriality in China, see: P. K. Cassel, Grounds of Judgement; Extraterritoriality and 
Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan (OUP, 2012); G.W. Keeton, The Development of 
Extraterritoriality in China (Howard Fertig, 1969); E. P. Scully, Bargaining the State from Afar: American 
Citizenship in the Treaty Port China 1844-1942 (Columbia University Press, 2001). For the development of the 
practice in Siam, see: F. B. Sayre, ‘The Passing of Extraterritoriality in Siam’ (1928) 22 American Journal of 
International Law 70; A. Iijima, ‘The “International Court” System in the Colonial History of Siam’ (2008) 5 
Taiwan Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 31. 




Both during the nineteenth century and today, Japan’s encounter with extraterritoriality is commonly 
seen as a smooth and successful one, due to the relative brevity of its operation (1858-1899) and the 
impressively rapid reforms Japan undertook to safeguard its abolition. However, this process was 
more complicated than the hegemonic legal and political narrative of the time suggests. The argument 
proposed here is as follows: for Japan to acquire ‘civilised’ status and to abolish extraterritoriality, it 
needed to introduce the reforms linked to the ‘standard of civilisation’, such as state centralisation, 
monopoly of legitimate violence and legalisation of domestic and international affairs.27 As has 
already been argued,28 these preconditions were intrinsically linked to the diffusion and stabilisation 
of the CMP. Japan’s rapid transition to ‘civilisation’ is largely attributable to the internal balance of 
social powers within Japanese society. When extraterritoriality was imposed in Japan, the CMP was 
already a rapidly developing force in the Japanese society, and the native bourgeoisie, albeit excluded 
from the political power, was largely dominant in the economic sphere. Hence, external pressure, both 
in the form of extraterritoriality and in the form of international commerce, facilitated and accelerated 
a process that was already well on track.  
As early as 1573, the daimyo (local ruler) of Omura allowed the Dutch to exercise jurisdiction in the 
port, not only over their subjects but also over Japanese, in order to secure their beneficial presence in 
the area.29 This admittedly was a highly exceptional case. However, in 1613, the English East India 
Company was granted the privilege/right to exercise jurisdiction over the English committing offences 
in Japan. The Dutch and the Spanish largely operated under a similar regime.30 Thus, foreigners 
residing in Japan were subject to their own laws and jurisdiction (which was not necessarily a state 
jurisdiction), and there is no indication that this was considered somehow humiliating or problematic 
for the Japanese. Nevertheless, this system did not have the chance to evolve, as it did, for instance, in 
the Ottoman Empire. In 1638, Japan imposed a strict system of seclusion that not only in principle 
excluded the foreigners from residing in Japan, but also prohibited the Japanese from going abroad or 
even building ships capable of making long voyages.31 The commonly accepted explanation for this 
practice was that aggressive Christian missionaries provoked unrest in Japanese society.  
This generally correct explanation needs to be taken a step further. Maintenance of uniformity and 
strength of Japanese religion was much more than a purely cultural, let alone spiritual, issue. Japanese 
religious organisation was in fact essential for maintaining the tributary mode of production in place. 
This was due to the structure of the political and economic system in Japan in the years of the 
                                                          
27 See Chapter 1 note 38 of this thesis.  
28 See Section 1:4 ‘A way forward: capitalism as civilisation’ of this thesis.   
29 F.C. Jones, Extraterritoriality in Japan (Yale University Press, 1931), 6.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Anand (supra note 25), 8. A small number of Dutch merchants were allowed to reside in Nagasaki under strict 
conditions.  




Tokugawa dynasty (1600-1868). Although real power rested with the military commander (shogun), 
the Emperor was formally the source of all power, being ‘the decedent of gods and representative of a 
dynasty coeval with heaven and earth’.32 It was he who delegated power to the shogun to deal with the 
everyday matters, although this process of delegation was a mere formality. This binary scheme of 
power was the backbone of the overall class structure of Tokugawa Japan. Beneath the shogun were 
the local rulers (daimyo) who received land in exchange for providing military services. Their number 
fluctuated but, just before the 1868 Restoration, there were 266 daimyo, and in essence they 
constituted ‘a “state class” utilising centralised political apparatus to extract surpluses—as tax or 
labour services—from a peasantry it did not personally control’.33 Further, the samurai (warriors) 
were paid in rice for their military services, even though many of them had never fought and largely 
constituted a parasitic class:  
 
In order to maintain internal stability, the Tokugawa rulers had deliberately separated the samurai from 
the means of production (land ownership), eliminating their fiscal and military autonomy. […] The 
power of the samurai class had becomealmost exclusively based on office-holding, and this monopoly 
was not immediately in danger because no other class had yet the experience, education, and, confidence 
to displace warriors in administration.34 
  
Further there were the farmers who were bound to the daimyo, the artisans, and the merchants. Given 
that class relations were ‘ritualized and formalized… to a very high degree’,35 the spiritual authority 
of the Emperor was essential to keep the system in place. Hence, rapid Christianisation of the 
population was a very real threat for the perpetuation of the tributary relations of power. Therefore, 
Japan’s seclusion efforts were an attempt to preserve the power relations that had come under 
pressure. Nevertheless, relative isolation did not save the Japanese tributary system. Although such 
estimates are always risky, it is suggested that, by 1868, the vast bulk of the country’s wealth was 
already concentrated in the hands of capitalists.36 In any case, by the mid-nineteenth century, Japan 
was experiencing serious social and political tensions, since economic power largely laid in the hands 
of a class excluded from political power.  
This tension was significantly accentuated after the forcible opening of Japan to the world in 1853. In 
Maier’s words:  
                                                          
32 Jones (supra note 29), 8.   
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34 Ibid., 478.  
35 J. Halliday, A Political History of Japanese Capitalism (Pantheon Books, 1975), 8.  
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The early Tokugawa after 1600 had sought to escape from decades of anarchic civil strife and 
to fix a stable order of Japan, to freeze it into a pyramid of isolated and hierarchical Confucian 
peace and order. […] Even before Commodore Matthew Perry arrived with his black ships in 
1853, the Japanese old regime faced fiscal difficulties and social unrest.37  
The US, anxious about the British expansion in China, sent Commodore Perry with four warships to 
make Japan accept the presence of foreigners. The shogun could not ignore the military supremacy of 
the US and moved forward with the agreement, asking though for imperial authorisation. Hence, in 
1854, the shogun and Perry signed the ‘Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce’ (Treaty of 
Kanagawa).38 
The Kanagawa Treaty had unpredictable implications for the international standing of Japan. 
Technically, the concessions made by the Japanese were quite limited, opening two ports to US 
merchants (Shimoda and Hakodadi), but without providing for permanent residence of US citizens in 
Japan.39 The Japanese were largely content with this arrangement, underestimating the importance of 
the most-favoured-nation clause that intended to secure for US citizens any right granted to other 
nations. Indeed, the following year (1855), Britain also rushed to sign a treaty with Japan (the 
Nagasaki Treaty), and in 1858 US signed a second, more comprehensive treaty with Japan that 
provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction.40 Unsurprisingly, numerous States, such as the Netherlands, 
Russia, France, Portugal, Austria-Hungary, the then-independent Hawaii and Peru followed the 
example set by the US and Britain and signed treaties granting them extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
their subjects in Japan. It is a historical curiosity that the most comprehensive extraterritoriality 
provision was that between Japan and Austria-Hungary, which had minimal commercial interests in 
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the Far East.41 Crucially, the operation of the most-favoured-nation clauses meant that all citizens of 
the Treaty Powers automatically enjoyed the rights granted to Austria-Hungary.42 
Legal reform was at the heart of the Meiji reform project and was of central importance for the Treaty 
Powers, in order for them to consent to the abolition of extraterritoriality. After all, the question of 
legal reform was of paramount importance when the Institut du droit international consulted its 
members as to the desirability and possibility of termination of consular jurisdiction in the ‘Orient’.43 
The Tokugawa legal system was in principle based on feudal jurisdiction, and the role of the-in any 
event, very thin-central power in prescribing and enforcing laws was very limited. Further, laws were 
in principle neither written nor publicly accessible and customary law was of central importance. 
Correspondingly, the degree of legalisation of everyday life was extremely low, leaving significant 
space for traditional practices, informal mediation, etc. Moreover, the separation of powers was 
unknown and courts were perceived as ‘administrative offices with concurrent power to settle 
disputes’.44 Legalisation was particularly thin, when it came to what is now understood as private 
law.45 The nominally tributary structure of the economy was at the root of this, since it precluded 
individual ownership of the land and extensive commercial transactions, at least in theory. It is telling 
that, in the 1840s, the shogunate officials accused the Westerners of only being interested in ‘the 
pursuit of profit, in contrast with a society intent on rites and rituals’.46 Since Tokugawa Japan aspired 
to be the latter, the place of private law, civil or commercial, was understandably extremely limited. 
Importantly, law reflected and perpetuated the strict class structure of the society, as status-based law 
was the backbone of Tokugawa’s law and administration.47 To give but one example, a samurai was 
                                                          
41 The provision read as follows: ‘All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or of person, arising 
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given the privilege to kill any commoner who addressed them in an inappropriate manner. Further, the 
family as a social and productive unit, and not the individual, tended to be the focal point of criminal 
legislation. As Jones reports, a husband could rightfully kill his wife and her lover in the case of 
adultery, and he was under an obligation to kill his wife if she offended his parents. What is more, a 
son who failed to assist his parents facing fatal danger was executed.48  
The Meiji legal reform process can be divided into two periods: the earlier extending between 1868 
and 1882, and the second covering the period between 1882 and 1898. In a nutshell, during the first 
period, reform focused on the reorganisation of the administration, while the second wave concerned 
legal codification. The reorganisation of the administration in accordance with the principle of legality 
meant that although law-making remained practically unrestrained, legal limits were imposed upon 
the administration to prevent secrecy and arbitrariness and enhance homogeneity and predictability in 
the way the state affairs were handled on a daily basis. Further, the old status-based law was gradually 
eroded to be replaced by a single legal status, that of the Japanese Imperial subject (shimmin).49 For 
example, in December 1871, the samurai were ‘liberated’, since the law allowed them to engage in 
any occupation they wished, moving towards the abolition of the legal institutionalisation of class 
divisions.50 Nevertheless, this process remained incomplete to the extent that hierarchical family 
relations were maintained during this period. Further, in 1882, a new Civil Code was promulgated, 
largely inspired by the French legal tradition.51 This brought to an end the centuries-long influence of 
the Chinese legal system upon Japan.  
However, when the future of extraterritoriality was examined at the Tokyo Conference in 1882, the 
process of legal reform was deemed incomplete. Harry Parkes, the British ambassador in Tokyo, 
objected to the abolition of the regime on four bases. First, the effective application of the new 
Criminal Code was still to be confirmed. Secondly, Japan lacked codified commercial and civil law. 
Thirdly, Japanese judges were not appropriately trained to implement the new legislation; and finally, 
more time was required in order to replace the judges of the old regime.52 Japan’s response to these 
criticisms was relatively quick and efficient. Α process of drafting a constitution was initiated and the 
Meiji Constitution came into force in 1889.53 Heavily drawing on the Prussian tradition, the 
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Constitution stated that the Emperor was ‘the head of the empire combining in himself the rights of 
sovereignty’54 and granted him the right to exercise law-making powers through the Diet.55 Rights 
were granted to the imperial subjects ‘within the limits of the law’ and the preamble of the 
Constitution read as follows: ‘[w]e now declare to respect and protect the security of the rights and of 
the property of Our people, and to secure to them the complete enjoyment of the same, within the 
extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and of the law’.56 Hence, the Constitution hailed 
Japanese subjects as individuals who enjoyed rights (and were not the beneficiaries of privileges), and 
individual property rights were singled out as worthy of the respect and protection of the Empire.57 It 
is fair to assert that status-based law and its neglect or even hostility towards private transactions were 
brought to a definite end with the introduction of the Constitution. Further, courts were separated into 
public and private law branches following the civil law model and the independence of the judiciary 
was secured.58 Publicity for trials was guaranteed59 and the proper qualifications, tenure and discipline 
of the judges were subjected to the law.60 Further, and despite controversies and delays to their 
introduction, three new private law codes (Commercial, Civil, and Civil Procedure) were made 
effective before the end of the century.  
Legalisation of social affairs was not exclusive to the domestic sphere; international law also 
developed rapidly in Japan. The dismantlement of tributary relations61 paved the way for the 
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61 For the traditional position of Japan in the outer limits of the Sino-centric tributary system, see: Y. Onuma 
‘When was the Law of International Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an 
Intercivilizational Perspective’ (2000) 2 Journal of the History of International Law 1, 11-18.  




development of a new regulatory system of inter-community relations. These communities were now 
necessarily nation-states and international law was the system that organised their reciprocal rights 
and obligations. Further, in their efforts to open Japan, Western powers commonly employed the 
language of international law.62 Initially, the Japanese were quite sceptical about international law, 
since their first encounter was through the system of unequal treaties. Still, they were determined to 
familiarise themselves with international law and, already in 1862, the Tokugawa government had 
sent eight students abroad to study it. By the end of the 1860s, parts of Wheaton’s work were 
translated into Japanese.63 Similarly, the Japanese Association of International Law was founded in 
1897 and the Japanese Journal of International Law was published in 1902, two years before the 
Revue générale de droit international public. Undeniably, though, the most important incident in this 
process was the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, which, according to the Japanese, was conducted 
‘consistently with the law of nations’.64 It is of particular interest that the leading international legal 
scholars, Professors John Westlake and Thomas Holland, advocated for the international legality and 
the civilised character of Japan’s military efforts. This link was forged when Takahashi Sakaye, 
Professor of the Imperial Naval Staff College and advisor of the Japanese navy during the war 
between Japan and China, visited Cambridge University and published a book entitled Cases on 
International Law during the Chino-Japanese War, at Cambridge in 1899. Westlake and Holland 
contributed to the introduction and the preface of the book: ‘[t]hese were like testimonials by the two 
distinguished British international lawyers to certify that Japan had been faithfully following rules of 
international law in the Chino-Japanese war and their opinions that Japan was ready to join the family 
of civilized States’.65 
As Kayolu observes, legal reform was in fact an important prerequisite for creating a unified 
administrative structure for Japan.66 The Meiji regime reorganised the local administrative units, 
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reducing the 250 daimyo down to 46 prefectures with a centralised and concrete administrative system 
that went down from the Emperor to the smallest village.67 Significantly, prefectures were 
demilitarised, since they could now maintain only one platoon of troops to safeguard the public 
order.68 In order to build national unity, a new education system was introduced by the 1872 
Education Act, which was openly dedicated to enhancing people’s loyalty to the state and the state’s 
ability to mobilise its citizens.69 Indeed, the state attempted to claim a central role in people’s 
education, both by introducing compulsory education, and by excluding from certain official posts 
graduates of non-state education institutions, and importantly, of private law schools.70 Further, 
conscription was a means employed to secure mass mobilisation and enhance people’s ‘patriotic’ 
feelings. Hence, conscription was first introduced in an attempt to concentrate military forces in the 
hands of the central government. This was the reason that the government did not choose to employ 
the unemployed samurai that were ‘liberated’ by their formal bonds a year earlier (1871), but opted 
for a new system built on exclusive commitment towards the newly emerging nation-state. In 1876, 
the systematic attempt to concentrate violence at the hands of the state both factually and symbolically 
resulted in the government banning the practice of wearing swords, a traditional samurai practice that, 
amongst other things, made their status visible.71  
This rapid and comprehensive transformation of Japanese law and society resulted in the relatively 
early abolition of extraterritoriality. In 1895, the Great Powers signed a treaty with Japan for the 
abolition of extraterritoriality. Four years later (1899), the treaty became effective, rendering Japan 
the first non-Western, non-Christian state to gain full sovereignty under international law. The 
argument proposed here is that the reasons for the relatively quick abolition of extraterritoriality can 
be traced in the comparatively easy and quick completion of the Meiji reforms programme between 
1868 and 1900. In turn, this fact can be associated with and at least partly attributed to the internal 
balance of social powers in Japanese society. In short, when extraterritoriality was imposed in Japan, 
the capitalist mode of production was already a rapidly developing force in Japanese society and the 
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70 Halliday (supra note 33), 38.  
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(Blackwell, 1992), 69.  




native bourgeoisie, albeit excluded from the political power, was largely dominant in the economic 
sphere. Hence, external pressure, both in the form of extraterritoriality and in the form of international 
commerce, facilitated and accelerated a process that was already well on track. It is asserted, 
therefore, that the reforms required for the abolition of extraterritoriality largely coincided with the 
demands of the rapidly rising Japanese capitalist class, and, hence, the success of the encounter.72  
2:2:2 The Ottoman Empire: the slow emergence of sovereignty in the periphery of 
Europe 
When it comes to extraterritoriality, the Ottoman Empire manifests certain particularities. Unlike the 
Japanese case, which involved varying degrees of isolation such that the problem of the legal 
treatment of aliens mainly arose in the course of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had been 
through centuries of interaction with Europe. Its geographical proximity to Europe and its vast 
territorial possessions in Europe, the existence of extensive trade relations between the two regions 
and the fact that significant Christian populations resided in the Empire, either as subjects of the 
Sultan or as merchants, posed the problem of the legal status of non-Muslim residents of the Empire 
quite early.  
In fact, this close symbiosis was less problematic than we might imagine. Mediaeval Muslim legal 
and political thought and practice evolved around the binary scheme of dar al-Islam (the whole 
territory in which the law of Islam prevails) and dar al-harb (Land of War), which generally can be 
defined as everything outside dar-al-Islam. Since ‘Muslim jurisdiction, and therefore dar-al-Islam, 
was coextensive with secure, non-oppressed Muslim inhabitation’,73 the scope of its application was 
personal, with only secondary territorial connotations. Given the tolerance towards the peoples of the 
Bible dictated by the Quran, non-Muslim populations were allowed to apply their own laws. Indeed, 
the degree of communal autonomy within the Empire was so extensive that religious communities 
were the loci of political and social self-identification. 
The regulation of the legal status of Christians, who were not subjects of the Ottoman Empire, was 
structured around the so-called capitulations. Capitulations were edicts of the Sultan that were 
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unilaterally granted to foreign powers, and regulated the protection of their subjects.74 Importantly, the 
capitulations were neither formulated nor perceived as treaties and, henceforth, they did not give rise 
to rights and duties, but rather granted privileges. As Spagnolo pointed out,  
these documents, regulating trade in the empire and the juridical status of European merchants, were 
negotiated arrangements that deliberately fell short, however, of being formulated as treaties. At the 
height of Ottoman imperial power they were granted to foreign representatives in the language of 
sovereign dispensation.75  
For example, in the preamble of one of these capitulations, the reigning sultan asserted that ‘entreaties 
were acceded to, and these our high commands conceded’.76 Importantly, the exception from Ottoman 
jurisdiction did not automatically result in the submission of the given foreigners to the state-law of 
their place of origin. For instance, in the case of British merchants residing in the Empire, it was not 
the British state, but rather the Levant Company that had jurisdiction over potential cases. 
Accordingly, the individuals who served as judges usually did not have extensive legal training, and 
thus resolved conflicts mainly through bargaining and compromise rather than by strictly applying 
legal rules. Impressively, this remnant of a mediaeval understanding of legality survived until 1825, 
when the Foreign Office took over extraterritorial authority by the Levant Company.77 
Given this long-standing character of extraterritoriality in the Ottoman Empire, it is difficult to detect 
the exact point of time when extraterritoriality was transformed from a concession granted by a 
powerful sultan to a practice imposed by the West over a collapsing empire.78 Indeed, there might not 
be a specific turning point, but it was rather an ongoing process extending into the first half of the 
nineteenth century. The situation was definitely blurred and complicated, but it is clear that, by 1856, 
extraterritoriality as a system imposed by the West had been crystallised.79 This was also the point 
that extraterritoriality was redefined as a legal paradox, as a violation of sovereign equality and finally 
as a humiliation. What undeniably complicated the state of affairs was the 1856 Treaty of Paris. The 
                                                          
74 The first such arrangement was between the Ottoman Empire and France in 1535. England and the Dutch 
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inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the ‘family of the civilised nations’ was dictated arguably by the 
necessity to enhance the status of the Empire and protect it both from Russian expansionism and from 
internal secession tendencies. That said, it inevitably sharpened the contradictions of 
extraterritoriality. If the Empire was indeed a civilised state, such extensive exceptions from its 
jurisdiction violated its sovereignty, its territorial integrity and the absence of any sense of reciprocity 
challenged the formal equality of states. These were indeed the arguments put forward a good sixty 
years later, when the Ottoman Empire unsuccessfully attempted to abolish extraterritoriality in 1914.80 
Furthermore, the arrangement was increasingly seen as unusual, humiliating and detrimental to 
Ottoman interests. In 1886, Hakkı Paşa, who was one of the first Ottoman international lawyers and 
the author of a relevant textbook, criticised harshly the regime, echoing the growing indignation of 
Ottoman elites: ‘In fact, one of the greatest calamities faced by Islam today is the privilege enjoyed by 
aliens [in the Ottoman realms], the intrusions by consuls; consequently, the favours accorded by our 
forefathers as a matter of grace and benevolence are used as weapons against us.’81 Crucially, 
extraterritoriality began to be seen as a factor hindering the administrative reform of the Empire, since 
it perpetuated the co-existence of multiple legal systems in its territory.82 
Eventually, the arrangement was abolished in 1923, with the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne.83 It 
is important to assess what were the developments that contributed to this abolition, as this might be 
useful in order to better grasp the social function of the system. For instance, certain Turkish 
historians assert that it was the military strengthening of Turkey and its overwhelming victory against 
Greece that necessitated this evolution.84 Further, the pertinence of the Turkish delegates and the 
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reluctance of Europe to engage in a war with Turkey also contributed towards this outcome. 
Nevertheless, this might be illustrative of the very specific moment when extraterritoriality was 
abolished (and, say, not five years later), and not of the general trend towards its abolition. 
The development of a centrally and bureaucratically organised nation-state, the modernisation and 
codification of the legal system and crucially, the dissolution of the remnants of the Asian mode of 
production were consistently perceived and presented as the preconditions for the abolition of 
extraterritoriality. By 1923, these goals were generally accomplished and, therefore, the continuation 
of the system was an anachronism attributed only to the particularistic interests of the Western states. 
Furthermore, it was exactly this centralisation and modernisation that transformed the ‘Sick Man of 
Europe’ into a considerable peripheral power. The victory against Greece in 1922, the exchange of 
populations between the two states countenanced by the PCIJ, and the ethnic cleansing of the 
Armenians enhanced the self-confidence of a specifically Turkish bourgeoisie that now felt that the 
emergence of a national capitalist class was possible and thus were determined to get rid of an 
international legal framework that put their interests in peril. 
In one of the most comprehensive works about the phenomenon of extraterritoriality, Kayaolu asserts 
that ‘Ottoman legal institutionalization is the centerpiece’85 for understanding the purpose and 
function of the system. Hornby, a high-ranking British Foreign Office official responsible for the 
promotion of the reforms in the Empire, provocatively asserted that its whole legal system should be 
subjected to revision.86 Even though being so outspoken cost him his post, his views largely reflected 
the views and the practice of the West. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, legal reform revolved 
around three main issues: codification, the abolition of religious law and the professionalisation of the 
judiciary. The codification process was mainly promoted by the 1839 Imperial Edict and the 1856 
Reform Edict. In this context,  
a number of codes were enacted between 1839 and 1881. These included a criminal code (1858), a code 
of criminal procedure (1880), a commercial code (1850), regulations determining the procedure of the 
commercial courts (1860), a code of maritime law (1864) and a code of civil procedure (1881). French 
law exercised a preponderant influence in fashioning this new legislation, which was restricted to the 
technical aspects of law and did not touch upon subjects such as family law and succession, which fall 
within the sphere of civil law proper.87 
Further, the prominence of religious law was a problem quite specific to the Ottoman Empire, in 
comparison to the other countries where the system of extraterritoriality was implemented. For 
instance, the Imperial Edict established state courts for the management of commercial and criminal 
cases, but civil cases still rested with the religious courts, be they Muslim, Christian or Jewish. 
Further, even when the codification advanced, it was understood that in case of conflict between 
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codified and religious law, the latter prevailed.88 Henceforth, the secularisation of legality was one of 
the primary targets of the process that was gradually accomplished and, indeed, reached its apogee 
with the abolition of religious courts in 1924 and with the constitutionalisation of a strict separation 
between religion and the state. This secularisation of legal affairs was of paramount importance, to the 
extent that Twiss, writing as a rapporteur for the Institut de droit international, identified the Empire’s 
Islamic world order as directly incompatible with reciprocity and equality, which were seen as basic 
concepts of ‘civilised’ international law.89 Thirdly, the legal training and ethos of the judges was 
considered a pressing issue. Hornby, for example, identified ‘lengthy bargaining that went against 
clear cut judgements’90 as one of the principal problems of the judiciary. Similarly, the US State 
Department Report on the subject identified the existence of well-educated judges as one of five 
conditions for the abolition of the system.91 The demand for the legal training of judges was in fact a 
demand for the creation of a distinct, professionalised class that was separated from the 
administration, but simultaneously faithful to the state. It is essential to note that the separation of 
powers went hand in hand with the centralisation and nationalisation (in the literal sense of the word) 
of the judicial system. Furthermore, this emphasis on the legal education of judges is symptomatic of 
the rise of law as a distinct technical discipline only accessible to certain individuals. As Poulantzas 
argued, ‘[m]odern law is a state secret which grounds a form of knowledge monopolized for reasons 
of State’.92 
Administrative reform and state-building constituted essential conditions for the abolition of 
extraterritoriality. The existence of a centrally organised state that would guarantee property rights and 
the conditions for capitalist accumulation by force were high on the agenda of the reforms. At the end 
of the day, any legal reform would be futile without the mechanisms necessary to enforce its 
provisions: ‘[a]lthough law organizes this violence, there can be no law or right in such a society 
without an apparatus that compels its observance and ensures its efficacy or social existence: the 
efficacy of law is never that of pure discourse, the spoken word, and the issuing of rules’.93  
It is notable that the emergence of such a modern nation-state was an endogenous process facilitated 
by international factors and not an externally imposed novelty, totally strange to the indigenous 
modalities and social needs. In the Ottoman Empire, this administrative re-organisation of the state 
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came to be known as Tanzimat and took place between 1839 and 1876. In the course of this period, a 
series of structural reforms took place, ranging from the issuing of banknotes and the creation of the 
first post office and telegraph network, to reforms that went to the heart of the mode of production, 
such as the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade and the replacement of guilds with factories.94 It 
is telling of the rapid expansion of the centralised state that the number of civil servants boomed from 
approximately two thousand to 35,000 in the course of a few decades.95 Furthermore, the interaction 
of the Empire with other states became professionalised, institutionalised and legalised. As a result, 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was founded in 1836. These reforms were closely associated with the 
rise of nationalists’ sentiments and movements, with the Young Turks constituting a prominent case. 
These social factors ‘not only enforced the territoriality of the law […] but they also territorialized the 
state, society and the individual’.96 The dissolution of legal pluralism and administrative centralisation 
reshaped the social meaning of territory that gradually arose as the locus for the exercise of power was 
similarly transformed into secular-national power. 
The emergence of a territorialised nation-state constituted the condition and the outcome of a process 
of dissolution of the feudal relations of production and of transition to capitalism. It is therefore 
interesting to examine how this process was linked with extraterritoriality in the Ottoman Empire. 
Nominally, the liberalisation of the economy did not constitute a condition for the abolishment of the 
system. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that it lay in the heart of the process, the reform of 
Ottoman land law being a good example. In a nutshell, the Ottoman Empire constituted a typical 
example of the Asiatic mode of production (AMP). The main characteristics of the AMP were the 
following: a) absence of private property of the means of production; b) collective organisation of the 
ruling class in a despotic state; and c) collective organisation of the ruled-labouring class in (village) 
communities.97 It was an economic model that relied heavily on agriculture and more specifically on 
schemes of communal ownership over land, and gave rise to a complicated system of personal bonds 
and dependencies that was ultimately reducible to the person of the Sultan. By the second half of the 
eighteenth century, this system became increasingly destabilised; a newly-emerging merchant 
bourgeoisie pushed forthe liberalisation of the economic model. Nevertheless, historical and social 
reasons hindered the dissolution of the traditional relations of production, even though the Tanzimat 
bureaucracy steadily promoted the establishment of a centralised state that would manage a growing 
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capitalist economy.98 Similarly, European states consistently pressed for the repeal of the rule that 
prohibited foreigners from buying land in the Empire.99 This reform would of course facilitate the 
commercial ambitions of Western merchants. Simultaneously, though, it was an essential step for 
freeing the land from the pre-capitalist burdens. Permitting foreigners to own land was more than 
simply reversing a discriminatory practice. Essentially, it was about abolishing personal relations as 
the basis of land ownership and turning land into a commodity that could be sold and bought freely in 
the market. Two Land Codes were, therefore, introduced in 1858 and in 1867. They both sought the 
commercialisation and privatisation of land ownership, fundamentally altering the patterns of 
ownership throughout the Empire. Ruth Kark summarises this evolution as follows:  
The Laws led to a change in ownership of village lands, particularly in uninhabited regions. Thus, large 
tracts of State lands that were available for sale changed hands (“fluid inventory” of land). These lands 
were purchased for speculative purposes, or for land reclamation and establishment of modern, profitable 
cash crop farms. This often involved the introduction of new technologies and had a large-scale and long-
term impact on the landscape.100  
 
Crucially, the 1867 Land Code permitted foreigners to buy land in the Empire on the condition that 
the Ottoman courts would have full jurisdiction over the cases arising.101 Undeniably, this was the 
result of bargaining and compromise between the Empire and European states. Still, this constitutes a 
strong indication that the exemption from Ottoman laws and jurisdiction only superficially was about 
‘civilisation standards’ and cultural differentiation. When the Ottoman Empire showed itself to be 
willing and capable of acting as the guarantor of private ownership rights, as ‘the ideal personification 
of the total national capital’,102 the raison d'être of extraterritoriality ceased to exist. Hence, long 
before the system was abolished, the privatisation of land set an important precedent and created a 
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discontinuity at the heart of the system. Given that this arrangement constituted an exception to an 
already exceptional system, it paved the way for the establishment of a new normality, which was 
characterised by the abolition of the practice altogether and the emergence of a centralised state 
capable of supporting a capitalist economy.  
Indeed, it is hardly coincidental that the abolition of extraterritoriality in 1923 coincided with the 
succession of the Ottoman Empire by Turkey. By then, most of the reforms demanded were either 
accomplished or well on track. In the final analysis, and in the words of Kemal Ataturk himself, the 
objective of the new government was to tear up the very foundations of the old regime anyway.103 
More specifically, the arrangement was abolished in 1923 with the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Lausanne.104 The argument put forward here is that the development of a centrally and 
bureaucratically organised nation-state, the modernisation and codification of the legal system and 
crucially, the dissolution of the remnants of the Asiatic mode of production were consistently 
perceived and presented as the preconditions for the abolition of extraterritoriality. By 1923, these 
goals were generally accomplished and, therefore, the continuation of the system was an anachronism 
attributed to the particularistic interests of the Western states. Accordingly, the military victory of 
Turkey was the catalyst, but not the structural cause, for the abolition of the regime.  
2:3 Beyond culture: Constructing a materialist narrative of extraterritoriality  
Drawing from the above historical examples, the argument put forward here is that through the 
concept of civilisation and more specifically through extraterritoriality, international law was a force 
of social engineering that enabled the transformation of certain societies in transition, such as Japan or 
the Ottoman Empire, into centralised nation-states with the institutions and legal systems necessary to 
support the diffusion and reproduction of the capitalist relations of production. In Chapter 1, I 
contested Miéville’s assertion that the concept of civilisation was a post-factum rationalisation of the 
unequal treaties between the West and certain ‘semi-civilised’ countries.105 I would like to return 
briefly to this point. Miéville’s argument rests upon the presumption that ‘[t]he polities with which 
these imperialist unequal treaties were concluded-Siam, China, Japan, Zanzibar, Madagascar, Muskat 
and others - were territorially bounded and internally sovereign’.106 Miéville is correct in identifying a 
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close link between these treaties and the concept of civilisation. That said, the starting point of his 
analysis has—hopefully—been shown to be mistaken. Even though he does not elaborate on his 
understanding of sovereignty, his assertion that, around the mid-nineteenth century, these polities 
were sovereign and territorially bound is incorrect. Indeed, personal-status laws and loose 
administrative structures were still prevalent in Japan and in the Ottoman Empire well into the 
nineteenth century. In fact, it was the very function of extraterritoriality to transform these societies 
into ‘sovereign and territorially-bound’ states and, upon the success of this process, extraterritoriality 
became redundant and was abolished. The fact that these polities exhibited characteristics divergent 
from those of the modern nation-state was not purely historically and geographically contingent. 
Rather, these arrangements were linked to the feudal/Asiatic modes of production that were dominant 
in the mediaeval era and their gradual disintegration had not yet led to the establishment of the CMP. 
Thus, it is argued that Japan or the Ottoman Empire not only were not, but from a Marxian point of 
view, could not possibly be similar to the state structures in Western Europe, where the transition to 
capitalism had largely been completed by the nineteenth century.107 Although this is part of a much 
broader discussion, Miéville’s general disregard for the role of the state in the organisation of 
capitalism108 is at the root of his misconception. Interestingly, this is a misconception shared by 
Anghie, who argues that ‘[t]his derogation from the sovereignty of the non-European state was 
naturally regarded as a massive humiliation by that state, which sought to terminate all capitulations at 
the earliest opportunity’.109 Here, Anghie appears trapped in an anachronistic scheme, which assumes 
that all political communities valued territorially-bound power. This is far from being true.110 There 
was nothing ‘natural’ in the sense of the humiliation extraterritoriality provoked during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Rather, this discomfort was the outcome of the process of social 
transformation extraterritoriality was promoting. Since feudal political structures were dissolved and 
the territorially-bound nation-state emerged, wide exceptions to territorial jurisdiction became a 
curiosity and, indeed, a sign of inferiority. This was not the prevailing attitude during mediaeval 
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times, when law was not predominately territorial in the first place. Thus, both Miéville and Anghie 
appear to ignore the transformative impact of the practice and to focus on the (undeniable) element of 
Western domination over these ‘semi-civilised’ states.  
My argument instead focuses on this transformative impact of international law and argues that it was 
at the heart of extraterritoriality. Twiss’s report for the Institut supports this interpretation. Even 
though a certain degree of romanticisation of the practice and of the attitude of  ordinary Ottomans 
needs to be presumed, Twiss pointed out that the example of consular courts inspired among the 
population (or rather among their rulers) great respect for foreign law, and was particularly important 
in diffusing the core elements of commercial law.111 Crucially, for Twiss, commercial law, trade and 
the concept of civilisation were intrinsically interlinked.112 Horowitz advances a similar  yet 
significantly more limited - point when he contends that it was as a result of the conditions attached to 
the abolition of extraterritoriality that China, Siam and the Ottoman Empire ‘came to increasingly 
approximate the European models of a national state by the early twentieth century’.113 I take this a 
step further and argue that this state-building was both the outcome and an essential precondition for 
the diffusion and smooth reproduction of the CMP. Fidler argues a similar point, even though he does 
not draw the wider conclusions this thesis does:  
Many of the basic elements of a “civilized” legal system supported capitalism at home and abroad. Under 
the influence of the standard of civilization, the conditions for economic intercourse established in 
capitulations were conditions that supported the kind of economic intercourse prevalent in Europe and 
the United States. Capitalism in both Europe and the United States rested on well-established legal 
systems that supported free enterprise. Capitulations represented the partial exportation of these legal 
systems to support commerce in the emerging markets of the uncivilized world.114 
Finally, it is suggested that, through this process of transformation, nineteenth-century international 
law was creating the conditions for its own demise. By being a force of social engineering for the 
promotion of capitalism, international law was forging social change and was pushing towards state 
centralisation, monopolisation of violence and legal codification. In turn, these material changes were 
one of the underlying factors for the rapid development of nationalist sentiments outside the West. In 
this context, overt imperialism and colonialism and international law as a system that organised and 
theorised these practices became increasingly intolerable. If the above observations are correct, two 
sets of conclusions follow. First, there was a stark contradiction at the core of international law of the 
time. On the one hand, its complicity with imperialism and colonialism appears unquestionable. On 
the other hand, its actual function created the material conditions that led to the questioning and 
                                                          
111 Twiss (supra note 43), 147.  
112 ‘[N]amely the fundamental elements of commercial law, as they were born by the progress of civilisation and 
from the needs of commerce.’ Ibid.  
113 Horowitz (supra note 11), 448.  
114 Fidler (supra note 19), 396.  




eventually the collapse of these specific structures of foreign domination.115 Secondly, this 
contradictory process indicates the limits of the approach that sees international law and institutions as 
simply ‘instruments’ at the hands of powerful states. Indeed, the case of extraterritoriality shows that, 
regardless of the conscious plans and wishes of its designers, the system developed its own dynamics. 
In this context, the short-term, particularistic interests of specific imperialist powers could delay or 
distort the process, but overall trends indicate that the rise and fall of extraterritoriality was linked to 
the impersonal, supra-national process of diffusion of the CMP.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I conducted a comparative historical analysis between two distinct cases of ‘semi-
civilised’ states that were subjected to the practice of extraterritoriality in the course of the nineteenth 
century. Despite significant cultural, geographical and historical differences, it is arguably the case 
that the imposition and abolition of the practice were dependent upon the requirement for domestic 
legal and institutional reforms, including legal codification, centralisation, bureaucratisation of the 
state apparatus and legalisation of international affairs. Crucially, these reforms were essentially pre-
conditions for the establishment and reproduction of the CMP and, hence, extraterritoriality must be 
understood as an international legal practice which, regardless of the consciousness of its promoters, 
advanced the diffusion of the capitalist mode of production building upon domestic trends and 
dynamics. Finally, and given the close association between extraterritoriality and the concept of 
‘civilisation’, the history of extraterritoriality reinforces my claim about the close conceptual and 
practical links between the standard of civilisation and the diffusion of capitalist relations in territories 
subjected to formal or (in the case of extraterritoriality) informal imperialism. 
Still, attempts by the imperial powers to manage and co-ordinate their expansion failed spectacularly. 
The outbreak of the First World War shook many of the beliefs of the ‘civilised’ world, including 
those of international lawyers. The situation was only complicated by the fact that a power in the 
close periphery of the ‘civilised world’, Russia, experienced a communist revolution and was 
staunchly denouncing all the products of the bourgeois civilisation, including international law. The 
Mandate System of the League of Nations arose as a method of managing the colonial question at a 
time when the old (international law) was dying, but the new (international law) was yet to be born.116 
The next chapter of this thesis focuses precisely on the Mandate System as a novel, institutional 
                                                          
115 For the impact of this process as a cause as well as a limitation of the process of self-determination see 
Section 4:1 ‘Decolonisation as homeopathy: the limitations of a revolution’ of the thesis at hand.  
116 I am borrowing here Gramsci’s classic aphorism: ‘This crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is 
dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to 
pass.’ A. Gramsci (ed/tr J. A. Buttigieg), Prison Notebooks (Columbia University Press, 1972), Volume 2, 32-
33.  




method of managing the colonial question and the problem of building sustainable capitalist systems 
outside the West. 




Chapter 3: The Mandates System and the twilight of ‘civilisation’: building sustainable 
capitalism in a transitional world  
 
The true nature of the international system under which we were living was not realised until it failed. 
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 
The League of Nations has been synonymous with failure and irrelevance in the grammar of 
international law and institutions, no less for its gradual demise during the 1930s and its failure to 
prevent the Second World War, with all the human suffering entailed by these. Nonetheless, in recent 
years, there has been a revival of interest in the inter-war period and a reassessment of the legacy of 
the institution.1 This chapter re-evaluates the functions and legacy of the ‘colonial’ branch of the 
League, the Mandates System (MS), and situates it within the broader framework of my argument 
about the ongoing synergy between international law and capitalism. More specifically, I argue that 
the MS was an attempt to both legitimise and, more significantly, rationalise colonialism, so as to 
safeguard the relatively smooth and sustainable transition of the mandate territories to capitalism. In 
other words, the institution of a soft system of international supervision operated as a force (gently) 
pushing colonial administrations into creating the political, legal and economic conditions that would 
facilitate the long-term interests of capitalism, promoting the reforms necessary for the establishment 
of capitalist relations of production in the mandated territories. In this respect, the reforms promoted 
by the MS bear significant similarity to those linked to the abolition of extraterritoriality, as analysed 
in the second chapter of this thesis,2 with the notable addition of a loose conception of welfarism.3 In 
turn, and regardless of the original intentions of its designers, this process of reform further advanced 
state-centralisation and undermined the conceptual and material foundations of nineteenth-century 
international law, paving the way for the decolonisation process after 1945.  
                                                          
1 Regarding the revival of historical interest and re-evaluation of the era, see: E. Manela, The Wilsonian 
Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (OUP, 2007); R. Henig 
and and A. Sharp, Makers of the Modern World: The League of Nations (Haus Publishing, 2010). The new 
edition of Carr’s classic critique with a substantive new introduction by Michael Cox is also part of this trend: 
E.H. Carr and M. Cox., The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (Palgrave MacMillan, 2001). For the forgotten role of the League in the population exchange between 
Greece and Turkey, see: U. Özsu, Formalizing Displacement: International Law and Population Transfers 
(OUP, 2014). For the first major work on the Mandates System in fifty years, see: S. Pedersen, The Guardians: 
The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (OUP, 2015). 
2 See:  Chapter 2 ‘Extraterritoriality and the civilising mission: international law and social transformation in 
Japan and the Ottoman Empire’ of the present thesis.  
3 For the most comprehensive study of welfarism and international law thus far, see: E. Jouannet (tr C. 
Sutcliffe), The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International Law (CUP, 2012).  




To substantiate this point, I focus on the political and ideological climate of the time in the aftermath 
of the First Wold War, which rendered direct annexations impracticable, and pointed towards the need 
for some form of interventionism both at home and abroad in order to sustain the capitalist mode of 
production (CMP). The specificities of the MS will then be described and situated within this climate. 
Initially emerging as a compromise between different Western powers (mainly the USA, Britain and 
France) on how to manage the territories of the powers defeated in the First World War, the system 
acquired its own dynamics, especially through the function of the Permanent Mandates Commission 
(PMC). The function of the PMC and its focus on economic development, free trade, free labour and 
welfarism will be the focal point of the second part of this chapter. My argument is that the PMC—
and more broadly the MS—oscillated between continuity and novelty in the way they arranged the 
relationship between international law, colonialism and capitalism.  
3:1 The beginning of the end for formal empires: internationalism, socialism and the 
rise of nationalism in the periphery  
The MS emerged as a solution to the problem of the territories that Germany and the Ottoman Empire 
lost after their defeat in the First World War. The historical novelty lies in the fact that the old recipe 
of partition of these territories among the victors and their annexation did not appear as the only and 
indisputable solution to this problem, even though it was consistently advocated by France.4 The 
reasons for this evolution are manifold, but at least three require our attention: first, the US, which 
emerged as a major global power, objected to these plans, formally opposing (overt) annexationism. 
Already in early 1917, Wilson had proclaimed that: ‘no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about 
from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property’.5 Secondly, the 1917 revolution in Russia 
and the fierce anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Bolsheviks gave rise to fears of contamination and the 
spread of communism. Finally, the emergence of anti-colonialist, nationalist movements, both in what 
were going to be the mandated territories, and more generally in the colonies and protectorates, 
challenged the legitimacy and practicability of national empires.  
The original proposal for a scheme of international tutelage belonged to Smuts, the Prime Minister of 
the Union of South Africa. However, according to him, the system would apply to the former 
                                                          
4 ‘As the Covenant would have prevented France from levying troops in the mandates, direct annexation of 
former German territories was clearly preferred. A compromise was eventually found which allowed France to 
levy troops in her mandates in case of war, but such an attitude raised some doubts as to French intentions and 
willingness to follow the principles of the Covenant.’ V. Dimier, ‘On Good Colonial Government: Lessons from 
the League of Nations’ (2004) 18 Global Society 279, 283. 
5 W. Wilson, ‘Peace Without Victory’ Address of President Woodrow Wilson to the US Senate (22 January 
1917) quoted in Manela (supra note 1), 24. 




territories of the Ottoman Empire and Eastern Europe and not to Africa or the Pacific.6 In this respect, 
the role of the US and of President Wilson personally in the emergence of the MS is indisputable. 
American promises of ‘a peace of a different kind’ and the general attitude of Britain’s Lloyd George 
against outright annexations led to the extension of the system. In fact, the plan President Wilson first 
submitted drew from a fairly long legacy of theories of international tutelage7 and proposed a system 
of direct international administration, where the sovereignty over these territories would actually lay 
with the League.8 Undeniably, this outlook was directly linked to Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points, 
and more directly to his call for national self-determination. That said, it is important to bear in mind 
that the MS was the outcome of a very complicated system of bargaining and compromise, and cannot 
be reduced to the plans and aspirations of the US. After all, the final months of negotiations took 
place after President Wilson was defeated by the US Senate, which failed to ratify the Versailles 
Treaty both in November 1919 and in March 1920.  
So as not to overstate the role of the US in the formation of the MS system, one also needs to consider 
the role of the other emerging power of the time, Bolshevik Russia. After all, it was Lenin who in 
1914 put forward the idea of national self-determination9 without limiting it to European peoples. 
Moreover, like Wilson, the Bolsheviks ‘blamed secret diplomacy and the old elites for the war, but 
they went further than him in breaking with diplomatic protocol, denouncing past treaties, publishing 
secret documents, and giving accounts of Trotsky’s negotiations with the Germans to reporters as they 
happened.’10 Moreover, as Grovogui observes, the October Revolution ‘directly challenged notions of 
                                                          
6 Q. Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations (Greenwood Press [1932], 1968), 33. For a general 
overview of the initial proposal, see: J. C. Smuts, ‘The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion’, reprinted in 
D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (G.P. Putnam’s Sons [1928], 1971). 
7 ‘Ideas of imperial tutelage or trusteeship had a long genealogy, with the history of British anti-slavery cited as 
evidence of the Empire’s role in generalizing humanitarian norms.’ Pedersen (supra note 1), 24. For a 
comprehensive overview of the idea of international trusteeship and its links with Empire, see: W. Bain, 
Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power (OUP, 2003).  
8 ‘Any authority, control or administration which may be necessary in respect of these peoples or territories 
other than their own self-determined and self-organized autonomy shall be the exclusive function of and shall be 
vested in the League of Nations and exercised or undertaken by or on behalf of it.’ W. Wilson’s Second Draft or 
First Paris Draft, 10 January 1919 quoted in P. B. Potter, ‘The Origins of the System of Mandates under the 
League of Nations’ (1922) 4 The American Political Science Review 563, 568. 
9 See V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (University Press of the Pacific, 2004 [1914]). For 
an overview of Marxists’ stance towards self-determination and international law during the twentieth century, 
see: B. Bowring ‘Positivism versus Self-determination: The Contradictions of Soviet International Law’ in S. 
Marks (ed.) International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies (CUP, 2008), 133-68. 
10 M. Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (Penguin, 2012), 126. 




legitimacy in the modern state’.11 Especially during the first decade of the new regime, the fear of 
contamination of the revolution was vivid and it posed constraints on the manoeuvres available to 
colonial powers, since the Soviets would rhetorically and, to a degree, practically, denounce 
imperialism.  
This brings us to the last factor that rendered imperial annexation impracticable: local resistance. In 
the aftermath of the war, anti-imperial sentiment was on the rise across the colonised world. The 
participation of colonised peoples in the war had given them aspirations for self-government or at the 
very least more humane imperial rule,12 and the unwillingness of the imperial powers to live up to 
these expectations stirred significant unrest.13 Wilson’s promise for self-determination offered hope to 
colonial peoples and, in spring and summer of 1919, a number of protests, strikes and revolts erupted 
in places as diverse as Egypt, India, Korea and China.14 Indeed, China became the only country that, 
despite its participation in the Paris Peace Conference, did not sign the Versailles Treaty, since the 
decision of Western powers to allow Japan possession over the region of Shandong provoked outrage 
in and outside China.15 Chinese mobilisation against the Versailles Treaty signalled the increasing 
importance of the masses for the formation of international law and diplomacy regarding the colonial 
question. Outside the West, 1919 turned out to be the moment for both the rise and the fall of liberal 
internationalism and many nationalist leaders gradually turned to the Soviet Russia for moral and 
material support, even if most of them did not embrace communism or socialism.16 This 
                                                          
11 S. N. Z. Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International 
Law (University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 115. 
12 ‘For these Africans, the sacrifice of their lives during the war was a debt sealed in blood that could not be 
reneged. This blood sacrifice (dette de sang) was the basis of African demands.’ Ibid., 114. 
13 The case of Gandhi is paradigmatic here: ‘For Gandhi, this was a moment of transformation, both in his 
private views and in his public stature. Throughout the war, he had been a staunch supporter of the empire and 
had worked hard to assist in the recruitment of Indians into the military. Now, however, he realized that his 
hopes of achieving equality of Indians within the empire had been in vain, and emerged for the first time as a 
figure of national stature to lead the movement to oppose these “black acts”. […] The response to his 
announcement was unprecedented. Strikes were declared in many of India’s cities, and, despite Gandhi’s call for 
the observance of nonviolence, clashes between protesters and police occurred in several places.’ Manela (supra 
note 1), 169. 
14 Manela has documented the largely unwarranted and unpredictable impact of Wilson’s proclamation with an 
emphasis on the above-mentioned countries: Manela (supra note 1).  
15 ‘It was rather the mobilized Chinese nationalists around the world who had heard the call of self-
determination and were determined that China, too, would have it. Largely due to their firm opposition, China 
became the only state represented at the conference that did not sign the treaty.’ Ibid., 193.  
16 Simultaneously some of them would join the communist movement through the anti-imperialist, rather than 
socio-economic, route. For example, in 1919, Mao Zedong was a young Chinese nationalist sympathetic to 




uncomfortable alliance re-emerged in the years of the New International Economic Order five decades 
later.17 At the same time, in Paris, the First Pan-African Congress took place and, in its final 
declaration, appeared to call for international administration of those territories that allegedly were not 
eligible for immediate independence.18  
It was within this particular historical context of liberal and socialist internationalism, supported by 
two newly emergent powers, the US and Soviet Russia, and of local resistance against formal empire, 
that a scheme of indirect international administration arose to resolve the problem of colonial 
administration in a changing world, where nineteenth-century international law was gradually 
collapsing. while the post-1945 generalisation of sovereign equality had not yet emerged. This 
peculiar context would determine the profoundly mixed legacy of the League of Nations in relation to 
the colonial question, since its gradual move away from formal empires was accompanied by a 
rejection of Japan’s proposal to institute racial equality, a rejection that was in fact orchestrated by 
President Wilson.19 
3:2 The structure and the function of an experiment: oscillating between the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries 
3:2:1 Article 22: continuation of the civilising mission by other means  
The basic outlines of the system were laid down in Article 22 of the League Covenant and the specific 
arrangements for each Mandate were exemplified in the respective mandate treaties signed between 
the Principal Allied and Associated (PAA) Powers, the Mandatory and the League of Nations 
represented by the Council. Importantly, the League was not responsible for political questions such 
as the inclusion of specific regions in the system or the boundaries of each mandate. As Balfour 
observed, in discussing the Palestine Mandate, ‘mandates were not the creation of the League and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Wilson’s ideas but, right after the USA’s support for Japan’s imperialist plans for China, he became interested in 
Bolshevism. Two years later (1921), he joined the Chinese Communist Party. Ibid., 195. Similarly, Ho Chi 
Minh, who then was ‘an obscure young Vietnamese leader’, unsuccessfully tried to arrange a meeting with 
President Wilson to express his people’s aspirations against French colonial rule. A. Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP, 2005), 140.  
17 For more on the enduring nature of this uncomfortable alliance, see: ‘The New International Economic Order: 
in search of post-colonial international law’ in Chapter 4 of the present thesis.  
18 B. G. Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and US Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007), 17. 
19 ‘Wilson viewed with suspicion any suggestion of racial or national equality, even when the equality proposed 
was limited to the imperialist powers. He vetoed a measure sponsored by the Japanese stating the “equality of 
nations” […] Later, Wilson opposed any mention of racial equality in the League Covenant.’ Grovogui (supra 
note 11), 121. 




they could not in substance be altered by the League’.20 Hence, the Covenant did not in principle 
specify the regions subject to tutelage. Still, the Covenant was significant since, in Article 22, it 
specified the general principles and modalities of the MS. To begin with, without mentioning specific 
regions, the Covenant stipulated that the MS concerned ‘those colonies and territories which as a 
consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly 
governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world’.21 What is of significance here is that the wording of the 
article indicated the provisional, transitional character of the settlement. The Mandate System was not 
presented as an institution with aspirations to last indefinitely, but as a necessary intermediate step 
given that specific people could not yet stand on their own. Indeed, when the PMC was confronted 
with the question of Iraqi independence, its vice-chairman Van Rees concluded that ‘[c]learly … this 
consideration cannot affect the principle—which has been accepted by almost all writers and by the 
mandatory Powers themselves—that the mandates system implies only a temporary charge’.22 Or, as 
Miéville comments, ‘[b]ut of course, this was an admission that they could learn. The natives, it is 
claimed, have not yet learnt to stand by themselves. These categories through which the mandates 
were conceived undermined them, by containing their own end.’23  
This reality was also reflected in the three-fold classification of the mandated territories. Following 
the general pattern of nineteenth-century science and international law,24 Article 22 embodied a 
progressivist understanding of history dividing the mandated territories into three categories, 
according to their perceived degree of development and civilisation. Echoing directly the progressivist 
outlook of the ‘standard of civilisation’, Article 22 and the specific mandate agreements constructed a 
strict hierarchy between the different categories: 
                                                          
20 Eighteenth Session of the League of Nations Council (1922) 3 League of Nations Official Journal, 547.  
21 Covenant of the League of Nations (adopted 29 April 1919, entered into force 10 January 1920) [1919] UKTS 
4 (Cmd. 153)/ [1920] ATS 1/ [1920] ATS 3, Article 22, para.1 (emphasis added). 
22 Note by M. van Rees, ‘General Conditions that must be fulfilled before the mandate regime can be brought to 
an end in respect of a country placed under that regime’ 20 Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes, Annex 
3, 197. On the same occasion, Lord Lugard wrote: ‘I venture to think that the Council by its reference to us 
assumes that a mandate is temporary, and that it has competence to terminate it. This is implicit in the question 
we are asked, and it is not for the Permanent Mandates Commission to dispute the correctness of the Council’s 
view, which I venture to think is beyond any question.’ Ibid., note by Lord Lugard, 201.  
23 C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Pluto Press, 2005), 258-59 
(emphasis in original).  
24 See Section 1:3 ‘Civilisation v. Culture: The broader origins of the concept and its emphasis on institutions’ 
of the thesis.  




The Mandate system enshrined in legal form an evolutionary view of human society. This was evident 
not just in the notion that colonial powers were bound to the Mandated territories by “a sacred trust of 
civilisation”, but also by the hierarchical organization of the Mandates into A, B, and C categories.25  
This understanding was reflected in all aspects of the administration of mandated societies. To 
provide an example that is perhaps marginal, yet illustrative, alcohol-related policies reflected the idea 
that certain ‘races’ and civilisations were physically and culturally unable to consume alcohol without 
descending to moral decay, whereas others were more suitable for it. Hence, consumption of alcohol 
remained unrestricted in the A Mandates, even though their population was predominantly Muslim, 
while it was subjected to strict regulation in the B Mandates and was altogether banned in the C 
Mandates.26 
In this respect, A Mandates were on the top of this hierarchy. They included Middle East territories 
formerly occupied by the Ottoman Empire (Palestine and Transjordan, administered by the UK, and 
Syria, administered by France) and their ‘existence as independent nations could be provisionally 
recognised’.27 Even though the provisional recognition of independence was a blurred expression with 
unclear international legal implications, the underlying understanding was that the degree of 
development of these societies was such that they were just a few steps before being recognised as 
sovereign states. Berman situated A Mandates in the spectrum of sovereignty as follows: ‘if the 
general Mandate System was a halfway house between colonisation and self-determination, the “A” 
Mandates ... constituted a half-way house between the Mandate system itself and self-
determination’.28 The statement of Sir Henry Dobbs, that Iraq ‘was governed for Iraqis and by Iraqis, 
helped by small numbers of British advisers and inspectors’,29 might have been dictated by political 
calculation, but was also reflective of this close-to-independence status of the A Mandates. In fact, the 
rise of Arab nationalism exerted ongoing pressure upon the British and, as early as 1932, Iraq was 
granted sovereign status and admitted to the League. This evolution is considered a mere formality 
and a cynical diplomatic manoeuvre by leading scholars like Pedersen, who stresses how Iraq 
remained dependent on Britain while imperial control could continue at a lesser cost and without the 
supervision of the League.30 Crucially, Britain could play this game of formal(istic) independence 
                                                          
25 P. Bourmaud, ‘Evolutionism, normalization, and the mandatory anti-alcoholism from Africa to the Middle 
East (1918-1939)’ in C. Schayegh and A. Arsan (eds), The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle 
East Mandates (Routledge, 2015), 76.  
26 Ibid., 79.  
27 Covenant of the League of Nations (supra note 21), Article 22, para. 3.  
28 N. Berman, Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism, and International Law (Brill, 2012), 270.  
29 Wright (supra note 6), 203.   
30 S. Pedersen, ‘Getting out of Iraq - in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood’ 
(2010) 115 The American Historical Review 975.  




precisely because the actual text of Article 22 paved the way for sovereign statehood by directly 
implying the temporary nature of the MS.  
Pursuant to this, B Mandates included former German colonies in Central Africa, where Mandatory 
powers were granted much broader authority, including the maintenance of an ‘open door’ policy for 
all League members, and guarantees for 
freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the 
prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of 
the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for 
other than police purposes and the defence of territory.31 
Finally, C Mandates included South West Africa, New Guinea and small Pacific islands like Nauru, 
Samoa and those within the South Pacific Mandate. These were in the peculiar legal position to ‘be 
best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the 
safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population’.32 Even though this was 
commonly interpreted as C Mandates being ‘colonies in all but name’, the staunch opposition of the 
PMC to the attempts by South Africa to grant its citizenship automatically to German settlers in South 
West Africa and its objections to Belgian attempts to govern Rwanda-Burundi as a mere province, 
hint at a more nuanced, yet messy, arrangement.33 Eventually, it was this unclear character of C 
Mandates that enabled South Africa’s annexationism against South West Africa and the prolonged 
relevant international dispute.34  
This three-fold categorisation of the mandates was important for a number of reasons. First, its three-
stage progressivist outlook confirms the survival of the basic structure of the ‘standard of civilisation’ 
                                                          
31 Covenant of the League of Nations (supra note 21), Article 22, para. 5.  
32 Ibid. para. 6. 
33 ‘At their second session the Commission recommended that inhabitants of both “B” and “C” mandates be 
given a national status distinct from that of the mandatory power. […] As Rappard said in the Brussels meeting, 
should the League allow mandatory powers to treat populations as nationals, those who claimed that mandates 
were nothing than a cloak for annexation would feel vindicated.’ Pedersen (supra note 1), 72. ‘Pressed by the 
PMC, the Council thus forced Belgium to concede that mandated territories has a distinct status under 
international law.’ Ibid., 220.  
34 See: International Status of South Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 128, South West Africa 
(Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) (Preliminary Objections) [1962] ICJ Rep 319, South West 
Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) (Second Phase) [1966] ICJ Rep 6. The origin of these 
cases in the Mandates System as a system of international tutelage is not unrelated to the fact that it was in their 
context that ‘a spate of judicial pronouncements which seemed to define the international judicial function vis-à-
vis an international “common interest”’ began to emerge: G. I. Hernández, The International Court of Justice 
and the Judicial Function (OUP, 2014), 209.  




during the first decades of the twentieth century.35 Apart from the obvious fact that the concept of 
‘civilisation’ was explicitly mentioned in Article 22,36 the idea that complex societies could be 
reduced to three stages of development, which represented not simply difference but a rigid hierarchy, 
is the core idea behind the ‘civilisation’ discourse, as exemplified both by extraterritoriality during the 
nineteenth and the MS during the twentieth centuries.37 Further, the MS was almost by definition 
organised around the idea that the standard was attainable for non-Western societies, a point that has 
been stressed already about the standard of civilisation in general.38 All political communities could 
achieve ‘civilised’ status in theory, provided that they implemented the necessary reforms. In fact, the 
MS was a structure designed to supervise the ‘civilising mission’ and make sure that mandate powers 
would not exploit their position to their benefit at the detriment of their reformist mission.  
So far it has been argued that, through the concept of civilisation, international law was not 
unequivocally about establishing hierarchies between different political communities and placing the 
West firmly on the top, even though this was undeniably part of its function. Much more 
fundamentally, the concept of civilisation was linked to socio-economic transformation with a view of 
spreading market relations and the capitalist mode of production outside the West. The MS was 
perhaps the clearest example of this function. In Article 22 of the Covenant the MS was designed as a 
temporary system, which was put in place to facilitate reform and lead to its own redundancy. 
Arguably, its designers and the international bureaucrats who applied it could not have imagined that 
this redundancy would occur within a few decades. Pedersen concludes her masterful account of the 
MS, observing that, in 1958, two prominent members of the PMC died while being ‘inadvertent 
architects of a world they had not imagined’.39 For her, these dynamics – which led to decolonisation 
– were the outcome of the process of internationalisation and not a product of the conscious design of 
imperial states, nor of the Covenant itself.40 Indeed, the MS developed its own dynamics that were not 
                                                          
35 Contra: ‘The nineteenth century idea of a society of civilised nations had already been shaken at the end of the 
British Age and did not survive the First World War as a basis and framework of international law.’ M. Grewe, 
The Epochs of International Law (Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 581-82.  
36 ‘… there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred 
trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.’ 
Covenant of the League of Nations, (supra note 21), Article 22, para. 1. 
37 See: Section 1:3 ‘Civilisation v. Culture: The broader origins of the concept and its emphasis on institutions’ 
of the present thesis.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Pedersen (supra note 1), 407. 
40 ‘The League helped make the end of empire imaginable, and normative statehood possible, not because the 
empires willed it so, or the Covenant prescribed it, but because that dynamic of internationalization changed 
everything- including how “dependent peoples” would bid for statehood, what that “statehood” would 




under the control of its designers. However, as argued above, Article 22 contained the possibility for 
normative statehood in itself; therefore, it is difficult to contend, as Pedersen does, that a piece of 
international legislation that recognised the provisional independence of A Mandates and was based 
on the presumption that some communities could not yet stand on their own, was unrelated to 
subsequent developments of decolonisation. In fact, the MS was a distinctive stage of a broader 
process of social transformation carried out through international law. In other words, through its 
application, the standard of civilisation had been pushing towards the expansion of free markets and 
the necessary political and economic institutions to support market relations since at least the 
nineteenth century, and Article 22 crystallised trends already present in international legal thought and 
practice.  
3:3:2 The Permanent Mandate Commission: supervising the experiment 
What was genuinely innovative about the MS was that its very basic structure dictated and enabled 
the supervision of the mandatory powers by the League. To begin with, the League Council was 
nominally considered the single most important organ regarding the function of the MS. It was a 
standardised clause of the mandate treaties that ‘the consent of the Council of the League of Nations is 
required for any modification of the terms of this mandate’.41 The Assembly established its right to 
discuss mandates in its first session and, having a permanent majority of non-colonial states, it 
developed a critical stance towards colonial governments. Even though its recommendations were not 
binding, they were taken seriously. For example, their recommendation that at least one woman 
should participate in the PMC —to which we will turn our attention shortly—was taken on board and 
two women (Anna Bugge-Wicksell and Valentine Dannevig) served successively on the 
Commission.42 Further, the Permanent Court of International Justice authoritatively interpreted the 
terms of the mandates in case of a dispute between the Mandatory and another member of the 
League.43 Finally, the Permanent Mandates Commission was the organ specifically dedicated to the 
supervision of the MS. The PMC had nine members who served in their personal capacity and only 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
henceforth mean, and whether empires would think territorial control essential to the maintenance of global 
power.’ Ibid., 406.  
41 Amongst many, see: Article 27 of the Palestine Mandate (confirmed by the League of Nations on the 24 th of 
July 1922, entered into full effect on the 23rd of September 1923), reprinted in Wright (supra note 6), 600-07; 
Article 12 of the Tanganyika Mandate (signed on the 12th of July 1922, confirmed by the League of Nations on 
the 20th of July 1922) reprinted ibid., 611-16; Article 7 of the Nauru Mandate (confirmed by the League of 
Nations on the 17 of December 1920) reprinted ibid., 616-21.  
42 S. Pedersen, ‘Metaphors of the Schoolroom: Women Working the Mandates System of the League of 
Nations’ (2008) 66 History Workshop Journal 188. 
43 Amongst many, see: Article 26 of the Palestine Mandate (supra note 41); Article 13 of the Tanganyika 
Mandate, ibid.; Article 7 of the Nauru Mandate, ibid.  




four of them were nationals of mandatory powers.44 Hence, the mandatory powers could not outright 
turn the Commission into a puppet-organ that would just disguise the uninterrupted continuation of 
colonial rule. In practice, most members of the PMC had extensive experience in colonial 
administration.45 On the one hand, this meant that they held all the assumptions of white supremacy 
and native ‘backwardness’ that informed colonial administration in general. On the other hand, their 
extensive experience meant that they maintained a degree of independence vis-à-vis their state of 
origin, having their own views on how non-Western societies ought to be administered. In fact, those 
who operated as ‘organs’ of their governments typically found their influence diminished.46  
Three broad aspects of the work of the PMC can be detected: legalism, a focus on fact-finding, and a 
strong inclination for standard-setting. The first aspect was essential, in light of the novelty of the 
Commission’s work. Since international supervision of colonial administration was an innovation and 
the legitimacy of the PMC was always in question, its members resorted frequently to the Covenant in 
trying to establish and legitimise their authority and show that they were doing no more or less than 
Article 22 stipulated. In Anghie’s words, ‘[t]he PMC […] saw its function in legalistic terms. It 
derived its authority from the Covenant, and its task was to give effect to Article 22.’47 Despite law 
occupying a minor position in Pedersen’s analysis, she reaches similar conclusions regarding the 
legalist ethos of the PMC: ‘the Commission was constrained—even its most conservative members 
were constrained—by its deep textualism. It was charged to uphold the authority of the Covenant and 
the mandates; indeed, its own authority was rooted in those texts.’48 This faith in the texts indicates 
that the PMC and the MS indeed developed their own dynamics, but within the framework set by 
Article 22, the mandate treaties and the Constitution of the Commission and, therefore, their functions 
                                                          
44 ‘The Permanent Mandates Commission provided for in paragraph 9 of Article 22 of the Covenant, shall 
consist of nine Members. The majority of the Commission shall be nationals of non-Mandatory powers.’ 
Constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission, Article a (Approved by the Council 1st of December 
1920). 
45 ‘Its members may have been hard-headed ex-colonial administrators in the middle age, but they were also, in 
their own way, idealists. They believed in their civilizing mission, in their right to rule.’ Pedersen (supra note 1), 
107.  
46 Martial Henri Merlin, the second French national in the Commission, was a typical example of how openly 
partisan behaviour was exceptional and was largely ineffective: ‘Merlin proved too pompous, indolent, and 
transparently partisan to win any friends. No one in the Commission much liked him, and when in 1932 he faced 
a public trial for embezzlement, officials at the Quai d’ Orsay squirmed with embarrassment.’ Ibid., 111.  
47 Anghie (supra note 16), 151.  
48 Pedersen (supra note 1), 205. Writing about the stance of the PMC regarding the revival of annexationist 
plans among the Mandatories, Pedersen also observes that: ‘[p]recedent and legalism, quite as much as 
conviction, would drive the PMC to resist those developments’. Ibid., 207.  




must be conceptualised not only as the functions of an emerging international bureaucracy, but also as 
intrinsically linked to international law.  
Secondly, fact-finding was an essential function of the PMC. As Rajagopal argues, the trend of 
collecting information as a means for improving colonial administration began during the nineteenth 
century, but ‘the establishment of international institutions under the League with special 
responsibility for collecting and analysing such information quickened and solidified the 
technocratisation of power in the colonial relationship’.49 Wright’s assessment of the PMC was clear 
in this respect: ‘[t]he ultimate object of the League’s action in regard to mandated territories is to 
improve conditions in those areas. To do this the League organs must know the facts and have in mind 
some standards by which they may be criticised.’50 There were different ways to collect information, 
though the annual reports submitted to the PMC were perhaps the dominant method used.51 The 
Commission attempted to standardise the form and content of the reports by issuing questionnaires 
which covered multiple aspects of the Mandates’ administration, such as slavery, labour, arms traffic, 
education, and public health.52 The PMC also put in place a system of petitions concerning the 
mandated territories, even though there was no relevant provision in the Covenant or its Constitution. 
Although it is estimated that only 10 per cent of these complaints were upheld,53 the system 
functioned as an additional source of information, given that mandatories’ reports were often 
incomplete or even misleading. In this context, statistics emerged as a principal method of 
international governance,54 and anthropology—which was already praised by Lorimer during the 
                                                          
49 B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance 
(CUP, 2003), 52.  
50 Wright (supra note 6), 190. 
51 ‘In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the 
territory committed to its charge.’ Covenant of the League of Nations (note 18), Article 22 para. 7, ‘The 
Mandatory Powers should send their annual report provided for by paragraph 7 of Article 22 of the Covenant to 
the Commission through duly authorised representatives who would be prepared to offer any supplementary 
explanations or supplementary information which the Commission may request.’ Constitution of the PMC 
(supra note 44), Article b.  
52 See: ‘Questionnaire Intended to Facilitate the Preparation of the Annual Reports from the Mandatory Powers’. 
Reprinted in: D. Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship (Stevens and Sons, 1948), 319-22.  
53 Pedersen (supra note 1), 91. 
54 ‘The Commission has sought to complete statistical tables of the mandates areas in order that progress in 
various directions may be tested and at the ninth session asked the Council to authorize the Secretariat to request 
the mandatories to submit supplementary data not included in the reports.’ Wright (supra note 25), 165.  




nineteenth century55—assumed a central function in facilitating the management of mandate 
territories.56 
Thirdly, the PMC developed standards and measurements in order to classify and make sense of the 
immense volume of collected information. Article 22 was fairly vague on the point of how the 
Mandates were to be governed, placing the ‘well-being and development’ of the locals at the heart of 
the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’,57 but without providing further specifications. As Anghie argues, this 
process of standard-setting created a ‘synthesis of law and administration’.58 In fact, both members of 
the PMC and the League Assembly were convinced that these standards were of broader applicability 
and they should be used to influence colonial administration outside the Mandates.59 A call for the 
codification of these standards failed,60 but there was a widespread conviction that, through its work, 
‘a science of colonial administration based on a deductive and experimental method’61 was being 
born. Analogies between this outlook and the subsequent function of international organisations are 
too stark to miss, especially in the area of ‘best practices’ and ‘guidelines’ regarding economic 
governance. Sixty-five years later, when the US/UK administration of Iraq was trying to legitimise its 
decisions invoking ‘international best practices’, it was essentially building on the evolving legacy of 
the Mandates System and the ambition to standardise foreign administration and economic 
management of territories deemed ‘uncivilised’ through the work of international institutions.62 
                                                          
55 Lorimer considered ‘ethnology’ or ‘the science of races’ (sic) to be the most influential discipline for 
international law at the time: M. J. Lorimer, ‘La doctrine de la reconnaissance, fondement du droit international’ 
(1884) 16 Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 333. 
56 ‘Yet, for the Mandated Territory in particular, the “anthropological turn” was important, not only because it 
helped officers distance themselves from a pervasive planter culture that saw the “native” as (in the words of 
one all too representative employer) “a child, but… also a born thief, liar and blackmailer”, but also because it 
provided that administration with a language, policies and a person – Chinnery - able to reconcile their labour 
policy to the norms of the “sacred trust”.’ Pedersen (supra note 1), 303 (emphasis as in original).  
57 Covenant of the League of Nations (supra note 21), Article 22 para 1.  
58 Anghie (supra note 16), 152. 
59 The Japanese member of the Commission, Yanagita Kunio, characteristically noted that: ‘the successful 
results which could be obtained within a short time in some territories where circumstances are favourable 
would be of great use, not only as regards other mandates but also for the Colonies of the whole world’. Wright 
(supra note 6), 228-29.  
60 ‘In discussing this suggestion, however, several members of the Commission expressed the fear that such an 
effort to codify mandatory principles might prove impracticable in view of the varied conditions in the different 
territories, and preferred to allow standards and principles gradually to emerge from precedents.’ Ibid., 220.  
61 Ibid., 229. 
62 ‘The purpose of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) shall be to promote the objectives 
set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) (Resolution 1483) of ensuring that the 




To conclude, the PMC was a legalist organ, but the vague nature of Article 22 meant that it had to 
develop novel administrative techniques in order to operationalise its provisions. In fact, this turn to 
statistics, standards and other disciplines was a broader trend for international law at the time. For 
example, Article 23 of the Covenant introduced co-operation for a wide range of social and economic 
issues and the specialised institutions that were founded in order for this co-operation to materialise63 
operated in a similar way as the PMC in collecting information and creating standards for evaluating 
policies. It was this overall institutional dynamics that enhanced the position of the PMC and 
prevented it from becoming a mere instrument at the hands of the colonial powers at the time. 
3:3 Capitalist transformation and international law: labour, trade and welfare in the 
Mandates 
Writing about the history of the PMC, Pedersen argues that ‘[i]f sovereignty was the most contested 
issue with which the Mandates Commission had to deal, the question of economic rights—for the 
mandatory power, other League states, and the local population alike—ran a close second’.64 In this 
section, I will contend that the two issues were in fact interlinked, at least in one aspect: the Mandates 
System was an additional episode in the process of diffusion of the capitalist mode of production 
(CMP) through international law and institutions. So far, it has been argued that the transformation of 
pre-capitalist societies into market economies was a central function of the concept of civilisation, as 
it was operationalised through practices such as extraterritoriality.65 It is further suggested that the 
Mandates System was at least partly a manifestation of the same broader process that was in operation 
at least since the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus, the Mandates Commission sought to 
promote different aspects of the standard of civilisation in the mandated territories. However, the 
diffusion of capitalism through the Mandates System was enriched with a crucial addition. With 
laissez-faire liberalism in profound crisis, the question of welfarism and the sustainability of 
capitalism entered political, legal and economic thought. This was also reflected in the functions of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) is used in a transparent manner […] and that export sales of petroleum, 
petroleum products and natural gas from Iraq are made consistent with international market standards.’ 
Coalition Provisional Authority ‘Terms of Reference for the International Advisory and Monitoring Board 
(IAMB)’ (21 October 2003). Available at S. Talmon, The Occupation of Iraq: Volume 2: The Official 
Documents of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council (Hart Publishing, 2013), 
1442 (emphasis added). For further analysis on international law and the occupation of Iraq, see Chapter 6 of the 
thesis.  
63 For a concise analysis of Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which also links the provision 
with the subsequent Article 55 of the UN Charter, see: G. I. Hernández, ‘Article 23’ in M. Schmidt and R. Kolb, 
Commentaire sur le pacte de la Société des Nations: article par article (Bruylant, 2014).  
64 Pedersen (supra note 1), 233.  
65 See Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis.  




the MS. In fact, my principal argument here is that what was self-assuredly branded as ‘disinterested 
humanitarianism’ in juxtaposition to ‘acquisitive nationalism’,66 was in fact an expression of 
international law’s systematic privileging of the long-term, general interests of capitalist reproduction. 
3:3:1 From ‘civilised’ to ‘emancipated’: conditions for statehood under the Mandates 
System and the persistence of ‘civilisation’ 
The survival of the ‘standard of civilisation’ through the MS was not purely rhetorical.67 This became 
evident when Britain started pushing for the independence of Iraq and its admission to the League.68 
Given the justified suspicion of other League members and of the CMP that Britain was attempting to 
circumvent international supervision and create a protectorate, the Council requested that the PMC 
determine the preconditions for a Mandate to be terminated. The PMC tried to avoid the specificities 
of Iraq as much as possible, which resulted in the promulgation of generalised standards instead of an 
ad hoc examination that would have been necessarily distorted by particularistic interests.69 In short, 
the PMC concluded that for a mandated territory to become independent, the following conditions had 
to be fulfilled:  
a) It must have a settled Government and an administration capable of maintaining the regular 
operations of essential Government services; 
b) It must be capable of maintaining its territorial integrity and political independence; 
c) It must be able to maintain the public peace throughout the whole territory; 
d) It must have at its disposal adequate financial resources to provide for normal Government 
requirements; 
                                                          
66 ‘First, as the Mandates System, so the Trusteeship also was born of a compromise between disinterested 
humanitarianism and acquisitive nationalism.’ W. E. Rappard, ‘The Mandates and the International Trusteeship 
Systems’ (1946) 61 Political Science Quarterly 408,  413.  
67 Contra: Grewe note 35 above.  
68 See note 30 above.  
69 ‘On January 22nd, 1931, the Council decided to invite the Permanent Mandates Commission to pursue the 
study of the problem of the termination of a mandate in its “general aspect”. The discussions which preceded 
this decision clearly showed that the Council does not expect this examination to extend to any particular cases 
or to the question of the conditions required for the admission of a mandated territory to the League. […] This 
resolution makes no distinction between the various territories at present under mandate. The Commission is 
therefore called upon to examine the three categories of territories under A, B, and C Mandates, although it is 
obvious that, as regards the last two categories, the question is of purely theoretical interest.’ Note by M. van 
Rees (supra note 22), 195.  




e) It must possess laws and a judicial organisation which will afford equal and regular justice to 
all.70 
What is striking here is that these preconditions were essentially a restatement of the requirements for 
a political society to be considered civilised, as summarised by Gong71 and crystallised in state 
practice around extraterritoriality72 in the decades preceding the MS. In essence, for the Mandate to be 
terminated, political communities needed to display core features of the modern capitalist state: 
territorialisation of relations of power, state monopoly over legitimate violence through pacification of 
social forces, judicialisation of social relations through legal reform and codification so that laws 
supported core market functions. In addition to these attributes, the criteria of the PMC were more 
explicitly concerned with economic functions than their nineteenth-century version. This is clear in 
the fourth criterion, which requires public finances of at least some soundness so that they can support 
‘normal Government requirements’. As Lugard, the British Commissioner, noted, for a mandated 
territory to be emancipated, it needed to have the rudimentary capacities of the modern capitalist state:  
The Council must be satisfied that the Mandatory has good grounds for its belief that the new State can 
maintain internal order and efficient government; that the Government of the area released from the 
mandate is acceptable to the majority, and the welfare and just treatment of racial, linguistic and religious 
minorities are assured; that the State is able and willing to fulfil the obligations it undertakes; that it has 
functioned for a certain time with success; and that there is an adequate prospect for economic and 
financial stability.73 
Apart from physical control over territory, these rudimentary capacities presumably included all these 
functions of the mandate powers that the PMC was supervising so closely: education and hygiene, 
labour management and infrastructure development and maintenance, to mention but a few.74 Other 
                                                          
70 Ibid., 228-30.  
71 Gong has summarised the criteria to be fulfilled for a polity to be considered ‘civilised’ as follows: ‘1. 
Guarantees of basic human rights, such as life, dignity, property, freedom of movement, of commerce and of 
religion. 2. The existence of a vertically and bureaucratically organised state apparatus, capable of armed self-
defence. 3. The legalisation of domestic and foreign affairs. This included codification and publication of laws 
along with the establishment of a professionalised, independent judiciary were central parts of this process. 4. 
Maintenance of permanent diplomatic relations with the outside world. 5. Abolition of “uncivilised” practices, 
such as polygamy, suttee and slavery.’ G. W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society 
(OUP, 1984), 14-15.  
72 For extraterritoriality as a principal expression of the ‘standard of civilisation’ and its close links with the 
transformation of archaic societies into capitalist economies, see Section 2:3 ‘Beyond culture: Constructing a 
materialist narrative of extraterritoriality’ in Chapter 2 of the present thesis.  
73 Note by Lord Lugard (supra note 22), 202.  
74 ‘Mlle Dannevig, referring to the conditions which must exist in a territory before it is released from the 
mandate, considered that a modern state should not only ensure the maintenance of peace and order by means of 
armed forces and police, but should also take positive steps to promote the development of its inhabitants by 




than that, the fifth criterion of the PMC reflected the demand for legal reform that was so strikingly 
present in the history of extraterritoriality. It is a central argument of this thesis that these legal 
reforms were intrinsically linked to the spread and consolidation of capitalist relations of production 
in semi-peripheral countries.75 Thus, even though the PMC did not substantially elaborate on how it 
understood these references to legality and justice, past legal practice can help us clarify this criterion. 
The history of imperial legal reform under extraterritoriality regimes indicates that ‘equal and regular 
justice to all’ was linked with the abolition of feudal and other archaic legal systems and the 
establishment of a state monopoly over legality. Further, the individualisation of the social body 
necessary for a market economy to function was crafted through the establishment of individual 
rights. The development of guarantees for property rights and commercial activity was also deemed 
essential for the achievement of ‘justice’, as stipulated in the fifth criterion. This is clearly hinted at in 
the Report of Count de Penha García, who explicitly stated that a territory’s capacity for self-
government was linked to its ability to be integrated smoothly in ‘the present political, economic, 
commercial and other conditions of the modern world’ and identified ‘the spirit of the legislation in 
force’ as one of the factors that would enable this smooth integration.76 For a territory to be integrated 
into the liberal capitalist order of the time, it was essential to amend its legislation and create a legal 
and institutional environment capable of supporting generalised market functions. Further, for this 
legal system to be effective, the state needed to assume effective control over territory and be able to 
enforce these laws over tribal, feudal or other interests. The preoccupation of the PMC’s criteria with 
control over territory was reflective of this core requirement for effectiveness of legislation and of 
dissolution or subordination of pre-capitalist structures of power.  
Pressure towards state centralisation was also vividly present in the way the Mandates were 
administered. For example, the British administration of Transjordan undertook comprehensive land 
reform centred around the imperative of ‘state-simplification’, which was in essence ‘an intrusive 
process of classifying, mapping, and enumerating society and space to make them legible to the 
agents of government for fiscal extraction or administrative regulation’.77 Through this process, ‘a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
means of education. The State should also create in its territory general health conditions, which would enable 
the population to avoid disease and to keep in good health. She therefore proposed to add a paragraph to the 
following effect: “It should possess an educational and health organisation which, while possibly not having 
reached full development, demonstrates the intention of the new State to take an interest in the mental, moral 
and physical health of its inhabitants.” The Chairman pointed out that the provisions as adopted of paragraph (a) 
of Chapter I covered the points mentioned by Mlle Dannevig.’ ‘General Conditions that must be fulfilled’ 
(supra note 22), 179.  
75 Ibid.  
76 Report by Count de Penha Garcia (supra note 22), 206.  
77 T. Tell, ‘The Social Origins of Mandatory Rule in Transjordan’ in Schayegh and Arsan (supra note 25), 219.  




homogenizing, centralizing discipline’78 arose, which was not only gradually dissolving traditional 
patterns of land ownership, but also consolidating state structures with effective control over 
territories and populations. Similarly, the generalised effort of the mandatory powers to collect taxes 
presupposed a developed bureaucracy with sufficient data about economic activity and the planning 
and infrastructure necessary to collect and administer public revenues.79 This commitment of both the 
PMC and mandatory powers to state centralisation meant that when decolonisation struggles erupted a 
few decades later, they built upon as well as were restrained by the material conditions fostered and 
solidified through the colonial encounter.80 As will be argued in the next chapter of this thesis, the fact 
that decolonisation assumed the form of state creation is at least partly attributable to the changes in 
the fabric of colonial societies brought about by international law and international institutions in the 
course of the colonial encounter.81 
In addition to the criteria for independence examined above, the work of the PMC directly reflected 
the criteria of the standard of ‘civilisation’ at least in one more aspect: the problem of (free) labour. 
To begin with, enforcement of the prohibition of the slave trade was explicitly mentioned as one of 
the core obligations for the B Mandates.82 Secondly, an International Labour Organization (ILO) 
representative was appointed to the PMC with ‘the right of attending in an advisory capacity all 
meetings of the Permanent Commission at which questions relating to labour are discussed’.83 
Thirdly, and more importantly, prohibition of forced or compulsory labour was incorporated expressly 
in all B and C Mandate agreements.84 Exceptions to this prohibition were only granted for public 
                                                          
78 Ibid.  
79 Wright generally considered increases in public revenue to be a positive sign of administration and 
development. Wright (supra note 6), 574-75. 
80 For an analysis that emphasises the material - as opposed to discursive - impact of the Mandates System, 
focusing on the electrification of Palestine, see: F. Meiton, ‘Throwing Transjordan into Palestine: electrification 
and state formation, 1921-1945’ in Schayegh and Arsan (supra note 25), 275-90.  
81 See Section 4:1 ‘Decolonisation as homeopathy: the limitations of a revolution’ in Chapter 4 of the thesis at 
hand.  
82 ‘Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible 
for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, 
subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade’ 
Covenant of the League (supra note 21), Article 22 para. 5.  
83 Constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission (supra note 44). 
84 Amongst many, the Tanganyika Mandate read as follows: ‘The Mandatory: (1) shall provide for the eventual 
emancipation of all slaves and for as speedy an elimination of domestic and other slavery as social conditions 
will allow; (2) shall suppress all forms of slave trade; (3) shall prohibit all forms of forced or compulsory labour, 
except for essential public works and services, and then only in return for adequate remuneration.’ Quoted in 
Wright (supra note 6), 611.  




works or services and in return for adequate remuneration.85 The gradual emancipation of all slaves 
was also one of the obligations assumed by the mandatories and supervised by the PMC. As has 
already been argued, the abolition of slavery was closely linked to the development of capitalism, 
since the creation of free labourers is an essential precondition for the emergence of capitalism as a 
distinctive mode of production where labour power emerges as a commodity sold by nominally free 
and equal labourers.86  
This effort was combined with the ambition to achieve ‘development’ for the territories, especially 
given that development was explicitly mentioned as one of the goals of the MS in Article 22.87 In 
other words, the creation of free labour was in immediate tension with other requirements for the 
effective function of capitalism, including the building of infrastructure such as road networks or 
railways that would allow both the intensification of commercial activity and the effective unification 
and control of territory. In fact, the importance of infrastructure – and especially railways – for 
capitalist development and state-centralisation had already become clear by the mid-nineteenth 
century: ‘[t]he railroad influenced political organization in two fundamental ways—first by 
reinforcing the credibility of the nation-state as a cohesive arena of collective decision making, 
secondly, by enabling and favouring new coalitions of historical actors to seize leadership within 
states.’88 Thus, what can be seen as tensions between the demand for the abolition of slavery and the 
demand for development were in fact contradictory aspects of the process of transforming the 
mandated territories into capitalist economies. Article 22 incorporated these two significant aspects of 
this process (free labour and infrastructure), but in practice the tensions that arose from the two 
requirements were difficult to reconcile and the PMC was striving to strike an almost impossible 
                                                          
85 Article 3 of the Nauru Mandate also read: ‘The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited, and that 
no forced labour is permitted, except for essential public works and services and then only for adequate 
remuneration.’ Nauru Mandate (note 39). The Rwanda-Urundi Mandate repeated verbatim the provision of the 
Tanganyika Mandate, with the sole difference that it permitted forced labour only for ‘public works and 
essential services’, setting, presumably, an even higher threshold: Article 5 para 3. Rwanda-Urundi Mandate 
(signed on the 12th of July 1922, confirmed by the League of Nations on the 20th of July 1922) reprinted in 
Wright (supra note 6), 611-16.  
86 See Section 1:4:3 ‘Abolition of slavery and free labour: vogelfrei labourers as civilisation’ of this thesis.  
87 ‘To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the 
sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle 
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the 
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.’ Covenant of the League of Nations (supra note 
21), Article 22, para a. (emphasis added).  
88 C. S. Maier, Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 
88. 




balance. Finally, the particularistic interests of mandate powers aggravated these contradictions. For 
example, in Rwanda, Belgian efforts to organise a system of labour extraction accentuated and 
racialised the divisions between Hutus and Tutsis, an event with devastating future ramifications.89 
However, it is impossible to conclude that the interest of the League in the abolition of slavery was 
only rhetorical and easily disregarded. The PMC followed the formulation of the provisions of the 
mandates agreements and considered the prohibition of forced labour the rule; all exceptions to this 
rule needed to be specifically justified. The fact that the PMC only approved of Belgium’s system of 
forced labour in Rwanda-Burundi in the light of the need to prevent another famine outbreak indicates 
how there was a strong presumption against such measures and, therefore, a general commitment in 
the creation of free labourers.90  
With nineteenth-century moralism in decline, it became clearer that the above-mentioned criteria were 
not primarily cultural, religious or racial. Adherence to Christianity was not mentioned even in 
passing, and as the Assyrians of Iraq were to find out, the PMC and the League were in fact content to 
disregard the concerns of Christians and grant a Muslim-majority country (nominal) independence, 
even if that meant that Christians’ livelihood was directly compromised.91 Further, the criteria of the 
PMC are clearly institutional, legal and political, but not cultural. In fact, the PMC’s adoption of 
Lugard’s ideal of ‘indirect rule’ not only tolerated but actively encouraged these aspects of native 
cultural heritage that could facilitate capitalist development.92 Decades later, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority of Iraq followed the PMC’s precedent and granted Islam an unprecedented position in the 
Iraqi Constitution, while at the same time promoting the most comprehensive and rapid programme of 
neoliberal reform in at least three decades.93 The MS was not hostile to the perpetuation, accentuation 
or even invention of cultural norms, provided that they were integrated in a broader system of 
                                                          
89 ‘When asked this question at the 1933 Commission session, however, Halewyck de Heusch insisted that “race 
hostility” had no place in the social order. “The lower race recognized all the qualities of the higher race,” he 
insisted; the Hutu masses “showed real veneration for the Watutsi nobles”. In this terrible claim we can detect 
the spectre of much human suffering.’ Pedersen (supra note 1), 252.  
90 For an overview of how the outbreak of a devastating famine that claimed the lives of 35,000-40,000 
Rwandans in 1929-1030 legitimised Belgian practices of forced labour in cultivation and road-building, see: 
Pedersen (supra note 1), 243-250.  
91 Assyrians of Iraq were not only Christians but they had also been the ‘shock troops of the British occupation’. 
However, when the independence of Iraq was decided, both Britain and the PMC decided to ignore their 
objections, which turned out to be legitimate: ‘In its first year of independence, 1933, the Iraqi Army would 
sweep through Assyrian villages, massacring as they went.’ Pedersen (supra note 1), 282.  
92 In his Dual Mandate, which was published just before he assumed his position in the PMC, Lord Lugard 
defended the idea of using native governing structures for ruling the colonies, specifically emphasising the case 
of Nigeria. See generally: Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Frank Cass & Co, 1922).  
93 See notes 86 and 87 of Chapter 6 of this thesis.  




capitalist accumulation and state-centralisation. As Yanaghita, the Japanese Commissioner noted, ‘a 
certain number of ancient customs, on which native life is founded, must be preserved in the interest 
of peace in the territory’.94 
This focus of the PMC on economic transformation did not escape Anghie, who, despite his emphasis 
on culture, acknowledges the centrality of capitalist economic form in the management of the 
Mandates, only to go on and state that this was nothing but the specific form of cultural difference 
assumed at the time:  
[c]rucially, the problem of cultural difference was presented in the Mandate System not in terms of the 
distinction between the civilized and the uncivilized, but rather in terms of the “backward” and 
“advanced”. […] It is in the Mandate System, then, that we arrive at this pivotal moment, when the 
“uncivilized” are transformed into economically backward.95  
As was argued in Chapter 1 of the present thesis, Anghie’s argument is undermined by the fact that 
his conceptualisation of ‘culture’ remains elusive.96 Finally, as was argued above, the criteria of the 
PMC had deep roots in the history of international law. In that sense, the workings of the PMC, at 
least in the promulgation of independence criteria, was less novel than Anghie or Pedersen assumed.97 
By and large, the preconditions for emancipation from the MS were a refined, less moralised 
reflection of the conditions for achieving ‘civilised’ status during the nineteenth century and the first 
few decades of the twentieth century. Ιn turn, these conditions were intrinsically linked to the 
construction of a modern, capitalist state, able to ensure the conditions for the establishment and 
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production.  
3:3:2 On continuities and breaks: the emergence of welfarism and the Mandate System  
So far it has been argued that the persistence of the ‘civilising mission’ in the workings of the 
Mandates System was not exclusively, or even primarily, rhetorical. Rather, I have shown that the 
criteria for the lawful termination of a mandate as elaborated by the PMC were a direct reflection of 
the criteria for achieving ‘civilised status’ during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In turn, 
these criteria were directly linked to the spread and smooth reproduction of the capitalist mode of 
production. However, the MS was not simply a façade for the uninterrupted continuation of 
nineteenth-century colonial international law. One important aspect of the social functions of the MS 
and related international law, which is found both in the monitoring processes and standard-setting 
                                                          
94 Note by Kunio Yanaghita ‘The Welfare and Development of the Natives in Mandates Territories’ 3 
Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes, Annex 19, 282. 
95 Anghie (supra note 16), 189.  
96 See Section 1:3: ‘Civilisation v. Culture: The broader origins of the concept and its emphasis on institutions’ 
of the thesis at hand.  
97 ‘When and how might a territory achieve statehood? In late 1930 and early 1931 the Commission - well aware 
that it was making international law - began hammering out doctrine.’ Pedersen (supra note 1), 267.  




functions of the PMC, was welfarism. Indeed, this was a broader trend of international legal theory 
and practice in the inter-war years. Jouannet has conceptualised this welfarist turn as a ‘promise of a 
major revolution to come for the liberal framework of classical international law’98 and has written 
extensively on the ILO, despite paying little attention to the PMC as a locus of welfarist thinking in 
that period.99 Nonetheless, promoting native well-being was one of the objectives of the MS, as 
stipulated in Article 22.100 To fulfil this goal, the PMC monitored mandatory powers’ efforts 
regarding land management, education, health, and labour, while transforming the international legal 
definition of statehood to include limited welfarist functions. Linking this welfarist turn with the 
overall emphasis of the present thesis on international law and capitalism, I further argue that there 
was a necessity to safeguard the long-term interests of capitalist development and the crisis of laissez-
faire liberalism–and not abstract humanitarianism—that dictated this turn.  
For example, the meaning of ‘normal Government requirements’ in the criteria for the termination of 
the MS was distinct from the simple maintenance of public order; as the Minutes of the PMC reveal, 
these functions included a minimum standard of welfarism in health, education and labour.101 
Moreover, the PMC monitored the administration of the mandates in reference to certain welfarist 
objectives. The shift was evident: during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the extermination of 
local populations was generally seen as a natural process. The PMC considered demographical 
collapses and high mortality as evidence of bad administration: ‘Mr Rappard of the Mandates 
Commission has insisted that “if the native races were dying out, it was clear that their moral and 
material welfare were being sacrificed”.’102 Against this background, public expenditure for health or 
education was an important criterion for evaluating the success of the MS. Even though the statistics 
of the time are unreliable, Wright defended the MS by arguing that ‘[i]n 1926 the health expenditures 
in African areas compared favorably with those in neighboring colonies of the mandatory’.103 
Similarly, relatively high expenditure on and increasing access to education were seen as principal 
achievements of the MS:  
French progress in education in Togoland and Cameroons was particularly notable. The expenditures 
doubled from 1920 to 1927, though at the end they were only one-third of the health expenditures. […] 
The proportion of the population in the schools, 2.2 per cent in French Togoland and 2 per cent in French 
Cameroons, was far beyond the average in West African colonies.104 
                                                          
98 Jouannet (supra note 3), 178.  
99 In a similar vein, Jouannet examines at length the relationship between classical international law and 
colonialism but she largely ignores the interplay between welfarist concerns and colonialism. Ibid., 143-51.  
100 See note 87 above.  
101 See note 74 above.  
102 Wright (supra note 6), 550.  
103 Ibid., 553.  
104 Ibid., 561-62.  




Crucially, welfare was tightly linked to the question of labour:  
[h]ealth is undoubtedly an important element in human welfare, and the Mandates Commission has often 
drawn attention to conditions such as recruiting labor for work at a distance which might militate against 
it. The Commission has also requested an explanation of heavy mortality in certain types of labor and 
suggested increases in medical staff, adequate health expenditures, and instruction in hygiene in 
schools.105 
This turn to welfarism ought to be understood in reference to the potential of social destruction, which 
is immanent to the capitalism mode of production. The fundamentally destructive power of capital 
over labour is key in Marxian critiques of capitalism. Competition forces each individual capital to 
reduce salaries and other costs related to labour (for instance, health and safety measures) and to press 
for the extension of the working day. This is an objective process that cannot be reduced to the ‘greed’ 
or any other objectionable personal characteristic of the capital owner; nor is it a moral issue.106 When 
no regulation of the labour process is in place, whoever does not conform to the above tendency will 
sooner or later go bankrupt. Here lies a fundamental contradiction between the interests of the 
individual capitals and of the capital as a social force. The suppression of wages, the extension of the 
working day and the lack of any welfare system might be beneficial for each capitalist individually, 
but these practices endanger the normal reproduction of the labour force as a whole. This is because, 
at a very basic level, the value of the commodity ‘labour power’ equals the value of all the products 
necessary for the reproduction of the labour power. That is, the worker must cover the absolute 
minimum needs for alimentation, housing and clothing, along with the corresponding needs of his/her 
children. When the salary drops below this level, or when exploitation is so intense that it undermines 
the working capacity of the worker, the long-term interests of capital as a social force are imperilled.  
This destructive potential of capitalist development became evident in the course of the nineteenth 
century. In 1844, Engels published his classic book on the appalling condition of the English working 
class,107 while a century later Polanyi argued that the central preoccupation of nineteenth-century 
sociology and political economy was the pervasive, unprecedented poverty that accompanied the 
                                                          
105 Ibid., 552.  
106 Marx explains the objective character of the struggle over the length of the working day as follows: ‘The 
capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the working day as long as possible... On the 
other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and 
the labourer maintains his right as seller when he wishes to reduce the working-day to one of definite normal 
duration. There is here therefore, an antinomy, of right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of 
exchange. Between equal rights, force decides.’ K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1954, 1977) Volume 1, 225.  
107 See generally: F. Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Penguin, [1844] 2009).  




Industrial Revolution and colonial expansion.108 Indeed, the destructive potential of market expansion 
was felt both at the centre and the periphery of capitalism and led to significant social unrest. As 
Jouannet observes,  
a new indigent population appeared that experienced both poverty and loss of status. The dreadful 
conditions of manual workers, the injustices and inequalities of the system generated succeeding 
economic and social crises at regular intervals, and that ended up sowing doubt about the capacity of 
liberal and financial capitalism to ensure growth and progress.109 
The First World War and the subsequent re-arrangement of the international legal order provided an 
opportunity for the incorporation of welfarist concerns in the discipline: ‘for most politicians and 
international lawyers of the age it was not a matter of dismissing the liberal purpose of international 
law in force among civilized states, but rather of redirecting its aim in a more social direction;’110 In 
an attempt to tame the most extreme aspects of capitalist exploitation and to prevent violent anti-
capitalist revolutions. In a number of conventions concluded shortly after its establishment, the ILO 
attempted to rationalise capitalist exploitation by setting minimum age requirements for industrial and 
agricultural employment, regulating weekly rest and night work for women.111 In this respect, the 
foundation of the ILO was indeed ‘an emblematic and principal turning point of international law’112 
in such a direction, and it was also accompanied by Article 23 of the Covenant and by the 
incorporation of welfarist concerns in colonial administration through the MS. However, this welfarist 
turn need not be romanticised or exaggerated. During the same period, in the absence of international 
financial institutions ‘the League’s main economic strategy had been to stabilize capitalism113 and 
prevent the spread of socialism: ‘[t]he League’s currency stabilization packages were basically 
written, as a British Foreign office official put it, in order to keep places like Austria and Hungary 
“from throwing up their hands and going Bolshy”.’114 The League incorporated indeed certain 
                                                          
108 ‘Up to the time of Speenhamland no satisfactory answer could be found to the question of where the poor 
came from. It was, however, agreed among eighteenth-century thinkers that pauperism and progress were 
inseparable. […] When the significance of poverty was realized, the stage was set for the nineteenth century.’ K. 
Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Beacon Press, [1944], 
2001), 108, 116.  
109 Jouannet (supra note 3), 169.  
110 Ibid., 174.  
111 ILO Convention Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of Children to Industrial Employment (Entry into 
force: 13 Jun 1921); ILO Convention concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings 
(Entry into force: 19 Jun 1923); ILO Convention concerning Employment of Women during the Night (Entry 
into force: 13 Jun 1921).  
112 Jouannet (supra note 3), 177.  
113 Mazower (supra note 10), 150. 
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welfarist concerns, while imposing on states like Austria a strict austerity programme.115 At the same 
time, the PMC would consider the establishment of a Jewish-Arab communist party in Palestine to be 
an existential threat that it needed to address urgently.116 All these initiatives, despite their seeming 
contradictions, were in fact instances of the same process of stabilising capitalism during a moment 
when both internal and external challenges threatened its viability. In the context of the MS, 
welfarism took the rhetorical form of impartial humanitarianism. Without questioning the sincerity of 
the intentions of its proponents, my argument here is that the rise of welfarism was part of the broader 
process of spreading and safeguarding capitalism through international law and institutions.  
Conclusion 
The partial and limited internationalisation of colonialism through the Mandates System was the 
outcome of a politically singular moment involving the rise of liberal and socialist internationalism, 
the emergence of anti-colonial and nationalist movements and a particular balance of power between 
imperial powers of the time. However, the MS was not simply historically contingent, but represented 
both a continuation and a ‘great transformation’ in the triangular relationship between international 
law, capitalism and colonialism. In a nutshell, through its workings, the PMC refined further the 
criteria for a political community to be a subject of international law and possess full sovereignty. 
These criteria largely overlapped with those for a political community to be considered ‘civilised’ in 
the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. State centralisation, legal reform, 
territorialisation of power relations and some degree of interventionism were necessary prerequisites 
for the establishment and smooth reproduction of the capitalist mode of production.  
In this respect, the MS was a continuation of nineteenth-century international law, in that it was part 
of a broader process of social transformation towards the globalisation of capitalism. By privileging 
                                                          
115 ‘The prestige of Geneva rested on its success in helping Austria and Hungary to restore their currencies, and 
Vienna became the Mecca of liberal economists on account of brilliantly successful operation on Austrian krone 
which the patient, unfortunately, did not survive.’ Polanyi (supra note 108), 25.  
116 ‘The Chairman stated that, according to an article in the French Press on February 1st, 1931, a Communist 
Congress composed of Arabs and Jews had met at Jerusalem in December 1930. An organisation had been 
formed in which the Arab element was predominant. He asked if these arrangements had been made with the 
knowledge and permission of the British Government. The Arabs said that the Communists were mostly found 
among the Jews, while the Jews stated that most of the Communists in Palestine were Arabs. […]The 
CHAIRMAN was glad that the Intelligence Service had been re-organised and hoped that it would work quite 
satisfactorily. He added that, as the service was now better organised, it would be inexplicable if the French 
Press were better informed than the Administration. It was evident that some circles were alive to the danger of 
Communist activity in Palestine. He therefore hoped the Palestine Government would keep this danger in view.’  
‘Communist Activity in Palestine’ (supra note 22), 87-88.    




one specific form of social and political organisation (capitalist societies governed by nation-states) 
and by promoting, co-ordinating and legitimising the reforms necessary for the function of that 
system, the Mandate System was altering profoundly the mandated territories in a similar manner as 
extraterritoriality transformed semi-peripheral countries some decades earlier. However, the MS was 
also novel in significant ways. First, this process of transformation took place through an international 
organisation that enjoyed relative functional autonomy. The PMC developed significant functions, 
including data collection, standard-setting and monitoring of colonial powers. This emergence of the 
international institution as a locus of colonial administration was a novel phenomenon of persistent 
importance, since it enabled a better (always judged against inter-systemic standards) balance between 
particularistic colonial interests and the long-term interests of capitalism. Secondly, it was through the 
work of the PMC that welfarist concerns entered formally the equation of colonial management. This 
welfarist turn of international law was part of a broader social transformation that had been initiated in 
the final quarter of the nineteenth century and entailed the demise of laissez-faire liberalism and the 
rise of the interventionist state. International lawyers and bureaucrats of the time attributed this turn to 
noble humanitarianism, but reality was a bit less idealistic: both internal contradictions of capitalism 
as a system of production and the rise of the ‘communist threat’ necessitated some form of 
interventionism to safeguard the viability of capitalism in the long term. International law and 
institutions as forces relatively autonomous from particularistic national or economic interests were 
particularly well-situated for performing this crucial function.  
Therefore, state-building and the diffusion of free-market economy were at the core of the Mandates 
System. Through their interventions, the bureaucrats of both the League and colonial powers were 
changing the social fabric of the colonies and creating the conditions for independence. The Second 
World War accelerated this process and brought about independence much faster than any inter-war 
international lawyer or colonial administrator would ever imagine. In fact, during roughly the third 
quarter of the twentieth century (1955-1980) it seemed possible that the social forces released by this 
process of transformation would threaten the very foundations of the international legal system and its 
commitment to free-market economy. The following chapter focuses precisely on this unfulfilled 
destabilising potential of the decolonisation process and its interplay with international law. 
 




Chapter 4: From decolonisation to the New International Economic Order: continuities 
and ruptures in international law 
I fought the law, and the law won.  
Sonny Curtis, The Cricketers, I Fought the Law  
This chapter inquires how the international law of colonialism was transformed into contemporary 
international law. To do so, I scrutinise the period stretching across the first three post- Second World 
War decades, examining how international law was challenged and transformed by the decolonisation 
process. The process of decolonisation and the role of international law therein should be understood 
as closely linked to colonial international law and its transformative functions. More specifically, I 
argue that it was due to the relative success of the ‘civilising mission’, coupled with the universal 
reach of international law at the time, that the decolonisation process took the form of sovereign 
statehood, and not of other forms of communal co-existence. Extraterritoriality in the nineteenth 
century and the Mandate System of the League of Nations are just two instances of international law 
and institutions altering social reality, privileging state-centralisation and capitalist relations of 
production.1 Thus, when the question of decolonisation arose, international law and institutions had 
shaped material conditions in the colonies in such ways that rendered national statehood the option 
that corresponded better to these new social realities. Shortly after their independence, post-colonial 
states initiated a campaign that came to be known as the New International Economic Order (NIEO), 
pushing for reforms of international law in order to achieve economic sovereignty and development.2 
For them, economic sovereignty and development were the necessary corollaries to political 
independence, and NIEO was seen as a means to correct the injustices of the past. In the context of 
this process, the Third World challenged the hierarchy between states as it arose from colonialism and 
demanded the restructuring of the global legal and economic order. However, NIEO did not challenge 
the process of social transformation towards state-formation and certain forms of capitalism linked to 
colonialism and to the international law of the time. The prioritisation of ‘state rights’ as a means for 
advocating for international economic justice was interlinked with the unwillingness of post-colonial 
states to address the question of class divisions and domestic structures of power. On the legal level, 
the endorsement of certain core concepts of international law (sovereign statehood, consent as the 
                                                          
1 See Chapters 2 and 3 of the present thesis.  
2 For the growing scholarly interest in the first post-war decades, decolonisation and international law see: S. 
Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality 
(CUP, 2013); M. Salomon, ‘From NIEO to Now and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice’ (2013) 62 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 31; L. Eslava, M. Fakhri and V. Nesiah, (eds), Bandung, the 
Global South, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures (CUP, 2016) (forthcoming). In spring 
2015 the US-based journal Humanity devoted a special issue to the New International Economic Order, 
indicating the growing interest in the topic. 




basis of international obligation) trapped the proponents of NIEO into the well-known oscillation 
between apology (state sovereignty) and utopia (international community) described by Martti 
Koskenniemi.3 These antinomies, coupled with unfavourable political circumstances, led to the defeat 
of NIEO.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 1 revisits the history of decolonisation, mapping how 
international law profoundly influenced its course, both by having transformed colonial societies 
during the nineteenth century and by providing a conceptual framework for what it means to be ‘post-
colonial’. Section 2 provides a brief account of the main axes of NIEO, focusing on its commitment to 
international law and the centrality of the concept of ‘development’. Section 3 analyses the reasons 
for NIEO’s failure. The argument put forward here is that NIEO’s reformist agenda was too narrow, 
accepting core tenets of international law and trying to utilise them mostly for the benefit of post-
colonial elites. As an initiative, therefore, NIEO was thus confronted with inherent contradictions of 
international law. Simultaneously, its silence about domestic arrangements and patterns of 
exploitation and injustice enabled its opponents to label it as ‘nationalist’ and defeat it politically 
through the promotion of legal concepts and techniques, like the World Bank’s ‘basic needs’ or 
human rights, that claimed to be addressing issues of domestic patterns of power.  
4:1 Decolonisation as homeopathy: the limitations of a revolution 
When studying the history of decolonisation, we are confronted with a fundamental, yet infrequently 
asked question: why did the decolonisation process proceed through the proliferation of the form of 
sovereign statehood? To rephrase: why did being anti- and post-colonial eventually come to require 
the form of a nation-state, and not, for example, a return to pre-colonial forms of political organisation 
or transnational forms of political organisation, pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism or pan-Africanism being 
some examples? It is not as if these options were never contemplated, or that the question constitutes 
a purely intellectual exercise. As Lal points out:  
[i]n 1960, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which went on to become the country’s 
ruling political party, offered to “postpone the celebration of Tanganyika’s independence”, which was 
then scheduled for the following year, to “celebrate East Africa’s independence in 1962 rather than take 
the risk of perpetuating the balkanization of East Africa.”4  
Similarly, as Cooper has argued, decolonisation was ‘a drama of competing visions’5.Plans for 
federalism between both (former) colonies or between them and the imperial centre were vividly 
                                                          
3 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP, 2005). 
4 P. Lal, ‘African Socialism and the Limits of Global Familyhood: Tanzania and the New International 
Economic Order in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2015) 6 Humanity 17, 20.  
5 F. Cooper, ‘Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective’ (2008) 49 Journal of 
African History 167, 176.  




debated in Francophone Africa and were even realised for a brief period in the case of Union 
française.6 Fanon, who emerged as one of the major figures of post-colonial theory and exerted 
significant influence on the Algerian War of Independence, was sceptical about the limitations of 
nationalism as an emancipatory project,7 and in 1961 he launched a comprehensive attack against 
what he saw as post-colonial elites’ willingness to mimic European institutions, including national-
statehood:  
So, comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions and societies that draw their 
inspiration from her. Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, which 
would be almost an obscene caricature. If we want to turn Africa into a new Europe, and America into a 
new Europe, then let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it 
better than the most gifted among us.8 
However impassioned or creative as the alternatives might have been, national-statehood ultimately 
prevailed.9 So far, the most comprehensive framework for comprehending the significance of 
international law in this process and in the eventual triumph of statehood as the form post/anti-
colonialism assumed has been provided by Sundhya Pahuja in her Derrida- inspired account of the 
potential and limits of international law.10 For her, the significance of international law in the process 
of decolonisation is both overestimated and underestimated.11 It is overestimated to the extent that a 
post-factum mythology attributes the dissolution of formal empires to the UN Charter (the Charter 
hereafter) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In fact, neither of these 
documents dictated the end of the colonial project. The UDHR urged for the enjoyment of human 
rights without distinction ‘on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the 
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or 
under any other limitation of sovereignty’.12 Hence, colonialism and other forms of foreign 
domination were not denounced; nor were they conceptualised as violations of rights as such, but 
                                                          
6 Cooper elaborates this argument further: F. Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking 
France and French Africa: 1945–1960 (Columbia University Press, 2014). 
7 ‘The objective of nationalist parties as from a certain given period is, we have seen, strictly national. […] 
When such parties are questioned on the economic programme of the state that they are clamouring for, or on 
the nature of the regime which they propose to install, they are incapable of replying, because precisely, they are 
completely ignorant of the economy of their country.’ F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Penguin Books, 
1990), 121.  
8 Ibid., 254.  
9 ‘Although decolonization ultimately produced an assortment of new nation-states, this outcome was not 
actually conclusive until the late 1960s.’ Lal (supra note 4).  
10 Pahuja (supra note 2). 
11 Ibid., 45.  
12 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) UN Doc 
A/RES/217(III) A, Article 2 (emphasis added). 




rather as ‘neutral’ backgrounds for the enjoyment of such rights. Further, the Charter included certain 
references to ‘self-determination’, which was conceptualised as a principle and not as a right.13 
Moreover, Article 77 practically exempted the Allies’ colonies from the trusteeship system, making 
their inclusion voluntary.14 In fact, France and the UK staunchly resisted any attempt to include their 
colonies in their trusteeship system by invoking the principle of non-interference in states’ domestic 
affairs.15 In San Francisco, France articulated an indirect, but clear, defence of its colonial enterprise: 
‘France recognized the value of a trusteeship system, but remarked that it was not the only way of 
promoting the development of dependent peoples.’16 Therefore, one of the most controversial topics 
of the negotiation process for Article 7717 was resolved in favour of imperial powers. Crucially, the 
UN Charter did not commit itself to the foreseeable independence of colonies. Independence was not 
explicitly mentioned as the ultimate goal regarding non-governing territories in general. With regard 
to the trusteeship system, independence was mentioned as one possible alternative outcome, along 
with self-government, a choice signalling no substantial progress regarding its interwar counterpart.18 
                                                          
13 Article 2 para 1 of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the UN is: ‘[t]o develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace’, while the introductory sentence of Article 55 reads as 
follows: ‘With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful 
and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples…’ Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entry into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 
XVI. Crawford characterised these references as ‘cryptic’, a rather generous interpretation: J. Crawford, The 
Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, OUP, 2006), 112. 
14 Article 77 para 1 of the Charter stipulated that ‘[t]he trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the 
following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements: a. territories now held 
under mandate; b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; 
and c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.’ UN Charter 
(supra note 13).  
15 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), San Francisco, 1945, 
Volume X (United Nations International Organization, 1945) 433, 440.  
16 Ibid., 433.  
17 The delegate of Australia summarised the importance of the disagreement as follows: ‘The principal issue 
before this Committee, in his opinion, was whether the application of the trusteeship system to territories other 
than League Mandates and ex-enemy dependencies should be left to voluntary action of the powers responsible 
for their administration. In the Australian view, a merely voluntary procedure was inadequate.’ Ibid., 428-429.  
18 Article 73 section b imposed upon states administering non self-governing territories the obligation ‘to 
develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the 
progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each 
territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement’. Article 73 UN Charter (supra note 13). 
Article 76 section b set the goals of trusteeship administration as follows: ‘The basic objectives of the 




Again, the role of the two major colonial powers of the time, France and the UK, was crucial in 
undermining any effort to promote independence as the sole ultimate goal of the trusteeship system. It 
is telling that the UK ‘warned the Committee against confusing independence with liberty. What the 
dependent peoples wanted was an increasing measure of self-government; independence would come, 
if at all, by natural development.’19  
What was perhaps more promising in comparison to the Mandate System was that the Trusteeship 
Council was not comprised of civil servants but of representatives of UN member states, ‘thus 
politicizing empire, putting the colonial powers in the minority, and increasing the likelihood of 
extensive public discussion of their policies’.20 Nonetheless, one could argue that there was nothing 
fundamentally anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist about the basic post-war international legal 
documents. Rather, they reflected a delicate balance of power between the will of European powers to 
maintain their empires, American antipathy towards overt imperialism and the worry that rapid, 
uncontrolled decolonisation would make available space for the expansion of the USSR and, more 
broadly, socialism and communism. The tensions were clear in the drafting process of the Charter. On 
the one hand, the representative of the USSR ‘emphasized the importance of independence’21 for 
entrusted territories, and the Philippines invoked the war effort against Nazism and fascism in order to 
legitimise colonised peoples’ demands for self-determination.22 On the other hand, the UK rejected 
the idea of independence, at least as a general prescription, and insisted that decisions should be made 
on a case-by-case basis.23 In any case, even proponents of independence believed it was ‘a distant 
prospect’.24  
In this sense, it is difficult to argue that the UN Charter and the international legal order that emerged 
in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War were inherently anti-imperial. Nonetheless, 
according to Pahuja, international law deeply marked the course decolonisation took by providing the 
vocabulary and conceptual tools for colonial peoples to articulate their aspirations and to render them 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present 
Charter, shall be: to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of 
the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of 
the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement’. Article 76 ibid.  
19 UNCIO (supra note 15), 440.  
20 M. Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (Penguin Books, 2012), 253. 
21 UNCIO (supra note 15), 441. 
22 ‘Peoples all over the world have been given new hope of freedom by this war, and this hope should not be 
disappointed.’ Ibid., 562.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid., 453.  




intelligible to the international arena, be it political or legal. In Pahuja’s words, international law ‘was 
already the universal juridical frame covering the globe. This coverage meant that international law 
could provide a structure by which the heterogeneous movements for decolonisation could be 
smoothed into a coherent story’25 and ‘be contained within the broader frameworks set by Western 
interests’.26 Thus, on one hand, whilst international law did provide a language in which claims for 
decolonisation could gain a certain audibility, on the other, it locked in ‘nation-statehood’ as the only 
way to claim legal personality.27Thus, both the universal reach and the claim to universality of 
international law provided a framework for decolonisation to take place, while defining the limits of 
this process at the same time.  
Though instructive, Pahuja’s argument overestates the discursive power of international law and 
underestimates its material implications. In order to grasp the role of international law in the 
decolonisation process, we need to consider how, through international law, colonialism changed the 
social, economic and political fabric of colonised societies. The principal argument laid out in 
previous chapters is key for this argument. First, the social and economic reforms introduced by 
administrating powers, whether these were outright colonisers, trustees under the Mandate system or 
imperial powers in relation to semi-colonies, such as Japan or the Ottoman Empire during the 
nineteenth century, promoted the transformation of colonial societies into centralised capitalist 
states.28 Arguably, the efficacy of this process varied greatly, depending on domestic conditions, the 
balance of social forces and the refinement of the policies applied. Whether through treaties or 
through the international administration of territories, international law assumed a proactive role in 
the transformation of colonial polities into centralised nation-states with capitalist economies. The 
dissolution of traditional modes of producing and living, and the gradual centralisation of power 
promoted by colonial international law, enabled the emergence of sovereignty as the hegemonic form 
of post-colonial communal organisation. Hence, sovereign statehood, far from being a self-evident 
truth or purely a discursive strategy, was in fact the very outcome of colonial social engineering, and 
international law had played a significant role in this process. In that sense, and in a very 
contradictory manner, international law of the nineteenth century was unintentionally paving the way 
for its own collapse. By pushing towards the legalisation of social relations, state centralisation, the 
creation of a (national) bureaucracy or even of national armies, colonial international law was creating 
the conditions that rendered it illegitimate and led to its demise. Simultaneously, the spread of a free-
market economy through international law created a national bourgeoisie that, despite its relevant 
                                                          
25 Pahuja (supra note 2), 45. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.  
28 See Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.  




weakness, would effectively restrain efforts to transform anti-colonial struggles into comprehensive 
programmes of social liberation.29  
On an international legal level, this reality was reflected by the principle of uti possidetis juris.30 
Despite its largely mythological links to Roman law, the principle was first applied in the 
decolonisation of Latin America31 and was mobilised a century later in the context of decolonisation 
in Africa and Southeast Asia, as well as in the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia at the turn 
of the twentieth century.32 The most common justification for the principle is that it safeguards 
territorial and border stability in the face of the largely cataclysmic events of decolonisation, or of 
state succession more broadly.33 This is undeniably true; however, the functions of the uti possidetis 
doctrine are more systemic than that. Apart from protecting already existing borders, uti possidetis 
protects and entrenches the very idea of borders and of nation-states as fundamentally territorialised 
political communities. As Malcolm Shaw argues, through the application of the uti possidetis 
principle, ‘[s]elf-determination, therefore, ensured the distinct identity of the colony and its 
decolonization, but on the basis of accepting the existence of a discrete territorial unit in international 
                                                          
29 ‘Ironically, it was African elites who sanctified the colonial state by ratifying its borders and forbidding even 
idle speculation about reconsideration of the issue. […] Even today, with overwhelming empirical evidence of 
the failure of the post-colonial state, African elites insist on clinging to this fiction of European creation to the 
bitter end.’ M. w. Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995)16 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 1113, 1119.  
30 ‘[T]he principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law, it is a 
general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence wherever 
it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by 
fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering 
power.’ Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v The Republic of Mali) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ 
Rep 554, para 20.  
31 ‘In this connection it should be noted that the principle of uti possidetis seems to have been first invoked and 
applied in Spanish America, inasmuch as this was the continent which first witnessed the phenomenon of 
decolonization involving the formation of a number of sovereign States on territory formerly belonging to a 
single metropolitan State.’ Ibid.  
32 ‘Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries became frontiers protected by international law. This 
conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and, in particular, from the 
principle of uti possidetis.’ Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Badinter Opinion No. 3 (11 
January 1992).  
33 ‘Reliance on uti possidetis during the post-Cold War break-ups has stemmed from three arguments or 
assumptions. First, uti possidetis reduces the prospects of armed conflict by providing the only clear outcome in 
such situations. Absent such a policy, all borders would be open to dispute, and new states would fall prey to 
irredentist neighbors or internal secessionist claimants.’ S. R. Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and 
the Borders of New States’ (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 590, 591.  




law’.34 In that sense, uti possidetis was drawing from the legacies of colonial international law, while 
consolidating them at the same time.  
It is a common trope that the boundaries that arose from this process were artificial.35 This is true to 
the extent that they did not correspond to the needs of the post-colonial peoples, especially the most 
oppressed and marginalised ones. However, it is difficult to argue that, for example, European 
boundaries were less artificial or less oppressive and unstable. Relative stability and (temporary) 
homogeneity only occurred in Europe after centuries of armed conflict and, crucially, after the de 
facto resolution of the ‘minority problem’ during the 1930s and 1940s with the large-scale expulsion 
and – alas – extermination of entire populations.36 Therefore, the idea that uti possidetis prevented the 
emergence of more ‘natural’ and therefore functional borders is unsustainable. Nonetheless, the 
principle can and should be criticised on the basis that it consolidated national-statehood as the only 
materially viable, politically acceptable and legally feasible form of post-colonial political 
organisation. Furthermore, uti possidetis entrenched the continuities between colonial and post-
colonial international law. In the course of the colonial encounter, international law would promote or 
encourage state-centralisation through the construction of railways or other infrastructure, through the 
(piecemeal and problematic) dissolution of traditional relations of production and of social 
organisation and through their replacement with (precarious) bureaucratic structures and free markets. 
Uti possidetis drew from this material reality, while simultaneously consolidating it. Thus, 
international law was not only or even primarily a discursive strategy providing a language that 
legitimised, but also limited, anti-colonial struggles. International law of the nineteenth century was 
part of a wider trend of social transformation that entailed state centralisation and the diffusion of 
capitalism outside the West. However, it was this very process of social transformation that brought 
about the rise of the social forces that brought formal colonialism and formal imperialism to an end. 
In a fine dialectical move, colonial international law, with its formal hierarchies between civilised and 
                                                          
34 M. N. Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ (1997) 3 European Journal of International Law 478, 
481.  
35 ‘Unlike their European counterparts, African states and borders are distinctly artificial and are not “the visible 
expression of the age-long efforts of [the indigenous] peoples to achieve political adjustment between 
themselves and the physical conditions in which they live.”’ Mutua, (supra note 29), 1115.  
36 Mazower has neatly summarised the decline of the faith in international law as a tool for managing the 
problem of minorities in Europe, and the rise of much more radical solutions, such as population transfers, 
during the 1930s and 1940s in an ideological climate that paved the way for Nazi atrocities: ‘Nations, Refugees, 
and Territory: The Jews and the Lessons of the Nazi New Order’ in M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The 
End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton University Press, 2009). For 
population exchanges that consolidated national identities and the role of international law and institutions: U. 
Özsu, Formalizing Displacement: International Law and Population Transfers (OUP, 2014).  




not-so-civilised states, collapses under the burden of the world it helped create. With the same 
dialectical move, though, international law set the limits for this emerging world. The form 
decolonisation assumed was that of the centralised, bureaucratic nation-state with some form of 
capitalist economy. Undeniably, certain post-colonial states, such as Algeria or Tanzania, struggled 
against this heritage and experimented with forms of ‘African socialism’. However, to the extent that 
they did so, they were fighting against both existing norms of international law and the legacies of 
colonial international law in the fabric of their societies.  
4:2 From politics to economics: a sense of incompleteness and the quest for a just 
international legal order 
This section summarises the attempt of post-colonial states to reform the international legal order in 
the course of the first three post-war decades. This reformist programme, commonly known as the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO), was formally launched in 1974, but its origins date back 
to the 1950s and 1960s, and Latin American states’ initiatives to promote national sovereignty over 
natural resources.37 For the purposes of this chapter, NIEO is used to signify the broader process of 
Third World states’ engagement with international law before the 1980s. The reform agenda of NIEO 
included demands, such as the absolute right of states to control their natural resources, the 
establishment and recognition of state-managed resource cartels to stabilise (and raise) commodity 
prices, the regulation of transnational corporations, technology transfers from North to South, the 
granting of preferential (nonreciprocal) trade preferences from the Global North to the Global South, 
and debt forgiveness.38 To begin with, I will argue three points: first, I shall outline the contradictory 
engagement of post-colonial states with law, which was understood by them as both an oppressive 
and emancipatory structure. Secondly, I will comment on how the Third World was confronted with 
the reality that political independence was not sufficient to safeguard their economic autonomy and 
well-being and henceforth, resorted to the concept of ‘development’ to address this problem. Finally, I 
will provide a short overview of the main legal reforms promoted under the NIEO umbrella, before 
moving on to critiquing them.  
                                                          
37 UNGA, ‘Right to Explore Freely Natural Wealth and Resources’ (21 December 1952) UN Doc 
A/RES/626(VII); UNGA, ‘Recommendations Concerning International Respect for the Rights of Peoples and 
Nations to Self-determination’ (12 December 1958) UN Doc A/RES/1314(XIII); UNGA, ‘Declaration on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ (14 December 1962) UN Doc A/RES/1803(XVII). For the 
most comprehensive account of the concept so far, see: N. Schrijver, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (CUP, 1997). For a contemporary account that also links this move to 
the NIEO, see: U. Özsu, ‘Rendering Sovereignty Permanent? The Multiple Legacies of the New International 
Economic Order’ (2016) European Yearbook of International Economic Law (forthcoming).  
38 N. Gilman, ‘The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction’ (2015) Humanity 1, 3.  




4:2:1 NIEO as a legal project: saving international law from itself?  
 
The contradictory sentiments felt in the Third World vis-à-vis international law lay at the heart of 
NIEO. This can be seen clearly in the interventions of Mohammed Bedjaoui, the Algerian jurist who 
was one of the major NIEO figures in the international legal realm. In his 1979 book on the subject,39 
Bedjaoui stressed the complicity of international law with the colonial project, asserting that it had 
functioned historically as an ‘international law of appropriation’.40 Even more so, he perceived the 
discipline as plutocratic, oligarchic and non-interventionist in the economic domain, claiming that ‘[a] 
permissive, liberal, indifferent law can only be a law for the benefit of the industrialised countries’.41 
More specifically, Bedjaoui focused his criticism on legal formalism, or ‘legal paganism’, as he chose 
to summarise what he saw as a fixation on legal form and a neglect of underlying facts that served to 
render a formally neutral norm socially unjust.42 The focus of his criticism also allowed him to justify 
his choice to engage heavily with international law in the quest of a fairer international society.43 If we 
read his argument closely, a dichotomy arises between international law as such (the ‘true nature’ of 
IL) and its ‘real function’, the former being genuinely progressive, while the latter, being formalist, 
giving IL a regressive function.44 In a sense, he advocated for the salvation of international law from 
(Western) international lawyers, a process capable of revealing the presumed progressive essence of 
international law. He was not alone in this quest. Many international lawyers from the periphery, such 
as Georges Abi-Saab or Prakash Sinha, engaged in critiques of international law, only to go on and 
reassure their readers that this critique does not imply a rejection, but rather a profound commitment 
to international law.45 Interestingly, this (anti-formalist) critique of international law frequently 
resulted in challenging international custom, which was perceived as particularly detrimental to the 
                                                          
39 M. Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (UNESCO/Holmes & Meier, 1979). For a 
concise overview of Bedjaoui’s arguments, see: U. Özsu ‘“In the interests of humankind as a whole”: 
Mohammed Bedjaoui’s New International Economic Order’ (2015) 6 Humanity 129. 
40 Bedjaoui, (supra note 39), 12. 
41 Ibid., 61. 
42 Ibid., 98. 
43 Bedjaoui himself acknowledged that there was a ‘seeming paradox’ in using law, which he had described as a 
conservative - if not reactionary - force, to bring about change. Ibid., 110.  
44 Ibid., 112. 
45 See: G. A. Abi-Saab, ‘The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline’ (1962) 
8 Howard Law Journal 95, 100; P. Sinha, (1965) ‘Perspective of the Newly Independent States on the Binding 
Quality of International Law’ 14 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 121, 121. Knox has argued 
convincingly that Sinha was a prominent representative of the conservative understanding of colonialism in 
international legal scholarship: R. Knox, ‘A Critical Examination of the Concept of Imperialism in Marxist and 
Third World Approaches to International Law’ (PhD thesis, LSE 2014), 100.  




interests of Third World states, on the most formalist ground one could possibly imagine: the lack of 
consent on the part of Third World states.46  
Setting this contradiction aside for a moment, it needs to be observed that post-colonial states’ 
positive attitude for international law in general, and distrust towards its contemporary state, were 
reflected in their sustained efforts for reform. Given that voting rules in the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs) were fundamentally inimical for them,47 Third World states turned to the UN 
General Assembly and other UN institutions (for example, the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development, UNCTAD), in order to promote their international legal agenda. After 1952,48 and 
especially after 1974, Third World states passed numerous resolutions49 and established multiple 
committees under the auspices of the UN50 with a view of reforming international law. We will turn to 
the details of these efforts shortly. What is of interest here is that this choice was dictated by 
pragmatic considerations, to the extent that this was the only forum that enabled the Third World to 
form a majority and have its voice heard. The successful campaign of India against South Africa’s 
discriminatory laws against Indian migrants had persuaded the states of the Third World that the UN 
                                                          
46 ‘These new States cannot be expected to accept the thesis that practice of a norm by a group of States may 
create rules binding upon all States, that, as one scholar argued, international law is based on the “decision of 
the overwhelming force in the international community.” For not all the rules of customary international law are 
acceptable to them.’ Sinha (supra note 45), 122. Accordingly, in his seminal work Bedjaoui praised the USSR 
for challenging the rules of state succession and thus, paved the way for ‘the gradual elaboration of a voluntary 
international law.’ Bedjaoui (supra note 39), 58. 
47 Post-colonial states attempted to rectify this perceived injustice in Article 10 of the Charter of Economic 
Rights: ‘All States are juridically equal and, as equal members of the international community, have the right to 
participate fully and effectively in the international decision-making process in the solution of world economic, 
financial and monetary problems, inter alia, through the appropriate international organizations in accordance 
with their existing and evolving rules, and to share the benefits resulting therefrom.’ Article 10 UNGA, Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (12 December 1974) UN Doc A/RES/29/3281. For the increasingly 
hostile position of the World Bank vis-à-vis NIEO, see: P. Sharma ‘Between North and South: The World Bank 
and the New International Economic Order’ (2015) 6 Humanity 189.  
48 In 1952, the General Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to prepare recommendations 
concerning international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination: UNGA, ‘The Right of Peoples 
and Nations to Self-determination’ (16 December 1952) UN Doc A/RES/637.  
49 The three most significant being: UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order’ (1 May 1974) UN Doc. A/Res/S-6/3201; UNGA, ‘Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order’ (1 May 1974) UN Doc. A/Res/S-6/3202; the Charter of Economic Rights (supra 
note 37).  
50 Amongst the more prominent were the Commission on Transnational Corporations, the United Nations Center 
on Transnational Corporations, and the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an International Code of 
Conduct on Transfer of Technology. 




was not a mere rerun of the League of Nations and that they could utilise its structures for their 
struggle against imperialism.51 Nevertheless, the fact that UNGA Resolutions are generally not 
binding under international law52 posed significant obstacles to this process.  
Post-colonial states and theorists adopted different strategies to confront this problem. Amongst the 
most ambitious arguments are Falk’s assertion that, under certain conditions, the UNGA enjoyed 
quasi-legislative powers, and Bulajić’s suggestion that when a few (Western) states are blocking a 
legislative process, it should be international consensus and not consent that forms the basis of 
obligation in the international community.53 It follows that NIEO was quickly confronted with 
questions related to the sources of international law and even more fundamentally the basis of 
international legal obligation.54 Admittedly, the reformist efforts of the Third World exceeded the 
limits of the UN achieving certain modest, and occasionally temporary, victories in fora such as the 
GATT55 or UNCLOS56, while it was due to their persistent efforts that the right to self-determination 
was introduced in common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESC.57  
                                                          
51 In relation to India’s successful resolutions, Mazower observed that: ‘[t]he emergence in the General 
Assembly of an entirely new conception of world order - one premised on the breakup of empire rather than its 
continuation, on politics rather than law - was no figment of the imagination. The General Assembly itself had 
proved more unpredictable than the drafters of the UN Charter had anticipated. And, for a time, it was more 
powerful too.’ Mazower (supra note 36), 185.  
52 See generally Articles 10 and 14 of the UN Charter. At San Francisco, the Philippines suggested that the 
UNGA should be vested with legislative power, a proposal defeated 26-1.  
53 R.A Falk, ‘On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly’ (1966) 60 American Journal of 
International Law 782; M. Bulajić, ‘Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order’ in K. Hossain (ed.), 
Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (Frances Pinter/Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), 
60. 
54 Falk admitted this and implied directly that Article 38 of the ICJ should not be considered an exhaustive 
enumeration of the sources of international law. Falk (supra note 53), 782. 
55 The GATT was fundamentally averse to the reformist aspirations of the Third World. Nevertheless, Article 
XXXVI of Part IV of the GATT was considered a significant success of the post-colonial states deviating from 
the rule of reciprocity. Furthermore, the Tokyo Round concluded an ‘enabling clause’ that enabled - but did not 
require - preferential treatment to ‘developing countries’. See: Tokyo Round ‘Decision on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries’ LT/TR/D/1 (28 November 
1979). 
56 Article 136 of UNCLOS designated the resources of the deep seabed as the ‘common heritage’ of humankind: 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1833 UNTS 3 / [1994] ATS 31 / 21 ILM 
1261 (1982) Article 136. This provision was the outcome of poorer states’ insistence and according to Salomon 
‘instilled in international law a scheme or distributive economic justice’, in Salomon (supra note 2), 45. It is 
generally understood that the 1994 Implementation Agreement, despite its title, eventually dismantled the 




In any case, their insistence on bringing about change to the fabric of international law using 
conventional (treaties) and less conventional (UNGA Resolutions) methods reveals the commitment 
of post-colonial states to international law, which they otherwise thought was complicit in, if not 
directly responsible for, the colonial project. This was not a self-evident strategy. For example, the 
USSR before the Second World War—and certainly in its ‘revolutionary’ phase in the 1920s—
engaged with international law in a profoundly different way at first, denouncing it as a bourgeois 
construct.58 It was only once the USSR had established its position in the international realm that 
Soviet lawyers began to advocate for the co-existence of two distinct international legal systems, one 
between socialist states, and one between socialist and capitalist states.59 The Third World 
consciously did not follow this path and remained committed to legal universalism.60 This observation 
does not imply that the Soviet strategy was necessarily ‘better’ or more radical than NIEO. It just 
seeks to point out that the choice to embrace international law and the struggle to reform it, in order to 
reveal its anticipated emancipatory core, were neither obvious nor inevitable, especially in the course 
of a process as disruptive and revolutionary as decolonisation. 
4:2:2 Building a coherent narrative: development as a legal strategy 
 
The previous sub-section showed that NIEO was a project both critical of and devoted to international 
law and how this is already something which is of note. In this section, I will discuss the strategy of 
the state elites promoting NIEO to build a coherent narrative about what kind of reform they sought to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
regime, promoting a free-market approach to the exploitation of the deep seabed: Agreement Related to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 
entered into force on 28 July 1996 UNTS 1836, No I-31364; ILM 33.  
57 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), signed 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976, UNTS 999/171, International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
signed 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, UNTS 993/3.  
58 The contrast here is stark to the extent, for example, that Third World states did not challenge that 
compensation was payable in the event of nationalisation of property, but negotiated the level of compensation, 
and importantly, which law (national or international) was applicable in these cases. On the other hand, the 
Bolsheviks nationalised property without any form of compensation and without emphasising the international 
legality of their acts as much as was done through NIEO.  
59 See generally: G.I Tunkin, International Law: A Textbook (Progress Publishers, 1986).  
60 ‘The NIEO’s central claims were clothed in a particularly effusive form of universalism, one that would 
inaugurate a new, generously ‘‘social’’ conception of international affairs while doing away with the last 
vestiges of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century classical international law.’ Özsu (supra note 39), 129.  




bring about. As others before me,61 I will argue that the main concept that was brought into play, in 
order to unify varying and often contradictory legal claims, was that of development. As part of this 
sub-section, it is also argued that the concept of development represented the internalisation of 
significant aspects of the capitalist and imperialist hegemony over international law, thus posing 
limits to the transformative potential of NIEO.  
As has already been hinted, NIEO advocates, be they states or lawyers, advanced arguments that were 
essentially contradictory: they called for both more and less state sovereignty, for enhanced state 
independence and extensive communitarian co-operation, and all at the same time. What unified those 
claims, arguably easing the tensions among them, was the conviction that international law should 
basically be devoted to one thing: the economic development of the Third World. Of course, 
development as a concept was not a novelty of NIEO.62 The concept first appeared in an international 
legal document in Article 22 of the League Covenant,63 and it gained prominence after being elevated 
in Point Four of Truman’s Inaugural Address in 1949: ‘[f]ourth, we must embark on a bold new 
program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’.64 Emphasising development had the advantage 
that it could be anchored in the UN Charter, which, in Articles 1 para 3 and 55 (a) embraces 
development and the wider promotion of socio-economic issues as purposes of the UN.65 
                                                          
61 Amongst many: A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP, 2005); E. 
Tourme-Jouannet, What is a Fair International Society?: International Law between Development and 
Recognition (Hart Publishing, 2013); Pahuja (supra note 2).  
62 For a comprehensive critique of the concept, see: G. Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins 
to Global Faith (4th edn, Zed Books, 2014). For a detailed commentary on the growing bibliography on 
development, see: J. Morgan Hodge, ‘Writing the History of Development: Part 1: The First Wave’ (2015) 6 
Humanity 429; J. Morgan Hodge, ‘Writing the History of Development: Part 2: Longer, Deeper, Wider’ (2016) 
7 Humanity 125.  
63 ‘To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the 
sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle 
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the 
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.’ Covenant of the League of Nations (adopted 29 
April 1919, entered into force 10 January 1920), [1919] UKTS 4 (Cmd. 153)/ [1920] ATS 1/ [1920] ATS 3, 
Article 22, para 1. 
64 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, Year 1949 (United States Government 
Printing Office, 1964), 114. 
65 Article 1 para 3 reads as follows: ‘To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’; Article 55 




Interestingly, for what was to follow, it was Western states that advocated for the inclusion of these 
clauses, whereas the USSR was very sceptical, arguing that they could serve as excuses for 
interference with the domestic affairs of states.66 That said, development was elevated to the main 
objective of decolonisation and subsequent attempted reforms from early on. In 1960, the UNGA 
Resolution ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ 
denounced colonialism, also on the basis of it impeding ‘the social, cultural and economic 
development of dependent peoples’.67 Hence, development was designated as the undisputable 
objective of all peoples and colonialism was understood as hindering this development, and not, for 
example, as promoting a specific form of development (capitalist development) or, even more 
broadly, as manufacturing societies where ‘development’ is elevated to the highest social goal. This 
trend went on, and Resolution 1710 confirmed the centrality of development for post-colonial states. 
Even more crucially, it elevated economic growth into the cornerstone of development, setting 
specific growth targets for the ‘developing states’, which, if achieved, were understood as resolving 
those states’ pressing social issues.68 Finally, a brief discourse analysis of the three core NIEO 
resolutions reveals the centrality of development in the thought of Third World elites. In the 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,69 words related to 
development (‘development’, ‘developing/ developed/least developed countries’, ‘growth’, 
‘acceleration’, ‘industrialisation’)70 appear thirty times in the space of two pages. In the Charter of 
Economic Rights,71 the respective number is above 100, and in the slightly longer Programme of 
Action (approximately 15 pages), we can detect almost 200 relevant references.72 This legacy survives 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(a) stipulates that: ‘With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a) higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development’, UN Charter (supra note 13). 
66 Tourme-Jouannet (supra note 61), 9. 
67 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples UNGA Res 1514 (XV) UN 
Docs A/RES/1514 (1960) Preamble. 
68 ‘[A]ccelerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of the economy of individual nations and their social 
advancement so as to attain in each under-developed country a substantial increase in the rate of growth, with 
each country setting its own target, taking as an objective an annual minimum rate of growth of aggregate 
national income of 5 per cent at the end of the Decade;’ United Nations Development Decade UNGA Res. 1710 
(XVI) UN Doc. A/RES/1710 (1961) Article 1. 
69 Declaration on the Establishment (supra note 49).  
70 Words like ‘rationality’ or ‘technology’ were not included in the word count, even though they are closely 
associated to the concept of development. Similarly, the word count did not include words connoting the ‘gap’ 
between rich and poor countries, since these are also linked to the concept of (inter-state) inequality.  
71 Charter of Economic Rights (supra note 47).  
72 Programme of Action (supra note 49).  




even today, since leading Third World international lawyers remain favourable towards (capitalist) 
development, even when challenging its specific modalities.73 
This commitment was reflected aptly in (self)identifying the Third World as ‘developing states’. 
Pahuja has argued convincingly that, in so doing, ‘development’ replaced theories of racial superiority 
and inferiority as the criterion that established a hierarchy between different political communities.74 
Core NIEO Resolutions confirm this assertion. To begin with, political independence and each 
people’s right to choose their political and economic system, free from coercion, were repeatedly 
stressed during that period.75 Nevertheless, the same documents constructed a very specific 
conception of economic and political organisation. Chapter 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights 
provides us with the best example thereof, arguing that international relations should aim to remedy 
the injustices of colonialism and restore a nation’s natural resources so that a State’s ‘normal 
development’ could be achieved: ‘Remedying the injustices which have been brought about by force 
and which deprive a nation of the natural means necessary for its normal development’.76 Combined 
with numerous statements in the context of NIEO which hail technological advancement and 
industrialisation as the appropriate modes of economic development, this provision signifies a 
normalisation of capitalist development. Throughout the core NIEO instruments, we encounter a 
historical narrative that divided different states in accordance with their level of development, which 
in turn was equated with industrialisation, technological advancement and economic growth. The 
‘historical destiny’ of ‘under-developed’ or ‘developing’ states is to be elevated to the level of the 
‘developed’ ones, which will both correct the injustices of colonialism and resolve their social 
problems.77 Hence, even though the Third World advocated for freedom to choose their socio-political 
system, they implicitly adopted the idea that the international legal realm should be structured around 
the transformation of their societies into developed, capitalist economies. This is further evident in the 
means chosen to advance this goal. Post-colonial states generally embraced the liberalisation of world 
                                                          
73 ‘To be sure, the post-colonial era has witnessed the massive violation of human rights of ordinary peoples in 
the name of development. But it is a particular kind of development policies that are responsible for these 
violations and not development per se.’ B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A 
Manifesto’ (2006) 8 International Community Law Review 2, 18. 
74 Pahuja (supra note 2), 63.  
75 ‘The new international economic order should be founded on full respect for the following principles: … d. 
The right of every country to adopt the economic and social system that it deems the most appropriate for its 
own development and not to be subjected to discrimination of any kind as a result.’ Article 4 (d) Declaration on 
the Establishment (supra note 49). 
76 Article 1 (i) Charter of Economic Rights (supra note 47). 
77 See note 68 above.  




trade,78 which was closely associated in their rhetoric with an improvement in living standards, and 
their calls to receive beneficial treatment were seen as temporary until they could ‘catch up’ with the 
‘developed’ states. Further, they insisted in the significance of foreign investment for achieving their 
goal.79 Therefore, the insistence of the Third World on political independence was conditioned by its 
own vision about economic development, which constructed a rigid understanding of what is 
desirable in the economic sphere. Fanon publicly resented this desire to catch up: ‘[n]o, we do not 
want to catch up with anyone. […] It is a question of the Third World starting a new history of 
Man’,80 but NIEO was deeply invested in this mode of thinking.  
To conclude, development was elevated to the principal goal and also shaped the narrative that 
provided NIEO with a degree of consistency and coherence. This approach had the advantage that it 
could be anchored in the Charter, and that it resonated with the economic ‘common sense’ of the time. 
On the one hand, development was traditionally one of the core Western beliefs associated with the 
concept of progress.81 On the other hand, the USSR had embraced industrialisation as absolutely 
essential in building socialism,82 while contemporary Marxism (over)emphasised underdevelopment 
as a consequence of capitalist imperialism.83 Therefore, NIEO, challenging as it might have been, was 
also embedded in the economic and political orthodoxy of its time.  
4:3 NIEO as failure: asking some fundamental questions  
This section, in line with the many international lawyers,84 argues that NIEO was politically and 
legally defeated and tracks this failure back in the early 1980s. NIEO’s suggested reforms were 
                                                          
78 Articles 2(h), 3(a)iii Programme of Action (note 49), Article 14 ibid.  
79 Article 22 ibid. 
80 Fanon (supra note 7), 254.  
81 ‘Offering a confident bridge to a better and more stable future, modernization theory posited a stark 
dichotomy between traditional societies and modern ones. History was the passage from one kind of society to 
the other, a passage that all peoples would eventually make.’ Mazower (supra note 20), 291.  
82 Lenin’s famous quote that ‘Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country, since 
industry cannot be developed without electrification’ summarises concisely the devotion of the USSR to 
industry and modernisation. V. I. Lenin, ‘Our Foreign and Domestic Position and Party Tasks’ in Lenin’s 
Collected Works (4th English edn, Progress Publishers, 1965), Volume 31, 408-426.  
83 For an overview and a critique of Marxist dependency theories, see: J. Milios and D. P. Sotiropoulos, 
Rethinking Imperialism: A Study of Capitalist Rule (Palgrave, 2008). 
84 There is general agreement about the failure of NIEO between both its friends and its foes. Amongst many: 
the texts of NIEO ‘have been long forgotten and many observers would probably regard them as politically 
quaint, economically barmy or the product of misguided economic nationalism.’ J. Faundez, ‘International 
Economic Law and Development before and after Neo-liberalism’ in: J. Faundez and C. Tan (eds), International 
Economic Law, Globalization and Developing Countries (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 17. Rajagopal begs 




generally not implemented and, by the mid-1980s, the reformist block had disintegrated, meaning that 
co-ordinated efforts for reform in NIEO’s direction ceased. What I will do here is to detect the reasons 
for this defeat, dividing them into legal and political ones. At the first level, it is argued that, since 
NIEO was a firmly international legal project, it ended up trapped in the very antinomies of 
international law. Following Koskenniemi, it will be argued that NIEO ended up oscillating between 
state sovereignty and the notion of international community, without being able to resolve this 
fundamental tension.85 The problems here were even starker, given that the Third World was not just 
advancing an international legal argument, but was involved in a reform project. At a second level, it 
is maintained that this legal deadlock was symptomatic of deeper political tensions at the heart of 
NIEO. The proponents of NIEO created a historical narrative of colonialism and international law that 
emphasised the exploitation of the colonial territories. Simultaneously, their international legal 
proposals neglected almost totally what I argue here was the principal function of international law 
during colonialism: the guarantee of the transformation of the colonies into capitalist societies, even to 
the detriment of colonial powers. Therefore, the leaders of NIEO criticised international law from an 
essentially left-wing liberal perspective;86 it was this adoption of liberalism that brought about the 
legal antinomies mentioned above. This political choice, combined with a series of contemporary 
political limitations, contributed to the failure of NIEO, and in turn paved the way for the rise of 
neoliberalism as the hegemonic international legal ideology.  
4:3:1 NIEO’s oscillation: from permanent sovereignty to ‘common heritage of mankind’  
In his contribution on international law and free trade, Stephen Neff, who is not among the keenest 
supporters of NIEO, conceptualised it as a manifestation of Third World economic nationalism.87 
Simultaneously, the USA would not ratify UNCLOS, as it objected to Article 136 and its designation 
of the deep seabed as a ‘common heritage of mankind’ on the basis that it was a form of ‘international 
socialism’.88 Who was right? Was NIEO a nationalist project that failed to acknowledge the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to differ: B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below Development, Social Movements and Third World 
Resistance (CUP, 2003), 73.  
85 Koskenniemi (supra note 3), 485-488. 
86 John Haskell has argued convincingly that left-wing liberalism is nowadays the dominant ideology within 
TWAIL: J. D. Haskell, ‘The TWAIL Paradox’(2014) 1 RGNUL Finance and Mercantile Law Review, 104  
87 ‘This proposed “new international economic order” is anything but new. From the economic standpoint, it is 
quite clearly rooted in nineteenth-century economic nationalism. From the legal standpoint, too, it is thoroughly 
traditional.’ S. C. Neff, Friends but no Allies: Economic Liberalism and the Law of Nations (Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 179. Despite this being the principal line of criticism Neff advances, he also asserts that 
NIEO was an attempt to establish ‘a global welfare state’, a claim which appears to contradict his first approach. 
Ibid., 189. 
88 ‘The main focus of concern was the ISA, which was to be financed by United Nations funds and was seen by 
the US administration in 1982 as especially designed to propagate international socialism and monopolistic 




interconnectedness of the global economy and sought to promote the particularistic interests of the 
Third World, or was it a communitarian project advocating global solidarity?  
The answer, paradoxical as it may sound, is that both critiques were at least partly accurate. As has 
already been suggested, NIEO was an international legal project that advanced fundamentally 
contradictory claims, oscillating between commitment to sovereignty and invocations of international 
community. Henceforth, post-colonial states rejected the claim that they were automatically bound by 
customary international law, contending that this argument violated their sovereign equality and 
forewent state consent as the basis of international legal obligation. For example, the Indian member 
of the International Law Commission, R.B. Pal, argued  
international law was no longer the almost exclusive preserve of the peoples of European blood, “by 
whose consent it exists and for the settlement of whose differences it is applied or at least invoked.” Now 
that international law must be regarded as embracing other peoples, it clearly required their consent no 
less.89  
Similar arguments were put forward in the debate surrounding the (dis)continuity of the international 
legal obligations of successor states.90 State sovereignty over natural resources and the primacy of 
domestic over international law in the determination of the level of compensation in case of 
expropriation were also central for NIEO.91 Therefore, at a certain level, NIEO was advocating for a 
traditionalist approach to international law, emphasising the extension of the principles of sovereign 
equality to non-Western states. The point that sovereignty was an achievement gained by the Third 
World through painful struggles, and therefore to be valued keenly, was raised regularly.92 
Interestingly, the overall picture of NIEO as a legal project is far more complicated. As has already 
been stressed, the choice of post-colonial states to promote legal reform through the UNGA gave rise 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
international bureaucracy and to serve the interests of developing States by promoting the so called “New 
Economic Order”.’ M. Fitzmaurice and O. Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (Eleven 
International Publishing, 2005), 69.  
89 Quoted in: R. P Anand, ‘Role of the “New” Asian-African Countries in the Present International Legal Order’ 
(1962)56 American Journal of International Law 383, 388. 
90 For the most authoritative summary of the debate, see: M. Craven, The Decolonization of International Law: 
State Succession and the Law of Treaties (OUP, 2007), 80-92.  
91 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources GA Res. 1803 (XVII) UN Docs A/RES/1803 
(1962).  
92 ‘For the newly independent states, sovereignty is the hard-won prize for their long struggle for emancipation. 
It is the legal epitome of the fact that they are masters in their own house. It is the legal shield against any 
further domination or intervention by stronger states. They are very aware of its existence and importance for, 
until recently, they were deprived of it.’ Abi-Saab (supra note 45), 103. ‘Sovereignty is the most treasured 
possession of the newly independent States.’ Sinha (supra note 45), 127. 




to the question of the normative effects of these resolutions.93 In order to circumvent this problem, 
proponents of NIEO would resort to clearly communitarian arguments, emphasising how a few 
Western states could not possibly block these reforms.94 For example, Castañeda argued that aid from 
developed to developing states ought to be conceptualised as a form of ‘international tax’,95 a 
viewpoint that implies the existence of an international community with normative consequences akin 
to those of domestic communities and he stressed the need for a legal obligation to co-operate.96 
Eventually, Bedjaoui resorted to the communitarian argument par excellence: jus cogens. Bedjaoui 
argued that ‘the right to development’ should be recognised as a jus cogens norm since ‘the right to 
development is, by its nature, so incontrovertible that it should be regarded as belonging to jus 
cogens.’97 The fundamental question is not about the correctness of this argument, but rather about its 
incompatibility with the rest of the claims advanced by NIEO proponents in general and Bedjaoui in 
particular. Here, the basis of international legal obligation appears to be the collective will of the 
international community as a whole, which is capable of overturning the will of individual states. 
However, this approach was rejected by post-colonial states in the debate about the binding character 
of customary law to newly founded states.98 This ambivalence is evident in Abi-Saab’s writings; 
having devoted pages to praise sovereignty, he went on to assert that ‘[v]oluntarism is not, however, 
very helpful because it is a double-edged weapon’.99 In this respect, Abi-Saab pithily summarised the 
paradoxes and contradictions of the legal scholarship linked to NIEO.  
In a nutshell, NIEO as a legal project got trapped between ‘descending’ and ‘ascending’ patterns of 
justification. In the arguments of its proponents, both the will of the state and international community 
are invoked as the basis of international legal obligation. Nevertheless, as Koskenniemi has 
convincingly argued, these arguments are ‘meaningful only in mutual exclusion’.100 NIEO was 
subjected to the imperative to be both concrete and normative.101 In turn, that meant that it advanced 
an incoherent argument ‘which constantly shifts between the opposing positions while remaining 
                                                          
93 Amongst many: M. Mendelson, ‘The Legal Character of General Assembly Resolutions: Some 
Considerations of Principle’, in Hossain (supra note 53), 95-107.  
94See: Bulajić ibid. 
95 J. Castañeda, ‘Introduction of the Law of International Economic Relations’ in M. Bedjaoui (ed.), 
International Law: Achievements and Prospects (Nijhoff, 1991), 592. 
96 Ibid., 596.  
97 M. Bedjaoui ‘The Right to Development’ in M. Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: Achievements and 
Prospects (Nijhoff, 1991), 1193. 
98 Castañeda (supra note 95). 
99 Abi-Saab (supra note 45), 103. 
100 Koskenniemi (supra note 3), 65. 
101 Ibid., 68.  




open to challenge from the opposite argument’.102 This is why the arguments against NIEO were as 
heterogeneous as depicted above. In fact, Koskenniemi identified NIEO as a typical example of the 
pre-determined failed projects promoting legal formality.103  
In a slightly different context, Craven has argued that ‘[d]ecolonization […] was not something that 
could be managed without simultaneously putting in question the very basis upon which law itself had 
been constructed’.104 The challenge Craven identifies was not only directed towards the ‘orthodoxy’ 
of international law. It was also a question and a challenge for NIEO, which unsurprisingly—if we 
accept Koskenniemi’s arguments—its proponents failed to address. Indeed, the pressure for NIEO 
was even greater, to the extent that its arguments were not just about the international law of its time. 
Rather, NIEO drew from international law whilst attempting to reform it, a project that inevitably 
trapped it in international law’s oscillation between concreteness and normativity. 
4:3:2 Beyond (in)coherence: the politics of NIEO  
Tracking the oscillation of NIEO between ascending and descending argumentation is crucial, to the 
extent that NIEO’s advocates themselves firmly placed their project within international law and 
never attempted a total rejection, or even a fundamental reconceptualization, of the discipline.105 A 
legal project must be judged against legal standards. Nonetheless, it needs to be stressed that the 
contradictory arguments of the project do not suffice to explain its failure. If we accept 
Koskenniemi’s line of thought, this contradictory argumentation is endemic to international legal 
argument:  
Consequently, international legal discourse cannot fully accept either of the justificatory patterns. It 
works so as to make them seem compatible. The result, however, is an incoherent argument which 
constantly shifts between the opposing positions while remaining open to challenge from the opposite 
argument. This provides the dynamics for international legal argument.106  
If this is the case, then the reasons why certain international legal arguments or international legal 
projects fail or succeed need to be sought outside their internal (in)coherence. To bring a directly 
relevant example, the international law of colonialism faced significant challenges in explaining why 
treaties signed with the otherwise legally incompetent native populations of the colonies were legally 
valid. Nevertheless, these treaties were operative, colonialism was thriving, and the international law 
of the time contributed significantly to the maintenance of the status quo. Hence, arguing that 
international law’s mission of ‘civilisation’ succeeded because it was legally superior to the 
                                                          
102 Ibid., 60, 485. 
103 Ibid., 484-88. 
104 Craven (supra note 90), 6. 
105 ‘Their attitudes towards these rules is being revealed. These range from acceptance to rejection, but mainly 
center around a call for specific revisions in the different rules.’ Abi-Saab (supra note 45), 100.  
106 Koskenniemi (supra note 3), 60. 




international law of ‘development’, is an untenable position. Without disputing that there might be 
legal arguments that are better than others, it is contended here that the ultimate success of 
international legal arguments lies outside the realm of law. This is particularly the case with regard to 
arguments about the basic construction of a legal system, in our case international law.  
In this section, the reasons that contributed to NIEO’s failure are divided into two broad categories: 
first, the factors related to the overall political climate of the time, with a focus on the modalities of 
the Cold War and the rise of neoliberalism, which coincided with the official ‘launch’ of NIEO. 
Secondly, NIEO adopted a very specific reading of colonialism and the international law of the 
colonial era that narrowed its political horizon. This reading emphasised international law’s 
complicity with the exploitation of the colonies, ignoring the social engineering employed through 
international legal techniques for the social transformation of the colonies into capitalist states.  
4:3:2:1 The political context: from the divisions of the Cold War to globalised 
neoliberalism 
To begin with, it is significant to keep in mind that, as both a political and as a legal project, NIEO 
was not only facilitated but also constrained by the necessities of the Cold War. To a certain extent, 
the divisions of the Cold War enabled the demands of post-colonial states. First, the communist bloc 
was sympathetic towards the demands of the Third World, since they saw the end of colonialism as an 
ideal opportunity for the spread of socialism. This was reflected in the voting patterns of the UNGA, 
where the Soviet bloc always sided with the demands of the Third World. Moreover, and especially 
after the Suez Crisis,107 the Third World operated under the reassurance that at the end of the day the 
USSR would side with them politically and even militarily, if absolutely necessary.108 Regardless of 
the accuracy of this conviction, it was still a factor that boosted the confidence of Third World leaders 
and allowed them to adopt a more proactive stance vis-à-vis the West. Simultaneously, the West, and 
more specifically, the US, were alarmed by the appeal the Soviet model had over the newly 
                                                          
107 In 1956, Egypt’s President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, provoking anxiety in the West, even though 
compensation was provided and passage through the canal was not disrupted. While the crisis was heading 
towards its resolution, the armed forces of Israel, France and Britain invaded Egypt, while Egypt sank a number 
of ships in the Canal. The USA and the USSR forced Britain and France to withdraw, causing their humiliation 
and signalling the death-knell for Britain’s empire. For the history of the canal and international law, see: M. 
Arcari, ‘Suez Canal’ in R. Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2007).  
108 ‘The Suez affair is a case in point. The latter case shows that the present international atmosphere has created 
a situation in which there is a balance of conflicting interests favorable to the development of international law.’ 
Anand (supra note 89), 390. ‘The Cold War and the loose bi-polar structure of power have helped not only in 
the emancipation of these newly independent states, but also in enhancing their power on the world scene.’ Abi-
Saab (supra note 45), 98.  




decolonised world.109 To a certain extent, this meant that they were prepared to be responsive to the 
developmental concerns of the Third World, in order to prevent them from ‘falling’ to the embrace of 
communism. Τhese concerns explain in part why the politically conservative Henry Kissinger was 
ready to adopt a conciliatory stance towards the Third World, even if it can be argued that it was more 
rhetorical than anything else.110 
That being said, the influence of the Cold War over NIEO was more complicated. Although 
prominent NIEO figures typically adopted a vaguely Marxist rhetoric,111 and despite the fact that 
dependency theories of the time were influenced from Marxism, the Third World was careful not to 
be too closely affiliated with the USSR. This was necessary for it to maintain its autonomous voice; 
or, as Tourme-Jouannet has observed, ‘the new nations now known as the Third World sought to 
organise themselves so as to be autonomous and united with respect to the two blocs and to express 
their own view of the world and international law’.112 In practice, this choice bore practical and 
theoretical difficulties. For example, there was a clear concern amongst certain Third World 
international lawyers that the demands of post-colonial states had to be moderate and not challenge 
too aggressively Western power.113 The concern not to be too radical was a restraint to what NIEO 
could or could not propose. Furthermore, the divisions of the Cold War also challenged the unity of 
the Third World. For instance, even though they chose to co-exist under the umbrella of the G77, 
Yugoslavia represented a model of socialism that was antagonistic but not hostile to the USSR, 
whereas Suharto’s Indonesia was a fiercely anti-Communist regime, which therefore enjoyed the 
                                                          
109 Mazower (supra note 20), 290. 
110 ‘On April 15, 1974, Kissinger delivered a speech to the Sixth Special Session titled “The Challenge of 
Interdependence” in which he acknowledged the “common destiny” of developing and developed countries. 
Kissinger’s speech adopted a conciliatory stance but did not substantively go beyond making several 
deliberately broad declarations of goodwill to which the United States could not be held later.’ ‘In an about-face, 
Kissinger declared that the United States was amenable to commodity agreements if negotiated on a case-by-
case basis. But besides such conciliatory proposals, Kissinger insisted on the important role that private capital 
and capital markets would play in the process of development. The United States, moreover, suggested 
establishing an International Investment Trust to increase portfolio capital for investment in local enterprises.’ 
V. Ogle, ‘State Rights against Private Capital: The “New International Economic Order” and the Struggle over 
Aid, Trade and Foreign Investment, 1962-1981’ (2014) 5 Humanity 211, 219, 221. 
111 To bring but a few examples, the hero of independence and first president and prime minister of Ghana, 
Kwame Nkrumah, was an avid admirer of Lenin and one of his major publications (Neo-Colonialism: The Last 
Stage of Imperialism) clearly echoes Lenin’s classic work, Imperialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism.  
112 Tourme-Jouannet (supra note 61), 21. 
113 ‘There is no doubt that the wave of nationalism in the new and underdeveloped states has led them 
sometimes to take excessive and perhaps unreasonable positions against the colonial powers.’ Anand (supra 
note 89), 390. 




support of the West. This meant that everything had to be negotiated carefully within the G77, so as to 
ensure that very diverse regimes were in agreement. Consequently, this process ‘smoothed’ the 
potentially more radical edges of NIEO.  
The situation was further complicated by the rise of neoliberalism during the 1970s.114 NIEO was 
articulated in terms of ‘states’ rights’115 and envisaged a central role for the state in the developmental 
and modernisation process, including varying degrees of state planning. This understanding was not 
strange to the West that, under Keynesianism, was also engaging with state planning. At the end of 
the day, it can be said that NIEO was an attempt to expand Keynesianism to the newly independent 
states and to their relationship with the rest of the world.116 It was resisted partly on grounds of 
Western exceptionalism, but still indicates the existence of a common language between NIEO and 
the Keynesian economic orthodoxy of the time. This changed radically with the rise of the neoliberal 
school of thought. The significance of the rising tide of neoliberalism is evident in the stance of the 
US vis-à-vis NIEO. As Sargent has argued, the position of the US was more contradictory than 
outright hostile: traditional conservatives like Kissinger were ready to compromise on certain 
economic points, in order to maintain American political hegemony.117 However, Kissinger found 
himself increasingly isolated within the US administration as neoliberals advocated for an 
uncompromising stance.118 Crucially, for neoliberals, the objective was not protecting the status quo 
from the attacks of the Third World, as Kissinger attempted to do. Much more radically, they 
envisaged an entirely new international legal, economic and political order based on generalised free 
competition and on minimised welfarism, which is will be analysed in detail in the next chapter of this 
thesis.  
                                                          
114 For further analysis of the concept, see Section 5:1 A new international paradigm in the making: the 
historical origins and conceptual underpinnings of neoliberalism of the thesis at hand.  
115 This follows from Moyn’s observation that decolonisation was argued in terms of peoples’ and not human 
(individual) rights: S. Moyn, Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2012), 84-120. 
For the relation between states’ rights and neoliberalism, see: S. Singh, ‘The Fundamental Rights of States in 
Neoliberal Times’ (2016) Cambridge Journal of International Law (forthcoming).  
116 ‘Apart from a few very radical provisions, the NIEO appeared to be less of a wholesome break with the older 
order, than a redirection of the old pluralistic liberal view in favour of a new equilibrium in economic relations 
between North and South.’ Tourme-Jouannet (supra note 61), 25. 
117 ‘Instead, by appeasing the Global South in specific areas, such as commodity prices and food assistance, 
Kissinger sought to stabilize the existing international order. If quieting the Third World’s insurgency required 
concessions, Kissinger was willing to make them. He would not mount the barricades in defense of what he 
called the ‘‘theology about the merits of the free market economy.’’’ D. J. Sargent, ‘North/South: The United 
States Responds to the New International Economic Order’ (2015) 6 Humanity 201, 207.  
118 Ibid., 208.  




Hence, when Margot Salomon writes that NIEO failed because of the staunch opposition of developed 
states,119 it is essential to contextualise and qualify this statement. This is because the West was also 
inimical or reserved with regard to decolonisation in the first place, though the process succeeded 
against their will. Hence, the stance of the West as such does not determine fully the success or failure 
of such initiatives. Furthermore, the 1970s and 1980s marked a period of intense social and 
ideological contestation within the West. From students’ mobilisations across Western Europe and the 
USA, to Italy’s ‘Hot Autumn’ and intense strikes in 1969-1970, and from British ‘stagflation’ and the 
‘Winter of Discontent’ to the rise of African-American socialist radicalism in the USA, it was 
becoming evident that the post-war economic model was coming to an end and opposing social forces 
were clashing over what would replace it.120 This process of intensified social struggles was 
concluded with the triumph of neoliberalism, which was fundamentally hostile to NIEO’s demands.121  
4:3:2:2 NIEO, domestic structures of power and capitalism: the limitations of a project 
In this subsection, I will reflect on the question of the internal deficiencies and incoherencies of NIEO 
that contributed to its defeat. More specifically, I will argue that NIEO incorporated many of the core 
concepts of liberal international law. Further, I will suggest that, by incorporating the hegemonic 
narrative that perceives the world as divided into states, NIEO adhered to a liberal ideology that 
‘reads’ colonialism and the international law of the time in a way that excluded from its conceptual 
horizon capitalist transformation and class divisions.  
A point of criticism common between sympathisers and critics of NIEO is its remarkable silence 
when it comes to issues of domestic income distribution, oppression and inequality.122 It is telling that 
                                                          
119 Salomon (supra note 2), 46. 
120 ‘The crisis of capital accumulation in the 1970s aﬀected everyone through the combination of rising 
unemployment and accelerating inﬂation. Discontent was widespread and the conjoining of labour and urban 
social movements throughout much of the advanced capitalist world appeared to point towards the emergence of 
a socialist alternative to the social compromise between capital and labour that had grounded capital 
accumulation so successfully in the post-war period.’ D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP, 2005), 
14-15.  
121 For an overview of neoliberalism and its implications for international law see Section 5:1 ‘A new 
international paradigm in the making: the historical origins and conceptual underpinnings of neoliberalism’. 
122 ‘What state-based rights talk did not address, or at least only made implicit was the internal, domestic 
distribution of resource profits. It was implied that national control over resources would allow for growth 
according to domestic needs and thus for bringing prosperity and well-being to a greater share of the population. 
But at least in the medium and long run, new and old elites in many Third World countries scrupulously 
enriched themselves by commodities without ever attending to the needs of the poor.’ Ogle (supra note 110), 
217. See also: ‘It is a grand design for the redistribution of global wealth- not, however, from wealthy to poor 
individuals, but rather from wealth to poor states.’ Neff (supra note 85), 190 (emphasis as in the original). 




Chapter 1 (m) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties set as a goal of NIEO the ‘promotion of 
international justice’, and the same chapter (i) relies on the presumption that colonialism did injustice 
to entire nations,123 which are represented in the international legal realm by states, and not to specific 
sections of the population that were submitted to colonial and later capitalist rule. Therefore, in the 
context of NIEO, colonial societies were perceived and represented as a homogeneous whole and no 
internal distinctions, based on class, gender or ethnicity were considered of importance. The mirror 
image of this is the representation of Western capitalist economies as homogeneous, as places where 
prosperity is enjoyed equally and, importantly, where poverty and exploitation are absent, whereas 
widespread prosperity is due to industrialisation and not due to popular struggles for fairer wealth 
distribution.124 Anghie has observed development was a means to safeguard national unity for post-
colonial states: ‘[t]he development state thus represented universal interests that would prevail against 
interests of minorities that were absorbed and assessed by criteria which were often externally 
determined and which purported, with formidable force, to be universal’.125 This observation applies a 
fortiori to NIEO, since the state was elevated to the primary locus of development in an attempt to 
smooth ethnic conflicts. The argument advanced here is that NIEO, by focusing on a world divided 
between unequal states, forged national unity not only between ethnic groups, but even more 
significantly between classes. By referring to ‘proletarian nations’,126 Bedjaoui was in essence 
constructing a binary scheme that neutralised social divisions within each and every state. It is worth 
recalling here that the phrase ‘proletarian nations’ has had a troubled political history. Despite its 
linguistic affiliations to Marx and Marxism, the phrase was in fact coined by the Italian nationalist 
intellectual, Enrico Corradini, and used extensively by Mussolini’s regime.127 This is not to imply any 
                                                          
123 ‘Remedying of injustices which have been brought about by force and which deprive a nation of the natural 
means necessary for its normal development;’ Chapter 1 (i) of the Charter of Economic Rights (supra note 47).  
124 The best illustration of the destructive effects of industrialisation upon the lives of the English working class 
is provided by: F. Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Penguin, 2009). Published in 1844 in 
the apogee of the industrial revolution this descriptive piece of works hints that industrialisation did not result in 
any direct amelioration of the lives of the working class and the poor in general. Further, studies on the material 
conditions of life in late Medieval societies indicate that the living conditions of the average working person 
where significantly better in the later Medieval era rather than in the first centuries of capitalism. For example, 
Braudel has argued that meat consumption in late Medieval Europe reached such levels that it was only restored 
after 1945: F. Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15-18th Centuries: The Structures of Everyday Life 
(William Collins & Sons, 1981), 190-199. 
125 Anghie (supra note 61), 206.  
126 See note 81.  
127 ‘[Corradini] applied to nations the socialist notion of solidarity among subordinated classes and claimed that, 
in the same way as subordinated classes are proletarian classes, so subordinated nations are proletarian nations. 
Thus, international socialism is transformed into national socialism and Italy, as well as other subordinated 




ideological proximity between NIEO and fascism; if anything, NIEO mobilised the concept for anti-
imperialist purposes, while the intellectual ‘fathers’ of the concept of ‘proletarian nations’ were 
staunch imperialists.128 However, the adoption of the phrase, coupled with NIEO’s exclusive focus on 
international patterns of oppression and dispossession, indicate how the initiative was oblivious to 
class divisions and domestic oppression in a way that left domestic elites outside its framework. 
The structure and function of international law necessitated and facilitated this political choice. The 
elementary positivist position, that the world consists of states and international law, reflects this 
reality; by elevating states to its primary subjects, it provides a conceptual framework that facilitates 
the construction of ‘national unity’ narratives that conceal the fundamental reality that societies 
consist of exploiters and exploited.129 Apart from this fundamental issue of international legal form, 
international law has also exiled class from its substantive vocabulary. The International Labour 
Organization acknowledges the existence of social classes, only to call for their co-operation, and 
practically denounces class struggle.130 Moreover, class appears as a prohibited basis of 
discrimination, but is not acknowledged generally as a basis of exclusion, oppression and 
vulnerability, for example regarding the protection of rights.131  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
nations became proletarian nations.’ F. De Donno, ‘Orientalism and Classicism: The British-Roman Empire of 
Lord Bryce and his Italian Critics’ in P. F. Bang and C. A. Bayly (eds), Tributary Empires in Global History 
(Palgrave, 2011), 63.  
128 For Corradini, ‘[t]he international struggle, cοnquest and imperialism - as opposed to emigration and 
pacifism - are the path to Italian national affiliation.’ Ibid., 64.  
129 For the stunning absence of the Marxian concept of exploitation from international law, see: S. Marks, 
‘Exploitation as a Legal Concept’ in S. Marks (ed.), International Law on the Left (CUP, 2008), 281-307. For 
the necessity to think about international law restoring the primacy of the concept of class, see: A. Rasulov, 
‘“The Nameless Rapture of the Struggle”: Towards a Marxist Class-Theoretic Approach to International Law’ 
(2013) 19 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 243. 
130 ‘The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the only tripartite UN agency with government, employer, 
and worker representatives. This tripartite structure makes the ILO a unique forum in which the governments 
and the social partners of the economy of its Member States can freely and openly debate and elaborate labour 
standards and policies.’ In ‘ILO Tripartite Constituents’, available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/who-we-are/tripartite-constituents/lang--en/index.html [last accessed 23 June 2016]. 
131 In international legal documents, any class-based analysis is substituted by vague references to ‘the poor’: 
‘The impact has been particularly severe on the most vulnerable: the poor, older persons, pensioners, persons 
with disabilities, women, children and immigrants.’ ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign 
debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, 
particularly economic, social and cultural rights, Cephas Lumina’ Human Rights Council Twenty-Fifth Session 
A/HRC/25/50/Add.1  




Furthermore, as was argued in previous chapters of this thesis,132 international law was instrumental in 
the colonial process of social engineering that altered profoundly colonial societies. Through 
international legal techniques like extraterritoriality,133 nineteenth-century international law promoted 
state centralisation and the construction of a bureaucracy that would mediate class divisions, 
promoting the interests of aggregate social capital. Paradoxically, NIEO was, amongst other things, 
the outcome of this process. This noticeable silence regarding domestic wealth distribution was partly 
attributable to NIEO being, to an extent, a strategy of the national ruling classes of the Third World. 
Even though it is inaccurate to conceptualise the ensemble of the reforms promoted by NIEO as such, 
at least some of these were essential for enhancing the relative power of the Third World bourgeoisie 
in comparison to their Western competitors. Regulation of transnational corporations is a good 
example to verify this claim. In his contribution to the debate, Bulajić expressed the standard position 
of post-colonial states by arguing that enterprises from ‘developing countries’ should not be subjected 
to the same regulations as businesses from ‘developed states’.134 One could argue that this might be a 
tenable position regarding Yugoslavia of the time, to the extent that enterprises were under workers’ 
control, a feature that partly (but not wholly) differentiated them from other businesses. However, it is 
unclear why privately-held businesses incorporated in a Third World state deserved beneficial 
treatment, to the extent that they served the interests of those that hold the means of production to the 
detriment of those subject to exploitation. Therefore, it is unclear why these businesses should not be 
regulated tightly. Hence, such proposals aimed to ameliorate the position of Third World capitalists in 
global competition and they were agnostic, or even hostile, to the interests of working classes or poor 
peasantry in the same states. The same could be argued about NIEO’s demands for trade liberalisation 
regarding products manufactured in the Third World.135 
My argument does not imply that NIEO was in its entirety a bourgeois project. NIEO contained 
radical demands that would have reshaped the international legal and economic landscape, had they 
succeeded. Moreover, even in the context of Marxism, it is recognised that other contradictions, 
                                                          
132 See note 2 above.  
133 See Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
134 Bulajić (supra note 53), 57. 
135 In a slightly different, but directly relevant context, Ha-Joon Chang has argued against trade liberalisation in 
agricultural products: ‘Moreover, some (although obviously not all) of the prospective “losers” from agricultural 
trade liberalization within rich countries will be the least well-off people by their national standards (e.g., hard-
pressed farmers in Norway, Japan or Switzerland), while some of the beneficiaries in developing countries are 
already rich even by international standards (e.g., agricultural capitalists in Brazil or Argentina). In this sense, 
the popular image that agricultural liberalization in rich countries is helping poor peasant farmers in developing 
countries is misleading.’ H.J. Chang, Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of 
Capitalism (Bloomsbury Press, 2008), 79-80. 




beyond the class struggle, are politically significant.136 In this case, there are strong political, 
economic and moral arguments for bridging the wealth gap between poor and rich states. That said, it 
bears recalling that, from a Marxian point of view, this political quest is always determined in the 
final analysis by class interests and antagonisms.137 Hence, if bridging this gap means that local 
bourgeoisies improve their relative strength in the context of global capitalism, radical or even 
progressive international lawyers should be reserved in their support for such a strategy. The 
argument put forward here is that NIEO combined both strategies, and its choice to ‘speak’ the 
language of international law was both symptomatic and constitutive of its political limits, as it 
endorsed the language of ‘state rights’, creating a legal and political narrative that equated the 
interests of divergent and antagonistic classes to the interests of the state. Hence, the assertion by 
MacVeigh and Pahuja that Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources ‘could therefore be 
understood as motivated by the desire to reject both colonial and capitalist forms of rule’138 should be 
treated cautiously, bearing in mind the inherent limitations of the ‘states’ rights’ legal language and 
the contradictions of NIEO as a political project that brought together Tito’s socialist Yugoslavia and 
Suharto’s anti-communist Indonesia.  
In the final analysis, Abi-Saab argued that ‘every legal system protects a certain structure of power. A 
defence of a legal system is a defence of the political system it consecrates.’139 NIEO did not exactly 
defend international law in its entirety, but did not attack its foundations either. If we accept the 
argument put forward in this thesis that the primary function of international law was and still is the 
promotion and stabilisation of capitalist relations of production on a global level, this deference to 
international law can also be understood as an ambivalent stance (or even endorsement) of its 
principal political project: capitalism. Despite its contradictions and its polymorphous nature, ΝΙΕΟ 
left unchallenged the core of the ‘civilising mission’ of international law as deployed in the course of 
the nineteenth century and until the collapse of formal imperialism in the 1960s. Undeniably, this 
process ordered political communities in accordance with their degree of ‘civilisation’, placing the 
West firmly at the top. NIEO was a revolt against this process. Simultaneously, international law 
contributed to the transformation of non-Western polities into centralised states capable of supporting 
capitalist relations of production. Indeed, it is a core argument of this thesis that this process was at 
                                                          
136 ‘[R]elations of power do not exhaust class relations and may go a certain way beyond them. Of course, they 
will still have class pertinence, continuing to be located, and to have a stake, in the terrain of political 
domination… [C]lass division is not the exclusive terrain of the constitution of power, [however] in class 
societies all power bears a class significance.’ N. Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (Verso, 2000), 43. 
137 See: ‘The capitalist mode of production: a very brief introduction’ in the Introduction of the present thesis.  
138 S. MacVeigh and S. Pahuja, ‘Rival Jurisdictions: The Promise and Loss of Sovereignty’ in: C. Barbour and 
G. Pavlich (eds), After Sovereignty: On the Question of Political Beginnings (Routledge, 2010), 102.  
139 Abi-Saab (supra note 45), 101. 




the heart of the ‘standard of civilisation’.140 NIEO not only failed to challenge this process, but 
actively reinforced it.  
Conclusion 
Eric Hobsbawm once wrote that ‘the Age of Empire created both the conditions which formed the 
anti-imperialist leaders and the conditions which […] began to give their voices resonance’.141 Few 
instances verify this claim as much as the quest for a New International Economic Order. In this 
chapter, it was argued that NIEO incorporated three major conceptual bases of contemporary 
international law: the state as the only legally acceptable form of communal organisation; 
development and industrialisation as the only road to prosperity; and the state as the indivisible unit of 
economic interests to the expense of conflicting class interests.  
NIEO should be understood as a by-product of the successful social transformation in the course of 
the colonial project. In this process, the role of international law can hardly be overstated. By 
promoting state centralisation and the dissolution of archaic modes of production through 
international legal techniques, such as the Mandate System or extraterritoriality, the colonial 
encounter created the conditions that determined its termination. Since state centralisation was already 
initiated, anti-colonial struggles that prioritised the creation of independent states resonated more with 
the material conditions on the ground and, therefore, triumphed over alternative solutions (Pan-
Arabism, Pan-Africanism etc). Moreover, the universal reach of international law provided the 
oppressed peoples with a language to express their political demands, while simultaneously 
channelling and restraining them. Correspondingly, the discourse of development provided post-
colonial states with a language to express their disappointment with the fact that political 
independence did not bring about economic independence and prosperity. Crucially, this political 
project embraced international law, seeking to reform it to the benefit of the Third World, while 
accepting its core concepts and underlying assumptions. In turn, this endorsement trapped post-
colonial states in the antinomies of international legal argumentation, rendering their claims 
contradictory and inconsistent. Combined with the complicated political balance of the time and the 
emergence of neoliberalism, this signalled the failure of NIEO.  
Anghie has observed that, in the context of NIEO, development was the solution, though it was not 
clear what the problem was.142 To a significant extent, NIEO stemmed from the conviction that the 
root cause of everything that was wrong was anaemic capitalist accumulation in the Third World. 
Therefore, NIEO incorporated mainstream economic positions that maximum growth was quasi-
                                                          
140 See: ‘A way forward: capitalism as civilisation’ in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
141 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 1875-1914 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 78. 
142 Anghie (supra note 61), 208. 




automatically beneficial for everyone in a given society and, to a certain extent, constituted a strategy 
for the ruling classes of the Third World to enhance their own position in global competition. Even 
though it is counter-productive to attempt to understand that which preceded the other conceptually, it 
suffices to note that the prioritisation of international law in the context of NIEO is intrinsically linked 
with the apparently ‘classless’ nature of its demands. In practice, this meant that its demands were 
either linked with a liberal perception of economics that equated the growth of the economy with 
widespread prosperity, or served the interests of the ruling classes.  
All of the above remarks hint at the complicated nature of NIEO, both on a legal and political level. 
Despite the objections raised, NIEO must be understood as having an ongoing legacy for international 
law. This is not because of its actual influence on international law, which was piecemeal and 
temporary. What is crucial about NIEO is how the attempt to reform international law and economy 
revealed how the latter is not a natural condition of the world, but is heavily determined by the 
former. Indeed, the international legal order was to undergo a major transformation at the time. 
However, the substance of this transformation was at the opposite end of what NIEO envisaged. 
Neoliberalism was a rising force, and it was about to challenge the post-war status quo as well.  
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Chapter 5: International territorial administration: international law and capitalism in 
a post-colonial world 
 
If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change. 
Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, ‘The Leopard’ 
History is full of ironies; international legal history no less so. At the time, the oil crisis of 1973 was 
seen as the event that enhanced the confidence of the Third World and led to the promulgation of the 
NIEO programme.1 Nowadays, NIEO is largely forgotten, and 1973 is remembered as the tipping 
point for the demise of Western social-democracy and the of neoliberalism as the hegemonic ideology 
and dominant organising principle of governance across the world.2 Indeed, relatively recently, it was 
documented how opposition to NIEO led neoliberals to devise a coherent programme for development 
that was distinct, both from 1960s modernisation theory and from the global welfarist aspirations of 
the Third World.3 
This chapter maps the ways in which this transition to global neoliberalism transformed international 
law in the post-1990s period. More specifically, I will argue that international law and international 
institutions persisted as a force, consistently promoting and consolidating the capitalist mode of 
production. However, after the 1990s, international law and international institutions promoted a very 
specific variant of the CMP, neoliberalism. My argument develops in three steps. First, a brief history 
of the rise of neoliberalism will be provided, with an emphasis on the relevant international legal 
developments, such as the decisive upgrade of the role of the Bretton Woods institutions. My main 
contention will be that, far from signalling a return to nineteenth-century liberalism, neoliberalism 
constitutes a novel form of capitalist accumulation, endeavouring to establish generalised competition 
as the fundamental basis of social co-existence, while acknowledging the importance of the state and 
                                                          
1 ‘In 1973, the OPEC oil cartel’s price hike was cheered on by many developing countries since it was, as one 
put it, the first time that non-Western powers had taken the initiative in the world economy. A meeting of the 
nonaligned movement in Algiers that year revived Raúl Prebisch’s old call for a New International Economic 
Order to improve the position of the Third World.’ M. Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea 
(Penguin Books, 2012), 303.  
2 1973 is commonly singled out as a symbolic date, not only because of the oil crisis that threw Western 
capitalist states into a hegemonic crisis, thereby warranting a re-organisation of the power bloc, but also because 
the first neoliberal government was established in Pinochet’s Chile: ‘The ﬁrst experiment with neoliberal state 
formation, it is worth recalling, occurred in Chile after Pinochet’s coup on the ‘little September 11th’ of 1973 
(almost thirty years to the day before Bremer’s announcement of the regime to be installed in Iraq).’ D. Harvey, 
A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2005), 7.  
3 J. Bair, ‘Taking Aim at the New International Economic Order’ in P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe, The Road from 
Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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other institutions in the construction of this competitive order. This section of the thesis offers a short 
intellectual history of neoliberalism and contains few direct references to international law and 
institutions. However, this analysis is essential to the extent that it provides us with the theoretical 
framework needed for comprehending international territorial administration, and, later, the 
occupation of Iraq. Secondly, an account of the position of international law and international 
organisations in neoliberal thought will be provided. Even though an exhaustive account of neoliberal 
internationalist thought falls outside the scope of this chapter, I will attempt a comparison between the 
positions of the ordo-liberal Roepke and that of Hayek. The principal argument put forward is that the 
internationalisation and legalisation of economic decision-making was seen as a crucial step for 
building a global neoliberal order, rolling back on the welfare state and restraining the impact of mass 
democratic politics on economic policy. Finally, this chapter will focus on the practice of international 
territorial administration (ITA), which gained substantial support in the course of the 1990s as the 
primary method of governing post-conflict societies and managing their transition to neoliberal 
capitalism. Drawing from the legacy of the Mandate System,4 international organisations, such as the 
UN, the EU, the IMF and the World Bank, were elevated into the main loci of managing and co-
ordinating neoliberal social engineering. In turn, this analysis will pave the way for the final case 
study of the present thesis: the neoliberal reconstruction of Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, 
and the role of international law and institutions in facilitating and legitimising the reconstruction 
process.  
5:1 A new international paradigm in the making: the historical origins and conceptual 
underpinnings of neoliberalism  
The previous chapter of this thesis focused on the process of decolonisation and on the rise and fall of 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the course of the first four post-war decades.5 
However, this section will go back to the final quarter of the nineteenth century. The history of 
neoliberalism can be better understood if situated within the overall history of liberalism and, more 
specifically, if examined in relation to liberalism’s prolonged internal and external crisis that was 
triggered during the last decades of the century and peaked with the 1929 crash and the Great 
Depression. The rapid rise of the capitalist mode of production (CMP) dissolved traditional modes of 
living, and deprived entire communities from their traditional means of sustenance, forcing them to 
turn to industrial labour and to move to cities. Sinclair summarises the situation and its profound 
influence on political thought as follows:  
                                                          
4 See Section 3:2:2 ‘The Permanent Mandate Commission: supervising the experiment’ of the present thesis.  
5 See Chapter 4 of the thesis at hand: ‘From decolonisation to the New International Economic Order: 
continuities and ruptures in international law’. 
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A range of problematic conditions accompanied the expansion of European commercial 
activity. Population growth, spreading industrialization and urbanization in Europe were 
attended by mounting anxieties regarding the ‘social question’. Pictured as a realm of disorder 
located ‘between’ the economy and the state, ‘the social’ was associated with multiple 
interlinked problems connected to a large, underemployed proletariat.6 
In that context, Bismarck’s Germany was the first state to introduce welfarist provisions intended to 
protect workers from the destitution associated with unemployment and to deter the advancement of 
revolutionary ideologies.7 More states, including the Nordic states, the Netherlands, and – notably – 
the United Kingdom,8 were to follow this example, introducing laws aiming at a partial de-
commodification of labour-power. Hence, the idea that workers had ‘to be free from pressure to 
commodify their labor in order to obtain their basic survival’9 started to gain ground, both 
domestically as well as internationally. In 1903, the International Labour Office was established and 
represented ‘a model of social reform that promoted social legislation as an alternative to violent 
revolution’.10 The Office not only paved the way for the establishment of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), but it also produced the 1906 conventions prohibiting night-time work for 
women and the usage of white phosphorous in the production of matches.11 Τhe establishment of the 
ILO crystallised the trend towards a partial internationalisation of a welfarist approach to labour, 
especially under the pressure of the newly-founded USSR. Even colonialism was infiltrated by the 
emerging welfarist spirit, which was central in the function of the Mandate System of the League of 
Nations.12 
                                                          
6 G. F. Sinclair, ‘State Formation, Liberal Reform and the Growth of International Organizations’ (2015) 26 
European Journal of International Law 445, 462.  
7 ‘It has become a convention to date the welfare state’s birth as 1883, when Bismarck introduced the first 
modern social insurance. Bismarck’s social policy rationale was strongly anti-socialist in that it was consciously 
designed to temper the workers’ revolutionary potential and to supplement the earlier repressive but ultimately 
unsuccessful antisocialist laws.’ K. van Kersbergen and B. Vis, Comparative Welfare State Politics: 
Development, Opportunities and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 38.  
8 For a normative defence and a historical account of the welfare state in the UK, see: K. Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press, 2001).  
9 P. Tsoukala, ‘Euro Zone Crisis Management and the New Social Europe’ (2013) 20 Columbia Journal of 
International Law 31, 48.  
10 Sinclair (supra note 6), 464.  
11 Ibid., 465.  
12 For an analysis of the welfarist aspect of the Mandate System, see: Section 3:3 ‘Capitalist transformation and 
international law: labour, trade and welfare in the Mandates’ of the present thesis. For other welfarist aspects of 
the League, see: E. Jouannet, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International Law (CUP, 
2012), 169-83.  
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Keynesianism was the most coherent version of this emerging welfarist agenda.13 Consistently applied 
in the US after the reversal of the Lochner precedent in the US Supreme Court,14 Keynesianism, or 
‘embedded liberalism’, influenced profoundly the fabric of international law and was crystallised in 
certain important post-war legal instruments, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.15 
Crucially, Keynesianism was an internal, rather than external, let alone hostile, response to the crisis 
of traditional liberalism. Dardot and Laval succinctly summarise this point: ‘it should not be forgotten 
that Keynesianism and neo-liberalism for a time shared the same concern: how to save from 
liberalism itself what could be salvaged of the capitalist system.’16 Nevertheless, this convergence was 
to come to an end soon, with the emergence of the two major neoliberal currents that specifically took 
aim at the Keynesian orthodoxy of their time: German ordo-liberalism and American neoliberalism.17 
Along with Keynesianism, neoliberals of all strands acknowledged the limitations of laissez-faire 
liberalism. In the Walter Lippmann colloquium, which is largely considered the founding moment of 
neoliberalism,18 Rougier called for the construction of a ‘positive liberalism’.19 This ‘positive’ or 
‘neo’ liberalism would depart from its classical antecedent, acknowledging that the market is not a 
natural, pre-political order that flourishes, if left alone by the state. Rather, as Roepke, one of the most 
prominent ordo-liberals, put it, ‘[t]he free market requires an active, an extremely vigilant policy’.20 
                                                          
13 See generally: John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (MacMillan, 
1957).  
14 ‘The “Lochner era”, of course, refers to the Supreme Court’s desultory affair with economic libertarianism, 
beginning in the late nineteenth century and abruptly ending on or about March 29, 1937, with West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish.’ J. Purdy, ‘Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy’ (2015) 77 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 195, 196.  
15 ‘The post-war trade regime therefore came to be deeply allied to—indeed in many ways an outward 
projection of—the Keynesian welfare state in all its varied institutional forms. One of the regime’s primary 
purposes was to maintain the international stability necessary to protect the welfare state from external shocks.’ 
A. Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Re-imagining the Global Economic Order (OUP, 2011), 30.  
16 P. Dardot and C. Laval, The New Way of the World: on Neo-Liberal Society (Verso, 2013), 38.  
17 The distinction is largely attributable to Michel Foucault, who in his relatively recently published lecture 
series, The Birth of Biopolitics, provides us with one of the most comprehensive accounts of neoliberalism as an 
intellectual current. See: M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979 
(Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010). Despite the significant differences between the two strands, this thesis refers to 
‘neoliberalism’ as a generic term that captures the similarities between them.  
18 The conference took place in Paris in 1938, bringing together theorists who were to become the most 
prominent neoliberals, such as Hayek, Rueff, Röpke and Rustow. For further details, see: F. Denord, ‘Aux 
Origines du neo-liberalisme en France: Louis Rougier et le Colloque Walter Lippmann de 1938’ (2001/2002) 
195 Le Mouvement Social 9. 
19 Quoted in: Foucault (supra note 17), 133. 
20 Ibid.  
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Otherwise put, neoliberals departed from the convictions of classical liberalism,21 and acknowledged 
that the relationship between the state and the market was not a zero-sum game.  
However, unlike Keynesians, neoliberals advocated for state intervention, in order to sustain, support 
and expand the functions of the market, and not in order to limit them. In Foucault’s words, if the 
purpose of Keynesianism was to balance out the anti-social effects of competition through state 
intervention, the purpose of neoliberal state intervention is to ‘nullify the possible anti-competitive 
mechanisms of society, or at any rate the anti-competitive mechanisms that could arise within 
society’.22 Therefore, the elementary differentiation between the ‘new’ liberals of the New Deal and 
of the ILO, and the ‘neoliberals’, was not about the desirability or even about the degree of state 
intervention in the economy; rather, it was about the purpose and orientation of such interventionism. 
It was in this context that neoliberals also started thinking seriously about law and legality, be it 
domestic or international. In 1937, Robbins proclaimed that: ‘[n]either property nor contract are in 
any sense natural. They are essentially the creation of law ... the actual result of centuries of 
legislation and judicial decision.’23  
Further, neoliberals attempted a second correction to classical liberalism. Within the neoliberal 
framework of thought, it is competition, instead of free exchange, that is elevated to the organising 
principle of economy and, more broadly, of society. Friedman summarises the shift as follows: ‘[b]ut 
instead of the nineteenth century understanding that laissez-faire is the means to achieve this goal, 
neoliberalism proposes that competition will lead the way’.24 This modification has important 
implications for the relationship between the market and interventionist policies. If one moves away 
from the simplistic imaginary of free exchange, one needs also to move away from the simplistic 
understanding of the state as a minimal entity that solely guarantees public order and property rights 
necessary for acts of free exchange to occur. Rather, generalised competition is a fragile condition that 
requires constant state intervention in order to uphold and solidify its bases. Despite its popularised 
version and the common perception amongst its opponents, neoliberalism is not an inherently anti-
                                                          
21 ‘This corresponded to the erroneous belief in the autonomy of the economic sphere as dominated by economic 
law independent of institutions, legal forms or social habits. […] This belief was triumphant in the period of the 
historical liberalism of the Nineteenth Century whose representative came dangerously near to the idea that the 
competitive economic order might be a completely natural order.’ W. Roepke, ‘Economic Order and 
International Law’ (1954) 86 Recueil des Cours 203, 210.  
22 Foucault (supra note 17), 160.  
23 L. Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (MacMillan, 1937), 227-28.  
24 Quoted in P. Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial 
Meltdown (Verso, 2013), 38.  
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statist ideology. Unlike their occasional fellow-travellers, libertarians,25 neoliberals emphasise the 
significance of the state in establishing and maintaining functional markets. James Buchanan was 
clear in stressing the difference between neoliberals and the so-called ‘anarcho-capitalists’: ‘Among 
our members, there are some who are able to imagine a viable society without a state… For most of 
our members, however, social order without a state is not readily imagined, at least not in any 
normatively preferred sense.’26 What neoliberalism aspires to achieve is to redesign the legitimate 
agenda and the legitimate mode of governing. In The Road to Serfdom, the neoliberal locus classicus, 
Hayek was clear in that the question of whether the state should intervene or not in the economy was 
‘ambiguous and misleading’.27 His suggestion to resolve this problematic dilemma was that ‘it is the 
character rather than the volume of government activity that is important’.28  
To return to international law and international institutions, the theory and practice of organisations 
like the World Bank or the IMF indicate that it is problematic to equate neoliberalism with 
deregulation or with a total offence against the state. Since the late 1990s, the World Bank and the 
IMF increasingly focused on institutional reforms and state restructuring. To recall an influential 
report of the World Bank:  
Most important, we now see that markets and governments are complementary: the state is essential for 
putting in place the appropriate institutional foundations for markets. And government's credibility the 
predictability of its rules and policies and the consistency with which they are applied can be as 
important for attracting private investment as the content of those rules and policies.29  
As Orford and Beard pointed out, this shift was wrongly interpreted as a welcome U-turn away from 
neoliberalism, when in fact it constituted a deepening of the neoliberal project.30 In this very report, 
the World Bank clearly designated the legitimate scope of state activity:  
A clearer understanding of the institutions and norms embedded in markets shows the folly of 
thinking that development strategy is a matter of choosing between the state and the market ... 
                                                          
25 Nozick’s understanding of a super-minimal state is taken here as indicative of the libertarian school of 
thought: R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (2nd edn, Basic Books, 2013). 
26 J. Buchanan, ‘Man and the State’ MPS Presidential Talk, 31 August 1986. Quoted in Mirowski (supra note 
24), 41.  
27 F.A. Hayek and B. Caldwell (eds), The Road to Serfdom: Text and Materials The Definite Edition (University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), 118. 
28 F. A. Hayek and R. Hamowy (eds), The Constitution of Liberty: The Definite Edition (University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), 331.  
29 World Bank, ‘World Development Report 1997. The State in a Changing World’ (1997) Overview, 3.  
30 A. Orford and J. Beard, ‘Making the State Safe for the Market: The World Bank’s Development Report 1997’ 
(1998) 22 Melbourne University Law Review 195, 196.  
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[T]he two are inextricably linked. Countries need markets to grow, but they need capable state 
institutions to grow markets.31  
Similarly, in a report on Armenia, the World Bank advocated institutional guarantees for the judiciary 
because ‘[b]oth domestic and foreign investors were expected to benefit from an efﬁcient, 
independent and impartial judiciary thus promoting private sector development and economic growth 
in Armenia’.32 These are just two illustrative examples of the fact that international neoliberal projects 
do not seek to erode the state, nor do they favour unconditionally its minimisation. Rather, these state 
mechanisms that establish and enforce market relationships and capitalist relations need to be 
protected and solidified. Further, the World Bank, along with prominent neoliberal theorists, 
welcomes state intervention in fields that are not immediately profitable for individual capital, but 
nevertheless enable long-term capital valorisation, for example, in the provision of primary 
education.33  
Further, neoliberalism is a project of redesigning the state itself. Under the influence of public choice 
theory,34 it is maintained that bureaucracies need to be subjected to the norms of competition and 
market discipline themselves, in order to optimise their performance. Within this process, citizens are 
rebranded as ‘consumers’ and public services need to conform to market principles and subject 
themselves to competitive processes, either internally or with the private sector. Thus, the state is not 
just an actor external to competition, but is transformed into an arena of competition itself. Anthony 
Giddens summarises this turn as follows: ‘[m]ost governments still have a good deal to learn from 
business best practice - for instance, target controls, effective auditing, flexible decision structures and 
increased employee participation’.35 To return to the international financial institutions (IFIs), the 
World Bank dictates that even acceptable state activity should be redesigned to conform to the 
imperatives of the market. In its reports, competition is elevated to the backbone of public 
administration: ‘Competition is the third leg of the broader approach, and there are many ways that 
competition can spur greater efficiency, transparency, and accountability in government.’36 In fact, 
even the concept of public administration is abandoned and ‘governance’, a hybrid mode of 
                                                          
31 World Bank (supra note 29), para. 38.  
32 World Bank, ‘Implementation Completion and Results Report (IDA-34170) on a Credit Amount of SDR 8.6 
Million (US$ 11.4 Million Equivalent) to Republic of Armenia for a Judicial Reform Project Report No. 
ICR0000493’ (June 28, 2007). 
33 World Bank, ‘World Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating World’ (1995) paras. 36-40. 
34 Amongst many: G. Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Public Affairs Press, 1965).  
35 A. Giddens, The Third Way (Polity Press, 1998), 74-75.  
36 World Bank, ‘Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy 
Implementation Update’ (April 2002), para. 38.  
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government that brings together public and private, national and international actors,37 becomes the 
conceptual framework for evaluating public services.  
This brings us to another aspect of neoliberalism’s engagement with the state: the need to separate 
politics from economics and to ensure that state intervention will only occur to sustain competition, 
and not to satisfy ‘particularistic interests’, such as those of organised labour. The neoliberal advocacy 
for a strong, competitive state operating as a guarantor of the free market indicates neoliberalism’s 
tentative relationship with democracy and, more broadly, with mass politics. Both in theory and in 
practice, neoliberals have been consistently sceptical towards the concept of a democratic, 
participatory government. In the inter-war period, German neoliberals also known as ordo-liberals, 
sided with Schmitt in advocating that the welfarist state of the Weimar era was expansive and 
simultaneously weak, since it was subjected to ‘the united onslaught of interest crowds’.38 The 
‘interest crowds’ were the rising working-class movement advocating for better working and living 
conditions, and even for radical social change. For ordo-liberals, a state responsive to these demands 
was a deeply problematic state that needed to be dismantled. It is important to keep in mind that ordo-
liberals had the chance between 1946 and 1949 to partly shape Western Germany in accordance with 
their views. During that period, Germany was occupied by the Allies and most progressively-minded 
economists had been eliminated, often physically, during the Nazi era. In 1948, Erhard, a prominent 
ordo-liberal, served as Director of the Administration for Economics in the Bizonal Economic 
Council, enjoying powers that even conservative German theorists described as ‘dictator like’.39 The 
fact that the golden era of ordo-liberalism in Germany was one void of any democratic safeguards 
confirms that the above mentioned anathemas of ordo-liberals against democracy were far from 
incidental. American neoliberals can only affirm the suspicion of neoliberalism’s anti-democratic 
inclinations. From the involvement of the ‘Chicago boys’ to Pinochet’s military dictatorship in Chile 
to Hayek’s assertions that liberalism and democracy are indeed potentially compatible, but 
analytically distinct and if in doubt we should opt for liberalism,40 the relationship between American 
                                                          
37 For the first comprehensive account of the concept, see: The Commission on Global Governance, ‘Our Global 
Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance’ (OUP, 1995). 
38 A. Rüstow, ‘Interessenpolitik oder Staatspolitik’ (1932) 6 Der deutsche Volkswirt 171. Ordo-liberals 
subsequently claimed that they were a locus of resistance against Nazism. This proposition is not easily 
substantiated. For more: R. Ptak, ‘Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations of the 
Social Market Economy’ in Mirowski and Plehwe (supra note 3) 112-19. 
39 W. Kalteﬂeiter, ‘Bedingungen für die Durchsetzung ordnungspolitischer Grundentscheidungen nach dem 
Zweiten Weltkrieg’ in W. Fischer (ed.), Währungsreform und Soziale Marktwirtschaf (Duncker u. Humblot, 
1989), 68.  
40 Hayek summarised this point in his attempt to justify his support for Pinochet’s dictatorship: ‘[A]s long-term 
institutions, I am totally against dictatorships. But a dictatorship may be a necessary system for a transitional 
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neoliberals and democratic government has been at best one of tension. My argument here draws from 
Wendy Brown’s thought to argue that there is an inherent tension between neoliberalism and 
democratic principles.41 This is because the centrality of competition in neoliberal theory and practice 
(instead of free exchange in the context of classical liberalism) is fundamentally inimical to the 
universalist and egalitarian premises of democracy. Unlike free exchange, competition does not 
necessarily promise a final equilibrium, an amelioration of everyone’s position. Competition has its 
winners and losers and indeed the losers should accept that their marginalisation, poverty and 
exclusion is their own fault.42 As a result, ‘[a] permanent underclass, and even a permanent criminal 
class, along with a class of aliens or non-citizens are produced and accepted as an inevitable cost of 
such society.’43 Furthermore, the neoliberal conceptualisation of the state as yet another terrain for the 
operation of market relations erodes every concept of ‘public good’ or citizenship-based solidarity, 
upon which (liberal) democracy depends.44 
To conclude, neoliberalism needs to be understood as a response to the intellectual and political 
bankruptcy of classical liberalism. Still, its emergence to hegemonic ideology and to prevailing 
governing structure on a global level is linked to structural transformations of the CMP, the 
profitability crisis of capitalism, the outcome of intense social struggles in Western Europe and, of 
course, the fall of the USSR.45 Even though the precise conditions that paved the way for the 
neoliberal hegemony are not the focus of this analysis, it is significant to bear in mind that, despite the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
period. At times it is necessary for a country to have, for a time, some form or other of dictatorial power. As you 
will understand, it is possible for a dictator to govern in a liberal way. And it is also possible for a democracy to 
govern with a total lack of liberalism. Personally, I prefer a liberal dictator to democratic government lacking in 
liberalism.’ Interview for El Mercurio (19 April 1981), reproduced in A. Farrant, E. McPhail and S. Berger, 
‘Preventing the “Abuses” of Democracy: Hayek, the “Military Usurper” and Transitional Dictatorship in Chile?’ 
(2012) 71 American Journal of Economics and Sociology 513, 521. 
41 W. Brown, ‘Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’ (2003) 7 Theory and Event 1; W. Brown, 
‘American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratisation’ (2006) 34 Political Theory 
690; W. Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Zone Books, 2015).  
42 ‘Instead of being frank about the fact that the extraordinary chances of gain which the game of the market 
economy offers for the good players are accompanied by chances of losing for those who are less capable or less 
fortunate, and that all those who want to participate in this game are obliged to take their chance, the propaganda 
[of classical liberalism] promised prosperity and happiness to all without exception.’ W. Roepke (with an 
appendix by A. Ruestow), International Economic Disintegration (William Hodge and Company, 1942), 271.  
43 Brown, ‘American Nightmare’, (supra note 41), 695.  
44 ‘Liberal democratic practices and institutions almost always fall short of their promise and at times cruelly 
invert it, yet liberal democratic principles hold, and hold out, ideals of both freedom and equality universally 
shared and of political rule by and for the people.’ Brown, Undoing the Demos, (supra note 41), 18.  
45 For the material conditions that enabled the rise of neoliberalism, see generally: Harvey (supra note 2).  
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marked differences the rise of neoliberalism brought about, the phenomenon needs to be 
conceptualised as symptomatic of capitalist transformation. Further, neoliberalism was fundamentally 
an attempt to rectify the simplistic laissez-faire assumptions of classical liberalism that eventually led 
to its political and conceptual demise and triggered a profound crisis of capitalism. Despite certain 
anti-statist slogans, neoliberals appreciated the role of intervention in constructing, maintaining and 
expanding competitive markets. Even though most of their writing focused on state intervention, 
neoliberals were also interested in the interplay between domestic and international (legal) orders in 
the construction of the said competitive markets. The next section of this chapter will focus precisely 
on this question.  
5:2 International law and international institutions in the context of neoliberal thought: 
disciplining the state, delimiting democracy 
The problematisation of democratic and mass politics by neoliberalism sketched above has direct 
implications for international law and international institutions. In 1954, the ordo-liberal thinker 
Roepke was invited to The Hague to deliver a lecture on economics and international law.46 In his 
Recueil des Cours lecture, Roepke provided us with some thoughts about the history of international 
law since the nineteenth century and criticised the demise of this international legal order due to the 
rise of the Keynesian state. In his own words, the difficulty in constructing a truly global economic 
order lays with the fact that ‘there is no world government, and therefore the world economy lacks a 
genuine world legal order which imposes identical norms and which enforces them by immediately 
effective sanctions’.47 Nonetheless, before 1914, this problem was rectified in practice by the 
operation of the gold standard, the depoliticisation of the economy and international law. The first 
factor safeguarded the existence of ‘a generally acceptable, free and stable currency’,48 while the 
much-celebrated distinction between politics and economics meant that there existed a high degree of 
uniformity between different national legal systems.49 What he, unsurprisingly, failed to mention was 
that this uniformity concerned a small number of Western states, while deviations from this 
homogeneity were enough to deprive a political community from the status of ‘civilised’, and 
therefore from the status of ‘sovereign’, and were ‘corrected’ through practices such as 
extraterritoriality.50 Finally, according to Roepke, international treaties were ‘surrounded by an air of 
                                                          
46 Roepke (supra note 21).  
47 Ibid., 219 (emphasis added).  
48 Ibid., 218. 
49 Ibid., 223.  
50 See generally Chapter 2 ‘Extraterritoriality and the civilising mission: international law and social 
transformation in Japan and the Ottoman Empire’ of this thesis. 
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sanctity’51 since all ‘civilised’ states adhered to them. Most-favoured-nation clauses, non-
discrimination and respect for property rights held this international order together.  
According to this narrative, this international order started collapsing when the purported distinction 
between politics and economics started disintegrating. In a discursive move very common in 
neoliberal thought, trade unions and popular government were blamed for this trend.52 Thus, for 
Roepke, it was urgent to limit national sovereignty, which in his account is at least partly synonymous 
to popular sovereignty: ‘[t]o diminish national sovereignty is most emphatically one of the urgent 
needs of our time. But the excess of sovereignty should be abolished instead of being transferred to a 
higher political and geographical unit.’53 Otherwise put, the rise of international law and international 
institutions was not seen as a process of simply transferring functions from the national to supra-
national levels. Rather, this very process disciplined the state and re-drew the limits between 
acceptable and unacceptable modes of state (and more broadly institutional) intervention in the 
economy. Sinclair has articulated a similar argument focusing on how international organisations had 
already dictated acceptable forms of statehood since the nineteenth century.54 However, Sinclair 
focuses on the ‘cultural’ aspect of this disciplining process, arguing that international organisations 
promote a Western model of statehood: ‘[T]his article argues that IO growth has been imagined and 
carried out as necessary to the ongoing process of making modern states on a broadly Western 
model’.55 This approach echoes Anghie and, therefore, is characterised by the same weaknesses that 
were criticised in Chapter 1 of this thesis.56 It is worth bearing in mind that Roepke’s turn to 
international law and institutions did not target ‘culturally alien’ political communities; nor was it 
employed predominately against the colonies. Rather, for neoliberal thinkers, the internationalisation 
of economic governance was a method for confronting the Keynesian state and, at a more 
fundamental level, for undoing the impact of mass politics, the democratisation of economic decision-
making, and the rise of working class militancy and of the political Left. It is telling that, in the 
                                                          
51 Roepke (supra note 21), 222.  
52 ‘This tendency is furthered by certain policies of trade unions which, in spite of internationalist lip-service, 
tend to promote national isolation of labour and commodity markets.’ Ibid., 233.  
53 Ibid., 250.  
54 ‘Most IOs and states were born and grew up together during the past century; it might seem equally plausible, 
then, to think of IOs as shaping states. Accordingly, it would be overly simplistic to assume that IO growth has 
necessarily resulted in a loss of sovereignty by states. To the contrary, I contend that IO growth is intimately 
bound up with the creation of states, the construction of state powers and the very constitution of modern 
statehood.’ Sinclair (supra note 6), 447.  
55 Ibid.  
56 For a critique of the argument that equates nineteenth century ‘civilisation’ hierarchy with cultural difference, 
see Section 1:3:1 ‘Civilisation v. Culture: The broader origins of the concept and its emphasis on institutions’ in 
the present thesis. 
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concluding remarks of his Hague lectures, Roepke clarifies that the constitution of this international 
legal order is not a neutral act, but is fundamentally incompatible with certain forms of government. 
In his case, these clearly encompassed both socialism and the democratic Keynesian state: ‘we have to 
make up our minds whether we can go on with certain national economic policies, which, however 
popular and tempting, are shown to be incompatible with that order’.57 
Roepke was not alone in these reflections about the importance of internationalised economic 
governance. In the 1930s, Hayek reflected systematically on the question of an international capitalist 
federation that would secure international order, prevent conflict and roll back welfarist 
interventionism.58 In fact, Hayek joined the Federal Union,59 an organisation founded in 1938 with the 
platform that a world federation was essential for avoiding war, and tried to advocate for his firmly 
capitalist vision of such a federation at a time when left-wing federalism was particularly popular.60 
For Hayek, this federation would be inter-linked with the restraint of independent economic decision-
making for its member-states.61 Areas such as monetary policy would be delegated to the federation 
and, in fact, Hayek envisaged a constitutional framework that would guarantee the (neo)liberal nature 
of the federation and discipline national democracy in compliance with individual freedom and a 
competitive economic order.62 Hayek’s aversion towards democratic, mass politics was central in his 
                                                          
57 Roepke (supra note 21), 255.  
58 F. A. von Hayek, ‘Economic Conditions of Inter-state Federalism’ (1939) 5 New Commonwealth Quarterly 
133, reprinted in F. A. von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (University of Chicago Press, 1948). 
Hayek also discussed the topic in the—rarely discussed—last chapter of The Road To Serfdom: Hayek (supra 
note 27). For an overview of Hayek’s federalist thought, see: J. Spieker, ‘F. A. Hayek and the Reinvention of 
Liberal Internationalism’ (2014) 36 International History Review 919.  
59 Ibid., 920. For a detailed account of the history of the Federal Union, see: O. Rosenboim, ‘Barbara Wootton, 
Friedrich Hayek and the Debate on Democratic Federalism in the 1940s’ (2014) 36 International History 
Review 894, 902-06.  
60 ‘Left-wing views within the movement were manifestly strong, especially in its early years, and several other 
inﬂuential members of the organisation agreed with this assessment. R. W. J. Mackay insisted that federation 
was a strictly political union which does not necessarily determine social and economic organisation.’ Spieker 
(supra note 58), 926-27.  
61 Ibid., 927.  
62 ‘The basic clause of such a constitution would have to state that, in normal times, and apart from certain 
clearly defined emergency situations, men could be restrained from doing what they wished, or coerced to do 
particular things, only in accordance with the recognized rules of just conduct designed to define and protect the 
individual domain of each’. F. A von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal 
Principles of Justice and Political Economy (Routledge, 1993), 108-09. ‘The international Rule of Law must 
become a safeguard as much against the tyranny of the state over the individual as against the tyranny of the 
new superstate over national communities.’ Hayek (supra note 27), 235.  
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federalist plans. This becomes clearer if we compare Hayek’s federalist vision to that of another 
notable inter-war neoliberal federalist, Lionel Robbins.63 Even though Robbins argued against the 
Keynesian policies of his time, maintaining that they aggravated the crisis and that they would 
inevitably lead to war, his federalist plans allowed for governmental restrictions on trade provided that 
they were the ‘the result of majority decisions’.64 Tellingly, no such exception is provided for in 
Hayek’s federalist writings. As Spieker points out, ‘for him, democratic government was more ﬁrmly 
subordinated to the principles of economic liberalism’.65 In Hayek’s own words, his vision of 
federalism was a democratic one, yet this was ‘a democracy with definitely limited powers’.66  
To take this argument one step further, Hayek’s federalist vision was also conditioned upon the 
political orientation of such a federation. Hayek saw this internationalisation of economic 
management as a means to an end, the end being the construction of a neoliberal legal and economic 
order: ‘[t]his division of power would inevitably act at the same time also as a limitation of the power 
of the whole as well as of the individual state. Indeed, many kinds of planning which are now 
fashionable would probably become altogether impossible.’67 Conversely, he was happy to postpone 
the realisation of his plans to avoid the emergence of a Keynesian federation: ‘the creation of a world 
state probably would be a greater danger to the future of civilisation than even war’.68 For Hayek as 
well as for Roepke,69 the legalised internationalisation of economic decision-making was not 
primarily about the actors that would exercise these powers (international instead of national), but 
rather about delimiting, channelling and disciplining of these powers in the first place: ‘[t]he powers 
which must devolve on an international authority are not the new powers assumed by the states in 
recent times but the minimum of powers without which it is impossible to preserve peaceful 
relationships, i.e., essentially the powers of the ultra-liberal “laissez-faire” state’.70  
However, Hayek’s above-described federation of political equality and economic frugality was not 
exactly a global one. Rather, it was conceptualised as a federation between Western, capitalist states 
that would largely retain their colonies. In his 1939 essay on federalism, Hayek discussed briefly 
whether colonies should be administered federally or nationally, concluding that the former solution 
                                                          
63 Lionel Robbins was a notable LSE economist who advocated against interventionist policies at the face of the 
Great Depression. He largely shared Hayek’s federalist vision: L. Robbins, ‘Economic Aspects of Federation’ in 
M. Chaning-Pearce (ed.), Federal Union: A Symposium (J. Cape, 1940). 
64 Ibid., 174.  
65 Spieker (supra note 58), 928.  
66 Hayek (supra note 27), 232.  
67 Ibid., 233.  
68 Hayek (supra note 28), 380.  
69 See note 56 above.  
70 Hayek (supra note 27), 232.  
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was preferable, given his overall preference for post-national, federal structures of economic 
governance.71 This unproblematised discussion of the colonial question indicates his acceptance of the 
colonial status quo, and in fact Hayek characterised the issue of colonial administration as being of 
‘comparatively minor importance’.72 Similarly, unproblematised references to colonial relations and 
the fact that federalism would only be applicable between Western states can be found in The Road to 
Selfdom: ‘I believe that these considerations still hold and that a degree of cooperation could be 
achieved, say, between the British Empire and the nations of Western Europe and probably the United 
States which would not be possible on a world scale.’73 After all, Hayek praised the internationalist 
thought of nineteenth-century liberal thinkers such as Sidgwick,74 who was a staunch believer in the 
distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ nations.75 Even though he was not an outright 
supporter of (neo)liberal interventionism,76 Hayek in his later writings adopted an evolutionary 
approach to human history that enabled him to conceptualise possessive individuals as the highest 
stage of human development. Thus, he suggested that, for all societies to develop towards this 
allegedly higher stage of civilisation, one needed to establish the (institutional and legal) framework 
that would enable individual initiative to flourish.77 Arguably, this idea that it is justified to impose the 
conditions necessary for a neoliberal conception of individual initiative to emerge closely echoes the 
‘civilisational’ efforts of the nineteenth and early twentieth century and more specifically, 
extraterritoriality,78 as well as the workings of the mandate system of the League of Nations.79 For 
                                                          
71 Hayek (supra note 58), 269.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Hayek (supra note 27), 235 (emphasis added).  
74 ‘Nineteenth-century liberals may not have been fully aware of how essential a complement of their principles 
a federal organization of the different states formed; but there were few among them who did not express their 
belief in it as an ultimate goal.’ Ibid., 234. ‘As late as the closing years of the nineteenth century Henry 
Sidgwick thought it not beyond the limits of a sober forecast to conjecture that some future integration may take 
place in the West European states.’ Ibid., 234, fn14.  
75 ‘Sidgwick conceives of international relations as a two-tiered hierarchical system in which the relations 
among liberal states are governed by the principle of equality, while the relations between liberal and non-liberal 
states are conceptualised in imperial terms. As has been noted elsewhere, Sidgwick’s vision of a liberal 
federation was constrained by a justiﬁcation of imperialism based on a cultural understanding of racial 
difference: “liberal internationalism and liberal imperialism went hand in hand”.’ Spieker (supra note 58), 933.  
76 ‘Whatever kind of civilisation will in the end emerge in those parts under Western inﬂuence may sooner take 
appropriate forms if allowed to grow rather than if it is imposed from above.’ F. A. von Hayek, The Constitution 
of Liberty (Routledge Classics, 2006), 2.  
77 ‘If it is true ...that the necessary condition for a free evolution - the spirit of individual initiative - is lacking, 
then surely without that spirit no viable civilisation can grow anywhere.’ Ibid.  
78 See Chapter 2 ‘Extraterritoriality and the civilising mission: international law and social transformation in 
Japan and the Ottoman Empire’ in the present thesis.  
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Hayek as well as colonial administrators and international lawyers before the Second World War, it 
was necessary and legitimate for developed capitalist states to further these reforms that constituted 
the necessary preconditions for the establishment of a capitalist society. The crucial difference here, 
though, is that Hayek had an even more narrow conception of the desired outcome of such reforms. 
Both his above-described federation and this tutelage relationship with ‘less advanced’ political 
communities needed to be not only capitalist, but specifically neoliberal. In turn, this vision not only 
resonated with the history of international law, but also paved the way for its future, legitimising a 
number of international legal innovations, and amongst them a distinctive model of neoliberal 
international territorial administration.  
Thus far, neoliberal thought on international law and governance has largely been neglected. This 
section sought to ratify this omission by arguing that, despite marked differences, we can trace 
significant similarities in the way Roepke and Hayek argued for the need to internationalise and 
legalise economic decision-making. Further, their vision of the international order was closely linked 
to their vision of the state. In order to ensure that the role of the state would be strictly confined within 
the limits of the creator and the guarantor of competitive orders, a process of disciplining state power 
was necessary. There are manifold aspects of this disciplinary process. What is of interest to 
international lawyers is that the internationalisation of economic decision-making was understood as 
one method capable of securing this disciplining by restraining national sovereignty. Further, the 
hostility of neoliberal thinkers towards mass politics, democratic institutions and organised labour 
signifies a partial overlap between national and popular sovereignty. Otherwise put, for neoliberals, 
the state had become too vulnerable to popular demands for welfarist, anti-competitive 
interventionism and, therefore, only a re-arrangement of institutional functions could restore its 
‘proper’ functions. As we will see in the next section, this understanding had profound implications 
for the role of international law and international institutions after 1990.  
5:3 Τhe rise (and fall?) of international territorial administration: building a world safe for 
neoliberalism  
Despite its deep historical lineages, neoliberalism became hegemonic on an international level in the 
course of the 1990s. The 1973 oil crisis triggered significant changes in Western Europe and the US. 
The most relevant here is the 1976 ‘Sterling crisis’ in the UK and the decision of the Labour 
government to turn to the IMF for assistance. It was from this point - and not in the course of the 
Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s - that the IMF assumed a proactive role in prescribing pro-
cyclical, austerity policies as conditionalities for the provision of loans.80 Still, the ‘debt crisis’ in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
79 See Section 3:2:1 ‘Article 22: continuation of the civilising mission by other means’ in this thesis.  
80 ‘The new Prime Minister, James Callaghan, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, were Atlanticists 
who were in favour of negotiations with the IMF, which had already provided temporary assistance. Further 
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course of the 1980s signalled the death knell of the NIEO, since a number of peripheral states that had 
advocated for it were obliged to implement neoliberal reforms, in order to be assisted by the IMF or 
the World Bank (also collectively known as the International Financial Institutions, or IFIs).81 Finally, 
the collapse of the USSR solidified the trend by providing neoliberal theorists and policy-makers with 
unprecedented confidence. The impact of these events on international law and institutions was 
nothing short of seismic. From international trade82 and investment law,83 to international criminal 
law84 and the law of international institutions,85 a distinctively neoliberal international legal order 
began to be formulated. Theorists like Gill even argued that certain regimes of international law 
acquired the character of an internationalised neoliberal ‘constitution’.86 Moreover, the collapse of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
help, however, would only come with strings attached. When they prevailed, it was much more than a defeat for 
the British left, the unions, and the working class. It was the first step in the capitalist reconstruction of the 
West.’ Mazower (supra note 1), 346.  
81 ‘The final dagger would be the Latin American debt crisis in 1982: bailing out indebted southern states was 
not done in charity but conditionally dependent on structural adjustments designed explicitly to weaken the 
reach of the state. The result was a ‘‘lost decade’’ in Latin America, and then another in Africa when the same 
policies were applied there.’ Nils Gilman, ‘The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction’ (2015) 6 
Humanity 1, 8. The example of Peru is illustrative. In its first encounter with the IMF in 1982-1983, the state 
experienced a 14% drop of its per capita GDP and the loss of 400,000 jobs, which pushed the Fund out. The 
Fund returned in the early 1990s and its policies contributed to Peru becoming the fastest growing state in the 
region. At the same time, social indicators deteriorated rapidly: real wages fell, poverty and inequality rose, the 
government exhibited clear authoritarian characteristics. It is telling that within six months the protein intake in 
Peru’s capital city, Lima, fell by 30%: D. Green, Silent Revolution: The Rise and Fall of Market Economics in 
Latin America (New York University Press, 2003), 255.  
82 Among many: Lang (supra note 14).  
83 Among many: D. Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalisation: Investment Rules and 
Democracy’s Promise (CUP, 2008); M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on 
Foreign Investment (CUP, 2015).  
84 Among many: K. M. Clarke, ‘“We Ask for Justice, You Give Us Law”: Justice Talk and the Encapsulation of 
Victims’ in C. De Vos, S. Kendall and C. Stahn (eds), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of 
International Criminal Courts Interventions (CUP, 2015); C. Schwoebel, ‘Market and Marketing Culture of 
International Criminal Law’ in C. Schwoebel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An 
Introduction (Routledge, 2014).  
85 Among many: A. Anghie, ‘Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions 
and the Third World’ (2001) 32 New York University of International Law and Politics 243; B. S. Chimni, 
‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’ (2004)15 European Journal of 
International Law 1. 
86 S. Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, democratisation and global political economy’ (1998) 10 Pacifica Review: 
Peace, Security and Global Change 23; S. Gill and A. Claire Cutler (eds), New Constitutionalism and World 
Order (CUP, 2014).  
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USSR and the fact that the 1990s was a decade of geopolitical decline and economic collapse for 
Russia signified the (interim) end of the widespread use of veto by the five permanent members, the 
‘revival’ of the UN Security Council and the eve of a new interventionist era. Indeed, Orford has 
contended that the expansion of the UN collective security system was one of the two most significant 
developments in international law and international relations after the end of the Cold War, the other 
being increased trade and financial liberalisation.87 This emergence of a specifically neoliberal 
international law will also be discussed in Chapter 6.88  
5:3:1 After the ‘end of history’: international territorial administration in the years of 
triumphant neoliberalism  
This chapter will conceive, in line with Stahn, international territorial administration (ITA) as ‘the 
exercise of administering authority (executive, legislative or judicial authority) by an international 
entity for the benefit of a territory that is temporarily placed under international supervision or 
assistance for a communitarian purpose’.89 Further, modern ITA arose as the corollary of the above-
mentioned intensified activity of the UNSC in the field of collective security.90 Here we need to take 
into account that Wilde has gone to significant lengths to show that there is nothing particularly 
unique about post-1990s ITA.91 There is definitely truth to the argument that ITA as a form of 
governing is not entirely new. However, if we focus on the internationalisation aspect only, we miss 
the fact that different ITA experiments have served diverse social, economic and political purposes 
and have been embodied in radically different international legal paradigms. ITA might be a 
temporary solution in order to manage a problem of competing nationalisms, as in the case of Danzig 
In that instance, the League of Nations acted as the ‘protector’ of the semi-autonomous city, in an 
attempt to reconcile the fact that the city was overwhelmingly inhabited by ethnic Germans, but 
Poland would not accept its incorporation to Germany, since it would deprive it from access to the 
Baltic Sea.92 Hence, internationalisation operated as a compromise in the light of incompatible 
geopolitical interests. ITA might also be a temporary management of territory before the final 
settlement of its status, as in the case of Eastern Slavonia, which was administered by the United 
Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (1996-1998), before returning to the control 
                                                          
87 A. Orford, ‘Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War’ (1997) 38 
Harvard International Law Journal 443, 443.  
88 See Section 6.1. Resolution 1483 and its legal implications: the laws of occupation and neoliberal legality of 
the present thesis.  
89C. Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond 
(CUP, 2010), 44-45. 
90 Ibid., 27.  
91 R. Wilde, ‘Taxonomies of International Peacekeeping – An Alternative Narrative’ (2003) 9 ILSA Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 391. 
92 Stahn (supra note 89), 182-185.  
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of Croatia.93 Finally, ITA can represent comprehensive international tutelage involving intense 
economic and political reforms, as was the case frequently after 1990. This chapter will focus 
exclusively on the last category: the subject of my analysis here is a form of specifically neoliberal 
ITA. However, a phenomenon can be both singular and part of a broader historical lineage. In this 
thesis, it is argued that post-1990 ITA should be understood as method of sustaining and expanding 
capitalist relations, and more specifically neoliberal capitalism, in a post-colonial world of equal 
sovereignty. This conceptualisation enables us both to distinguish between different instances of ITA 
without fetishising the mere form of internationalised governance, while capturing the continuities 
between ITA and, among other examples, the Mandates System of the League of Nations or 
nineteenth-century extraterritoriality, as does this thesis.  
Indeed, it is the case that a heavy focus on economic reform first arose as a core characteristic of ITA 
after 1990.94 In fact, both the increased frequency and complexity of ITAs led to (eventually 
unsuccessful) efforts to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as part of the UN system.95 This turn to 
a proactive, intrusive model of ITA is commonly attributed to the ideological hegemony of 
‘democratic peace theory’ after 1990.96 Democratic peace theory prides itself in drawing from the 
                                                          
93 R. Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went 
Away (OUP, 2008), 53-54.  
94 ‘The inclusion of economic aspects in comprehensive peacebuilding missions is a very recent phenomenon in 
international law. The addition can be seen as underlying a tendency to recognise the economic dimension of 
international peace and security.’ E. de Brabandere, Post-conflict Administrations in International Law: 
International Territorial Administration, Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in Theory and 
Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 148. ‘In recent years, the UN Security Council has been adopting 
increasingly broad and complex peace mission mandates, going well beyond the simple maintenance or re-
establishment of peace. In particular, the UN has assumed tasks of political and economic reconstruction, now 
incorporated under the lofty concept of peacebuilding.’ L. Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Taking the International 
Rule of Law Seriously: Economic Instruments and Collective Security’ International Peace Academy Policy 
Paper (October 2005), 8.  
95 UNGA Resolution 60/180 ‘The Peacebuilding Commission’ A/RES/60/180 (30 December 2005); UNSC 
Resolution 1645 S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005). For a brief analysis, see: M. Berdal, ‘The UN Peacebuilding 
Commission: The Rise and Fall of a Good Idea’ in M. Pugh, N. Cooper and M. Turner (eds), Whose Peace? 
Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).  
96 ‘The hubris of peacebuilders keys the political economy of war-torn societies into a map captioned “the 
liberal peace project;” that, in its economic dimension, requires convergence towards “market liberalisation.” 
This became an aggressively promoted orthodoxy, with variations, derived from the late 1990s Washington 
Consensus.’ M. Pugh, ‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective’ (2005) 10 
International Journal of Peace Studies 23, 23. Examples drawn from ITA feature prominently in Buchan’s 
analysis of democratic peace theory and international law as examples of the intersection between the two: 
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Kantian tradition,97 as renewed by Wilson during the interwar period.98 The theory was, in essence, an 
attempt to develop a competing theory to Realism by claiming that ‘state preferences derived from the 
domestic and transnational social pressures critically influence state behaviour’.99 Doyle elaborated 
this theory by arguing that democracies do not go to war with each other, having established between 
them a zone of liberal peace.100 In contrast, non-liberal states go to war against each other, while 
liberal democracies are still likely to go to war against non-liberal states. For Doyle, this latter fact is 
attributable to liberal democracies’ conviction that non-liberal states are inherently aggressive, since 
‘non-liberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people’.101 In turn, this 
domestic behaviour is understood as an indicator of a state’s external behaviour and ‘non-liberal states 
are expected to externalise this domestic aggressive behaviour when interacting in the international 
sphere’.102 Thus, in the context of democratic peace theory, it is both normatively desirable and 
empirically observable that liberal states systematically try to expand this sphere of liberal peace by 
promoting (whether through peaceful or forcible means) liberal democracy.103 This diffusion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘[t]hus, whereas during the Cold War the UN was adamant that peacekeeping missions would not become 
involved in domestic political matters, in the post-Cold War era the UN’s political bias in favour of liberal 
democracy has become overt.’ R. Buchan, International Law and the Construction of the Liberal Peace (Hart 
Publishing, 2013), 127.  
97 This genealogical line is common but debatable to the extent that Kant focused on republicanism and not on 
liberalism, let alone democracy. See: I. Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ in I. Kant, Political Writings (H. Reiss ed, 2nd 
edn, CUP, 1991). 
98 W. Wilson, ‘Fourteen Points’ (8 January 1918) Available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (Last accessed: 11/05/2015). For the most comprehensive 
critique to the liberal theory and practice of the interwar period, see: E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-
1939 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).  
99 A. Moravcsik, ‘The New Liberalism’ in C. Reus-Smit and D. Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations (OUP, 2008), 236.  
100 ‘[E]ven though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with non-liberal states, 
constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another’ M. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal 
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I’ (1983) 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 205, 213 (emphasis in original).  
101 M. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II’ (1983) 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
323, 325.  
102 Buchan (supra note 96), 79.  
103 ‘For this reason, liberals argue that liberal states should act in concert on the international stage, seeking to 
promote their liberal values to non-liberal states in order to defend and expand their zone of liberal peace.’ Ibid., 
3; ‘In particular, Andrew Moravcsik and Anne-Marie Slaughter have both dedicated much academic energy to 
presenting liberalism as empirical, scientific and non-normative. Their argument is that liberalism has made the 
transition from a normative theory which makes recommendations about how liberal states should interact with 
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political and economic liberalism is morally desirable since it represents ‘a system of governance that 
is universally desirable’.104 Simultaneously, it is the only rational foreign policy for liberal 
democracies, since international peace and security will always be threatened by the existence of non-
democratic states that do not abide to liberalism and a free-market economy. Crucially, democratic 
peace theory was also endorsed by the UN Secretary- General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.105 
A fundamental addition needs to be made in order to comprehend fully the emergence of neoliberal 
peacebuilding. Apart from democratic peace theory, we must also factor in the neoliberal aversion 
towards national interventionism and the preference for internationalised schemes of decision-making, 
as sketched above.106 Otherwise, if one relies solely on the predominance of democratic peace theory, 
it is not readily clear why it was international actors, such as international institutions or 
internationally-recognised occupying powers, which assumed such a central role in promoting those 
economic and political reforms deemed necessary for the establishment of long-lasting peace. Even 
though democratic peace theorists favour (neo)liberal capitalism,107 their nominal focus is on domestic 
political arrangements involving a minimum of free elections and guarantees of basic rights. 
Neoliberals, such as Hayek, Robbins or Roepke, advanced a similar, yet more ambitious, argument: 
for them, the interventionist state was fundamentally incompatible with a genuine, stable and peaceful 
international order.108 Furthermore, as has been shown already, neoliberals clearly favoured 
internationalised schemes of economic governance, since they considered them ideal, in order to 
diminish the impact of organised labour, mass politics and the political left on decision-making.109 It 
was in this context that, as Orford points out, the local/national level was reconceived as a source of 
conflict, strife and disorder, while international law and institutions were reconceptualised as a 
solution to those problems: ‘[t]he second assumption made by advocates of an expanded humanitarian 
role for the Security Council is that the principal threats to human rights, democracy, and security 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
other states in the world order to an explanatory theory that is able to accurately account for how liberal states 
do interact with other states.’ Ibid., 40 (emphasis in original).  
104 Ibid., 80. 
105 In his relevant report, Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that ‘a culture of [liberal] democracy is fundamentally a 
culture of peace.’ UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Democratization’ UN Doc 
A/51/761 (20 December 1996) para. 17.  
106 See: ‘International law and international institutions in the context of neoliberal thought: disciplining the 
state, delimiting democracy’ above.  
107 For example, in the context of the occupation of Iraq in 2003, Buchan argued that: ‘Thus, for Iraq to be 
transformed into a liberal democracy it was necessary to engage in a profound market-orientated economic 
adjustment, taking a “leap into robust capitalism”.’ Buchan (supra note 93), 198. 
108 See notes 57, 58 above.  
109 See notes 53, 65, 66 above.  
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occur at the state or local level’.110 However, as Orford also proceeded to show, in numerous cases of 
conflicts the international law and institutions were far from ‘absent’ or ‘inactive’. To give but one 
example, it was under sustained pressure from the IMF that the former Yugoslavia changed its 
republican, federal structure, transferring powers to the central government while simultaneously 
implementing austerity politics with divisive social consequences.111 In turn, these reforms provoked 
nationalist feelings that eventually led to the outbreak of the civil war.112 Furthermore, Orford argues 
that IFIs or liberalising trade agreements have decisively contributed to the weakening of democracy 
and to systematic violations of human rights.113 Therefore, without this excusing local actors or 
wholly explaining the occurrence of conflicts, it nonetheless shows that ‘[r]esponsibility for that 
violence belongs to both international and local actors, not to local actors alone’.114 Apart from post-
conflict ITA, this mode of thinking also became obvious in different branches of international law, 
such as international criminal law or with regard to the ‘responsibility to protect’, where the 
‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’ of the state to act appropriately ‘triggers’ the involvement of 
international actors, be it the ICC or the UN Security Council.115 The possibility of international 
actors being ‘unwilling or unable’ or even partly responsible for whatever tragedy is occurring at a 
particular moment is simply not accounted for, while the national level is conceptualised as one of at 
least partial failure, oppression and conflict. As has been argued already, this faith in international law 
and organisations to manage successfully conflicts and other disastrous events takes little—if any—
                                                          
110 Orford (supra note 87), 449.  
111 Ibid., 455.  
112 ‘People began to look to other sources of community, and in that vacuum ethnic nationalism re-emerged to 
provide a new form of community and a needed structure of identity.’ Ibid., 457. For an argument on how the 
IFIs and multilateral development assistance triggered conflict and genocide in Rwanda, see: R. Andersen, 
‘How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda’ (2000) 21 Third World Quarterly 
441; A. Storey, ‘Structural Adjustment, State Power & Genocide: The World Bank & Rwanda’ (2001) 28 
Review of African Political Economy, 365.  
113 Orford (supra note 87), 464-471.  
114 Ibid., 459.  
115 ‘In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.’ UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome A/RES/60/1, 
para 139; ‘Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’. Article 17 para. 1 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 2187 UNTS 90/37 ILM 1002.  
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stock of the fact that these conflicts or disasters are at least partly attributable to international law and 
organisations in the first place.  
Finally, this turn to comprehensive forms of ITA gave rise to significant doctrinal questions. The most 
readily relevant here is whether the laws of occupation apply in cases of ITA created under an 
international agreement or by the UN Security Council. Laws of occupation, as incorporated in the 
Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, and reflected in customary law, are 
conservative in the literal sense of the word. The core idea behind the laws of occupation remains the 
fact that the occupier exercises physical control over a territory, but does not acquire sovereign rights 
over it, and hence is not allowed fundamentally to alter its political order.116 To begin with, Article 43 
of the Hague Regulations reads as follows: ‘[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact 
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the 
laws in force in the country’.117 This is accompanied by Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
1949 (GCIV) which stipulates that local penal laws must remain in force unless ‘they constitute a 
threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention’.118 Even though the 
exact scope of Article 64 GCIV is open to debate,119 the provision appears to confer the occupying 
power with broader legislative authority, so as to ensure that local laws will not impair the perceived 
humanitarian purposes of the GCIV.120 For instance, local laws that authorise grave violations of 
human rights can, and in fact must, be repealed. 
                                                          
116 ‘Thus, as Schmitt observed, the legal institution of occupatio bellica recognizes a direct relationship of 
protection and obedience between the occupying power’s military commandant and the territory’s inhabitants, 
potentially mediated by local laws and institutions but in the last instance arising from the occupant’s “naked 
power”, which is at once legitimised and constrained by international law’s precarious balance of “military 
necessity” and order preservation.’ N. Bhuta, ‘The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation’ (2005) 16 
European Journal of International Law 721, 727.  
117 Article 43 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 1907). 
118 Article 64 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 
1949) 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287 (hereinafter GCIV). 
119 E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (2nd edn, OUP, 2012), 95-102. 
120 ‘The third difference between the Hague and Geneva approaches, and which derives from the second one, 
relates to the structure of the occupant’s duties and powers. The occupant must be a proactive regulator, no 
longer the disinterested watch guard envisioned in the Hague Regulations.’ Ibid., 74. These duties include: ‘to 
respect, among other things, the protected persons’ honor, family rights, religious convictions and practices, and 
manners and customs (Article 27), to facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and 
education of children (Article 51), provide specific labor conditions (Article 52), ensure food and medical 
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To return to ITA, there are numerous ‘technical’ legal arguments advanced for and against the 
applicability of the laws of occupation in such cases. The UN, being a non-state actor, has not ratified 
the Hague Regulations or the GCIV. In fact, it is a stated - if contested - position of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross that, as a matter of principle, non-state actors are incapable of becoming 
parties.121 The situation became increasingly problematic, since the UN started assuming functions 
virtually indistinguishable from those of an occupying power after 1990, as will be shown below. The 
doctrinal discussion gets further complicated, incremental and inconclusive, if we factor in the 
wording of the different Security Council Resolutions that established ITA schemes. Given the 
hierarchy between international legal rules and the superior position of Charter-based obligations 
established by Article 103 UN Charter,122 Security Council resolutions could supersede obligations 
under international humanitarian law, even if we consider IHL to be applicable in the first place. Even 
if an explicit authorisation to violate the laws of occupation would be unlikely, the Security Council 
Resolution 1244 on Kosovo authorised the interim administration to develop ‘democratic self-
governing institutions’ and aimed for  
[a] comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. 
This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad 
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, 
stability and regional cooperation.123  
It is difficult to see how these objectives could be achieved without contravening the ‘conservationist 
principle’ of the laws of occupation, as sketched above.124  
Without ignoring the importance of this doctrinal conversation, my argument is that it is impossible to 
understand the relationship between ITA and the laws of occupation without taking into account the 
hegemony of the democratic peace theory and of neoliberalism during the first two post-Cold War 
decades. One need not be a believer in radical legal indeterminacy125 to acknowledge that it is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
supplies of the population (Article 55), maintain medical services (Article 56), and agree to relief schemes and 
to facilitate them by all means at its disposal (Article 59).’ Ibid.  
121 ‘Only States may become party to international treaties, and thus to the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols.’ International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Answers to 
your Questions’ 2002, 12.  
122 Article 103 UN Charter reads as follows: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’ Charter of the United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (24 
October 1945).  
123 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) S/RES/1244 (1999).  
124 See notes 111-115 above.  
125 For the most comprehensive account on legal indeterminacy, especially in its radical form, see: D. Kennedy, 
‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1976)89 Harvard Law Review 1685.  
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readily evident or uncontested what measures are indeed essential for the restoration of ‘public order 
and security’ and, therefore, are permissible under the laws of occupation. After all, the 
‘conservationist principle’ was reflective of the general consensus of the time of its promulgation 
about the separateness between economic life and public authority, domestic or foreign.126 Hence, 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations especially is based on a presumption of separation of interests 
between the occupying power and private actors in occupied territories.127 Nonetheless, as has already 
been argued, neoliberalism (and Keynesianism) arose precisely as a response to the political and 
intellectual bankruptcy of this simplistic and inaccurate laissez-faire understanding.128 The evolution 
of hegemonic conceptions of the relationship between the market and the state is to an extent evident 
in Article 64 GCIV and in the GCIV more generally, which grant much broader powers to the 
occupying power, acknowledging the unattainability of the belief that private life could even continue 
unhindered under new public authority.129  
My argument here is that the hegemony of neoliberalism in the international realm after 1990 enabled 
a more proactive, interventionist interpretation of the state and the market, and reconceived the former 
as an essential enabler of the latter. Further, the emergence of the democratic peace theory 
intrinsically bound questions of internal political and economic organisation to issues of international 
peace and security. For proponents of this approach, the establishment of liberal democracy and 
capitalism constitute absolutely essential preconditions for a secure and peaceful international 
environment. The applicability and normative scope of the laws of occupation vis-à-vis ITA also need 
to be examined in this light. This does not imply that the change of the ideological underpinning of 
the international legal order meant that the laws of occupation are no longer legally binding. However, 
an approach that does not account for the rise of neoliberalism and ‘democratic peace theory’ assigns 
a supposedly neutral and objective meaning to the question of what measures and legal reforms are 
necessary for the maintenance of order and security, and ignores the importance of ideological factors 
and material relations of power for the construction of legal meaning. The aporias of this approach 
will become more evident when discussing the neoliberal reconstruction of Iraq and international law 
in Chapter 6 of this thesis.130  
                                                          
126 Benvenisti (supra note 119), 70.  
127 Ibid.  
128 See note 17 above.  
129 ‘The third difference between the Hague and the Geneva approaches, and which derives from the second one, 
relates to the structure of the occupant’s duties and powers. The occupant must be a proactive regulator, no  
longer the disinterested watch guard envisioned in the Hague Regulations.’ Benvenisti (supra note 116), 74. 
130 See Chapter 6 ‘Civilising Iraq: the neoliberal reconstruction of Iraq and the role of international law’of the 
thesis at hand.  
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5:3:2 International territorial administration and the normalisation of neoliberal state-building: 
Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor  
As was argued above, since the 1990s the practice of international organisations, especially that of the 
UN, has transitioned from traditional peacekeeping designed to minimise international conflict, to 
peacebuilding, a proactive process of altering the social economic and political foundations of a state 
by linking these reforms with peace. Such was the transformation of the approach of the UN to post-
conflict societies that an official of the organisation wrote in 2004 that classic peacekeeping ‘has 
taken on a somewhat fossil-like appearance’,131 while UN mandates broadened significantly to include 
a series of administrative duties that, in the cases of Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor, 
reached the level of full governing authority. Due to the emergence of the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ 
and due to the actual experiences of peacebuilding during the 1990s and early 2000s, the idea that 
economic neoliberalisation is essential for the establishment of peace was legitimised within the 
international community. This led scholars otherwise sympathetic to the idea of the globalisation of 
the (neo)liberal market economy, such as Roland Paris, to argue that there is a ‘liberal bias’ in 
international peacekeeping that echoes the nineteenth-century civilising mission.132 It is telling that, in 
virtually all peacebuilding instances after 1990, the UN actively co-operated with the World Bank and 
the IMF, a choice that indicates the willingness of the organisation to restructure these societies in 
conformity with the neoliberal paradigm promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions.133  
A good first example to establish this trend of radical neoliberal reform in the context of ITA is that of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). After 44 months of devastating civil war, the Dayton Peace Accords 
were signed by Croatia, BiH and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, establishing a complex system 
of international tutelage.134 Various organisations were involved in the ITA of BiH, including the UN, 
the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions. Among these the High Representative, an official appointed by the UN Security Council 
through a complex process involving multiple actors, along with the secretariat (collectively known as 
the Office of the High Representative [OHR]) gradually asserted the right to perform important 
administrative actions in the country.135  
                                                          
131 E. Mortimer, ‘International Administration of War-Torn Societies’ (2004) 10 Global Governance 7, 8.  
132 ‘Although modern peacebuilders have largely abandoned the archaic language of civilised versus uncivilised, 
they nevertheless appear to act upon the belief that one model of domestic governance - liberal market 
democracy - is superior to all others.’ R. Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice”’ 
(2002) 28 Review of International Studies 637, 638.  
133 Ibid., 639-40.  
134 Wilde refers to the complexity of the system established by Dayton as ‘unusual and, to outsiders, largely 
mysterious’. Wilde (supra note 93), 70.  
135 Ibid., 64.  
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As Pugh observed, ITA in BiH involved the framing of the post-conflict socialist economy ‘as the 
dysfunctional “other”’,136 and oscillated between ‘nation building and diminishing the state as an 
economic actor by privatizing essential services and shifting responsibility for employment from the 
state to the individual’.137 In this context, the Constitution of BiH, which is incorporated in the Dayton 
Agreement, elevates the construction of a free market to one of its primary purposes, linking it further 
to the rejection of violence and the establishment of peace.138 The conviction that free markets would 
automatically bring peace and stability was so prevalent that the ‘international community’ praised 
repeatedly the Arizona Market, a marketplace in the city of Brčko that sprang up to cover the 
everyday needs of the local population: ‘[f]rom the beginning, the international refrain was that while 
the rest of Bosnia was mired in ethnic hatred, men (not women) of different ethnic groups happily 
interacted in Arizona Market with business as their neutral ground’.139 To build this ‘market-driven 
peace’ narrative, though, the ‘international community’ had to ignore the fact that women and 
children were systematically sold and bought at Arizona Market for forced prostitution and slave 
labour:  
While human rights and the rule of law were discussed and planned for in other parts of Bosnia, they 
were blatantly violated in Arizona Market with the full acquiescence of the IC, which insisted that the 
market represented the highest expression of free market ideals. Eventually it was publicly acknowledged 
that women and girls were being trafficked through Arizona Market.140 
As in the case of Kosovo that will be discussed below, the greatest obstacle to this transition to a free-
market economy were the socially-owned enterprises (SOEs) that previously dominated the economy 
of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had a highly idiosyncratic system of market socialism and, therefore, 
productive enterprises did not belong to the state, but to society as a whole and were run by their 
employees.141 The Bretton Woods Institutions and USAID advocated for the rapid privatisation of the 
SOEs, mobilising arguments ranging from the inherent inefficiency of non-privately owned 
                                                          
136 M. Pugh, ‘Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Spoils of Peace’ (2002) 8 Global 
Governance 467, 468. 
137 Ibid.  
138 ‘Rejecting the violence of war; Wishing to contribute to peace promotion; Desiring to support individual 
liberty and to develop a free market’ Annex 4 Constitution Preamble Dayton Peace Agreement, General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (21 November 1995), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de495c34.html (Last accessed: 13/01/2016).  
139 D. F. Haynes, ‘Lessons from Bosnia’s Arizona Market: Harm to Women in Neoliberalized Postconflict 
Reconstruction Process’ (2010) 158 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1779, 1785.  
140 Ibid., 1789.  
141 For a comprehensive analysis of the legal aspects of Yugoslavia’s socialist legal system and of the legal 
aspects of UNMIK’s privatisation plans, see: M. Grasten and L. J. Uberti, ‘The Politics of Law in a Post-conﬂict 
UN Protectorate: Privatisation and Property Rights in Kosovo (1999–2008)’ (2015) Journal of International 
Relations and Development 1. 
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businesses142 to the need to combat corruption and political influence, which were seen as 
synonymous to public management.143 Moreover, the IMF argued that privatisation would have a 
positive impact on employment and export-led growth, which allegedly would also be evident within 
three years.144 Apart from privatisations, a commitment to neoliberalism was also evident in the 
design of macro-economic policies. As Wilde points out, all non-elected positions were staffed by 
international appointees.145 More specifically, the Governor of the Central Bank was appointed 
directly by the IMF,146 which meant that the monetary policy of BiH was completely controlled by the 
IMF and subjected to its monetarist doctrines.147  
Further, the internationalised rule of BiH nominally intended to establish a liberal, pluralistic 
democracy,148 while it displayed disregard or even open hostility towards local political actors. For 
example, it was common to blame the Bosnians (and other peoples of the former Eastern Bloc) as 
being uncooperative whenever an initiative, such as rapid privatisation, failed:  
[p]rivatization in transition economies could have and should have been better managed; opportunities 
were missed. However, holding privatization accountable for all the problems of transition is inaccurate, 
and unfair. Change of ownership was by itself insufficient to cut political-financial links between firms 
and the state, but that was not clear at the outset, and still appears to be a necessary, if not a sufficient, 
condition for successful reform.149 
                                                          
142 ‘Managers and workers had few incentives to preserve capital or to ensure healthy profits. On the contrary, 
inefficient enterprises continued to benefit from government subsidies, guarantees and risky bank credits, 
thereby preventing new enterprises from entering the market or from expanding.’ World Bank, ‘Implementation, 
Completion and Results Report on a Credit in the Amount of SDR 15.60 Million (US$19.80 Million Equivalent) 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina for a Privatization Technical Assistance Credit’ (21 March 2007), 7.  
143 ‘Efficient enterprises often failed to serve as engines of growth because political parties or public agencies 
intervened directly in their business activities.’ Ibid.  
144 ‘These are grounds to state that the newly privatized companies will continue to operate successfully and 
have a positive effect on the overall economic development of the country. The experience of other transition 
countries was that it took roughly three years for the effects of reforms to start being felt.’ International 
Monetary Fund ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Mid-Term Development 
Strategy’ (April 2004), 66.  
145 Wilde (supra note 131), 70.  
146 Dayton Peace Agreement (supra note 138) Annex 4 Article VII. 
147 For a comprehensive critique of IMF’s monetarism, see: J. E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents 
(Penguin, 2003). 
148 ‘In both Bosnia and Herzegovina generally, and Mostar and Brčko in particular, the use of ITA has been 
understood, in part, as an attempt to promote a multi-ethnic social and political culture.’ Wilde (supra note 131), 
219. 
149 J. Nellis, ‘The World Bank Privatization and Enterprise Reform in Transition Economies: A Retrospective 
Analysis’ Transition Newsletter (January-February 2002), 17.  
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Moreover, the OHR assumed a proactive role that amounted to defying the will of local 
representatives and even removing them from office.150 As Wilde convincingly argues, such decisions 
ran counter to the narrative that it was the absence of local governing structures that necessitated the 
establishment of ITA and indicated how the OHR passed substantive judgments on the agenda and 
qualifications of local representatives.151 It is also indicative of the limited perception of democracy 
promoted in BiH that a number of crucial appointments, such as that of the Commission on Public 
Corporations, was conducted by international actors (in this case the President of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development), without even a formal requirement to consult local actors.152 
As the case of BiH indicates, the rhetoric of democracy casually co-existed symbiotically with anti-
democratic practices and assumptions against genuine local participation in ITA.  
The reconstruction of BiH was the blueprint for the ITA experiment in Kosovo.153 Established by 
UNSC Resolution 1244,154 which followed NATO’s bombing campaign, UNMIK (United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo) assumed full legislative, executive and judicial authority over Kosovo,155 while 
sovereignty nominally rested with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).156 UNMIK worked 
closely with the EU Commission and the World Bank in planning and executing the reconstruction of 
Kosovo along neoliberal lines. The vision of the three organisations was summarised in a policy 
document entitled Toward Stability and Prosperity: A Program for Reconstruction and Recovery in 
Kosovo, where transition to a free-market economy is presented as a neutral, inevitable process that 
will also quasi-automatically resolve Kosovo’s pressing social problems: ‘[t]o develop a thriving, 
open and transparent market economy, which can quickly provide jobs to a large part of the Kosovar 
population; this will require restarting the rural economy, encouraging the development of the private 
                                                          
150 OHR ‘Decision Removing from Mr Nikola Poplasen from the Office of the President of Republika Srpska’ 
(5 March 1999) Available at: http://www.ohr.int/?p=55123&print=pdf (Last Accessed: 11/01/2016).  
151 Wilde (supra note 93), 16.  
152 Ibid., 71.  
153 J. S. Sørensen, State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery: Political Economy, Ethnicity and 
Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo (Berghahn Books, 2009), 30.  
154 UNSC Resolution 1244 (supra note 120). 
155 ‘Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an 
international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the 
people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will 
provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic 
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.’ 
Ibid., para. 10.  
156 ‘Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2.’ Ibid.  
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sector, and addressing the issues of public enterprises’.157 In a stark parallel with BiH,158 the principal 
obstacles for the realisation of this vision were Kosovo’s socially-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Confronted with the peculiarity of the property rights in Kosovo and with own internal tensions,159 
UNMIK opted for instituting a system of tradable leasing so that commercial transactions would not 
violate formal property rights, whenever clarified.160 This measure enabled the commercialisation of 
Kosovo’s public property, while protecting UNMIK from lawsuits from potential right-holders. It is 
telling that, commenting on the process of dismantling Kosovo’s SOEs, de Brabandere argued that 
‘[t]he majority of state-owned enterprises and socially-owned enterprises were as such not viable in a 
market economy’.161 This assessment echoed directly the public pronouncement of the Special 
Representative of United Nations Secretary General Michael Steiner: ‘[w]e need to face reality and 
call a spade a spade. Most of Kosovo’s socially owned enterprises are dinosaurs. Even if we had the 
capital needed to rebuild them - and we don’t have it - we could not make viable enterprises out of 
them. It is time to acknowledge that the old economic approach has failed.’162 Both theorists and 
practitioners confidently pronounced the unsuitability of SOEs for a free-market economy. Whether 
and why Kosovo should become a neoliberal free-market economy was not even up for discussion. In 
fact, the 2008 Constitution of Kosovo included a provision (Article 159) that mandated the 
privatisation of the SOEs: ‘All enterprises that were wholly or partly in social ownership prior to the 
effective date of this Constitution shall be privatized in accordance with law.’163 
This is not an exhaustive list of the neoliberal reforms of UNMIK. Nonetheless, the case of SOEs is 
instructive, since it shows that the stance of UNMIK was a typical example of neoliberal perceptions 
                                                          
157 ‘Toward Stability and Prosperity: A Program for Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo’, Prepared by the 
European Commission and the World Bank in Support of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (3 November 
1999), para. 4.  
158 See note 38 above. 
159 Grasten and Uberti argue that within UNMIK there were two different and largely contradictory 
understandings of property rights; one that emphasised policy and one that saw rights as side-constraints to 
governmental action. Grasten and Uberti (supra note 141), 10.  
160 UNMIK Regulation No. 2003/13 ‘On the Transformation of the Right to Use Socially-Owned Immovable 
Property’ (09 May 2003) UNMIK/REG/2003/13. 
161 de Brabandere (supra note 91), 150-151.  
162 UNMIK Press Release, ‘SRSG Michael Steiner Addresses University of Pristina on Privatization’ UN Doc. 
UNMIK/PR18 (18 April 2002).  
163 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (15 June 2008), Article 159, para. 1. The Constitution, further, 
expressly allowed for the privatisation of publicly-owned enterprises: ‘The Republic of Kosovo shall own all 
enterprises in the Republic of Kosovo that are Publicly Owned Enterprises. All obligations related to such 
ownership rights shall be the obligations of the Republic of Kosovo. The Government of Kosovo may privatize, 
concession or lease a Publicly Owned Enterprise as provided by law.’ Ibid., Article 160, para. 1.  
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of publicly owned enterprises. UNMIK considered assets that were not privately owned – be they 
socially- or state-owned – a prima facie problem and did not envisage any role for them in the society 
they were building. A few years later, the occupying powers of Iraq (the Coalition Provisional 
Authority [CPA]) closely followed this approach.164 Further, UNMIK adhered to a narrow, formalistic 
and diminished concept of democracy, as the CPA also did in Iraq after 2003.165 For example, it is 
worth noting that, despite the rhetorical centrality of humanitarian concerns in Resolution 1244,166 
during the first months of UNMIK’s presence in the region, between 65,000 and 250,000 individuals 
belonging to ethnic minorities were displaced and more than 1,000 killed.167 The inability or even 
outright unwillingness of NATO’s troops to intervene while Serbs, Roma and other minorities were 
persecuted calls into question not only the motives of the intervention, but also their understanding of 
democracy in Kosovo. Hence, the 2004 open outbreak of ethnic violence, which ended up 
undermining the very authority of UNMIK, cannot be seen as a mere accident.168 Further, faithful to 
the commitment to formal elements of democracy, UNMIK had already pushed for elections since 
October 2000, even though there were grave technical problems (inter alia, the absence of updated 
catalogues, no registration forms in Turkish, even though it was recognised as a minority language by 
the FRY),169 which undermined the credibility of the process. Hence, it is unsurprising that 
participation rates steadily declined.170 Disenfranchisement was particularly prevalent among the Serb 
population, which, from a certain point onwards, boycotted the process altogether.171 Here, the 
process of democratisation was reduced to a series of formal processes and rights, while ethnic 
violence was systematically tolerated and the people of Kosovo were deprived of their previously 
                                                          
164 See Chapter 6 of the present thesis.  
165 Ibid.  
166 ‘Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to 
provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes; Condemning all acts of 
violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party; Recalling the statement made 
by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in 
Kosovo; Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety.’ Preamble 
UNSC Res 1244 (note 181).  
167 ‘The majority of IDPs in Serbia today are ethnic Serbs (75%) and RAE (10%) who fled Kosovo in 1999 after 
the United Nations assumed responsibility for the Province under the mandate of the United Nations Interim 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). […] Today, seven years after the conflict in Kosovo ended, the number of IDPs 
from Kosovo in Serbia still remains high: 206,879 persons.’ UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Analysis of 
the Situation of Internally Displaced Persons from Kosovo in Serbia: Law and Practice’ (March 2007), available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4704bff72.html [accessed 31 December 2015]. 
168 Sørensen (supra note 153), 221. 
169 Ibid., 224.  
170 Ibid.  
171 Ibid., 233. 
 166 
 
communally-held assets. Finally, the neoliberal character of Kosovo’s economy was enshrined in its 
Constitution: ‘[a] market economy with free competition is the basis of the economic order of the 
Republic of Kosovo’.172 Radically diminishing the democratic options of the people of Kosovo and 
‘locking in’ a very particular form of social organisation, the Constitution of Kosovo reveals a vision 
of democracy directly influenced by the Hayekian conviction that democratic process should always 
be subordinated to neoliberal imperatives.173  
A third example of this subordination is East Timor, now officially renamed Timor-Leste. Following 
years of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian aggression, East Timor decided in a referendum to 
become independent. The results of the process were followed by widespread violence by Indonesian 
militias that in turn gave rise to a UN intervention. UN Security Council Resolution 1272 established 
the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) and conferred to it ‘overall 
responsibility for the administration of East Timor’ and authorised it ‘to exercise all legislative and 
executive authority, including the administration of justice’174 until the country achieved formal 
independence. It is therefore clear that the authority of the UN was akin to that of a sovereign power. 
Yet, the UN exercised this authority without due regard to local actors invoking the factually tenuous 
argument that there were no local actors to work with.175 Therefore, ‘the mission was a purely UN 
operation, with no recognized local counterpart. It had an internationally recruited civil 
administration, staffed by people with no expertise of the country or knowledge of locally understood 
languages.’176 Thus, Richmond and Franks have contended that ‘[t]he UN’s centralized approach was 
reminiscent of colonial administrations in its reluctance to share power’,177 a choice that arguably 
damaged the development of democracy in East Timor.178 The parallels with the attitude of the High 
                                                          
172 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (15 June 2008), Article 10. A free market economy was also 
enumerated as one of the core values of Kosovo: ‘The constitutional order of the Republic of Kosovo is based 
on the principles of freedom, peace, democracy, equality, respect for human rights and freedoms and the rule of 
law, non-discrimination, the right to property, the protection of environment, social justice, pluralism, separation 
of state powers, and a market economy.’ Ibid., Article 7.  
173 See note 66 above.  
174 UNSC Res 1272 (25 October 1999) S/RES/1272. 
175 In practice, CNRT (National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) controlled significant parts of East 
Timor and, due to its participation to the liberation struggles, was both well-organised and enjoyed legitimacy. 
See: J. Chopra, ‘The UN's Kingdom of East Timor’ (2000) 42 Survival 27, 32.  
176 A. Suhrke, ‘Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor’ (2001) 8 International 
Peacekeeping 1, 11. 
177 O. P. Richmond and J. Franks, ‘Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor’s New Clothes?’ (2008) 
15 International Peacekeeping 185, 190.  
178 ‘This generated mistrust and particularly affected capacity-building attempts, especially in governance and 
the civil service. The dilemma was that in order for locals to build capacity they needed the time to be included 
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Representative in BiH179 are too stark to miss, establishing a distinctive pattern of authoritarianism 
endemic to ITA experiments. Disregard of the communities’ opinions was linked to the inherently 
orientalist character of ITA projects,180 that are more or less explicitly based on the presumption that 
local actors are not mature enough to resolve their conflicts. After all, Wilde has cogently argued that 
the international administration of East Timor was envisaged before the referendum and the violent 
outbreaks, but rather ‘it concerned the perceived inability of the East Timorese, in the short term, to 
govern themselves once Indonesia withdrew’.181 
Moreover, a degree of authoritarianism and detachment from local societies was necessary for the 
promotion of neoliberal reforms promoted by ITA systematically, since they tended to be destructive 
and unpopular with local communities. The case of agricultural reform will be illustrative of this 
approach, since it shows how authoritarian neoliberal reform became the norm of post-conflict 
governance. In East Timor, the absolute control of UNTAET over the country, and the fact that 
economic governance was mainly conducted by the World Bank,182 meant that the organisation was 
able to reform East Timorese agriculture according to its will. Hence, the World Bank encouraged 
export-oriented agriculture, implementing its conviction that agriculture should be predominately a 
commercialised activity incorporated to global value chains and rejecting proposals for self-
sufficiency.183 Correspondingly, it discouraged the protection of rice production,184 which constitutes 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(and trusted) by internationals to perform the roles and tasks, and, if necessary, to make mistakes from which to 
learn.’ Ibid. 
179 See note 147 above. 
180 Even though good manners and political restraints did not allow for an explicit reproduction of orientalist 
stereotypes, the justifications for the disregard of local actors echoed the perception of the ‘Orientals’ by 
colonialists: ‘Orientals are inveterate liars, they are “lethargic and suspicious”, and in everything oppose the 
clarity, directness, and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race.’ E. W. Said, Orientalism (Vintage Books, 1978), 78.  
181 R. Wilde, ‘Representing International Territorial Administration: A Critique of Some Approaches’ (2004) 15 
European Journal of International Law 71, 84. 
182 ‘UNTAET was ill-equipped for peacebuilding because it was structured as a peacekeeping operation. Indeed, 
the World Bank latterly undertook this role.’ Richmond and Franks (supra note 175), citing an interview with 
Telibert Laoc, National Democratic Institute Country Director, Dili, 28 Sept. 2006. 
183 Although there has been discussion within East Timor and its donors of a policy that would ensure self-
sufficiency in food production, other countries have found this approach to be expensive and difficult to sustain. 
It is expensive because to guarantee sufficient local supplies in a low production year, stocks must be purchased 
and held from above average production years. World Bank, ‘Updates No 1-8: Trust Fund for East Timor’ 
(2000-2001), para 4.47. 
184 The Bank rejected the proposal for a temporarily higher tariff on rice imports, which would have assisted 
local production to recover after years of conflict: ‘This in turn could promote shifts in cropping patterns not 
necessarily beneficial or sustainable in the long term. These factors suggest that a hasty decision on higher 
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the basis of the East Timorese diet, a choice that exposed the population to significant risks regarding 
their food security:  
The global food crisis of 2008 was the culmination of a double movement in price volatility, 
which had been brewing for some years. Timor was already in the grip of yet another of its own 
food crises, following the political violence of 2006; the global food crisis compounded this. In 
the first phase, cheap subsidised grain imports killed local developing country markets. In the 
second phase, expensive grain imports starved whole populations. Until the recent crisis, small 
farmers had been hurt by cheap imports.185  
Further, along with Australia (a state heavily involved with ITA in East Timor), it prioritised the 
privatisation of agriculture, since  
[t]he alternative of having the public sector heavily involved in the provision of research, 
extension and input supply services was examined and discarded because: (i) such public sector 
involvement has not proven successful elsewhere; and (ii) the anticipated government fiscal 
resources would not be able to afford such a burden. That is the reason why the proposed 
PASCs are designed to be privately owned, commercially-operated and self-sustaining 
enterprises.186  
Similarly, the World Bank rejected the proposal to create a public abattoir and a public grain silo, 
even though it was supported by the East Timorese and even by parts of the UNTATET. Interestingly, 
the World Bank was happy to acknowledge the unpopularity of its decision, but insisted since public 
access to grain would undermine its plan to commercialise and privatise agriculture fully.187  
Conclusion 
Chimni has argued that the universality of international organisations such as the UN is a significant 
legitimisation force for the neoliberal paradigm since it can ‘offer an “intellectual and moral unity” to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
protection should be avoided, and any such decision should be preceded by developing feasible means to assist 
the poorest rice consumers, particularly in the uplands, who are currently benefiting from the greater availability 
of imported rice.’ Ibid., para 4.33.  
185 Τ. Anderson ‘“Land reform” in Timor Leste? Why the Constitution is worth defending’ M. Leach, N. Canas 
Mendes, A. B. da Silva, A. da Costa Ximenes and B. Boughton (eds), Understanding Timor-Leste: Proceedings 
of the Understanding Timor-Leste Conference (Universidade Nacional Timor-Lorosa’e, Dili, Timor-Leste, 2-3 
July 2009), 215. 
186 World Bank ‘Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Trust Fund for East Timor Grant in the Amount of 
US$6.8 Million Equivalent and a Second Grant of US$11.4 Million to East Timor for an Agriculture 
Rehabilitation Project’ (14 June 2000) Report No: 2043 9-TP. 
187 ‘To ensure a realistic project design and implementation program the Project did not finance certain activities 
proposed by UNTAET and East Timorese counterparts. These include the construction of slaughterhouses, the 
provision of central grain silos, etc. Some members of UNTAET and East Timorese counterparts may not 




a particular vision of the world order in the matrix of which their mandate and functions acquire 
meaning’.188 This observation is particularly pertinent in the context of increased (neo)liberal 
interventionism and post-conflict social transformation after the 1990s. This chapter showed that the 
neoliberal model of statehood was standardised, legitimised and (almost) universalised through the 
practice of UN-led ITA after the end of the Cold War. In this sense, the role of international law in the 
global diffusion of capitalist relations of production was both maintained and altered. It was 
maintained to the extent that neoliberalism constitutes the hegemonic form of capitalist accumulation 
of our times. It was also altered, as was shown in this chapter, because neoliberalism represents a 
distinctive, novel capitalist rationality, and it is not simply a repetition of nineteenth-century 
liberalism. In this sense, my narrative is one of rupture as much as it is one of continuity. In fact, it 
was in this moment of transition to a distinctively neoliberal international legality that the 2003 
invasion of Iraq took place. Signalling a moment of profound crisis for the discipline, but also for 
international relations as a whole, and given its significant and enduring consequences, the invasion, 
occupation and transformation of Iraq will be the subject of the final chapter of this thesis  
                                                          
188 Chimni (supra note 84), 23.  
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Chapter 6: Back to Iraq: neoliberal reform and the role of international law in the 21st 
century 
First time as tragedy, second time as farce.  
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
Writing about the independence of Iraq under the supervision of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission of the League of Nations, Pedersen entitled her article ‘Getting out of Iraq - in 1932’.1 
Written in 2010, the irony of the title is evident: Pedersen was indirectly referring to the subsequent 
adventures of the UK (and the US) in Iraq and their apparent difficulty to ‘get out of’ the Middle 
Eastern state. Without subscribing to any ‘circular’ understanding of history, this thesis will conclude 
with an analysis of the events that followed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the role of international 
law. More specifically, I will examine the neoliberal reconstruction of Iraq in the aftermath of the 
invasion. In doing so, I will also attempt to link this example to the wider argument in this thesis, 
namely, the central importance of international law in the promotion and consolidation of capitalist 
relations of production.  
Arguably, there are numerous examples that establish the intrinsic links between neoliberalism and 
international law and institutions, ranging from international trade and investment, to structural 
adjustment in the Global South, and recently in the South of the European Union.2 Still, the choice of 
Iraq as a case study of the continuing synergies between international law and capitalism is dictated 
by three distinct, but interrelated reasons. First, this thesis rests upon the presumption that, even 
though international law has undergone significant changes since the nineteenth century, some of its 
core social functions remain the same. The argument of this thesis is that the diffusion and 
consolidation of capitalist relations of production is one of these functions. Given this claim to 
functional continuity, it is worth revisiting Iraq, in light its centrality during the Mandate era.3 The 
second reason is linked to the reform process that followed the invasion as such. The reforms 
implemented since 2003 constitute the most rapid and complete process of neoliberal social 
engineering thus far, and, importantly, it was also seen as such by the occupying powers and the UN. 
Therefore, Iraq constitutes the most archetypical example of neoliberalism in motion, and would 
                                                          
1 S. Pedersen, ‘Getting out of Iraq - in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood’ 
(2010) 115 The American Historical Review 975.  
2 A. Anghie, ‘Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions and the Third 
World’, (2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics’, 243; I. Katsaroumpas, ‘EU 
bailout Conditionality as a de facto Mode of Government’ (2013) 96 Critical Quarterly for Legislation and Law 
345.  
3 See generally Section 3:1 ‘From “civilised” to “emancipated”: conditions for statehood under the Mandates 
System and the persistence of “civilisation”’ of the thesis at hand.  
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allow me to verify some of the claims advanced in the previous chapter.4 Finally, this choice is 
motivated by a desire to participate in the intra-disciplinary debate of international lawyers about the 
role of international law in a troubled world.  
Undeniably, 2003 was a moment of disciplinary crisis for international lawyers. After a rare moment 
of unity in the characterisation of the war as illegal,5 an intense period of self-reflection was initiated.6 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many international lawyers chose to turn this crisis into an opportunity for 
salvation of the discipline. The general feeling was that if international law were more effective, and 
if the great powers respected it, the tragedy of Iraq would have been avoided. Charlesworth was not 
alone in her assessment when she concluded that:  
I think that the war of Iraq, with its aftermath, has shaken the foundations of international law, but at the 
same time it underlined the real value of the international legal system. [International law] offers a set of 
standards against which we can measure international behaviour and call governments to account.7  
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that, even though this may well be true when it comes to 
international law regulating the use of force, the situation is much more complicated when it comes to 
the events that followed the invasion. Therefore, one of the reasons dictating this choice of case study 
is the need to highlight the complicity of international legal structures with the radical neoliberal 
reforms in Iraq and, by implication, with the catastrophic events that followed. To recall Miéville, my 
argument here is that the chaos unfolding in the Middle East is not primarily the result of a ‘lawless 
world’;8 rather, it is an outcome of the rule of international law.9 
                                                          
4 See: Chapter 5 ‘International territorial administration: international law and capitalism in a post-colonial 
world’ of this thesis.  
5 ‘War Would Be Illegal’ The Guardian (London, 7 March 2003).  
6 To mention but a few examples, the American Journal of International Law organised an agora on the Iraq 
War and international law, hosting thirteen articles in its summer and autumn issues of Volume 97 (2003). For 
the subsequent thoughts of four of the signatories to the open letter to the Guardian see: M. Craven, S. Marks, 
G. Simpson, R. Wilde, ‘“We Are Teachers of International Law’” (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 363.  
7 H. Charlesworth, ‘What’s Law Got to Do with the War?’ in R. Gaita, Why the War Was Wrong (The Text 
Publishing Company, 2003), 57; ‘It is not the Charter system that is in disarray, providing sensible grounds for 
declaring the project of regulating recourse to war by states a failed experiment that should now be abandoned. 
It is rather leading states, and above all the United States, that need to be persuaded that their interests are served 
and their values realized by a more diligent pursuit of a law-oriented foreign policy.’ R.A. Falk, ‘What Future 
for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 590, 598.  
8 The phrase is borrowed from Sands’ homonymous book, which also heavily criticised the 2003 invasion and 
defended international law: P. Sands, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Penguin, 2006).  
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To do so, this chapter will proceed as follows: in the first section, a sketch of the legal architecture of 
the occupation will be provided. My analysis will focus on UNSC Resolution 1483,10 which 
recognised the fact of the occupation. My main point of analysis will be whether and to what extent 
the resolution authorised a ‘transformative’ occupation that was compatible with the sweeping 
reforms of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Subsequently, an account of these sweeping 
reforms of Iraq’s economic, political and social system will be provided. The argument put forward is 
that the establishment of an independent central bank, the process of outsourcing and shrinking public 
functions, the imposition of a flat tax and the unprecedented liberalisation of investment law 
constitute one of the most intense and rapid processes of establishment of a neoliberal model of 
government. Secondly, this part of my analysis focuses on the concept of ‘low intensity democracy’ 
as the model put forward for the political reconstruction of Iraq. My broader argument is that, as the 
indeterminacy of both the laws of occupation and the said Resolution, the ideological climate of the 
time is crucial when interpreting these legal materials. Given that democratic peace theory appeared to 
have strong ideological appeal in its links between peace, democracy and a certain version of the free 
market economy, the argument that the neoliberal reforms were patently illegal is unjustified. 
Returning to my earlier argument about the neoliberal social engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
East Timor, and Kosovo,11 each of which were carried out by international organisations such as the 
UN, it will be argued that international law and organisations had assumed a central role in the 
gradual erosion of sovereignty and self-determination to the benefit of neoliberal social 
transformation. In an indirect, implicit revival of the ‘standard of civilisation’, experiments in ITA 
gradually redefined the ‘acceptable’ model of statehood in international law. Even though sovereignty 
remained nominally at the core of the discipline, neoliberal statehood was indirectly elevated into the 
sole international legal paradigm of political organisation. This transformative exercise never reached 
the clarity and rigidity of the nineteenth-century standard of civilisation. However, it is argued that 
Iraq occurred in the middle of a process of radical transformation of international law and institutions 
in accordance with neoliberal imperatives, and therefore, it must be understood as part of this broader 
process.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 ‘A world structured around international law cannot but be one of imperialist violence. The chaotic and bloody 
world around us is the rule of law.’ C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law 
(Pluto Press, 2006), 319 (emphasis as in the original).  
10 UNSC Res 1483 (22 May 2003) S/RES/1483 (2003).  
11 See Section 5:3:2 ‘International territorial administration and the normalisation of neoliberal state-building: 
Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor’ of the thesis at hand.  
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6:1 Resolution 1483 and its legal implications: the laws of occupation and neoliberal 
legality  
On the 20th of March 2003, the US, the UK and their Coalition partners launched a military attack 
against Iraq, and quickly overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein. They did so after they had 
failed to secure a UN Security Council resolution that would authorise the use of force under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. After this failure, the US and the UK attempted to justify their actions under 
international law with a complicated argument involving a combination of UNSC Resolutions 678, 
687 and 1444 and the assertion that Iraq was allegedly in a ‘material breach’ of disarmament 
obligations of the cease-fire regime established by Resolution 687. In turn, the US and the UK argued 
that this ‘material breach’ somehow revived Resolution 678 (1991), which had authorised the use of 
force against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait.12 The US also invoked the right to self-defence under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.13 As was mentioned already, these arguments were largely rejected, and 
the UN Secretary-General publicly stated that the use of force was unlawful under international law.14 
However, these intense debates about the (il)legality of use of force were pragmatically side-lined by 
new conditions on the ground. On the 8th of May, the US, the UK and the Coalition partners jointly 
addressed a letter to the UNSC. Even though the letter stopped short of describing the role of the 
Coalition as one of occupying powers, it contained clear references to the laws of occupation: ‘[t]he 
States participating in the Coalition will strictly abide by their obligations under international law, 
including those relating to the essential humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq. We will act to 
ensure that Iraq’s oil is protected and used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.’15 Furthermore, the 
involved states referred to their intention to secure a ‘representative government’ for Iraq, while they 
also signalled their willingness to allow for some (limited) involvement of the UN in the 
administration of Iraq: ‘[t]he United Nations has a vital role to play in providing humanitarian relief, 
in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, and in helping in the formation of an Iraqi interim 
                                                          
12 For the UK’s argument, see: C. Warbrick and D. McGoldrick, ‘The Use of Force Against Iraq’ (2003) 52 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 811. For a good summary of the US position, see: W. H. Taft and 
T. F. Buchwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq, and International Law’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 
557.  
13 In an interview with the BBC at the time, Kofi Annan, when pressed, stated that: ‘I have indicated it was not 
in conformity with the UN Charter from our point of view, from the Charter point of view, it was illegal.’ ‘Iraq 
war illegal, says Annan’, BBC News 16 September 2004, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/ 3661134.stm [last accessed 25 June 2016].  
14 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council’ 8 May 2003 S/2003/538, 1.  
15 Ibid., 2.  
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authority’.16 Along with the letter, the US and the UK also initiated the process to secure a Security 
Council resolution that would legitimise their presence in Iraq and, presumably, would facilitate 
and/or legalise the radical neoliberal reforms that they were planning to implement. Even though the 
details of the negotiation process have not been publicised, it is clear that their product, Resolution 
1483,17 was the outcome of intense bargaining and compromise, and needs to be approached as such. 
The representative of the Russian Federation publicly acknowledged that the Resolution was ‘a major 
compromise’ that ‘did not provide final answers to all questions related to Iraq’.18  
Even though the Resolution did not provide an exhaustive legal regulation for the occupation of Iraq, 
it attempted to set a fairly comprehensive framework. To do so, it expressly characterised the US and 
the UK as ‘occupying powers under unified command’, and referred to their specific authorities, 
responsibilities and obligations under the applicable international law. Indeed, the usage of the word 
‘occupation’ was of paramount importance, given that the UN had studiously avoided using the term 
when referring to instances of international territorial administration (ITA) in Bosnia, Kosovo or East 
Timor.19 Further, Resolution 1483 specifically called upon ‘all concerned to comply fully with their 
obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Hague Regulations of 1907’.20 Arguably, this included the ‘conservationist principle’, as mapped in 
Chapter 5 of the present thesis.21 More specifically, the ‘conservationist principle’ derives from the 
obligations of the occupier to respect the laws in force in the country, unless absolutely prevented 
from doing so in accordance with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,22 and to allow local (penal) 
                                                          
16 Ibid.  
17 Resolution 1483 (supra note 10). 
18 Security Council, Press Release: ‘Security Council Lifts Sanctions on Iraq, Approves UN Role, Calls for 
Appointment of Secretary-Genera’s Special Representative’ 22 May 2002 SC 77/65, available at: 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7765.doc.htm [last accessed 25 June 2016].  
19 ‘For the first time in its decade-old history of peace enforcement and restructuring efforts, the UN resorts to 
the concept of occupation.’ E. Benvenisti, ‘The Security Council and the Law on Occupation: Resolution 1483 
on Iraq in Historical Perspective’ (2003) 1 IDF Law Review 19, 36. Benvenisti took his analysis several steps 
further, arguing that the invocation of the concept restored ‘occupation’ to its original, neutral meaning. Indeed, 
he concluded his article with the following statement: ‘Besides the obvious potential benefits to the Iraqi people, 
a satisfactory implementation of the Resolution will help relieve the doctrine on “occupation” of its derogatory 
connotation.’ Ibid., 38.  
20 Resolution 1483 (supra note 10), Preamble.  
21 See Section 5:3:1 ‘After the “end of history”: international territorial administration in the years of triumphant 
neoliberalism’ of this thesis.  
22 Article 43 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 1907). 
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laws to remain in force, unless ‘they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application 
of the present Convention’.23  
Even though this legal framework appears prohibitive of profound reforms such as those undertaken 
by the CPA, the rest of the Resolution creates a much more complicated picture. In various parts, the 
Resolution contained references to the ‘creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely 
determine their own political future’,24 the ‘efforts to restore and establish national and local 
institutions for representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a process 
leading to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq’,25 and encouragement of 
‘international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform’.26 Given that, prior to the invasion, Iraq 
was governed by a dictatorial regime, it is difficult to see how the above-mentioned reforms towards 
representative government could take place in conformity with the ‘conservationist principle’. 
Moreover, when enumerating the responsibilities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, who acted as the main locus of the UN’s engagement with Iraq, Resolution 1483 made 
extensive references to the economic reconstruction of Iraq: ‘promoting economic reconstruction and 
the conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional 
organizations, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and the international financial institutions’.27 Once 
again, it is difficult to reconcile these functions with a strict approach to the ‘conservationist 
principle’. Still, it has been argued that the specific functions are only mentioned in relation to the 
Special Representative, and not the CPA.28 Even though this is technically correct, it ignores that, in 
the overall architecture of Resolution 1483, the role of the UN was a complementary and supervisory 
one. Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1483 reads as follows:  
Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq whose independent 
responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the Council on his activities under this resolution, 
coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq, coordinating among 
                                                          
23 Article 64 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 
1949) 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287 (hereinafter GCIV).  
24 Resolution 1483 (supra note 10), Paragraph 4.  
25 Ibid., Paragraph 8 (emphasis added).  
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
28 ‘Second, and more specifically, the resolution's list of reformist tasks was directed not to the CPA but to the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The distinction is not merely semantic. Many Council 
members opposed to the war were prepared to authorize the United Nations to perform tasks they would not 
explicitly delegate to the CPA.’ G. H. Fox, ‘The Occupation of Iraq’ (2004) 36 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 195, 261.  
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United Nations and international agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction 
activities in Iraq, and, in coordination with the Authority, assisting the people of Iraq.29  
Therefore, such responsibilities of the Special Representative cannot be wholly uncoupled from the 
permitted functions of the CPA itself. On a related note, it is important to point out that Resolution 
1483 follows the standard practice of UN-led ITA30 and engaged the international financial 
institutions in the reconstruction of Iraq.31 I have earlier argued that, given the consistent practice of 
the IFIs at least since the 1980s to implement highly intrusive, neoliberal policies both in the context 
of ITA,32 and more broadly,33 the choice to implicate them in the reconstruction of Iraq is not 
compatible with a strict reading of the laws of occupation. As Koskenniemi once pointed out, ‘once 
one knows which institution will deal with an issue, one already knows how it will be disposed of’.34 
In 2003, the choice of engaging the IMF and the World Bank in the reconstruction of Iraq does not 
support a restrictive interpretation of Resolution 1483, but rather hints at a far-reaching neoliberal 
project of reconstruction. 
A strict reading of the resolution would also be incompatible with the fact that the UN Secretary-
General specifically focused on the need for Iraq to be transformed into a free-market economy: ‘[i]t 
is against the backdrop of this situation, further exacerbated by the recent war and the attendant 
breakdown of social services, that the development of Iraq and the transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy needs to be undertaken’.35 Even though such a statement does not 
automatically render the reforms undertaken by the CPA lawful, it indicates that the UN welcomed 
the general direction of the CPA’s reforms. Even though the reasons for this convergence are open to 
speculation, the earlier denunciation of the use of force against Iraq as unlawful provides strong 
indications that, in this instance, no problem of illegality was seen to exist. It is neither a coincidence 
                                                          
29 Resolution 1483 (supra note 10), Paragraph 8.  
30 See Section 5:3:2 ‘Post-1991 international territorial administration and the normalisation of neoliberal state-
building: Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor’ of the present thesis.  
31 Resolution 1483 (supra note 10), Paragraph 8.  
32 See Section 5:3:2 ‘Post-1991 international territorial administration and the normalisation of neoliberal state-
building: Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor’ of the thesis at hand.  
33 For an overview of the neoliberal agenda of the IFIs that draws parallels between them and the nineteenth-
century system of capitulations, see: D. P. Fidler, ‘A Kinder, Gentler System or Capitulations? International 
Law, Structural Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization’ (2000) 35 Texas 
International Law Journal 388. See also: Anghie (supra note 2).  
34 Μ. Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 Modern 
Law Review 1, 23.  
35 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 24 of Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), 17 
July 2003, UN SC S/2003/715, July (2003) para. 84. 
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nor a mere discursive stratagem that the CPA quoted repeatedly both Resolution 148336 and the report 
of the Secretary General, in order to affirm the legality and legitimacy of its actions. For example, the 
Preamble of Order 81, which fundamentally altered Iraqi patent law to the benefit of international 
agribusiness,37 reads as follows:  
Acting in a manner consistent with the Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council of July 
17, 2003, concerning the need for the development of Iraq and its transition from a non-transparent 
centrally planned economy to a free market economy characterized by sustainable economic growth 
through the establishment of a dynamic private sector, and the need to enact institutional and legal 
reforms to give it effect.38 
The above analysis should not be taken to mean that the Resolution automatically authorised the 
measures adopted by the CPA in their totality. In fact, even the lawyers of the Authority doubted that, 
especially in the case of investment law reform.39 However, my argument is that the conviction shared 
by numerous international legal scholars that the reforms were unlawful is not outright supported by 
the text of Resolution 1483.40 This is partly because the Resolution was the outcome of intense 
                                                          
36 It was a standard practice of the CPA to invoke UNSC Resolution 1483 in the preambles of its 
orders/regulations: ‘Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 
and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including 
Resolution 1483 (2003)’ Coalition Provisional Authority Order 20 ‘Trade Bank of Iraq’ CPA/ORD/17 July 
2003/20.  
37 ‘The production crisis opened the door for the agricultural business to move in: the seed bank destroyed, the 
harvest yield dramatically down due to the natural disaster and years of war, Iraqi farmers were vulnerable, 
desperate, exploitable. They needed seed, and agribusiness-backed relief efforts were there to provide it. Bremer 
Order 81 sealed the farmer’s permanent dependence on the agribusiness giants.’ W. Brown, Undoing the 
Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Zone Books, 2015), 144-45.  
38 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 ‘Patent, Industrial Design, Undisclosed Information, Integrated 
Circuits and Plant Variety Law’ CPA/ORD/26 April 2004/81.  
39 ‘CPA lawyers were generally opposed to the sale of Iraq’s industries, on the grounds that such sales violated 
the Hague Convention. What if a sovereign Iraqi government objected to privatization? You couldn’t reverse the 
sale of a factory. Better to leave it to a future Iraqi administration, the CPA lawyers said.’ R. Chandrasekaran, 
Green Zone: Imperial Life in the Emerald City (Bloomsbury, 2010), 131.  
40 ‘Despite this language, Resolution 1483 should not be read as a clear endorsement of the CPA agenda.’ G. H. 
Fox, Humanitarian Occupation (CUP, 2008), 267. ‘While some changes to the legislation and administrative 
structures of Iraq may have been permissible on the basis of security, public order, or furthering humanitarian 
objectives, on the basis of the Fourth Geneva Convention, more wide ranging reforms in terms of economic 
governance in Iraq were not lawful.’ L. F. Eslava Arcila, ‘Occupation Law: (Mis)use and Consequences in Iraq’ 
(2007) 27 Revista Contexto 79. ‘These reforms go considerably beyond what is necessary to re-establish public 
order and civil life.’ R. Wolfrum, ‘Iraq – From Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty: Foreign 
Power versus International Community Interference’ (2005) 9 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1, 
23. Even Benvenisti, who supports a relaxed interpretation of the ‘conservationist principle’ concluded that the 
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bargaining and compromise, and, therefore, it incorporated diverging demands and visions. Much 
more fundamentally, though, the resolution reflected a conflict between formal legal validity and the 
‘real life’ of international law, which is heavily underpinned by ideological and political struggles. As 
was already mentioned in Chapter 5, Benvenisti has argued convincingly that the underlying 
ideological assumption behind the ‘conservationist principle’ is a laissez-faire radical distinction 
between public power (in this case, the occupier) and private interests.41 However, if we accept that 
2003 represents the apogee of (neo)liberal interventionism, we also need to accept that this laissez-
faire understanding had been replaced by an appreciation of the importance of interventionism for the 
creation, consolidation and expansion of markets.42 In this context, perceptions of what is necessary to 
maintain peace and security are radically different in comparison to the perceptions of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century.  
After all, the occupation of Iraq took place after a series of highly intrusive and interventionist 
instances of ITA, such as the ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor.43 As argued 
in Chapter 5, actors involved in ITA, such as the UN or different states, did not consider the laws of 
occupation to be applicable, even though the doctrinal debate was far from being settled.44 My 
argument here is that, roughly after 1990, international law was undergoing a process of radical 
transformation. At the time, the core principles and rules of the UN Charter, such as equal 
sovereignty, non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force, were still nominally at the core 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reforms of the CPA were ‘a radical departure from the “conservationist principle” mandated under the law of 
occupation’. E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (2nd edn, OUP, 2012), 268. Charlesworth 
provides a more nuanced assessment of the legal situation: ‘The Resolution emphasised the transitional nature of 
the CPA and looked forward to “an internationally recognized, representative government … established by the 
people of Iraq”. On the other hand, Resolution 1483 contemplated a sweeping role for the CPA, with a 
subsidiary role to be played by the UN and an interim Iraqi Administration (to be created primarily by the 
Coalition). Resolution 1483 allowed the Coalition to exercise full governmental authority in Iraq and provided 
few restrictions on its actions; there was a minimal accountability mechanism through an obligation to report to 
the Security Council.’ H. Charlesworth, ‘Law After War’ (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 233.  
41 See: Benvenisti (supra note 40), 70. For the broader significance of this argument in the context of ITA, see 
Section 5:3:1. ‘After the ‘end of history’: international territorial administration in the years of triumphant 
neoliberalism’ of the present thesis.  
42 For a mapping of the history and core assumptions of neoliberalism, and their significance for international 
law, see Section 5:1. ‘A new international paradigm in the making: the historical origins and conceptual 
underpinnings of neoliberalism’ of this thesis.  
43 See Section 5:3:2. ‘Post-1991 international territorial administration and the normalisation of neoliberal state-
building: Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor’ of the thesis at hand.  
44 See Section 5:3:1 ‘After the ‘end of history’: international territorial administration in the years of triumphant 
neoliberalism’ of the present thesis.  
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of the international legal order. As recently as 2012, Crawford argued that ‘[r]eports of the death of 
sovereignty are much exaggerated’,45 while the ICJ has repeatedly confirmed the basic findings of the 
Nicaragua case regarding non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force.46 However, in 
2003, a ‘parallel’ system of international legality was being formulated. After all, as has been noted in 
a somewhat different, yet related, context, ‘[t]he Court’s judgments may be of utility in this 
endeavour, but only subject to the caveat that the Court remains a mirror against which international 
lawyers may assess the present state of international law; it is not an engine for its future 
development’.47  
As has already been mentioned, the structural adjustment projects of the IFIs constituted intrusive 
mechanisms of social engineering, disciplining states to a strict neoliberal economic and political 
model.48 At the same time, ITA was performing similar functions in post-conflict societies, by linking 
peace and security to neoliberal reform and to the promotion of a formal(ist) conception of liberal 
democracy.49 Crucially, this new ‘great transformation’ was not confined to peripheral, post-colonial 
states. During the same period, thousands of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) came into force, 
bringing about consistent liberalisation of investment policies on an international level. Even though 
the origins of contemporary international investment law can be traced back in the first post-war 
decade,50 the end of the Cold War signalled their numerical proliferation and their institutional 
                                                          
45 J. Crawford, ‘Sovereignty as a Legal Value’ in J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi, The Cambridge Companion 
to International Law (CUP, 2012), 132. 
46 Amongst many: ‘In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) case, the Court made it clear that the principle of non-intervention 
prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal 
opposition in another State (ICJ Reports 1986, p. 108, para 206). […] The Court further affirms that acts which 
breach the principle of non-intervention “will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, 
constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations” (ibid., 109-10, para. 209). 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, 
Merits [2005] ICJ Rep. 168, p. 168, para. 164.  
47 G. I. Hernández, ‘A Reluctant Guardian: The International Court of Justice and the Concept of “International 
Community”’, (2013) 83 British Yearbook of International Law 13, 60.  
48 See note 35 above.  
49 See Section 5:3:2 ‘International territorial administration and the normalisation of neoliberal state-building: 
Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor’ of the present thesis.  
50 See: N. Tzouvala, ‘The Ordo-liberal Origins of Modern International Investment Law: Constructing 
Competition on a Global Scale’ (2016) European Yearbook of International Economic Law (forthcoming).  
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refinement.51 To mention but one example, investment tribunals developed conceptually incoherent, 
yet expansive and restrictive concepts, such as the one of ‘regulatory takings’ that imposed strict 
limits on permissible state action vis-à-vis foreign investment.52 Disciplining states’ control over 
capital, dismantling the Keynesian state, and disciplining the emerging post-colonial states were the 
stated objectives of the architects of international investment law already since the 1950s,53 and the 
rise of the field after 1990 needs to be understood through this prism. During the same period, 
international trade law, both in the form of the WTO and in that of regional trade agreements such as 
NAFTA, was transformed as well. In a nutshell, the regulation of international trade moved from the 
paradigm of ‘embedded liberalism’ to that of neoliberalism. In the course of the first three post-war 
decades, the GATT represented a delicate balance between free trade and desired state policies, such 
as full employment.54 However, after the 1970s, the focus of international trade law gradually shifted 
from the reduction of tariffs to much more comprehensive management of non-tariff barriers.55 In 
                                                          
51 ‘It was in the neoliberal phase (1990-2004) that harder treaties with strong and inflexible rules on investment 
protection came to be made. The treaty practice also reached the 3,000 mark during this time.’ M. Sornarajah, 
Resistance and Change in the International Law of Foreign Investment (CUP, 2015), 39.  
52 For a poignant critique of the ‘empty circularity’ of the concept, see: A. Rasulov, ‘The Empty Circularity of 
Regulatory Takings: The Legacy of a Legal Realist Critique for a 21st-Century Context’ in U. Mattei and J. D. 
Haskell, Research Handbook on Political Economy and Law (Elgar Publishing, 2015).  
53 To give but one example, take the Abs Shawcross Draft, a draft international investment treaty that was never 
formally adopted, but had enduring influence over international investment law. The drafters, in their 
introductory comments, suggested quite clearly the perceived problem to which the Draft Convention was 
responding: ‘[t]hese principles have a broad basis in the practice of civilized states and the findings of 
international tribunals, though during the last few decades in some countries there has been a tendency to 
disregard them’: see ‘The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment’ (1960) 9 Journal of 
Public Law 116, 119 (emphasis added). Given that the Draft was promulgated in 1957, one need to conclude 
that the model the drafters were taking aim at was Keynesian interventionism.  
54 ‘It is therefore common among historians of the trade regime to talk of the initial GATT as being built upon, 
and sustained by, a shared normative commitment to interventionist domestic policies of a broadly Keynesian 
kind - that is, a broadly shared understanding of what constituted the “normal” and legitimate purposes for 
which governments might intervene in economic life.’ A. Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Re-
Imagining the Global Economic Order (OUP, 2011), 195.  
55 ‘In Baldwin’s (1970) inimitable analogy, the reduction of tariff was akin to the draining of a swamp, revealing 
many rocks and tree trunks that had been hidden by the water - i.e. making non-tariff barriers more visible 
steadily more visible. In the following rounds – Tokyo (1973-79), Uruguay (1986-94), and Doha (2001-present) 
– the shift toward NTBs continued. Negotiators had originally understood the term NTBs to refer to non-tariff 
barriers imposed for economic reasons (antidumping (AD), countervailing, safeguards). Gradually, it expanded 
to encompass all areas of non-fiscal regulation.’ B. M. Hoekman and P. C. Mavroidis, World Trade 
Organization (WTO): Law, Economics, and Politics (2nd edn, Routledge, 2016), 12.  
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turn, this transformation of international trade law meant that an increasing number of measures that 
were formerly perceived as background regulations to trade were reconceptualised as discriminatory 
and, therefore, only permissible if they could be justified under the exceptions of Article XX of 
GATT.56  
This entrenchment of neoliberal conceptions of the state and the economy in international law was 
also vividly present in the constitutive documents of regional organisations, such as the EU/EC. 
Admittedly, ordo-liberalism, the German variant of neoliberalism, was always at the heart of 
European integration:  
European competition law has developed under the influence of the ordoliberal school of thought, 
according to which the actual goal of competition policy is the “protection of individual economic 
freedom of action as a value in itself, or vice versa, in the restraint of undue economic power”. The 
concept of abuse under Article 82 also bears the imprint of ordoliberal thinking, which first influenced 
the development of an identical concept of abuse under German competition law.57  
Writing from a broader and more critical perspective, Dardot and Laval have also argued that, 
already, the Treaty of Rome (1957) ‘began to establish strict rules to prevent competition being 
distorted by discriminatory measures, abuses of dominant position and state subsidies’.58 This 
‘competitivism’ constitutes, as has already been argued in Chapter 5,59 one of the core characteristics 
of the neoliberal paradigm. More so, the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) stabilised, refined and, importantly, ‘constitutionalised’ the neoliberal character of the 
Union. To begin with, Article 4 stipulated that the Community and the Member States shall establish 
‘an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, 
on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with 
                                                          
56 ‘[A]s Article III was broadened, the task of determining the legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular distorting 
regulations fell primarily to Article XX. As it is well known, one of the most significant consequences of this 
development was the importation of a mean-and rationality test into certain paragraphs of Article XX’. Ibid., 
265.  
57 For the argument that EU competition law, and in particular Article 102TFEU, has been influenced by 
ordoliberalism, see: E. Rousseva, ‘Modernizing by Eradicating: How the Commission’s New Approach to 
Article 81 EC Dispenses with the Need to Apply Article 82 EC to Vertical Restraints’ (2005) 42 Common 
Market Law Review 587, 590–91. See also: D. J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: 
Protecting Prometheus (OUP, 1998), 264.  
58 P. Dardot and C. Laval, The Neo-Liberal Way of the World: on Neo-Liberal Society (tr G. Elliott) (Verso, 
2013), 198.  
59 For the replacement of ‘free exchange’ with ‘competition’ in neoliberal theory and its political implications, 
see: Section 5:1 ‘A new international paradigm in the making: the historical origins and conceptual 
underpinnings of neoliberalism’ of this thesis.  
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the principle of an open market economy with free competition’.60 In so doing, the Maastricht Treaty 
elevated the ‘open market economy with free competition’ to a central principle for the organisation, 
both of the Community and the Member States. Moreover, fiscal discipline rules were incorporated 
into the Maastricht Treaty, imposing limits on the deficit and debt levels states were allowed to run.61 
Crucially, the European Central Bank (ECB) was modelled upon the solidly ordo-liberal German 
Bundesbank. The ECB became independent from national governments following the ordo-liberal 
imperative that monetary policy should be decoupled from (mass) politics:  
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties 
and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, neither the European Central Bank, nor a national central 
bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. 
The Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and the governments of the Member States undertake 
to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the 
European Central Bank or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks.62 
It needs to be borne in mind that the fact that the ECB was independent from national governments 
did not mean that it was an apolitical organ. Rather, it was subjected to the imperatives of the 
competitive market. After all, the case of West Germany indicates that independent central banks are 
relatively insulated from democratic mass politics, but play an actively political role, largely 
restrained from the limits of popular pressure:  
several studies of policymaking in West Germany have suggested that on occasion the Bundesbank has 
distorted policy for the purpose of removing from ofﬁce elected individuals or governments it found 
uncongenial. These accusations throw into a different light the normative question of who should control 
policy.63  
Theorists working in the intersection between international law and international relations have 
proposed the term ‘new constitutionalism’ to describe this transformation of international law after 
                                                          
60 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 4, 2006 OJ C 321 E/ [hereinafter TEU pre-
Lisbon]. 
61 ‘Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. The Commission shall monitor the development of 
the budgetary situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States with a view to identifying 
gross errors. In particular it shall examine compliance with budgetary discipline.’ Article 104, Ibid.  
62 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community Article 130.  
63 J. Forder, ‘Central Bank Independence: Economic Theory, Evidence and Political Legitimacy’ in P. Arestis 
and M. Sawyer (eds), The Rise of the Market: Critical Essays on the Political Economy of Neo-Liberalism 
(Edward Elgar, 2004), 162.  
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1990.64 Having as his starting point the 1997 World Bank Report The State in a Changing World, Gill 
focuses on the insistence of the World Bank to create mechanisms locking in neoliberal policies: 
[o]nce reforms are announced, their lasting success may depend on designing and implementing policies 
in ways that credibly signal that the government will not renege on its promises. A number of possible 
lock-in mechanisms are available, all with the same basic logic: to provide checks that restrain any 
impulse to depart from announced commitments.65  
Otherwise put, the Bank wanted to ensure that the neoliberal reforms implemented in different 
contexts would be difficult to reverse and become deeply entrenched in the institutional and legal 
fabric of states: ‘experience suggests that long-run goals are better served by sticking to self-imposed 
restraints and living with the rigidities they inflict’.66 Three different techniques are proposed to that 
end: the empowerment of the judiciary, separation of powers and, crucially for our analysis, external 
disciplining mechanisms including international agreements and agreements with multilateral 
organisations. Invoking the example of the WTO, the World Bank argued that: 
[I]nternational agreements are a second mechanism for strengthening commitments not anchored by any 
domestic institution. […] Clearly, sovereign countries can still reverse course on, for example, trade 
policy by withdrawing from such agreements. But they then have to calculate not just the benefits and 
costs of the policy reversal, but also the broader costs of reneging on an international commitment for 
which their partners will hold them accountable. The threat of international censure makes countries less 
likely to reverse course.67  
Drawing from this suggestion, Gill argues that we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘new 
constitutionalism’ that consists of ‘the proliferation of policies and legal measures that are intended to 
reinforce the rights and political representation of investors, and in doing so to strengthen the power 
of capital οn a world scale’.68 Further, he points out that ‘the aim of new constitutionalism is to allow 
dominant economic forces to be increasingly insulated from democratic rule and popular 
accountability’.69 Even though the concept of ‘constitutionalism’ is may not be ideal to describe this 
trend,70 this does not deprive Gill’s arguments of their descriptive and normative significance. It is 
                                                          
64 S. Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratization and Global Political Economy’ (1998) 10 Pacifica Review 
23. For a more recent engagement with the concept that focuses on specific international legal regimes, see: S. 
Gill and A.C. Cutler (eds), New Constitutionalism and World Order (CUP, 2014).  
65 World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (OUP, 1997), 50.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid., 101.  
68 Gills ‘New Constitutionalism’ (supra note 64), 37.  
69 Ibid., 23.  
70 One of obvious problems here is that constitutionalism is commonly seen as the corollary of community 
which in turn is characterised by ‘binarity’ and ‘commonality’: ‘Simply put, this discussion acknowledges that 
when invoking community as part of constitutional governance, the importance of its meaning must, at a 
minimum, be acknowledged, and cognisance of its implications recollected.’ A. O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism 
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argued here that the end of the Cold War signalled the rise of international legal mechanisms ranging 
from ITA and structural adjustments to BITs and increasingly interventionist international trade 
norms. Nominally, these mechanisms require state consent to be implemented. Therefore, sovereignty 
and state consent remain at the heart of the international legal order. However, the intensification and 
increased intrusiveness of such mechanisms meant that, in the course of the first post-war decades, a 
new, implicit ‘standard of civilisation’ was in the making. According to this implicit standard, certain 
forms of statehood were inherently problematic and destabilising and therefore needed to be 
disciplined and modelled along neoliberal lines. Admittedly, this system never acquired the explicit, 
formal character of the ‘standard of civilisation’ during the nineteenth century.71 However, it can be 
detected in numerous legal documents, including the Dayton Agreement regarding Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, UNSC Resolutions 1244 and 1272, and the subsequent practice of international legal 
actors regarding Kosovo and East Timor respectively.72 
Any analysis of post-Cold War international law that aspires to understand how international law 
shapes the world, instead of only focusing on a formalistic, and often untenable, distinction between 
legality and illegality needs to take into account the above deliberations when discussing the 
neoliberal reconstruction of Iraq, UNSC Resolution 1483, and international law. When discussing 
international law and the occupation of Iraq, we need to locate the reforms undertaken within the 
broader context of transformation of international law at the time. Instead of trying to ‘fit’ the reforms 
within the binary scheme of legality and illegality, we should situate them within the broader trend of 
transformation of international law after 1990. In 2003, international law was undergoing a process of 
radical transformation. While the core formal features of the system remained nominally intact, 
international law and institutions gradually acquired a thick nexus of disciplinary mechanisms that 
enabled social engineering towards a neoliberal model of statehood. Acknowledging this 
transformation process enables us to comprehend the contradictions both of Resolution 1483 and of 
the state practice and opinio juris of numerous states at the time, including the two main occupying 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in Global Constitutionalisation (CUP, 2014), 60-61. For binarity and commonality as the distinctive 
characteristics of community see: Ibid., 61-69.  
71 The core argument of Chapter 1 of the present thesis is that the ‘standard of civilisation’ was linked to state 
transformation and the development of capitalist societies, rather than with cultural or inflexible racial concepts. 
See generally: Chapter 1 ‘1776-1914: The long century of the ‘standard of civilisation’ in international law’ of 
the present thesis.  
72 For an overview of the normalisation of neoliberal reforms through the practice of ITA, see Section 5:3:2 
‘Ιnternational territorial administration and the normalisation of neoliberal state-building: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor’. 
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powers in Iraq, the US and the UK.73 Crucially, this idea of parallel transformation enables us to do so 
without resorting to ‘psychological’ arguments like that posed by Fox, who insists on describing 
Resolution 1483 as ‘schizophrenic’ (sic).74 Far from being ‘schizophrenic’, Resolution 1483 
incorporated not only geopolitical tensions, but, much more fundamentally, the contradictions 
between the past and the evolving present of international law. While the laws of occupation were 
nominally still valid, the ‘real life’ of international territorial administration and a complicated nexus 
of structural adjustments, international investment treaties, practice of regional and global 
organisations, such as the EU or the WTO, were advancing a radical reorganisation of international 
law towards a system that designated neoliberal statehood as the only legitimate form of statehood. In 
the (reluctant) words of Fox, ‘the transformation of Iraq was not without normative roots’.75 After all, 
international lawyers have long distinguished between breaches of international law that indeed 
strengthen the breached rule, for example by prompting other states to reaffirm its validity, and 
breaches that, when accumulated and if accompanied by the necessary opinio juris and inaction, or 
even approval, on the behalf of other states, lead to legal transformation.76 Therefore, even if the 
reforms undertaken by the CPA are seen as unlawful, the overall evolution of international law after 
1990 indicates that they were part of a broader process of transformative illegality. It is under the lens 
of this argument that the substance of the political and economic reforms in Iraq will be approached in 
the next section of this chapter.  
 
                                                          
73 Marten Zwanenburg has mapped briefly the opinio juris and state practice regarding the laws of occupation, 
Iraq and Resolution 1483, concluding that: ‘[S]ubsequent state practice (as exemplified by the Netherlands) 
would appear to suggest that Resolution 1483 has created a “carve out” from the law of occupation. In response 
to a question by a member of the House of Lords concerning the legality of Order 39, a UK government 
representative stated that the content of the Order was decided by the Iraqi Interim Governing Council and 
endorsed by the CPA. This could be read as implying that the CPA could in certain circumstances derogate from 
the law of occupation, provided that the Iraqi authorities agreed.’ M. Zwanenburg, ‘Existentialism in Iraq: 
Security Council Resolution 1483 and the Law of Occupation’, (2004) 86 International Review of the Red Cross 
745, 766-67.  
74 ‘The resolution itself echoes this schizophrenia, espousing both a commitment to reform and fidelity to 
international law within a single paragraph.’ Fox (supra note 28), 260; see also: Fox (supra note 40), 267-68.  
75 G.H. Fox, ‘Transformative Occupation and the Unilateralist Impulse’ (2012) 94 International Review of the 
Red Cross 237, 239.  
76 ‘[B]reaches of international law may, paradoxically, strengthen the law rather than weaken it, if the offending 
State is condemned and isolated. Conversely, as I shall explain shortly, if other States remain silent in the face 
of an apparent violation of the law, it may be that the first steps towards a change in the law are being taken.’ V. 
Lowe, International Law (OUP, 2007), 46.  
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6:2 Re-inventing Iraq: neoliberalism as civilisation 
As has already been made clear, a full appreciation of the significance of the Iraq war for our 
understanding of international law requires looking beyond the initial events of the invasion. A critical 
account of the invasion and the occupation needs to engage extensively with the rapid and radical 
reforms of the economic, political and social system of Iraq by the CPA. Natarajan has remarked that:  
Angry articles were written in academic journals and newspapers condemning the legal reasoning of the 
Coalition and its few supporters. It was easy to sympathize with scholarly indignation. The invasion was 
in many ways an affront to international law, particularly the laws on the use of force. At the same time, 
there was something faintly familiar about the Coalition’s reasoning for the invasion. This feeling of déjà 
vu escalated once regime change was implemented and the Coalition began the task of nation-building. 
The idea of recreating Iraq - trying to change it for the better - was not a new one.77 
Further, Fox has observed that ‘it is no exaggeration to describe the CPA as having engaged in a 
social engineering project in Iraq’.78 Moreover, and faithful to the prioritisation publicly expressed by 
the CPA’s head, Paul Bremer,79 this social engineering process pushed towards the reconfiguration of 
Iraq into a society based on private property rights, and on competition as the organising principle of 
economic and social life, ergo a neoliberal society.  
6:2:1 Constructing the ‘spontaneous’: CPA and economic reforms in Iraq 
The CPA made clear its intention to undertake sweeping reforms in Iraq with its first issued 
Regulation, through which it assumed ‘all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to 
achieve its objectives’80 and vested orders and regulations of the CPA with superior legal validity in 
relation to Iraqi law.81 Subsequently, with its first Order, the CPA promoted the removal of Ba’ath 
                                                          
77 U. Natarajan, ‘Creating and Recreating Iraq: Legacies of the Mandate System in Contemporary 
Understandings of Third World Sovereignty’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 799, 800. Despite 
significant methodological problems, Naomi Klein’s work can also provide us with a helpful factual 
background: N. Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Penguin, 2008), 323-60.  
78 Fox (supra note 28), 208. 
79 Bremer identified the transformation of Iraq’s economy away from central planning as ‘the most immediate 
priority’ of the CPA: L. Paul Bremer, Address to the World Economic Forum in S. Talmon, The Occupation of 
Iraq: Volume 2: The Official Documents of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing 
Council (Hart Publishing, 2013), 834.  
80 Section 1.2. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1 CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01.  
81 ‘Unless suspended or replaced by the CPA or superseded by legislation issued by democratic institutions of 
Iraq, laws in force in Iraq as of April 16, 2003 shall continue to apply in Iraq insofar as the laws do not prevent 
the CPA from exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations, or conflict with the present or any other 
Regulation or Order issued by the CPA.’ Section 2 ibid.  
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members from public administration in an attempt to foster the de-Ba’athification of Iraqi society.82 In 
practice, this meant that members of the top three levels of the party were directly removed and 
banned from public positions and that all individuals occupying significant positions in the 
administration were deemed suspect of having ties with Ba’ath. One could argue in good faith that 
this move was necessary for the democratic transformation of Iraq and for a decisive move away from 
the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein, and there is definitely truth to this assertion. 
Unsurprisingly, the CPA attempted to explain and legitimise this choice by reference to de-
Nazification in post-war Germany.83 Nonetheless, the decision gave rise to significant practical 
difficulties and, importantly, constituted a major impediment for Iraq’s public sector. As Lt Gen. 
Sánchez, Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq at the time, noted: ‘[e]ssentially, it eliminated the 
entire government and civic capacity of the nation. Organizations involving justice, defense, interior, 
communications, schools, universities, and hospitals were all either completely shut down or severely 
crippled, because anybody with any experience was now out of a job.’84 For example, in its final 
public account of its perceived achievements, the CPA noted that 12,000 Ba’ath members were 
dismissed from primary and secondary education alone.85 As the report of the US Special Investigator 
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR hereafter) observed: ‘the consequences of the de-
Ba’athification order quickly became clear: it reduced the ranks of Iraq’s capable bureaucrats and thus 
limited the capacity of Iraqi ministries to contribute to reconstruction’.86  
Τhis decision was, further, not unrelated to the wider tide of profound reconstruction and 
minimisation of the public sector undertaken by the CPA. This decision only resonated in the context 
of the radical reconstruction of Iraq to a neoliberal, outsourced state. Crucially, this radical and 
seemingly impracticable removal of numerous public servants (broadly conceived) is not unique in 
the history of social transformation and international law. As was stressed earlier in this thesis, the 
abolition of feudalism in Japan under extraterritoriality brought about the ‘liberation’ of significant 
                                                          
82 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1 ‘De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society’ CPA/ORD/16 May 
2003/01, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 5 ‘Establishment of the Iraqi de-Ba’athification 
Council’ CPA/ORD/25 May 2003/05. 
83 In his autobiography, Bremer, the head of the CPA, wrote: ‘In this respect, de-Baathification was similar in its 
intent and scope to de-Nazification in post-war Germany, which banned the swastika and portraits of Hitler.’ L. 
P. Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (Simon and Schuster, 2006), 42.  
84 Lt Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (HarperCollins, 2008), 184. 
85 Coalition Provisional Authority, An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments 2003-2004 (June 2004, 
Bagdad), 23. 
86 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 74, 
available at: 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001113012/http://www.sigir.mil/publications/hardLessons.html 
[last accessed 20 May 2016]. 
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numbers of samurais, in an attempt to abolish private armies. Further, in their attempt to create an 
army faithful to the ideas of nationhood and statehood, Japanese authorities did not employ these 
samurais in the newly established Japanese army, even though it would have been a practicable 
solution in terms of technical knowledge and unemployment management.87 Bearing in mind the 
limitations of the analogy, the Japanese case highlights how seemingly impracticable or irrational 
decisions acquire meaning and purpose if social transformation objectives are factored in. Hence, 
apart from the reasonable demand for the removal of oppressive elements, de-Ba’athification was also 
consistent with the idea of a limited public sector that would denounce ideas of central planning and 
subscribe to an intensive free-market ethos. Bremer himself acknowledged that de-Ba’athification 
‘demonstrated that we intended not just to throw of the brutal tyranny of Saddam, but also to establish 
in its place a new political order’.88 The CPA’s commitment to altering the prevalent economic and 
administrative discourse was also evident in its initiative to organise weekly ‘free-market’ seminars 
for ‘people from the ministries, Iraq’s nascent “private sector”, and younger potential political 
leaders’.89  
This was necessary in light of the overall economic reforms promoted by the CPA. By now it is 
uncontroversial that the CPA engineered the transition from a centrally-planned economy to a free-
market economy. After all, it was Bremer’s publicly stated position that: ‘[m]arkets allocate resources 
much more efficiently than politicians’.90 Nevertheless, this appears to be an overly broad statement, 
to the extent that the vision of the CPA for Iraq was not generally the transition to a free-market 
economy but, much more specifically, the construction of a solidly neoliberal economy, without any 
form of state planning, characterised by strong investment and property laws that secure private 
actors’ rights, full-scale free trade, an independent central bank and flat, minimal taxation with 
competition being elevated to the organising principle of economic and social life.91 This distinction is 
essential to the extent that currently almost all national economies on a global level subscribe to some 
                                                          
87 See Section 2:2:1 ‘Japan's successful encounter with extraterritoriality: 1858-1899’ of the present thesis.  
88 Bremer (supra note 83), 45; ‘Only someone deeply inclined to see government purely as a burden and public 
sector workers as dead wood could have made the choices Bremer did.’ Klein (supra note 76), 352.  
89 Bremer (supra note 83), 63.  
90 Bremer (supra note 79), 835; ‘In addition to these political and legislative adjustments, the CPA was required 
to introduce an economic structure oriented by capitalist theory and premised upon economic liberalism, where 
the pursuit of individual interest in a free market was considered to be an essential precondition for any durable 
liberal democracy.’ R. Buchan, International Law and the Construction of the Liberal Peace (Hart Publishing, 
2013), 198.  
91 ‘If carried through, the measures will present the kind of wish-list that foreign investors and donor agencies 
dream of for developing markets. […] The unspoken wish is that this will create a poster child for the 
recalcitrant economies surrounding it.’ ‘Iraq’s Economic Liberalisation: Let’s All Go to the Yard Sale.’ (The 
Economist, 25 September 2003).  
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version of market-driven economy, even to some version of neoliberalism. Nonetheless, the CPA did 
not attempt to replicate the model of Sweden, or even that of the USA, but explicitly drew inspiration 
from the transition processes of Eastern and Central Europe in the early 1990s that were marked by a 
rapid and robust introduction of extreme free-market reforms. Addressing the World Economic 
Forum, Bremer made a clear reference to post-communist states as an inspiration and blueprint for the 
reconstruction of Iraq: ‘[i]n the past 15 years, other countries have attempted to break this cycle. The 
experience of these economies shows that there is no substitute for a vibrant private sector.’92 Four 
major areas of economic reform can be identified here: tax law, trade and investment law with an 
emphasis on the regulation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the engagement of the CPA with 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and finally the question of the proper role of the central bank in a 
capitalist economy.  
One of the most profound reforms promoted by the CPA was the introduction of an income tax rate of 
a maximum 15 per cent both for individuals and corporations.93 The introduction of low and flat tax 
rates rests upon some core premises of neoliberal economic, political and moral thought. First, 
taxation cannot constitute the means for wealth redistribution to the extent that this would incentivise 
leisure at the expense of work, and it would also deter the perceived productive elements of each 
society to create more wealth through personal effort, since this enrichment will be ‘penalised’ 
through higher tax rates. Harvey has summarised the centrality of lowering taxes in neoliberal theory 
and practice as follows:  
The economic ideas marshalled in support of the neoliberal turn amounted, Blyth suggests, to a complex 
fusion of monetarism (Friedman), rational expectations (Robert Lucas), public choice (James Buchanan, 
and Gordon Tullock), and the less respectable but by no means uninfluential ‘supply-side’ ideas of 
Arthur Laffer, who went so far as to suggest that the incentive effects of tax cuts would so increase 
economic activity as to automatically increase tax revenues (Reagan was enamoured of this idea). The 
more acceptable commonality to these arguments was that government intervention was the problem 
rather than the solution, and that ‘a stable monetary policy, plus radical tax cuts in the top brackets, 
would produce a healthier economy’ by getting the incentives for entrepreneurial activity aligned 
correctly.94 
                                                          
92 Bremer (supra note 80), 835; ‘Coalition officials relied heavily on the experiences of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union in assembling their transition blueprint for Iraq. Based on their review of reforms in these 
societies, Coalition officials concluded that the blueprint contained four components: stabilization, 
liberalization, privatization, and legal and regulatory reform.’ A. E. Henderson, The Coalition Provisional 
Authority’s Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq Lessons Identified (United States Institute for 
Peace Special Report 138, April 2005), 11.  
93 ‘The highest individual and corporate income tax rates for 2004 and subsequent years shall not exceed 15 per 
cent. ‘Section 4 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 37 Tax Strategy for 2003 CPA/ORD/19 
September 2003/37. Order 37 was updated, but not substantively altered in February 2004: Coalition Provisional 
Order Number 49 ‘Tax Strategy of 2004’ CPA/ORD/19 February 2004.  
94 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP, 2005), 54.  
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In an explanatory note, the CPA endorsed these approaches, defending the flat 15 per cent corporate 
income tax rate:  
This low rate, compared to the prior rate of up to 40 per cent, will encourage reinvestment of company 
profits. This in turn will encourage increased capital investment and job creation in Iraq by private sector 
firms. The lower flat rate also will lead to increased revenue collection as companies respond to Iraq’s 
transition to a free market-based economy.95  
Given the condition of Iraq’s economy, this radical decrease of tax rates resulted in a destabilisation 
of state revenue and in the elevation of the oil industry into the only actual source of income. 
Crucially, all contractors and sub-contractors ‘who supply goods directly to or on behalf of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority and Coalition Forces’ were exempted from taxation altogether.96 The 
resulting budgetary imbalance was so stark that, in their joint report, which otherwise adopted the 
same basic principles as the CPA’s reforms, the UN and the World Bank noted that ‘Iraq’s draft 2004 
budget assumes realistic oil revenue of US $12 billion, but very little non-oil revenue, reflecting that 
view that introducing low tax rates would stimulate economic growth’ and went on to recommend that 
‘a broader-based revenue effort should be adopted’.97 However, it is worth bearing in mind that the 
CPA was not acting in an unprecedented manner here. For example, in Kosovo, UNMIK had also 
introduced a system of flat rate corporate tax (20 per cent), which was later reduced to 10 per cent,98 
and introduced extensive exemptions for its private contractors.99  
The determination of the CPA to liberalise trade was materialised first through Iraq acquiring 
observer status at the WTO,100 and secondly through the decisive abolition of ‘[a]ll tariffs, customs 
duties, import taxes, licencing fees and similar surcharges for good entering or leaving Iraq, and all 
other trade restrictions that may apply to these goods’.101 Both WTO membership and this 
unprecedented liberalisation rest upon the Ricardian idea of the ‘comparative advantage’ as the main 
justification for free trade: if each and every state trades in that which they do relatively better - even 
if they are worse than others - everyone will be better off in the end.102 Without examining the merits 
of this proposition, its immediate consequence is the inability of a state to apply protectionist 
                                                          
95 Coalition Provisional Authority Explanatory Note, CPA Order Number 49, Strategy of 2004. 
96 Section 3.2.d. CPA Order 37 (supra note 93).  
97 ‘United Nations/ World Bank Joint Needs Assessment’ (October 2003) para. ix. 
98 Section 5, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Regulation No 2004/51, ‘On Corporate 
Income Tax’ 4 December 2004 UNMIK/REG/2004/51. 
99 Section 6 (d) ibid.  
100 World Trade Organization, ‘Iraq-Request for Observer Status’ WT/L/560 (23 January 2004). 
101 Section 1 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 12 ‘Trade Liberalization Policy’ CPA/ORD/7 June 2003/12. 
102 For an overview of the argument, see: D. Alessandrini, ‘WTO and Current Trade Debate: An Enquiry into 
the Intellectual Origins of Free Trade Thought’ (2005) 11 International Trade Law and Regulation Journal 53. 
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measures, in order to develop new, more advanced industries.103 Therefore, it becomes both 
practically impossible and theoretically undesirable for developing states to alter significantly their 
economic structure and to develop industries of high added value. As a consequence, developing 
states remain over-dependent on the production of raw materials or on industries of low technology 
and low added value. In this specific case, and given the destructive effects of Saddam Hussain’s wars 
and mismanagement, as well as the adverse impacts of the UN embargos, rapid trade liberalisation 
meant in practice that the reconstruction of some of Iraq’s industries and the diversification of Iraq’s 
economic and tax basis became impossible. Given also the low tax rates and wide tax breaks to CPA-
related contractors, this meant that the revenues of the administration were unsustainably low, which 
in turn explains why the US had to approve financial assistance packages of historical dimensions104 
Arguably, this rapid trade liberalisation was a direct outcome of the neoliberal commitment of the 
CPA. Chang has emphasised the centrality of free-trade for neoliberal thought:  
Belief in the virtue of free trade is so central to the neo-liberal orthodoxy that it is effectively what 
defines a neo-liberal economist. You may question (if not totally reject) any other element of the neo-
liberal agenda – open capital markets, strong patents or even privatisation – and still stay in the neo-
liberal church. However, once you object to free trade, you are effectively inviting ex-communication.105 
The reform of investment law was underpinned by effectively the same conception about acceptable 
economic models and the bases of growth and prosperity. The preamble of Order 39 exemplifies this 
view, since FDI is identified as the single most important means that ‘will help to develop 
infrastructure, foster the growth of Iraqi business, create jobs, raise capital, result in the introduction 
of new technology into Iraq and promote the transfer of knowledge and skills to Iraqis’.106 Therefore, 
it does not come as a surprise that, as Fox has argued, foreign investment reforms were potentially the 
most far-reaching the CPA undertook.107 This proposition is supported by Section 3 of Order 39, 
which explicitly states that ‘[t]his Order replaces all existing foreign investment law’.108 In terms of 
specific reforms, the Order removed all nationality restrictions on foreign investment, enabling 
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foreign companies and individuals to own as much as 100 per cent of the investment, with the 
exception of direct investment in natural resources.109 Perhaps more crucially, the Order enabled 
foreign investors to  
transfer abroad without delay all funds associated with its foreign investment, including: i) shares or 
profits and dividends; ii) proceeds from the sale or other disposition of its foreign investment or a portion 
thereof; iii) interest, royalty payments, management fees, other fees and payments made under a contract; 
and iv) other transfers approved by the Ministry of Trade.110  
In practice, such unrestricted capital flows deprive the state of the capacity to tax efficiently 
investment revenues, and even combat criminal activities, such as corruption or money-laundering.  
Thirdly, the future of SOEs became a thorny issue for the CPA, the Iraqi Governing Council and Iraqi 
society. The starting point of this engagement was that ‘[i]n the long term, the CPA planned to 
“corporatize and privatize” the SOEs. Initially, the CPA aimed for small-scale privatization or leasing 
of competitive SOEs from August to October.’111 This divergence between long-term and short-term 
plans was due to popular reactions in Iraq as well as the reluctance of the CPA’s international 
lawyers, who advised against outright privatisations, raising issues of compliance with the laws of 
occupation.112 Nonetheless, the CPA promoted the minimisation of the public sector in a number of 
intertwined ways. First, the CPA outsourced – without directly privatising – numerous core public 
functions. For instance, both primary and secondary education, water and sanitisation, and the 
construction of significant infrastructure projects were awarded to private companies, usually 
American ones. A good example here is the practice of the Program Management Office (PMO), an 
authority set up by the CPA to manage the reconstruction of Iraq. The PMO had authority over the 
reconstruction of six major domains: electricity; public works and water; security and justice; 
communications and transportation; oil; and buildings, education, and health.113 According to the 
report of the US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, instead of the CPA or the PMO 
carrying out reconstruction efforts, they outsourced the process to private firms: ‘[t]he twelve “design-
build” construction contractors were awarded indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) cost-plus 
contracts for design, engineering, and physical work in the sectors’.114 Interestingly, the CPA had 
outsourced its own administrative functions to the extent that it ‘ultimately outsourced to private 
                                                          
109 Section 6.1 ibid.  
110 Section 7.2.d. ibid.  
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contractors much of the program-management and oversight responsibilities, thus diluting the 
government’s authority’.115  
This outsourcing process had both short- and mid-term impact. First, the multiplicity of contractors, 
sub-contractors and authorities ‘resulted in a disorganised and chaotic approach to the country’s 
reconstruction’.116 Secondly, this chaotic situation and the multiple levels of outsourcing meant that 
the CPA fell remarkably short of its reconstruction plans: ‘By the time the CPA closed its doors at the 
end of June 2004, the PMO had spent only $366 million of the $18.4 billion IRRF 2 appropriation. 
Bremer was never able to realize his grand reconstruction vision.’117 Thirdly, even though the 
contracts were formally temporary, they created practical policy effects that were difficult to reverse. 
Relatedly, in one of its more controversial decisions, the CPA decided to place a moratorium on state 
business cash withdrawals and to extend it to all debt and receivables that ran between state entities 
before the 1st of June 2003, which were estimated to 1.2 trillion dinars.118 Simultaneously, private 
businesses were allowed normal access to their accounts. A mixture of justifications was put forward 
to explain this choice, ranging from the undeniably high corruption levels of SOE administrations, to 
the necessity to manage inflation and prevent a liquidity crisis. Again, one need not doubt the 
sincerity of these claims to observe that the management of these actual problems was 
disproportionately to the detriment of the public sector. After all, corruption was also endemic in the 
private sector, the CPA’s outsourcing process included. The starkest example here is perhaps a 
number of contracts between the US Army in Iraq and KBR, a company owned by Halliburton, the 
chairman of which in the 1990s was the then-US vice-president, Dick Cheney. Still, this did not pose 
any obstacles to substantial amounts being paid to private enterprises.119 Moreover, the withdrawals 
and payments moratorium resulted in the economic strangulation of the SOEs and, as CPA advisors 
had warned, it undermined particularly the viability of relatively healthy SOEs that would be unable 
to access their funds and were therefore driven to bankruptcy. Once again, we need to stress the 
suspicion, or even outright hostility, vis-à-vis state or socially owned enterprises that runs deeply in 
the history of ITA. Both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, the respective ITA schemes 
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moved towards the privatisation of SOEs, a fact that is clearly demonstrated in the Constitution of 
Kosovo that mandates the privatisation of previously communally-held businesses.120 
Finally, one of the least debated, but nevertheless highly influential, reforms of the CPA was the 
establishment of an independent central bank. Order 18 stipulated that ‘[t]he CBI shall have the 
authority to determine and implement monetary and credit policy without the approval of the Ministry 
of Finance’.121 Hence, fiscal and monetary policy were removed from political control,122 and 
decision-making in this domain was reserved for specialists and bureaucrats.123 The danger of 
hyperinflation was the reason invoked to justify this choice. Indeed, the precedent of Saddam 
Hussein’s governmental mismanagement of fiscal and monetary policy was commonly invoked to 
justify this decision. It is known that Hussein’s regime habitually opted to print money to counter 
Iraq’s serious economic issues, contributing to extremely high inflation levels. Nonetheless, this 
precedent does not justify the pursued policy in its own right, to the extent that after 1991 Iraq was a 
sui generis economy operating under a strict international embargo. Otherwise put, there is no reason 
to assume that a democratic Iraqi government operating under relative normalcy would replicate the 
ill-conceived policies of an economically isolated dictatorship. This specific reform is directly linked 
to a topic that will be discussed in the following section of this chapter: the democratisation of Iraq. 
Even though the questions of economic and political reforms are examined separately in this chapter, 
the case of the Central Bank shows how this distinction is largely untenable. This is the case to the 
extent that a nominally economic decision had direct ramifications for the construction of the political 
landscape in Iraq. In other words, by removing fiscal policy from the terrain of (mass) politics and 
democratic deliberation, the CPA directly impacted upon the scope of this very democratic 
deliberation. Even if Iraq was to become a model liberal democratic state, its citizens would be 
fundamentally deprived of the right to (directly) decide on questions of fiscal policy. As in the case of 
the Eurozone, this independence of the central bank opens up a critical ‘gap’ between social policy 
goals (employment, social security, environmental protection, etc), and the means for achieving such 
goals. Even though the government (or multiple governments, in the case of the EU) is entrusted with 
the former, they have been deprived of one significant socio-economic tool for achieving them. 
Therefore, Order 18 both delimited the scope of democracy by removing a crucial policy area from 
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the domain and democratic deliberation, and it created a ‘mismatch’ between means and ends of 
policy-making that sows the seeds of crisis for democratic government.  
6:2:2 Building ‘low intensity’ democracy: the political reforms of the CPA 
In any case, the political reforms of the CPA merit separate analysis to the extent that ‘democracy 
promotion’ was one of the principal political justifications put forward to legitimise both the invasion 
of Iraq and the subsequent reforms.124 Before proceeding, a clarification is required: given the 
complex political landscape of Iraq, this section will not attempt to analyse the concrete political 
manoeuvring of the CPA, including, for instance, its close alliance with the Shia population at the 
expense of Iraqi Sunnis, or the complicated position of the Kurds. Instead, the focus of this section 
will be CPA’s understanding of what constituted an ideal democratic model for Iraq, trying to abstract 
from the specificities of everyday politics. The main argument put forward here is that the political 
model promoted focused on formal elements of liberal democracy, like elections and 
constitutionalism, while neglecting or even directly undermining enhanced democratic participation 
and control, and robust protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. In turn, this is linked to the 
neoliberal economic model promoted by the CPA, which it will be argued is in tension with a model 
of meaningful democratic participation.  
6:2:2:1 A lower standard for self-government: the orientalist heritage of international 
institutions  
The ‘civilising mission’ has always been intrinsically linked to orientalist stereotypes about the 
‘nature’ of non-Western peoples. In Koskenniemi’s words: ‘[i]f “barbarian” societies were uncivilized 
this meant they indulged in vice, lacked restraint and moderation, that they were “fanatical”, 
untrustworthy, and uneducated. Even at best, barbarians were, in the favourite metaphor, like children 
who allowed their passions to rule their behaviour.’125 Similarly, Natarajan has observed that, 
specifically during the British Mandate, Iraq was understood through dominant cultural stereotypes 
linked to British perceptions of the Ottoman Empire,126 a pattern that that was reproduced by the US, 
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especially through its reliance on Iraqi exiles who had neither detailed knowledge of nor genuine links 
with the majority of Iraqi society.127  
A series of statements and political choices by major figures involved with the reconstruction of Iraq 
support the argument that a formal, limited and weak model of democracy was deemed the only 
functional model given the supposedly unfree, immature and deceitful character of Iraqis. For 
example, the head of the CPA, Paul Bremer, had stated that: ‘[m]ost Iraqis have no experience of free 
thought. They vaguely understand the concept of freedom, but still want us to tell them what to do.’128 
Correspondingly, the CPA habitually dismissed or manipulated Iraqi objections regarding economic 
reforms.129 Order 39, on investment law reform, provides a good example of this attitude. When the 
IGC objected to the reforms, the CPA, instead of dropping the plan, invited World Bank experts to 
press them further.130 Moreover, when public opinion was unfavourable to the decisions of the 
administration, CPA officials or friendly commentators habitually blamed Iraqis instead of 
questioning the reforms. For example, in a study funded by the National Security Research Division, 
the authors concluded that Iraqis were disappointed with the CPA’s economic management and that 
this was largely their own fault: ‘[t]his was in a large measure the product of wildly unrealistic Iraqi 
expectations’.131 
Crucially, this restrictive understanding of what democracy meant for Iraq was not simply the echo of 
former colonial structures and the ideologies they materialised. Rather, it also corresponded with 
current perceptions of peacekeeping sanctioned by the UN. The Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) warrants some attention here.132 Being highly critical 
of UN’s approach to peacekeeping thus far, the report suggested a more pro-active and partisan 
approach to peacekeeping missions and, therefore, articulated a more nuanced perception of the 
interaction between peacekeepers and local communities. For example, calling for mandates that 
enable peacekeepers to use force, the Brahimi Report stated that ‘the Secretariat must not apply best-
case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case 
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behaviour’.133 The assumption that it is the behaviour of the locals that impedes these missions – and 
not, for example, the failings of the UN – reveals a preconception of local populations as inherently 
belligerent or problematic. To recall Said: ‘Orientals are inveterate liars, they are “lethargic and 
suspicious”, and in everything oppose the clarity, directness, and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race.’134 
In an argument extensively discussed in Chapter 5 of the present thesis,135 Orford has argued 
convincingly that this trend towards associating the local or national level with conflict, strife and 
disorder, and the international realm with peace, harmony and stability, runs at the core of 
international law after the Cold War.136 Similarly, arguing again for the need of a pro-active approach 
to peacekeeping, the Brahimi Report states that in certain cases a lack of action ‘may amount to 
complicity with evil’.137 Here, conflicts in the periphery are understood as a battle between good – 
often represented by the ‘international community’ and by innocent victimhood – and evil, and not as 
complex political conflicts that can be resolved through political means. After all, this sharp 
distinction between evil tyrants and innocent, but weak, common people is constitutive of the 
orientalist understanding of the periphery.138 Finally, openly expressing its scepticism towards local 
political structures of deliberation, the Brahimi Report asserted that, even though consent is important, 
it asserted that ‘in the context of intra-State/ transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in 
many ways’.139 Moreover, the Report revealed a preference against local legal legislation, perceiving 
it as a tool at the hands of ‘powerful local political factions’ and ‘crime syndicates’.140 Crucially, the 
Brahimi Report was far from an isolated initiative. Rather, it had profound impact on the UN’s 
approach to ‘peacebuilding’. On the occasion of the 2000 Millennium Summit, the Security Council 
‘welcomed’ the Report,141 and later that year the Council committed to improving its peacekeeping 
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decision-making and requested the Secretariat to develop a military peacekeeping doctrine.142 Further, 
even without an explicit endorsement, the UNSC adopted the principal guidelines of the Report, 
putting in place multidimensional mandates and robust engagement rules in cases such as, notably, 
Timor-Leste, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leonne, and Burundi.143  
6:2:2:2 The paradigm of low intensity democracy in international law and practice 
The CPA’s political reforms can also be seen as symptomatic of a wider pattern of limited 
democratisation of peripheral states after the 1980s, as well as of the transformation of liberal 
democracy after the ideological triumph of neoliberalism. Introduced by Gills, Rocamora and 
Wilson,144 and having entered international legal scholarship through the work of Marks,145 the 
concept of ‘low intensity’ democracy attempts to capture this trend. More specifically, the term was 
coined to capture ‘the relative formality of this conception of democracy’146 when ‘the holding of 
periodic multiparty elections and the official separation of public powers are taken largely to 
suffice’.147 Gills, Rocamora and Wilson developed this concept to explain the seemingly paradoxical 
phenomenon of expansion of formal democracy in parallel with the maintenance, consolidation and 
deepening of unequal relations of political and economic power. For them, ‘low intensity’ democracy 
is a fundamentally tame, pro status quo regime that operates as the political corollary of rapid 
economic neoliberalisation. For example, writing about Latin America, Gills, Rocamora and Wilson 
argued that the principal goal in the aftermath of the collapse of the military dictatorships was the 
encouragement of stable, viable “democratic” regimes that could pre-empt more radical change by 
incorporating broad popular forces in electoral participation, yet guarantee continuity with the anti-
communist and anti-reformist traditions of their military predecessors.148  
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This takes us back to the point raised in Chapter 5 about the tense relationship between the core 
premises of neoliberalism, such as generalised competition as a mode of governing, and democracy.149 
The concept of ‘low intensity democracy’ bridges the gap between two seemingly conflicting 
realities. If one accepts, along with Brown, that there is a fundamental tension between democracy 
and neoliberalism, then it appears paradoxical that the global rise of neoliberalism after 1990 
coincided with the expansion of democracy. However, if one interprets the phenomenon through the 
lenses of ‘low intensity democracy’, this apparent paradox is explained away. Indeed, the spread of 
formal democracy became a method of legitimising and stabilising economic domination, while 
democracy was being deprived of its radical potential. Finally, it is essential to bear in mind that ‘low 
intensity democracy’ is a precarious, fragile form of democracy. While neoliberalisation increases 
social tensions, asymmetries in the distribution of resources and social polarisation,150 due to its 
formal and superficial character the political system is unable to channel and reconcile divergent 
social interests. As Marks points out, the accentuation of social crises leads to a (re)introduction of 
authoritarian measures, while ‘low intensity democracy’ appears unable to deliver even its limited 
promises.151 
The rapid demise of democracy in Iraq after the formal end of the occupation in 2004 highlights the 
relevance of the above observations. Therefore, it is essential to understand how the reforms of the 
CPA contributed to subsequent events. To begin with, the CPA was determined to dictate the pace 
and the modalities of Iraq’s transition to democracy leaving limited, if any, space for actual, 
grassroots mobilisation. In this context, the CPA intervened to stop provincial elections being worried 
about their outcome, as happened in Najaf, in central Iraq.152 Moreover, and even though the quick 
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establishment of a democratic regime appeared to be a shared goal between the UN and the CPA, the 
fact-finding mission led by a familiar figure, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser Brahimi, 
advised against holding elections by the end of June 2004.153 This view was then endorsed by UNSC 
Resolution 1546, which designated January 2005 as the new deadline.154 Τhis was the case despite 
multiple voices from both in and outside Iraq warning that postponing the elections would aggravate 
the then-unfolding crisis.  
Practicalities aside, these events indicate how the political reforms in Iraq ‘have sought to establish 
democracy in one sense of the term, while blocking it in a different sense’.155 Once again, it is 
essential to situate these reforms within the broader experience of ITA since the 1990s and to avoid 
reproducing the fallacy of ‘American hubris’ or ‘American unilateralism’ when analysing them. The 
Brahimi Report,156 the UN, the EU and other international legal actors all had embraced a formalistic 
approach to democracy in BiH, Kosovo or East Timor. Ranging from the open disregard of the rights 
of the Serbs or Roma residing in Kosovo, to an obsession with conducting elections regardless of 
whether they were fair and meaningful, and from the fact that crucial positions were fulfilled by 
unelectable, unaccountable international bureaucrats in Kosovo to the uncontested decision that 
social-owned enterprises both in BiH and Kosovo needed to be privatised,157 the UN had endorsed 
and applied the most inflexible models of ‘low intensity democracy’ in multiple contexts.  
Similarly, the relation of the CPA with civil liberties and human rights in Iraq was complicated and 
contradictory. While human rights rhetoric was again central to the invasion and the occupation, since 
the CPA consistently declared that it had liberated Iraq and the Iraqis,158 the facts on the ground were 
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more complicated. For example, Order 14 prohibited any media activity that advocated the return of 
the Ba’ath party to power,159 while Order 19 placed heavy restrictions upon the right to protest, which 
practically impaired its exercise.160 Similarly, the CPA devoted much of its energy in attempting to 
restrain Al-Jazeera’s broadcasting. Even accounts of the occupation sympathetic to the CPA 
acknowledge that senior Bush administration officials had unsuccessfully contacted Qatar, trying to 
alter the ‘tone and content’ of Al-Jazeera’s reporting,161 and Decision 48 of the IGC closed down the 
broadcaster for one month.162 Hence, in the absence of formal democratic institutions, the CPA 
adopted a restrictive approach to the very rights that enable public mobilisation and the political 
influence of those otherwise unable to access decision-making centres. The move to authoritarianism 
on the face of mounting tensions, as described by Marks above,163 only took a few months to 
materialise in Iraq.  
This limited understanding of democracy was also expressed through the Law of Administration for 
the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL hereafter). The document was drafted by a ten-man 
committee, with close co-operation with US and UN officials, and came into force on the 28th of June 
2004, when occupation ended officially. TAL was effectively Iraq’s Constitution until the adoption of 
the 2005 Constitution and embodied multiple aspects of ‘low intensity democracy’. To begin with, the 
process of drafting and enactment of the TAL has attracted widespread criticism for its lack of 
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democratic, or even representative, credentials.164 Moreover, its content was problematic in multiple 
ways. For example, Article 26 stipulated that: ‘The laws, regulations, orders and directives issued by 
the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in 
force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.’165 Given 
how dysfunctional the law-making process was in post-occupation Iraq, Article 26 meant in practice 
that the CPA’s reforms were to be maintained, at least until the first democratically elected 
government reversed them. Moreover, Article 31 appeared to stipulate vague, arbitrary or excessively 
exclusionary criteria as for who could be a nominee for the National Assembly, including having ‘a 
good reputation’ and a secondary school diploma, in a state in which the educational structures had 
been poor for decades.166 Thirdly, TAL established a non-secular state to the extent that Article 7 
designated Islam as the official religion of the State and elevated Sharia into a source of law.167 This 
was novel to the degree that Iraq had been for decades a secular dictatorship, and it revealed the 
readiness of the CPA to combine an aggressively neoliberal economy with social conservativism. 
Bremer’s statement that ‘Sharia can coexist side by side with Western secular law, as it does here in 
Qatar, as long as Sharia is limited to family issues’168 supports the argument that Iraq’s ‘low intensity 
democracy’ appeared compatible with non-liberal, non-secular, non-egalitarian forms of legislation, 
especially when it came to matters understood as private.  
Finally, it is argued that the promotion of neoliberalism was intrinsic to the establishment of this low 
intensity democratic model and vice versa. Gills, Rocamora and Wilson cryptically advance a similar 
point when arguing that ‘the new formal democratisation is the political corollary of economic 
liberalisation and internationalisation’.169 As the example of the central bank invoked earlier shows, 
the CPA intentionally diminished the decision-making processes subjected to political and, if 
democracy was to be established successfully, democratic control. Similarly, the entirety of the CPA’s 
decisions that outsourced, privatised or internationalised decision-making on economic issues meant 
automatically that the sphere subjected to political or democratic control was accordingly diminished. 
Arguably, subsequent Iraqi governments could reverse these reforms. This is an argument that 
deserves to be taken seriously. Hence, the continuation of similar policies cannot be wholly attributed 
to the reforms of the CPA, but must also be sought in domestic structures of power and social 
                                                          
164 See generally: A. Arato, Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq 
(Columbia University Press, 2009).  
165 Article 26.c Iraq: Law of 2004 of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (8 March 
2004) Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45263d612.html [last accessed 17 June 2015].  
166 Article 31 ibid.  
167 Article 7 ibid.  
168 Bremer (supra note 83), 73.  
169 Gills, Rocamora and Wilson (supra note 143), 4. 
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struggles. However, the reversal of such profound reforms can be impracticable, especially for a state 
politically torn and economically unstable. Moreover, this argument does not negate the fact that the 
economic reforms promoted by the CPA delimited the space for political deliberation and democratic 
decision-making to the extent that  
it is a conceptual error to suppose that the democratic reversibility [of independence] is, from the 
normative point of view, equivalent to democratic control of policy. Democracy is not maintained by the 
possibility of restoring it – the elected local government of London was abolished, being replaced with 
executive control, and was then restored. It is uncontroversial that, whatever else may be the case, in the 
interim, Londoners were governed less democratically.170 
Conclusion  
Engaging with liberal critiques of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Douzinas raised a crucial point: liberal 
scholars and politicians who were enraged with US/UK exceptionalism and their disregard for 
international law in the case of Iraq, remained silent or even applauded the bombing of Kosovo four 
years earlier.171 Discussing post-conflict reconstruction instead of jus ad bellum, this chapter raised a 
similar issue. Discussing UN Security Council Resolution 1483, I have argued that it is simplistic and 
inaccurate to describe the political and economic reforms of the CPA as simply illegal. Rather, a 
series of international legal norms and practices, including ITA, structural adjustments, the 
development of regional integration mechanisms, such as the EU and the Eurozone, and thousands of 
BITs, had set the framework for the said reforms by gradually introducing a specifically neoliberal 
form of international legality. It is, therefore, argued that Iraq needs to be situated within a broader 
process of legal transformation that was in motion at least since the early 1990s. Even though it is not 
the purpose of this thesis to map this transformation in its entirety, it is argued that international law 
assumed once again clear disciplinary functions legitimising, enabling and imposing the establishment 
of neoliberal models of statehood on a global level.  
The case of Iraq documents the continuing implication of international law in the diffusion of the 
CMP on a global level. More specifically, the attempted neoliberal transformation of Iraq needs to be 
situated within a broader spectrum of capitalist state-building through international law and 
international organisations that has its roots in the nineteenth-century ‘standard of civilisation’ and the 
                                                          
170 Forder (supra note 62), 164.  
171 ‘Kosovo was at least as blatant a violation of international law as was Iraq, but it did not attract the ire of 
liberal lawyers. In a book entitled Lawless World, not a single page is devoted to Kosovo or Afghanistan, except 
for the oblique comment that “the intervention in Kosovo provided the only real hint that the rules of 
international law might need to be revisited, but this would be in order to promote respect for human rights”.’ C. 
Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge-Cavendish, 
2007), 214. See also: A. Rasulov, ‘Writing about Empire: Remarks on the Logic of a Discourse’, (2010) 23 
Leiden Journal of International Law 449.  
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practice of extraterritoriality, while it was linked to international institutions through the experience of 
the Mandate System. This is not to say that international law has remained unchanged since. 
However, despite real and significant changes, international law retains its function as an enabling 
mechanism for the diffusion and reproduction of the capitalist relations of production. After 1990, this 
synergy witnessed a further twist, since international law became a primary method for the 
dissemination of the neoliberal model of capitalist accumulation around the globe. If a sentiment of 
crisis prevails among (certain) international lawyers, this is due to the hegemonic crisis of the model 




It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of 
foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it 
was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything 
before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the 
other way. 
Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities 
Critical histories of international law: reconstructing the past, challenging the present 
Since a complete, accurate and impartial reconstruction of the past is an exercise that is both elusive 
and pointless,1 historical narratives can only be partial, and therefore political. This positionality is 
more frequently admitted in the context of the critical legal canon,2 but it is in no sense a unique 
characteristic of critically-minded international lawyers. Embracing its positionality, this thesis aimed 
to reconstruct the history of international law in the context of its intersection with the history of 
capitalist expansion outside its original spatial matrix, i.e. Western Europe. More specifically, I 
argued that central international legal doctrines, such as the concept of civilisation, as well as the 
expansion of international law as such, were and still are intrinsically linked to the process of 
spreading, consolidating and legitimising the capitalist mode of production on a global scale.  
The starting point of my inquiry was the era around the mid-nineteenth century. During this time, 
international law arose as a distinct profession and academic discipline,3 while the revival of imperial 
                                                          
1 ‘Critical histories do not doubt that certain events “occurred”. Historical records, such as official public 
records, can rectify the reality of some events. Critical approaches, however, underline the fact that disputes 
about history, at least in their majority, do not concern the reality of facts but rather the selection of facts 
included in the historical account and the relationship between them. Knowing what happened does not tell you 
what it means.’ T. Skouteris, ‘Engaging History in International Law’ in J. M. Beneyto and D. Kennedy (eds), 
New Approaches to International Law: The European and American Experiences (Springer, 2012), 112-13. 
2 ‘That there will be losers and excluded parties are not an unfortunate by-product of the political world, by the 
very purpose of struggle: to fight for some condition that will change the distribution and well-being of 
particular individuals and communities always comes as theft and sacrifice to others. […] Let us say, so be it. 
As progressive international lawyers committed to a better world, let us leave the comforts of the condemnation 
of warfare and venture forward into some battle, whatever that might be.’ J. D. Haskell, ‘Hugo Grotius in the 
Contemporary Memory of International Law’ in J. M. Beneyto and D. Kennedy (eds), New Approaches to 
International Law: The European and American Experiences (Springer, 2012), 146.  
3 ‘[M]odern international law did not “begin” at Westphalia or Vienna, and the writings by Grotius, Vattel, G. F. 
von Martens or even Wheaton were animated by a professional sensibility that seems distinctly different from 
what began as part of the European liberal retrenchment at the meeting of the Institut de droit international and 
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adventures was now led by centralised, industrialised, capitalist states. Even though it is implausible 
and unnecessary to reduce imperialism entirely to capitalism and its 1873 crisis, the links between the 
two are too tight to miss. Colonies, semi-colonies and de facto dependent states provided great 
opportunities for capitalist valorisation at times when European capitalism seemed to be running out 
of steam. However, if capital is not a thing but a social relationship, then for this valorisation to take 
place it was essential for these colonies and semi-colonies to be transformed into capitalist societies. 
International law assumed a central role in this process of capitalist state-building. In this respect, 
Chapter 1 has shown how the standard of civilisation performed a crucial role of exclusion-inclusion 
for international law. By setting vague, yet specifiable, criteria as for which political communities 
were participants in the society of civilised states, international law excluded those communities not 
exhibiting the core characteristics of a modern, capitalist state. Christian moralism and racial thought 
were part of the repertoire – the latter, increasingly so.4 Still, what decided the inclusion or the 
exclusion of political communities in the final analysis was whether a given political community 
exhibited a centralised, bureaucratic state structure with factual and legal monopoly over violence, the 
legalisation of social relations both domestically and internationally, and the corresponding 
dichotomy between the two spheres. The guarantee of certain individual rights that were necessary 
both for the everyday function of trade and capitalist production and for the construction of free and 
equal individuals able of selling their labour power and finally, the abolition of pre-capitalist relations 
of production, such as slavery, that were hindering the development of a labour force under the 
discipline of the market were also essential for becoming a full subject of international law. 
Even though this process is observable in many contexts, semi-colonies provide a particularly good 
example due to the overt operation of international law and the relatively diminished role of colonial 
powers’ arbitrariness found in colonies proper. Comparing the extraterritorial experiences of Japan 
and the Ottoman Empire, Chapter 2 of the present thesis substantiates the connection between the 
standard of civilisation and capitalism. Indeed, the establishment and abolition of extraterritoriality 
needs to be understood as a process of temporary exception (from local jurisdiction), in order to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the pages of the Revue de droit international et de législation compare from 1869 onwards.’ M. Koskenniemi, 
The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (CUP, 2001), 4.  
4 ‘Spanish and Portuguese greed wore a religious cloak; bourgeois Holland and England represented a new 
society that took naked class division for granted, without holy water or feudal camouflage, and could regard a 
frank confrontation of higher and lower races as no less natural.’ V. G. Kiernan, Imperialism and its 
Contradiction (Routledge, 1995), 101; ‘During the nineteenth century, colonialists and their allies in the 
scientific community interpreted the Darwinian postulate that human nature is uniform and universal to support 
the racist theories that justified colonialism. They did so over the objections of prominent scientists, including 
Darwin himself, who disavowed the racist abuses of science by colonial apologists.’ S. N’Zatioula Grovogui, 
Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans (University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 37.  
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establish a new normality. This normality entailed the establishment of these institutions and legal 
apparatuses necessary for the establishment and reproduction of capitalist relations of production: 
property rights, commercialisation of land, abolition of legalised feudal relations, and also proficiency 
in the vocabulary of international and domestic law were essential preconditions for becoming a 
civilised state, and therefore abolishing extraterritoriality. This process also reveals the dialectic and 
contradictory character of international law’s function: the more successful this transformative 
process, the more intolerable the hierarchical assumptions of the discipline were becoming. In a fine 
dialectical move, this very success of nineteenth-century international law also signalled its death 
knell, creating a world of competing nationalisms seeking self-determination even outside the West.5 
This was a prolonged and painful death. The First World War shook some of the civilisational 
assumptions of international lawyers, although without challenging the core of the civilising mission. 
Political exigencies of the time forged innovation in the realm of colonial administration, and the 
Mandates System arose as such an innovation. Chapter 3 focuses on this continuation of imperialism 
by other means, focusing not only on its continuities, but also on the novelties of the situation. With 
regard to continuity, it is worth emphasising the persistence of the criteria for what constitutes a 
‘civilised’ state. With the moralistic language of the previous generation in decline, the independence 
of Iraq in 1932 provided an excellent opportunity for the explicit systematisation for the concept by an 
international institutional body: capitalist state-building through the establishment of a centralised 
government factually, legally and financially capable of managing capitalist expansion was at the core 
of the System. With regard to rupture, welfarism entered the equation of colonial management as a 
means of safeguarding the long-term sustainability of capitalism against its own self-destructing 
tendencies. Moreover, the entry of international institutions in the equation paved the way for their 
future central role in the organisation of global capitalism.  
Nevertheless, the bureaucrats of the League proved unable to stop both the Second World War and the 
cataclysmic events that followed it. With specific regard to the colonies, nineteenth-century 
international law collapsed under the burden of its own success. Chapter 4 suggests that 
decolonisation took the form of state-building precisely because of the relative success of the 
disciplinary techniques of international law. However, decolonisation and the subsequent effort for a 
New International Economic Order were moments of contestation and uncertainty, rather than 
instances of teleology. Experiments in African socialism were initiated, but they need to be viewed as 
attempts to negate the material effects of international law in the fabric of colonial societies. Despite 
                                                          
5 Marx himself was a thinker of productive contradictions: ‘The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of 
the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual 
private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the 
inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation.’ K. Marx, Capital: A Critique 
of Political Economy (Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), Volume I, 715.  
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its ambitions, nothing similar can be said about the NIEO. Centred around the concept of development 
and oscillating between sovereignty and community the project sought to bring about numerous 
reforms that would bridge the gap between the First and the Third World. In its steady denial to 
challenge domestic structures of power, statism and capitalist inter-dependence, NIEO needs to be 
read as the logical extension of colonial international law, rather than its radical negation.  
NIEO was not defeated from the left, but from the right. In retrospect, the 1970s are not remembered 
as the age of developmentalism, but rather as the defining moment for the emergence of a specific 
form of capitalism, the neoliberal paradigm. Going back to the 1930s, Chapter 5 argues that, in their 
attempt to save both liberalism and capitalism from themselves, neoliberals re-invented both. 
Generalised competition and, in our case, the internationalisation of economic decision-making were 
two core pillars of the neoliberal project. Still, the material conditions of the international realm did 
not allow for this project to unfold fully until the 1990s. Comprehensive changes in the fabric of 
international law occurred, including the numerical expansion and qualitative transformation of 
international territorial administration. Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor and Kosovo were 
elevated into laboratories of neoliberal experimentation, while core assumptions of the international 
law of occupation were implicitly or explicitly challenged.  
If this is the case, the neoliberal reform of Iraq after the 2003 invasion cannot be addressed 
satisfactorily by simply situating it on the lawful-unlawful binary. Discussing the comprehensive 
neoliberal reforms implemented by the Coalition Provisional Authority, my analysis turns to UN 
Security Council Resolution 1483, which partly set the international legal framework for the 
occupation. Indeed, a close reading of the Resolution reveals its close ties with previous experiments 
of neoliberal international territorial administration under the auspices of the UN. It is, therefore, 
argued that it is much more intellectually productive and politically useful to think the reforms of the 
CPA and international law of the time as mutually constituted, rather than as being in direct tension 
with each other. In this respect, Iraq needs to be conceptualised as a distinct phase of capitalist state-
building facilitated by international law. The peculiarity of this instance, along with other cases of 
international territorial administration examined in Chapter 5, is that this nexus of international legal 
and institutional practices promoted a specific model of capitalist accumulation: neoliberalism.  
The above narrative does not assume an uninterrupted, undifferentiated continuity in the relationship 
between international law, imperialism and capitalism. If anything, the period under examination was 
marked by one of the greatest ruptures this relationship ever experienced: the October Revolution and 
the establishment of a number of states professing not to be capitalist. Ιf my narrative gives a sense of 
uninterrupted continuity, it is in my effort to map the under-examined relationship between 
international law and capitalist relations of production. Since spatial expansion in search of increased 
valorisation opportunities is at the heart of the capitalist mode of production, a normative system that 
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guarantees the conditions necessary for this valorisation is needed. National statehood and national 
bourgeoisies played this role successfully – and still do – but only to an extent. When capitalist 
expansion was happening faster than the political and institutional transformation able to support it, as 
was the case during the second half of the nineteenth century, international law partly bridged the gap 
between the two. From extraterritoriality to the reformist efforts of the Mandate System, and from uti 
possidetis during decolonisation to international territorial administration, international law assumed 
crucial functions of social engineering towards the creation of centralised states that would act as 
guarantors of the capitalist mode of production. In this chain of events, the neoliberal reconstruction 
of Iraq serves as a focal point, both of continuity and of rupture. Its analysis establishes the 
contemporary relevance of the historical narrative: the role of international law and institutions in the 
process of capitalist transformation and engineering of the state remains of importance However, we 
are also witnessing a moment of rupture for two distinct, yet interrelated, reasons. First, the case of 
Iraq indicates a crucial narrowing of the hegemonic international legal agenda, to the extent that the 
bias of the discipline now lies with a specific model of neoliberal capitalism seeking to subject to the 
discipline of competitive markers ever-expanding aspects of human life. Secondly, it is partly due to 
this very narrow and specific outlook that this hegemonic (legal) conception is in profound crisis. 
Indeed, if international law is in a state of crisis, as will be argued below, this is because the 
hegemonic neoliberal model with which it is closely linked is in crisis.6  
Why Marxism? Why now? 
Writing during the period between the intervention in Kosovo and the invasion of Iraq, Hilary 
Charlesworth argued that the discipline of international law is prone to reinvent itself in times of 
crisis, and not in particularly fruitful ways: ‘[w]hile international lawyers are generally not obsessed 
with great men as individuals, we are preoccupied with great crises, rather than the politics of 
everyday life. In this way international law steers clear of analysis of longer-term trends and structural 
problems.’7 In the present conjuncture, thinking in terms of crisis through Marxian lenses is precisely 
the way to shed light on the structural social problems linked to the biases of international law. This 
thesis was finalised in the temporal intersection of at least two major crises. First, the economic crisis 
                                                          
6 It is telling that even figureheads of the International Monetary Fund, the beacon of neoliberal reform, now ask 
publicly whether the neoliberal model has been oversold: D. Ostry, P. Loungani and D. Furceri, ‘Neoliberalism 
Oversold?’ (June 2016) 53 IMF Finance and Development 38.  
7 H. Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ (2002) Modern Law Review 377, 389. ‘Wars, 
forced migrations, environmental catastrophes, pandemic outbreak, trade breakdowns, mass grave exhumations, 
technological breakthroughs: the international legal imaginary is littered with ruptive instances. […] Of such 
acute moments is a sense of disciplinary life strung together; of the episodic international law makes an 
everyday.’ F. Johns, R. Joyce and S. Pahuja ‘Introduction’ in F. Johns, R. Joyce and S. Pahuja, Events: The 
Force of International Law (Routledge, 2011), 1.  
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that erupted in the aftermath of the US subprime crisis of 2007-2008 turned out to be the worst 
capitalist financial crisis since the 1930s Great Depression.8 The unleashing of the destructive 
tendencies inherent in the logic of capitalist accumulation is a good entry point for discussing the 
synergies between international law and the structural violence of the capitalist mode of production. If 
my thesis invites its readers to rethink international law as ‘letters of blood and fire’,9 it does not do so 
by invoking specific colonial massacres or colonial encounters of particular brutality and terror, such 
as Congo under King Leopold.10 Even though these are undeniable, examining them as isolated 
incidents would distract our attention from instances of structural domination, dispossession and 
exploitation that do not necessarily match the grotesque events of the Mau Mau rebellion’s 
suppression in Kenya11 or of Syria’s bombing during the Mandate era.12 In this respect, discussing 
international law’s implication with capitalism’s structural violence in the immediate aftermath of a 
historic capitalist crisis enables us to reflect on the discipline’s role in perpetuating and, indeed, 
deepening these relations of domination in the present era. Secondly, this thesis was completed in a 
time of intense conflict in the Middle East, which is ‘felt’ in Europe predominantly as a refugee crisis. 
Given that these events are seen as somehow important for international law,13 there needs to be a 
                                                          
8 ‘The Great Recession has impacted more people worldwide than any crisis since the Great Depression. Rooted 
in bad government policy and worse corporate behavior in the United States, the American financial meltdown 
was globalized with devastating consequences, raising fundamental questions about global capitalism.’ B. Clark, 
‘Introduction: The Discontents Confront Crisis’ in B. Stark (ed.), International Law and its Discontents (CUP, 
2015), 2.  
9 Marx (supra note 5), 669.  
10 ‘Frequent uprisings were suppressed by Leopold’s Force Publique, whose methods of warfare included 
massacres of the populations of whole villages, the notorious severing of the hands of killed or sometimes 
simply recalcitrant natives, and the destruction of native cattle and crops. Though statistics of the period are 
unreliable, as many as 8-10 million Congolese died as a result of these measures.’ Koskenniemi (supra note 3), 
158.  
11 Amongst many: J. Newsinger, ‘Revolt and Repression in Kenya: The “Mau Mau” Rebellion, 1952-1960’ 
(1981) 45 Science and Society, 159; D. M. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya 
and the End of Empire (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005). 
12 ‘Those easy assumptions about civilizational hierarchies and Arab fanaticism could not, however, 
accommodate the eyewitness account of the bombardment of Damascus that The Times ran on 27 October. 
There, readers learned for the first time of the French army’s burning of villages, its display of the rebel corpses 
in Damascus, and the use of tanks in the city’s narrow streets. But it was the bombardment – the wanton 
destruction of an ancient and beautiful city and the subjection of its civilian inhabitants to terror and fire – that 
really turned civilizational assumptions on their heads.’ S. Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and 
the Crisis of Empire (OUP, 2015), 147-48.  
13 The call for papers of the annual conference of the European Society of International Law in 2016 read as 
follows: ‘[t]he territorial integrity of many States continues to be undermined. The rise of ISIS and the 
 211 
 
discussion as to how these two are related, and how international lawyers ought to respond to this 
crisis. However, this presupposes a common understanding of what is the precise content of the crisis. 
Some might view it as an apocalyptic humanitarian catastrophe, a challenge for international refugee 
law and human rights. Intellectual exercises for the prosecution of the Islamic State and/or the Assad 
regime rely on the presumption that impunity is the greatest of all crises. My thesis, and more 
specifically Chapters 5 and 6, contests these approaches, arguing that the collapse of Iraq, with its 
broader ramifications for the region, need to be understood as a part of a failed experiment of state 
transformation along neoliberal lines. Acknowledging the central role of international law in this 
process is a first step in reflecting sincerely on the role of international law in the constitution of 
asymmetrical relations of power, and their destructive social effects, which we currently witness. 
Therefore, the choice of the conceptual framework of this thesis reflects a determination to think 
about social structures of domination linked to the asymmetrical relations people develop when 
reproducing the material conditions of their very existence. For this reason, Marxism, as a prism for 
analysis of international law, might not provide an exhaustive account of its social functions, but 
enables us to re-interpret decisively the unfolding crises as structural, rather than incidental or 
irrational and inexplicable, outbursts of violence and cruelty. Moreover, the conceptualisation of 
international law as an apparatus of capitalist state-building enables us to escape a number of false 
dichotomies that run at the core of the discipline’s collective imagination. One such problematic 
dichotomy is that between the state and the individual; another, that between state intervention and the 
‘free market’; and a third, between the nation-state and international law and institutions. A Marxian 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
continued proliferation of other violent extremist groups provide serious challenges to the world order we have 
striven to build. Crises around the world range from more traditional threats to territorial integrity and security, 
through the use of modern technology or forms of warfare to more fundamental challenges to the planet through 
climate change and environmental threats. [...] Many of these developments are interlinked. For example, the 
unprecedented flow of migrants and refugees into Europe is linked to security, the economy, and climate 
change.’ European Society of International Law, 12th Annual Conference, ‘How International Law Works in 
Times of Crisis’ available at: http://www.rgsl.edu.lv/uploads/files/ RGSL_ESIL_Call_for_Papers_2016.pdf [last 
accessed 23 June 2016]. Similarly, the call for papers of the Canadian Council for International Law in 2016 
was centred around the idea of overlapping crises: ‘[t]he international community faces crises on numerous 
fronts across all dimensions: social, political, economic, and environmental. In fact, it can be applied to almost 
any international law issue. As such, international law has been called on to tackle pressing subjects like climate 
change, genocide, fluctuating oil prices, unstable economies, human migration, disease outbreak, poverty, 
consumerism/consumption, war, species extinctions, corporate instability, and lack of governance.’ Canadian 
Council for International Law, 45th Annual Conference 'The Promise of International Law: Solutions for the 
World’s Crises', available at: http://www.ccil-ccdi.ca/#!CCIL-45th-Annual-Conference-The-Promise-of-
International-Law-Solutions-for-the-World’s-Crises-Nov-35-2016-Global-Affairs-Canada-
Ottawa/c1bcl/570672ba0cf2c53596abe26 [last accessed 23 June 2016].  
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theory that simultaneously appreciates the role of law – domestic or international – in the constitution 
of capitalist relations of production enables us to grasp the co-constitutive nature of these problematic 
binaries.  
On the impossibility of redemption and the necessity of tactics 
If the above critique is correct, where does that leave those international lawyers who subscribe to it 
in relation to our discipline? As in the case of most critical legal projects, the temptation of a final, 
and unexpected, redemption is considerable,14 and (even more) so is the temptation of a clear-cut 
rejection.15 Still, as Robert Knox has pointed out, the dilemma ‘redemption or nihilism’ is a false 
one.16 A third, much more politically viable and intellectually consistent, option is one of tactical 
engagement with international law:  
this is a false dilemma, since actualising strategic concerns does not necessarily mean jettisoning 
practical interventions in everyday legal struggles, but rather framing these struggles in terms of the 
overall strategic goal. It was argued that a position of “principled opportunism” offered the best scope for 
intervening in conjuctural legal debates without losing sight of the strategic goal.17  
In this context, international law can be mobilised in order to assist the struggles of the exploited and 
the oppressed. This is the case for at least two reasons. First, the historic defeat of organised labour 
and the political left in the last quarter of the twentieth century has left this bloc at a significantly 
disadvantaged position. In this context, institutions and techniques initially introduced to counter 
labour radicalism and to prevent the possibility of revolutionary change, such as Western European 
welfarism, are now dismantled to the detriment of the exploited and the oppressed. In this context, 
tactical alliances with forces such as the International Labour Organization or with these factions of 
international bureaucracies that support socio-economic rights can be fruitful or even tactically 
inevitable. After all, Marx was a staunch supporter of struggles for the amelioration of the living 
conditions of the working class, notably struggles over the length of the working day:  
                                                          
14 See, for example, Koskenniemi’s redemptive call for a ‘culture of formalism’: Koskenniemi (supra note 3), 
494-509. ‘I continue to hope, together with the many scholars who are working to reconstruct an international 
law precisely because of their awareness of the many ways in which it has operated to exclude and subordinate 
people on account of their gender, race and poverty, that international law can be transformed into a means by 
which the marginalized may be empowered. In short, that law can play its ideal role in limiting and resisting 
power.’ A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP, 2005), 318.  
15 ‘The chaotic and bloody world around us is the rule of law.’ C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist 
Theory of International Law (Haymarket Books, 2006), 319.  
16 ‘The problem is that this counterposition of liberal legalism as against legal nihilism ultimately reproduces the 
rigid theory/practice divide outlined above, and essentially insists that strategy and tactics exist to the rigid 
exclusion of one and other.’ R. Knox, ‘Strategy and Tactics’ (2010) 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 
193, 214.  
17 Ibid., 227-28 (emphasis in original).  
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For “protection” against “the serpent of their agonies”, the labourers must put their heads together, and 
as a class, compel the passing of a law, and all-powerful social barrier that shall prevent the very 
workers from selling, by voluntary contract with capital, themselves and their families into slavery and 
death. In place of the pompous catalogue of the “inalienable rights of man” comes the modest Magna 
Carta of a legally limited working-day, which shall make clear “when the time which the worker sells 
is ended, and when his own begins.18  
Secondly, this tactical engagement acknowledges that even international law is the product of political 
contestation. If indeed we acknowledge the centrality of the class struggle within the universe of 
Marxian philosophy of history, then the effects of these struggles on the fabric of law need to be taken 
seriously into account. There is little doubt that, without social struggles, the bulk of social legislation 
and significant aspects of civil liberties in many states would never have come to be: 
[T]he capitalist legal system also takes the dominated classes into account in regulating the exercise of 
power. Faced with working-class struggle on the political plane, law organizes the structure of the 
compromise equilibrium permanently imposed on the dominant classes by the dominated. It also 
regulates the forms in which physical repression is exercised: indeed, we need to stress the fact that this 
juridical system, these “formal” and “abstract” liberties are also conquests of the popular masses.19  
However, this does not mean that progressive social actors encounter international law as an empty 
vessel that can be filled with any content. After all, the main point of this thesis was to document the 
pro-capitalist bias of international law. International law is emphatically not a neutral space in which 
classes with competing interests meet to negotiate or that it can be claimed by any class interest on an 
equal footing. Much more so, in the arena of international law, social struggles are more often than 
not mediated by (capitalist) states that filter and transform progressive demands through their 
bureaucratic and legalistic lenses. Even in cases when states ambivalent towards capitalism mobilised 
in order to bring about international legal change, such as the insertion of the concept of jus cogens in 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the results were at best underwhelming.20 In this 
sense, our tactical engagement with international law cannot descend into a ‘suspension of disbelief in 
law’s dark potential’.21 After all, the ILO was established as a response to the October Revolution and 
constituted a successful paternalist alternative to workers’ radical emancipation, and social rights have 
often served as a substitute for radical wealth redistribution. Therefore, it is essential that our tactical 
reliance on, and defence of, international law does not happen in ways that in fact undermine the 
potential for social emancipation that goes beyond tactical gains. If the denouncement of the 
unilateralism of the US under Bush’s administration entails uncritical praise of the UN and its 
(comprehensively imperialist) Security Council or support for the increased justicialisation of 
                                                          
18 Marx (supra note 5), 285-286.  
19 N. Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (Verso, 2000), 92.  
20 See: U. Özsu, ‘An Anti-Imperialist Universalism? Jus Cogens and the Politics of International Law’ in M. 
Koskenniemi, W. Rech and M. Jiménez Fonseca (eds), International Law and Empire: Historical Comparisons 
(OUP, 2016) (forthcoming).  
21 D. Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy 
(Princeton University Press, 2016), 246. 
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international relations, then our resistance to imperialism is both superficial and fragile.22 Crucially, 
this is a critique that precludes any confrontation with the structural imperialism and violence of the 
international legal system. If multilateralism is the antidote to imperialism, then the horrors of the 
UN’s actions in Haiti,23 or the neoliberal engineering of Kosovo or East Timor by the UN,24 are 
excluded from the realm of critique or, even worse, indirectly condoned and legitimised. We need to 
resist the temptation of fighting battles in ways that make it more difficult to win the war.  
In a nutshell, progressive and radical lawyers’ engagement with international law should be centred 
around the understanding that, in the final analysis, our commitment does not lie with our discipline, 
but with social emancipation. Occasionally, these two are compatible and international law could be a 
useful tool in moving towards emancipation, but this is not necessarily the case. If my analysis is 
correct, it is not only central international legal concepts, but even the expansion of international law 
as such after the 1990s that consolidated capitalist expansion and transformation. In such a context, 
our engagement with our discipline should always be informed by the conviction that the path to an 









                                                          
22 Writing in a similar context, Rasulov attacked those critiques of the 2003 invasion that ended up 
‘whitewashing’ international legality: ‘Between its uncritical acceptance of the old-line Westphalian mythology 
and its unreflective support for supranational juridification as the most effective weapon against neo-
imperialism, not only does it manage to propagate a completely fabricated narrative of historical progress – the 
very stuff of conservative utopia – but it also distracts and redirects its audience’s political attention towards 
causes and projects whose pursuit, in the final analysis, is at best completely pointless, at worst, downright 
counterproductive.’ A. Rasulov, ‘Writing about Empire: Remarks on the Logic of a Discourse’ (2010) 23 
Leiden Journal of International Law 449, 453.  
23 See: C. Miéville, ‘Multilateralism as Terror: International Law, Haiti and Imperialism’ (2008) 19 Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law 63; R. Knox, ‘Valuing Race? Stretched Marxism and the Logic of Imperialism’ 
(2016) 4 London Review of International Law 81.  
24 See Section 5:3:2 ‘International territorial administration and the normalisation of neoliberal state-building: 
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